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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the inter-related attempts to secure the legitimation of risk and 
democracy with regard to Bt cotton, a genetically modified crop, in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh in India.  The research included nine months of ethnographic fieldwork, extensive 
library and newspaper research, as well as university attendance in India, undertaken 
between June, 2010 and March, 2011.  This comparative study (involving organic, NPM 
and Bt cotton cultivation) was conducted in three villages in Telangana, a region which was 
granted secession from Andhra Pradesh in July, 2013, and in Hyderabad, the state capital.  
Andhra Pradesh is renowned for its agrarian crisis and farmer suicides, as well as for the 
conflict which Bt cotton represents.  This study adopts the categories of legitimation 
developed by Van Leeuwen  (2007; 2008) in order to explore the theory of risk society 
(Beck, 1992; 1994; 1999; 2009), and the Habermasian (1996: 356-366) core-periphery 
model as means of theoretically analysing democratic legitimacy.  
 
The legitimation of risk and democracy in relation to Bt cotton refers to normative views 
on the way in which power should be exercised with regard to risk differentiation, 
construction and definition.  The analysis finds that the more legitimate the exercise of 
power, the lower the exposure to risk as a concern for the collective.  This also has 
consequences for the way in which resources are distributed, knowledge constructed, and 
democratic praxis institutionalised as a concern for social and epistemic justice.  The thesis 
argues that the struggle to legitimate risk and democracy has implications not only for the 
constitution of the new state of Telangana and the region’s development, but also for the 
emergence of global society and the future development of humanity as a whole.   
 xiii
Glossary 
 
 
Adivasi:  India’s indigenous population, also referred to as ‘tribals’ 
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Chapter One 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Bt Cotton and the 
 Struggle for Legitimation in Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
1.1 Thesis Overview and Contribution 
For centuries, India has intrigued Western authors who have sought to encapsulate 
something of the essence of this vast and ancient society.  Hegel ([1837] 1991: 139)  
described India as a dreamy ‘land of imagination’ in which all that was ‘rigid and 
contradictory [was] dissolved’ (ibid.: 140).  Later, Weber ([1916], 1958: 185) 
discussed the ‘world-fleeing mysticism’ of the Indian spiritual tradition.  Such early 
portrayals conjured images of a mystical, timeless setting, comprised of passive 
subjects who were far too preoccupied with philosophical concerns to attend to the 
considerable risks of their material reality.    
 
This thesis takes a different view.  It argues that India has been, and remains, the 
site of highly localised and contingent power struggles, where social actors seek to 
negotiate risk and secure a just form of governance in tense battles to safeguard 
their ontological survival.  It is argued that this social struggle has, more recently, 
been channeled through a democratic praxis which is, along with Indian society 
itself, being transformed as a result of ongoing attempts to secure the legitimation 
of risk and democracy. 
 
 2 
The dynamic interaction between risk and democracy is here explored through a bi-
level study of Bt cotton, a genetically modified crop, in Andhra Pradesh, India.  
Fieldwork for this study was undertaken between June, 2010 and March, 2011, a 
time chosen to coincide with a cotton season.  The thesis concentrates specifically 
on those aspects of Indian society which pertain to risk, both as a material and 
political concern, and adopts discourse analysis in two distinct ways in order to 
analyse data at both a micro (village) and meso (institutional) level.  
 
The location of India has been selected given its political and sociological centrality 
as the world’s largest democracy, as well as its intriguing positioning in the ‘world 
at risk’ described by the German sociologist, Ulrich Beck (2009).  Paul Brass 
(1990: xi) argues that India is one of the ‘most culturally diverse and socially 
fragmented’ societies in the world.  Robinson (1988: 254), too, suggests that Indian 
society is ‘possibly the world’s most complex.’ In recognition of this, the in-depth 
analysis of Bt cotton undertaken within this study does not claim to be 
representative of the views on Bt technology in India as a whole.  Likewise, it does 
not claim to provide a comprehensive agrarian analysis, but relates only to those 
aspects of agrarian life which were found to have a direct relevance to Bt cotton 
cultivation.   
 
The theoretical concept of ‘risk society’ developed by the German sociologist, 
Ulrich Beck (1992; 1994; 1999; 2009), is the central theoretical framework of the 
thesis.  Beck (1992: 22-23) claims that contemporary risks are distinguished by 
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their potential for irreversible harm on a global scale.  Given the intangibility and 
the uncertainty or ‘non-knowing’ (Beck, 2009: 115) with which these risks are 
associated, Beck (1992: 23) argues that they ‘exist only in relation to (scientific or 
anti-scientific) knowledge about them.’ Hence, they are ‘particularly open to social 
definition and construction’ (ibid.) [italics in the original].    
 
Risk theorists assert that the genetic modification of crops is highly symbolic of 
global risk society (Strydom, 2002: 33; Giddens, 2003: 33; Renn, 2008: 180; Beck, 
2009: 74-76).  Renn (2008: 180) claims that genetically modified (GM) crops fall 
within the category of risk classified as ‘ambiguous’ given that they are linked to 
‘unresolved uncertainty’ (ibid.: 179).  Because of this, they are subject to bans in 
many states world-wide,1 and remain highly controversial due to the fears for 
human and environmental risk with which they are associated.2   
 
Cotton is one of India’s most ancient and symbolic crops (Santhanam and 
Sundaram, 1997; Shiva et al., 1999: 602).  Archaeological evidence uncovered 
cotton fabrics from the Mohenjo Daro excavations in modern day Pakistan dated c. 
                                                 
1
 States which ban GM crops include Japan, Australia, Austria, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria and 
Luxembourg.  Available at http://www.examiner.com/article/what-countries-have-banned-gmo-crops 
Accessed on 24/9/2013.  Only four African countries – Burkino Faso, Egypt, Sudan and South Africa - 
commercially cultivate GM crops, although GM food aid is now accepted by many, provided it is milled.  
Cameroon, Nigeria, Kenya, Malawi and Uganda are currently conducting field trials. Available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201309040277.html Accessed on 24/9/2013. 
2
 In 1996, a study conducted by Dr Arpad Pusztai at the Rowett Institute in Scotland found that rats fed 
with GM potatoes developed immune system dysfunction and organ abnormalities (Smith, 2004: 15-31).  
There have also been reports of allergies experienced by cultivators, food allergies related to GM soy, 
sheep deaths, and the potential for other, as yet, undetected, unintentional changes within the wider 
ecological system (Smith, 2007).  These include concerns for pollen drift, gene drift, ‘superweeds’, and Bt 
resistance (Buttel, 2005: 313).  Full details of the main concerns related to GM crops are available in Smith 
(2007) and in Shiva et al. (2011). Available at   
http://www.navdanya.org/attachments/Latest_Publications7.pdf Accessed on 16/10/2013.   
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2,500 B.C. (Cohen, 2010: 32).  The cotton crop was also pivotal in the country’s 
fight for independence from British colonialism. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi 
(1869-1948), popularly known as Mahatma (Sanskrit: ‘high-souled’), became 
globally renowned for his role in the Indian struggle for freedom from British rule.  
Gandhi advocated non-violent resistance and swadeshi or self-sufficiency as a 
means of challenging the illegitimate use of power associated with colonialism.  
The idea of khadi or homespun cotton was central to this, and the charkha or 
spinning wheel became the emblem of the independence movement.   
 
Bt cotton was officially approved for cultivation in India in 2002.  The crop is 
genetically modified to incorporate one or more Cry genes from the soil bacterium, 
Bacillus thuringiensis (Stone, 2011: 387).  This is purported to render it resistant to 
Lepidopteran bollworms, of which the most destructive is the American bollworm 
(Helicoverpa armigera).3  Prior to its official approval, the crop had been illegally 
adopted by cultivators as early as 1999 (Herring, 2012: 48).4  The UK government 
also offered significant aid funding to Andhra Pradesh in 2001 in order to promote 
the research and development of biotechnology.5  This was at a time when Bt crops 
were banned in the UK due to safety concerns (Harding and Vidal, 2001).   
 
                                                 
3
 Multiple gene hybrids which extend the resistance to further pests were introduced in 2006. 
4
 Mahyco,  a well established Indian seed company, was granted permission to import one hundred grams 
of Bt cotton seed as part of an agreement with Monsanto as early as 1995 (Scoones, 2005: 252).  The 
Review Committee on Genetic Modification (RCGM) later approved forty field trials in nine states (ibid.).  
It would appear that the wider diffusion of the technology arose as a result of a failure to adequately 
regulate these early field trials (ibid.: 253).   
5
 Biotechnology is a broad area which incorporates the development of edible vaccines for cholera, rabies 
and hepatitis B, as well as gene therapies for various genetic disorders (Sharma, 2004: 741).  It is 
recognised, however, that the development of GM crops is by far the most controversial area of research in 
this diverse field (ibid.). 
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By 2009, eighty-seven per cent of the Indian cotton crop was sown to Bt varieties 
(Choudhary and Gaur, 2010: 1).  The adoption rate of Bt cotton in the country has 
made it the fastest-adopted agricultural technology in history (Dinham, 2001, as 
cited in Stone, 2007: 68).  It has also made Indian farmers the fastest adopters of Bt 
cotton in the world (Monsanto, 2006, as cited in ibid.).   
 
The accelerated diffusion of a technology associated with ambiguous risk highlights 
Giddens’ (2003) portrayal of globalised society as a ‘runaway world’. The 
financing of the technology’s research and development in Andhra Pradesh with 
UK aid funding also illustrates the way in which risk society is being diffused as 
part of the contemporary development project.  In this regard, this thesis argues that 
Bt technology is symbolic of a far wider debate concerning the way in which 
science and technology are being emphasised as the basis for the future 
development of India generally (Sharma, 2004), and of Andhra Pradesh in 
particular (Frankel, 2005: 616; Rajan, 2006: 78).   
 
The adoption rate of the technology is highlighted by proponents as evidence of its 
success in alleviating rural poverty.  However, its diffusion has also coincided with 
significant protests, amid claims of crop failure, and links to animal deaths, as well 
as to farmer suicides.  These demonstrations have been led by a strong NGO sector 
which, as Stone (2011: 387) observes, has ‘contested the new technological regime 
at every step.’   
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The current study explores the paradox of a technology whose widespread adoption 
coincides with significant opposition.  This is undertaken using the concept of 
legitimation as a means of examining the conflict through the discourse of 
cultivators and risk definers themselves.  According to Habermas (1973: 3, as cited 
in Pile, 1990: 15), legitimation refers to the ‘practices of people and how they 
understand the situation of which they are a part.’ Bernstein (2004: 18, as cited in 
Clark, 2007: 197) argues that legitimacy is ‘highly contextual, based on historical 
understandings…and the shared norms of the particular community granting 
authority.’   
 
This thesis asserts that the process of legitimation is mediated through power 
relations.  These significantly influence the way in which social practices (here, the 
cultivation of Bt cotton), and political institutions (related to democratic praxis), are 
accepted.  This mediation of the legitimation process through power relations is 
explored using Van Leeuwen’s (2007; 2008) ‘categories of legitimation’ which 
examine legitimation through a) authorization; b) moral evaluation; c) 
rationalization; and d) mythopoesis.6  The use of these categories as an analytical 
framework at both the micro and meso levels is in line with Van Leeuwen’s (2008: 
106) view that legitimation refers to both ‘practices and institutions.’   
 
                                                 
6
 It should be noted that Van Leeuwen uses the American spelling of ‘authorization’ and ‘rationalization’, 
while the current thesis adopts British spelling – ie., authorisation and rationalisation, as a standard format.  
Where direct references are made to Van Leeuwen’s text, however, the American spelling is adopted.   
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Foucault (as cited in Fournet-Betancourt et al., 1987: 129) claimed: ‘I don’t believe 
there can be a society without relations of power.’  This thesis supports this view; 
however, it also argues that power can be exercised with varying degrees of 
legitimacy. The American critical theorist, Nancy Fraser (1989: 18), notes that 
Foucault attempted to bracket the problematic of legitimacy in his work, yet 
questions remain as to how successfully this was achieved.   
 
Certainly, Foucault’s portrayal of the exercise of power in a society controlled by 
means of panoptical governmentality implicitly suggests a normative judgement 
that such an exercise of power is illegitimate and undesirable, even as it is asserted 
as unavoidable.  It is also noted that Foucault’s purported non-legitimationist stance 
was belied in his assertion of the need for ethics ‘as a practice of the self’ (1984, as 
cited in Fournet-Betancourt et al., 1987: 129) which would allow ‘games of power 
to be played with a minimum of domination’ (ibid.).  
 
 
The thesis adopts the core-periphery model developed by Habermas (1996: 356) as 
a means of ‘demarcat[ing]…legitimacy from illegitimacy’ (Habermas, [1973], 
1976: 201) as a political concern.  This thesis takes the view, along with Habermas, 
that without this capacity to differentiate the exercise of legitimate as opposed to 
illegitimate power, there is no basis for social struggle.  Thus, as Habermas (1994: 
96) argues, without a normative standard of legitimation, the questions would 
become: ‘why fight at all?...Why ought domination to be resisted?’  
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This thesis argues that a legitimate exercise of power can be assessed by the extent 
to which it promotes social and epistemic justice in the negotiation of risk.  This 
relates to the idea of inclusion incorporated in the theorisation of a ‘circulation of 
power’ posited by Habermas (1996: 356) as a means of illustrating legitimate 
democratic praxis.  Here, the concept of development is critiqued on the grounds of 
its potential to ideologically legitimate a distribution of resources which contributes 
to an ongoing differentiation of risk, and to support the institutionalisation of 
illegitimate power as part of democratic praxis.   
 
The central finding of the thesis is that risk is inherent in power relations.  It argues 
that the potential for the legitimation of an illegitimate exercise of power which 
would seek to secure an unjust differentiation of exposure to risk, and an unjust 
marginalisation of discourses which seek to assert such risk through democratic 
praxis, is the real concern for a ‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas, [1973], 1976) in 
risk society.  The thesis concludes that Bt cotton is a highly problematic response to 
the agrarian crisis in Telangana, not least due to the differentiated risk exposure 
associated with the context, as well as the ambiguity of the technology itself.  The 
research highlights that a response to risk which emphasises the welfare of the 
collective, and a legitimate exercise of power which seeks to secure social and 
epistemic justice at both micro and meso levels, represents the most effective 
response to ontological risk.  It finds that the greater the degree of illegitimacy 
associated with the exercise of power, the more profound is the extent of the risk to 
which the collective of humanity is exposed. 
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The particular contribution of this thesis is as follows: 
 
a) The study explores the legitimation of the potential risk of Bt cotton from the 
perspective of cultivators themselves.  This is a need which is highlighted by Ho 
et al. (2009) who claim, ‘we know little about farmers’ experiences and 
perceptions of GM crops’ potential risks and benefits’; 
 
b) The fieldwork was conducted over a period of nine months from March, 2010 to 
June, 2011.  The requirement for such a prolonged study is highlighted by 
Pearson (2006: 309) who asserts the need for an ‘extended period of time ‘in the 
field’’ using a ‘reflexive ethnographic approach’; 
 
c) The analysis seeks to provide an empirical basis for Beck’s theorisation of risk 
society.  This relates to critiques of Beck’s work which refer to the ‘striking 
absence of empirical research’ to support his claims (Campbell and Currie, 
2006: 162), as well as the lack of a ‘broader discussion of risk-construction’ 
(Lacy, 2002: 59) in his work.    
 
d) The research entails an exploration of the wider context of agrarian risk in 
which Bt cotton adoption is embedded. Kuruganti (2009: 29) argues that ‘[a] 
matter of great concern is the lack of analysis of the current agrarian crisis in 
India (and using that understanding to predict the implications from risky 
technologies)’. 
 10 
e) The analysis is comparative and explores the potential of Bt cotton for the 
alleviation of the risks of the wider agrarian crisis when compared with that of 
alternative cultivation methods.  The need for this is asserted by Ramanjaneyulu 
(2006: 563) who argues that, ‘before making…categorical statements on [Bt] 
technology’, more effort should be made ‘to study…other options available’ 
(ibid.)  
 
f) The study involves both a micro (village) and a meso (institutional) level.  This 
recognises that these levels are mutually constitutive, and that an analysis of the 
wider political context is central to locating the discourse of villagers within the 
wider ideological struggle to constitute society.  This seeks to present a 
‘political economy [of risk]’, the need for which is highlighted by Lacy (2002: 
59);   
 
g) Finally, it should be noted that the researcher worked in logistics for the 
multinational, Syngenta, for seven years.  Along with Monsanto, Syngenta is 
one of the key organisations involved in the research and development of Bt 
technology worldwide.  The combination of this employment history with a 
more recent study of Sociology, and volunteer work with the Irish Green Party, 
supports the constructionist approach adopted in this thesis. This recognises that 
it is through the discursive conflict between antagonistic perspectives that 
societies are transformed (Strydom, 2002: 151).    
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The researcher’s own position, as a result of her eclectic background and five years 
of study on the Sociology of GM crops, is that the production and application of 
knowledge is a function of the ethos of a given society.  This ethos also informs 
judgments on legitimacy. GM technology may well hold potential benefits for 
farmers, particularly in areas such as drought and flood resistance. However, this 
potential would need to be explored through responsible research within local 
contexts with an emphasis on equity and the long-term welfare of the collective.  It 
would also require that the technology is adopted appropriately in conjunction with, 
and informed by, the experiential knowledge of cultivators, and supported by 
informed, environmentally-aware extension workers. 
 
It is evident from the current study, however, that technological innovation diffused 
as part of neo-liberal development occurs within highly unequal contexts.  Here, the 
application of knowledge often serves the interests of power-holders, and reinforces 
a differentiated exposure to risk.  Protests against technological innovations are, 
therefore, essentially challenges to the power structures engaged in knowledge 
construction, and the values with which such knowledge construction is associated.  
This is particularly pertinent in the case of Bt crops, given that the plant is known to 
produce a toxin which proponents claim is hazardous to target organisms only. The 
legitimation of the technology is, therefore, highly dependant upon the degree of 
trust in scientific knowledge which exists within a given society.  Bt technology 
also leads to questions as to the extent to which economic gains associated with, for 
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instance, the cost saving on pesticides, should supersede concerns for human and 
animal health.   
 
It is clear, therefore, that the application of GM technology within a given society is 
strongly informed by the values which underpin that society.  In the case of the 
current study, it is argued that a clash of values lies at the root of the power struggle 
which Bt cotton represents.  The resulting ideological conflict means that the 
potential of GM technology generally will remain highly contingent upon 
legitimation struggles at local, national and global levels. These struggles will 
themselves be strongly informed by exogenous challenges, such as those resulting 
from climate change. 
 
1.2 Bt Cotton and Agrarian Risk in Telangana and Warangal 
The concept of ‘risk society’ describes the de-territorialised risk which Beck argues 
characterises contemporary global society.  According to Beck (1992: 2; 1995: 1; 
2009: 7), modern risks are manufactured as a result of scientific and technological 
innovation, and distributed as the basis for development.  Campbell and Currie 
(2006: 151) note the ambiguity of Beck’s usage of the term ‘risk’. This is variously 
defined as a ‘probabilit[y] of physical harm due to…technological…processes’ 
(Beck, 1992: 4) and a ‘systematic way of dealing with hazards’ (ibid.: 21).  Adams 
(1995: 180), too, highlights that Beck’s ‘definition of risk as a way of dealing with 
what is commonly called risk [represents] a confusing tautology.’   
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This thesis adopts a position of ‘weak naturalism’ (Strydom, 2011: 10) which 
argues that, while social knowledge is constructed, there is a natural reality which 
exists beyond the attempts of humanity to grasp it.  In this sense, it is argued that 
risk represents an epistemic gap pertaining to future contingency which must be 
negotiated ideologically in the present.  The actualisation of risk as a material 
reality is contingent and is, therefore, subject to probability assessments.   
 
This view of risk coincides most closely with the definition posited by Giddens 
(2003: 22) that ‘[r]isk refers to hazards that are actively assessed in relation to 
future possibilities.’ The current study also asserts, however, that the de-
territorialised risk associated with the epistemic gap related to Bt technology is 
subject to legitimation in context.  Thus, it is argued that while the legitimation of 
risk is ideologically informed by a wider global power struggle, the influence of 
such wider ideologies is mediated through the power structures in local contexts.  
 
Beck (1992: 19) argues that the ‘social production of wealth is systematically 
accompanied by the social production of risks’ (ibid.) [italics in the original]. In 
Andhra Pradesh, the adoption of Bt cotton is embedded within a wider shift to neo-
liberal policies, most strongly associated with the Vision 2020 initiative which was 
launched by the government in 1999.  This pledged to alleviate poverty by the year 
2020 (Gupta, 2002; Frankel, 2005: 616).  The idea was that this would be achieved 
through a focus on technological innovation, economic growth, and support for 
non-farm sources of employment (Bandyopadhyay, 2001: 900; Frankel, 2005: 616).   
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The legitimation of the ambiguous risk associated with Bt technology was secured 
through its potential to deliver economic benefits as a means of alleviating the risk 
of poverty, particularly for vulnerable small and marginal cultivators (Choudhary 
and Gaur, 2010: 20). 
 
The research upon which this study is based was undertaken both in Hyderabad, the 
state capital, and the Telangana region of the state.  As a location for research into 
risk, Telangana is noted as being particularly vulnerable, not least due to its 
exposure to an acute agrarian crisis, the risks of which are evident from the high 
number of farmer suicides with which the region is associated (Galab et al., 2009: 
166-167; Ramachandran et al., 2010: 8).   
 
Historically, Telangana has also been the site of significant political unrest.  In more 
recent decades, this has been associated with protests for secession from Andhra 
Pradesh, a demand which was granted on the 31st July, 2013.7  Protests against the 
bifurcation are ongoing.  Given that the new state had not yet been created at the 
time of writing, and that the state of Andhra Pradesh was the focus of the political 
analysis in the study, this thesis continues to refer to Andhra Pradesh in the present 
tense.   
                                                 
7
 Available at:  
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-state-that-must-fulfil-a-higher-purpose/article4971018.ece 
Accessed on 31/07/2013.   
Available at:  
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/telangana-bill-not-coming-in-monsoon-
session/article4978082.ece Accessed on 29/8/2013. 
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A total of twenty-six participants from three villages in the Warangal district of 
Telangana form the central focus for the exploration of the struggle to legitimate the 
risk of Bt cotton at the micro level of cultivators.  Warangal has been referred to as 
‘the most controversial district in India’ (Herring, 2008b: 145) given that a high 
adoption rate of Bt cotton coincides with ongoing protests against it.8   
 
Beck (1992: 41) notes that ‘[t]here is a systematic ‘attraction’ between extreme 
poverty and extreme risk.’ This research highlights that, in Warangal, the 
ambiguous risk of Bt technology is legitimated within a wider context of 
ontological risk.  This context of risk impacts upon the ‘trade off’ (Renn, 2008: 
196) involved in the legitimation of an ambiguous technology, and the judgment on 
‘how much uncertainty one is willing to accept for some future opportunity’ (ibid.).  
This is also asserted by Gaurav and Mishra (2012: 3) who claim ‘[cotton] varieties 
with the Bt gene are as susceptible to all the risks in cotton cultivation that non-Bt 
varieties are, and ignoring such risks [would represent] a serious analytical flaw.’   
 
In Warangal, these wider risks include water scarcity, the general non-viability of 
agriculture, ecological degradation, climatic catastrophes, and the vagaries 
associated with the erratic rains of the Indian monsoon (Le Mons Walker, 2008: 
557; Rao, 2009; Deshpande, 2010c; Reddy and Mishra, 2010a; Singhal, 2010).  As 
                                                 
8
 This opposition is highlighted in the protests with which the district is associated.  These focus on the 
crop failure of Bt cotton, as well as the pest attack and low yields which cultivators assert it is associated.  
A sample of these protests is available at:  
http://www.hindu.com/2004/10/16/stories/2004101604770500.htm 
http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/may/agr-apcotton.htm 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/bitter-sweet-gm-crops 
Accessed on 27/10/2013. 
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Reddy and Mishra (2010a: 43) observe, the resultant agrarian crisis is characterised 
by the fact that ‘a growing proportion of the farming community [is unable] to meet 
their basic consumption needs from their dependence on agricultural income.’ It is 
also recognised, however, that the exposure to such risks in Warangal is highly 
differentiated in line with power relations.   
 
Each of the three villages in this study is associated with different perspectives on 
cultivation as a means of negotiating agrarian risk.  In Bantala, Bt cotton is strongly 
legitimated, and only Bt cotton is grown.  Meanwhile, however, the technology is 
banned in Orgampalle and cotton is cultivated using only organic methods.9  In 
Nandanapuram, Bt cotton is adopted by many villagers, in conjunction with 
significant opposition to it.  A small number of cultivators in the village have also 
opted to cultivate cotton using a practice referred to as Non-Pesticide Management 
(NPM).10 These alternative methods are facilitated through the affiliation of 
Orgampalle and Nandanapuram with the NGOs, Crops Jangaon and the Deccan 
Development Society, respectively.   
 
The analysis highlights that the villages are not only associated with different 
approaches to Bt technology; they are also characterised by differing power 
arrangements which result from the diversity of caste compositions and land-
holding patterns with which they are associated.  The study illustrates the way in 
                                                 
9
 Organic cultivation prohibits the use of chemical pesticides, fertilisers and Bt technology. 
10
 Cultivators using NPM or Non-Pesticide Management methods oppose the use of pesticides and Bt seed 
varieties.  However, chemical fertilisers are permitted as part of cultivation praxis. 
 
 17 
which these differing power relations contribute to the legitimation of a particular 
distribution of resources and differentiation of risk associated with access to 
resources; it also indicates the centrality of power relations to the way in which 
wider ideologies are mediated and legitimated as a concern of risk construction in 
the villages.  It is recognised, too, that these power relations are themselves subject 
to change as a result of shifting material and normative positions emerging from 
local processes of legitimation. 
 
The current study incorporates a comparative material analysis of the differentiated 
exposure to risk of cultivators adopting the various cultivation methods in the  
2010/2011 season.  This season was characterised by widespread flooding which 
led to significant crop loss.  This analysis suggests that Bt technology is a high-cost, 
high-risk strategy for negotiating the risks associated with the agrarian crisis.  This 
is also highlighted by Gaurav and Mishra (2012: 14) who argue that ‘costlier 
production techniques [are] riskier, especially in bad crop seasons.’   
 
The study also suggests that the alternative methods of NPM and organic 
cultivation appear to offer more viable alternatives for vulnerable cultivators, 
particularly in catastrophic seasons.  The lower risks associated with these methods 
were highlighted by the finding that, despite the catastrophic season, not a single 
NPM or organic farmer in the study made a loss, while almost half of the Bt cotton 
farmers did so. The significantly higher debt exposure of Bt cotton cultivators also 
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indicates the greater risk-taking with which Bt cotton is associated as a farming 
praxis. 
 
The material analysis, therefore, raises questions as to the way in which the risk of 
Bt cotton is ideologically legitimated, not only given the ambiguity associated with 
the risk of the technology itself, but also due to the additional cultivation costs and 
indebtedness with which it is particularly associated in an already high-risk agrarian 
context.  This exploration is particularly pertinent in Telangana given that high 
levels of debt are strongly related to farmer suicides (Sridhar, 2006: 1560; Galab et 
al., 2009: 169; Deshpande and Arora, 2010a: 24; Deshpande and Shah, 2010c: 134; 
Iyer and Arora, 2010: 266; Sreedhar, 2010: 227).   The Indian social anthropologist, 
A.R. Vasavi (2012), notes that farmer suicides in India are sidelined to ‘shadow 
spaces’ which lurk behind the dominant narrative of India’s high-profile economic 
success.  
 
The analysis highlights that, in those villages where Bt cotton is cultivated, it was 
introduced by farmers who were influential as a result of their positioning within 
the particular composition of the villages. These farmers were imitated by the less 
powerful in line with the ‘prestige bias’ highlighted by Stone (2007: 71), in which 
farmers emulate each other on the basis of social status.  Bt cotton is also perceived 
as a more advanced, ‘modern’ farming practice.  Adoption also occurred as a result 
of the ‘conformist bias’ identified by Stone (ibid.).  Here, the uptake of the 
technology created a ripple effect which facilitated its ideological legitimation.  
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The current research indicates that the potential risks of Bt technology were initially 
legitimated due to its reduced requirement for pesticides and its potential to deliver 
increased yields, both leading to higher incomes.  This study highlights, however, 
that the legitimation of the technology has begun to wane over time as yields have 
decreased, costs have spiralled, and debts have accumulated.  There is also growing 
anxiety with regard to the technology itself in terms of its purported contribution to 
ecological degradation and animal deaths.    
 
The analysis of the influence of power relations on the legitimation of risk at the 
micro level also explores the way in which risk is negotiated as a political concern 
in the villages.  This examines the ‘vernacularization of democracy’ (Michelutti, 
2007: 639) as the process by which ‘democracy become[s] embedded in particular 
cultural and social practices’ (ibid.).  Here, the focus is on the Gram Sabha meeting, 
or village assembly, as the institutionalised forum of village democracy.   
 
As Kumar (2006: 213) notes, the Gram Sabha meeting is envisaged to ‘facilitate 
dialogue, introduce people to the art of negotiation and collective decision 
making…and [provide a] forum to seek accountability of…leaders.’  According to 
the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act (1994), village assemblies are legally 
obliged to convene at least twice per year.11  These assemblies represent a forum 
whereby the risks of the current development model could potentially be deliberated 
                                                 
11
 These stipulations vary by state.  The Andhra Pradesh requirements are available at: 
http://www.rd.ap.gov.in/EGS/SA_Rules_170408_final.pdf 
Section 3 (2): q.  Accessed on 27/10/2013. 
 20 
upon, and elevated to wider decision-makers involved in the definition of risk as a 
political concern.   
 
The study highlights, however, that the meeting has instead become associated with 
the accessing of development funds in an attempt to negotiate risk as a material 
concern. This serves to legitimate the current development model and the ongoing 
differentiation of risk exposure with which it is associated.  In this regard, the 
analysis provides some support for the claim by Corbridge et al. (2013: 176) that 
India’s is a ‘patronage democracy’.   
 
This study also highlights, however, that there is more to village democracy than 
simply the accessing of patronage.  This relates to the wider village mobilisations 
which assert the risks of Bt cotton.  These eschew the Gram Sabha meeting, and are 
co-ordinated across villages by NGOs.  This thesis asserts that these mobilisations 
are central to ensuring that discourses of risk are recognised, and that power is 
contested, as part of democratic praxis.  They also serve to secure the legitimacy of 
democratic praxis as a concern of both the micro level of the villages, and the meso 
level of state politics. 
 
1.3 Risk Definition and the Legitimation of Democracy in Andhra Pradesh 
Beck (1992: 185) argues that contemporary risks have created the requirement for a 
‘new political culture’ [italics in the original] as a means of undertaking decision-
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making. According to Beck (ibid.), this involves ‘new demands for political 
participation outside the political system [italics in the original].   
 
The legitimation of democracy as a meso level institutional concern in Andhra 
Pradesh is explored using the core-periphery model developed by Habermas (1996: 
356-359).  This posits that democratic legitimacy is characterised by a ‘circulation 
of power’ between the core of government and the periphery of civil society.   Here, 
legitimacy is derived not only from the distribution (and redistribution) of material 
resources as a concern for promoting social justice in the alleviation of risk; it is 
also secured through the promotion of epistemic justice with regard to the inclusion 
of micro level discourses of risk within wider attempts to construct knowledge 
pertaining to the definition of risk, and to the future development of society. 
 
Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003) discuss the relative significance of 
recognition and redistribution in securing social justice. This thesis asserts, in line 
with Fraser, that both are essential to the negotiation of risk.  In the current study, 
social justice relates to the distribution of resources as a material concern, while 
epistemic justice refers to the inclusion of potentially marginalised normative 
perspectives in attempts to define risk politically.  Both are concerned with the 
material alleviation of risk, though it is argued that epistemic justice can occur 
through democratic praxis in the absence of social justice, given adequate 
representation and/or the sufficient mobilisation of interests.  It is argued that this is 
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occurring, to some extent, in the current study, due to the efforts of NGOs in 
representing the discourses of risk asserted by the economically marginalised. 
 
This thesis recognises that the mass mobilisations which seek to highlight the risks 
of Bt cotton eschew the institutionalised structures of democratic praxis in the 
villages. Nonetheless, the thesis adopts the Habermasian model to illustrate that 
these mobilisations are not outside the political system as Beck suggests, but are 
central to it, and vital to securing its legitimacy.  This is particularly true given the 
threat of an illegitimate concentration of power which, as the analysis highlights, 
characterises the attempts of certain power holders to secure closure in risk 
definition.    
 
The primary risk at the meso level is that of ‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas, [1973], 
1976).  Habermas (ibid.: 2) argues that a legitimation crisis ensues when ‘fewer 
possibilities for problem solving are allowed than are necessary for the continued 
existence of the system.’ The meso level analysis highlights, however, that the risk 
of legitimation crisis is not primarily associated with an inability to establish 
solutions with regard to risk; instead, it arises from the possibility that a 
theoretically illegitimate institutionalisation of power will be legitimated as part of 
democratic praxis itself. 
 
The meso level study involves ten participants from the areas of politics (the 
Congress Party and Communist Party (Marxist)), regulation (the Review 
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Committee on Genetic Modification), four representatives from industry (all from 
Monsanto), and three NGOs (the Deccan Development Society, the Centre for 
Sustainable Agriculture and Crops Jangaon).  The meso level analysis focusses on 
the way in which the ideological struggle for legitimation of particular definitions 
of risk is mediated through power relations associated with the institutional 
positioning of the participants as part of democratic praxis.   
 
The analysis highlights the way in which the struggle at the meso level relates to 
conflicts regarding the institutionalisation of power, and the type of knowledge 
construction which will form the basis of development.  This thesis argues that this 
legitimation struggle will be highly relevant in the new state of Telangana, and will 
determine the degree of legitimacy associated with its democratic praxis, as well as 
the normative conceptualisation of development which will inform the macro 
constitution of Telangana society.  This supports the view of Clark (2007: 195) that 
‘legitimacy [is] a constitutive element within a society.’  It is also, however, highly 
relevant to the global struggle to establish knowledge on the risk of Bt technology 
as a concern of the collective of humanity. 
 
Beck (1994: 8) argues that risk society is associated with a ‘profound institutional 
crisis’. The current research highlights that this relates to attempts to institutionalise 
power with regard to knowledge construction. This indicates that scientific 
knowledge is being asserted as a means of securing democratic closure in risk 
definition.  This relates to the ‘authoritarian technocracy’ (1995: 166) described by 
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Beck.  When assessed theoretically, the exercise of power which this would entail 
would be deleterious to democratic legitimacy, and significantly limit the ability of 
those on the periphery to have their normative perspectives concerning 
development recognised.  The blending of scientific knowledge with a neo-liberal 
market rationale is highlighted in the emergence of intellectual property rights 
administered by the World Trade Organisation,12 as well as the Indo-US 
Knowledge Initiative (Raina, 2006: 1622) which seeks to establish stronger research 
partnerships between the corporate sector and public research institutions.   
 
The potential for a hegemonic concentration of power secured through scientific 
knowledge within risk society is particularly evident in the proposed legislation to 
introduce a Biotechnology Regulation Authority of India, formed of eminent 
scientists.  This would supersede the government as the apex decision-making body 
on biotechnology in India (Gupta, 2011: 739). It is argued that such an 
institutionalisation would secure an illegitimate exercise of power within 
democratic praxis itself, and support the authoritarian tendencies which Fraser 
(2008: 140) asserts are a characteristic feature of democratic societies.   
 
The analysis indicates that the assertion by power holders of the primacy of a 
commodified and decontextualised form of scientific knowledge as the basis for 
risk definition within the current development paradigm represents a significant 
                                                 
12
 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) involves the 
globalisation of intellectual property laws, and extends patent protection to modified genes (Weis, 2007: 
138).   
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threat to the ability of cultivators to assert discourses of risk.  It also highlights the 
significant potential for ‘epistemic injustice’ described by the British philosopher, 
Miranda Fricker (2007), where social actors are denied in their ‘capacity 
as…knower[s]’ (ibid.: 20) [italics in the original].   
 
This raises significant concerns for epistemology itself given its potential reduction 
to a ‘scientism [which] means that we no longer understand science as one form of 
possible knowledge but rather identify knowledge with science’ (Roderick, 1986: 
50).  This thesis asserts that this potential for a reductionist simplification of 
knowledge construction at a time when humanity is seeking to address an epistemic 
gap characterised by its complexity represents a profound threat to the ontological 
survival of humanity.   
 
The study argues, however, that the attempts to institutionalise the illegitimate 
exercise of power which would give rise to such reductionist knowledge 
construction are strongly contested.  The potential for exclusion of the discourse of 
risk articulated by cultivators is, it is argued, alleviated somewhat by the activism of 
English-speaking scientists from NGOs and the Communist Party (Marxist) in 
opposition.  These actors assert the need for knowledge construction which 
incorporates the perspectives of cultivators as a concern for the legitimation of risk 
in context.   
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This analysis highlights the way in which micro level mass mobilisations bolster the 
negotiating power of NGOs and secure the recognition of their perspectives.  
Through their co-ordination of these mobilisations, NGOs ensure that the core is 
obliged to remain open to the discourse of risk on the periphery.  This supports the 
view of Strydom (2002: 109) that, ‘there are different types of power’ and that 
those who ‘attack dominant meanings are by no means powerless’ (ibid.).  This 
thesis argues that the activity of NGOs enhances the legitimacy of democratic 
praxis itself.  This is also highlighted by Haunss (2007: 161) who asserts that ‘while 
challenging the legitimacy of their opponents, [NGOs] may, at the same time, 
strengthen the legitimacy of the system as a whole.’ 
 
Given that all participants at the meso level of this study are scientists, the conflict 
relates to the normative conceptualisation of development which should inform the 
knowledge construction associated with science.  Thus, the analysis highlights that, 
within the conflict concerning knowledge construction, values remain central.  
Here, the NGO and the CPM actors assert that scientific knowledge must 
incorporate local experiential knowledge as a concern for epistemic justice, and as 
part of the transformation of scientific knowledge itself.  The analysis indicates, 
however, such a transformation is itself dependant upon the struggle to legitimate 
democracy within local contexts.   
 
The analysis also highlights the legitimation trap in which the Andhra Pradesh 
government is caught. This is due to its need to secure economic growth in response 
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to the aspirations of its citizens, many of whom are classified as poor, while 
simultaneously being obliged to protect its citizens from risk, and to maintain law 
and order in the case of protests which entail civil disobedience. The significance of 
the ongoing differentiation of risk exposure in Andhra Pradesh, and the protests 
associated with its legitimation, means that the globalised form of development 
associated with neo-liberal policies must be tempered with government initiatives 
which seek to address this differentiated exposure to risk in context.  This is also 
noted by Habermas ([1973], 1976: 54) who argues that the ‘[s]tate [must] 
compensate…for dysfunctional consequences of the accumulation process’ 
associated with capitalism.  
 
Given India’s historic reliance on development aid from external powers, and the 
consequences of this on its autonomy to take decisions on its own development, 
there is also a marked concern with self-sufficiency at the meso level.  It is 
recognised that globalised trade is currently enhancing India’s positioning globally, 
and has mitigated India’s reliance on foreign aid.  However, globalisation also 
entails negotiation with global power structures in ways which threaten autonomy, 
and inhibit the ability of the government to respond to the legitimation demands of 
its own citizens.  Here, the analysis explores the way in which the state is conflicted 
by competing threats to its own legitimacy. 
 
It is noted that, according to the Democracy Index published by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, India is classified as one among fifty ‘flawed democracies’ in the 
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world (Deccan Chronicle, 5/1/2011).  It is also recognised, however, that Indian 
democracy is ‘deeply paradoxical’ (Chandhoke and Priyadarshi, 2009: ix). This 
thesis asserts that the chaotic radicalisation of citizens in Andhra Pradesh, and the 
non-institutionalised ‘[p]arliament of the streets’ (Lummis, 1996: 142), ensure that 
power is contested within a democratic praxis which also has strong authoritarian 
tendencies. The analysis highlights that this radicalisation, turbulent as it is, 
contributes to the glimpses of legitimacy with which democratic praxis in Andhra 
Pradesh is characterised.   
 
1.4 Layout of the Thesis 
The approach to the study of the legitimation of risk and democracy in this thesis is 
as follows: 
 
Chapter Two explores the dimensions of caste, land-holding and gender as the 
basis for risk differentiation in the context of the Indian village.  It also presents the 
differing perspectives with regard to the legitimation of risk in the Bt cotton debate.  
It argues that the conflict regarding Bt cotton is symbolic of a wider struggle to 
legitimate the exercise of power, and the distribution of resources and 
differentiation of risk with which this is associated; 
 
Chapter Three presents the Habermasian (1996: 356) core-periphery model as the 
theoretical framework adopted to analyse the legitimation of democracy.  The 
chapter also examines the potential for ‘institutional crisis’ (Beck, 1994: 8) with 
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regard to the contemporary debate on Bt bringal. This highlights the way in which 
the ideological struggle which Bt technology represents is having a direct material 
impact on attempts to institutionalise the exercise of power through democratic 
praxis.  It is argued that, through their opposition to Bt technology, the NGOs in the 
current study are playing a crucial role in seeking to establish a more legitimate 
democratic praxis as a concern for social and epistemic justice; 
 
Chapter Four explores the historical struggle to secure a legitimate exercise of 
power in response to agrarian risk in Telangana, and the district of Warangal within 
it. The chapter also examines the competing demands for legitimacy which confront 
the Andhra Pradesh government, not least given the attempts by political power-
holders to reconcile their support for a neo-liberal development model with 
demands for secession in Telangana, and the history of radical communism in the 
region. Efforts to negotiate these demands have led to the Andhra Pradesh 
government being referred to as ‘the most troublesome’ in India (Jishnu, 2010) with 
regard to its negotiation of the Bt technology debate. 
 
In Chapter Five, the methodological approach to the research is examined.  The 
chapter argues that, as in the case of knowledge construction in risk definition, the 
construction of knowledge in social research is mediated by power relations related 
to the ‘positionality’ (Pearson, 2006: 308) of the researcher. It argues, however, that 
reflexivity on these aspects significantly adds to the learning which research entails.  
The chapter also highlights the significant ethical dilemmas involved in research 
 30 
into risk, but argues that these need to be balanced against the ethical implications 
of the failure to undertake such work. 
 
Chapter Six introduces the Risk Coalitions as the basis for a comparative 
quantitative analysis of risk differentiation in relation to cotton cultivation using Bt, 
organic and NPM methods in the 2010/2011 season.  This indicates that Bt cotton is 
a high-risk, high-cost method of cultivation in relation to the other methods, 
particularly in the far from atypical catastrophic seasons associated with the 
agrarian crisis in Telangana;   
 
In Chapter Seven, Van Leeuwen’s (2007; 2008) categories of legitimation are used 
to structure a less critical form of discourse analysis.  This aims primarily to 
foreground the perspectives of the villagers. The chapter highlights the way in 
which the legitimation and delegitimation of Bt cotton is embedded within wider 
normative perspectives on development. The ‘vernacularization of democracy’ 
(Michelutti, 2007: 639) indicates that village democracy is strongly focussed on the 
securing of patronage as a means of accessing resources in the negotiation of risk.  
It also highlights, however, a discourse of rights which underpins village 
mobilisations and, in the case of Bt cotton protests, seeks to challenge the 
legitimacy of the differentiated risk exposure associated with neo-liberalism. 
 
Chapter Eight entails an analysis of the impact of power relations on the meso 
level ideological struggle to define risk as part of institutionalised democratic 
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praxis. Here, the Habermasian core-periphery model (1996: 356) and Van 
Leeuwen’s (2007; 2008) categories of legitimation are used to structure a more 
critical form of discourse analysis.  This chapter examines the interplay between 
knowledge construction and the legitimation of power in democratic praxis.  It 
argues that attempts by power holders to promote scientific knowledge as a means 
of closure in democratic praxis are theoretically illegitimate.  It also illustrates the 
way in which these attempts are challenged by Bt cotton opponents who call into 
question the ideology of development itself; 
 
In Chapter Nine, the research findings are discussed.  This suggests that Bt cotton 
is a particularly high risk cultivation method for more vulnerable participants.  It 
also discusses the impact of power relations on risk construction and definition at 
both the micro and meso levels. The chapter argues that, although informed by 
global discourses, the struggle which Bt cotton represents is contingent upon power 
structures and legitimation struggles in local contexts.   
 
Chapter Ten concludes the thesis with a discussion of the implications of the 
research for the new state of Telangana, as well as for an emergent global society. It 
argues that the government of the new state needs to begin to unpack the ideology 
of development, and to secure greater inclusion in decision-making from those who 
are attempting to negotiate agrarian risk within Telangana itself as the basis for its 
own legitimation.  This chapter also asserts that the fundamental struggle in global 
risk society, as in Andhra Pradesh, is that between values which relate to the 
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distinction between the legitimate and illegitimate exercise of power, and posits that 
it is on the outcome of this highly contingent clash that the future survival of 
humanity rests.   
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Chapter Two 
The Indian Village and a  
Differentiated Exposure to Risk 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the way in which agrarian risk, and a differentiated exposure 
to it, is a central aspect of village life in India.  It outlines how this differentiated 
exposure occurs as a result of village power structures which operate primarily 
along the dimensions of caste, land-holding and gender.  This examines the way in 
which the differentiation of power along these dimensions results in the ‘social risk 
positions’ described by Beck (1992: 23) [italics in the original].  The analysis 
highlights that such risk positions are central not only to the differentiation of risk 
exposure as a direct material concern, but also to its ideological legitimation 
through particular risk constructions.   
 
The chapter also critically examines the way in which Bt cotton as an ‘ambiguous’ 
technology (Renn, 2008: 168) is associated with competing interpretations of 
material reality (ibid.: 77).  This is explored through an analysis of the competing 
views with which attempts to legitimate the risk of Bt technology are characterised.   
 
2.2  Agrarian Crisis and the Differentiation of Risk in Village India 
The research at the village level has been undertaken in light of the view that the 
global forms of power suggested in Beck’s (2009) ‘world at risk’ can best be 
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explored through understanding the infinitesimal practices of a micro level context 
where the negotiation of risk has a direct ontological meaning.  This refers to 
Foucault’s ‘microphysics of power’ (Gordon, 1991: 3) and recognises that the 
legitimation of risk is mediated through power structures in local contexts. 
 
India is home to 640,867 villages.13  This has led to its depiction as ‘a land of 
villages’ (Inden, 1990: 131). Similarly, the American political sociologist, 
Barrington Moore (1966: 318), described the village as ‘the basic cell of Indian 
society.’  Karl Marx claimed that the social organisation associated with villages in 
ancient India and China represented a distinct ‘backward’, pre-capitalist, Asiatic 
mode of production (Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 184). 14  Here, villages were depicted 
as subject to despotic rulers and portrayed as one step above barbaric.   
 
Marx’s views were formulated on the basis of reports from British colonial 
administrators which described Indian villages variously as ‘self-sufficient 
communities’ (Elphinstone, 1866: 69-71) and ‘village republic[s]’ (Metcalfe, 1810, 
as cited in Inden, 1990: 132).15 This was due to the common ownership of land, the 
combination of cultivation with village industries, and the existence of village 
councils (panchayats) formed of elders who managed issues of justice relevant to 
the village.  
                                                 
13
 Figures from the 2011 Census of India.  Available at: http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-
results/paper2/data_files/india/paper2_at_a_glance.pdf  Accessed on 5/3/2013. 
14
 According to Marx, the Asiatic mode of production was characterised by the absence of private land 
ownership, as well as the self-producing unity of handicrafts and agriculture in the villages (Hindess and 
Hirst, 1975: 200).   
15
 In fact, the idea of the self-sufficiency of the village has been strongly refuted in later literature.  The 
highly regarded Indian sociologist, M.N. Srinivas (1987: 38), argued that villagers would not have been 
entirely self-sufficient, but would have depended upon weekly markets for commodities such as salt, 
spices, iron, silver and gold.  
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Marx argued that the autonomous nature of the village and the absence of class 
conflict, as well as the presence of a caste system, had rendered Indian society static 
and unchanging, preventing its progression through the industrialisation of 
capitalism, and so on to the advanced stage of socialism.  He ([1867], 2007: 394) 
claimed, ‘[t]he structure of the economic elements of [Asiatic] society remains 
untouched by the storm clouds of the political sky.’ Marx (1853: 94, as cited in 
Madan, 2002: 4) also argued that ‘these idyllic village communities…restrained the 
human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of 
superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and 
historical energies.’   
 
Gandhi, however, took a different view.  For Gandhi, the village was symbolic of 
India itself, and central to his conceptualisation of the country’s future 
development.  He claimed that the Indian village represented ‘a spiritual vision of 
life which had not been corrupted by materialism’ (Brown, 2008: xvii).   He argued, 
‘the moment you talk [to villagers]…wisdom drops from their lips.  Behind the 
crude exterior, you will find a deep reservoir of spirituality’ (1938: 44, as cited in 
Frankel, 2005: 10).   As Omvedt (1993: 11) observes, Gandhi’s wholesale ‘rejection 
of industrial capitalism led him to formulate…the goal of Indian independence in 
terms of the regeneration of Indian village society, a small-scale, labour-focussed 
society.’ 
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In his study of the negotiation of the risk of water scarcity in a village in Andhra 
Pradesh, Robert Wade (1994: 1) notes that villages differ ‘even within culturally 
homogenous areas’ as a result of their internal social structure and demographic 
composition, as well as their relations with external markets.  He (ibid.) also argues 
that scarcity and risk are central aspects of village life.    
 
The analysis of the three villages in the current study highlights that power relations 
defined by the particular composition of castes and land-holding within each village 
contribute significantly to variations in village society.  (All three villages have 
strong ties to external markets given their cultivation of cash crops).  Such power 
relations are also found to have a significant impact upon the negotiation of risk as 
both a material (risk differentiation) and an ideological (risk construction) concern.   
 
India is a predominantly agricultural country and sixty-eight per cent of the 
country’s population lives in rural areas.16  Indian agriculture has, however, been 
subject to an agrarian crisis for generations (Deshpande and Arora, 2010; Le Mons 
Walker, 2008; Reddy and Mishra, 2009; Roy, 2006).  This has threatened the 
viability of agriculture as a primary source of livelihood.  The crisis has a complex 
variety of causes, many of which are historical and some of which are more modern 
in origin.   
 
                                                 
16
 2011 census data.  Available at:  
http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/paper2/data_files/india/paper2_at_a_glance.pdf 
Accessed on 5/3/2013.   
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Historically, it is argued that the particularly extortionate extraction of revenues by 
imperial rulers contributed significantly to ontological risk in the villages.  As 
Romesh Dutt ([1892], 1970: xviii), an Indian civil servant working for the British 
colonial government, observed, ‘the Land Tax in India was [such as] was never 
known under any government in Europe or Asia.’ This meant that ‘Indian 
cultivators were permanently poor’ (ibid.: xxviii).   
 
Similarly, the allocation of land to intermediary revenue collectors known as 
zamindars17 during British colonialism led to a consolidation of power and an 
unequal distribution of the means of production.  It is argued that this historic 
system of tenure lies at the root of the contemporary agrarian crisis (Deshpande and 
Arora, 2010: 2; Roy, 2006: 5392).   
 
The unequal access to land continues to represent a significant risk for many of 
those involved in Indian agriculture. As Frankel (2005: 97) highlights, following 
Independence in 1947, more than one-fifth (twenty-two per cent) of all rural 
households were landless, a further twenty-five per cent owned less than one acre, 
and fourteen per cent owned uneconomic holdings of between one and 2.5 acres.  
This meant that sixty-one per cent of rural India was landless or owned marginal 
                                                 
17
 During the period of Mughal rule in India (which was at the height of its power from the late seventeenth 
until the early eighteenth century), zamindars, or landlords, had collected taxes in return for a fixed 
proportion of the levy as a fee (Frankel, 2005: 31).  A variety of regional names existed for the Zamindar.  
Mirasidar was a comparatively modern term for a titleholder and revenue-payer (Bayly, 1998: 198).  
Similarly, Deshmukh (ibid.: 67) and Dora (Omvedt, 1994: 67) were the titles for large land-holders and 
revenue-takers in Andhra Pradesh.  The term dora was most frequently used by villagers in the current 
study.  
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holdings, a situation which represented significant ontological risk in a context 
where agriculture often represented the sole means of survival.   
 
Ecological factors also contribute significantly to the agrarian crisis.  The vagaries 
of the Indian climate, and the frequent droughts, floods and cyclones with which the 
country is associated, have contributed to the poverty of village life.  The recurrence 
of droughts has also made cultivators particularly reliant on access to irrigation in 
order to increase the productivity of their holdings.18 Since India’s turn to neo-
liberal policies in 1991, however, public investment in irrigation has been largely 
neglected, and irrigation has become a cost to be borne by farmers themselves 
(Reddy and Mishra, 2009: 49).  However, the sub-optimal plots of land often do not 
permit efficient use of water.19   
 
It has been recognised for some time that ground-water exploitation has reached 
unsustainable levels in dry regions (Reddy and Mishra, 2009: 9).  A report produced 
by the Royal Commission of Agriculture in India (1927, 377-379, as cited in Roy, 
2006: 5394) claimed that ‘the groundwater supply [in Bengal] is becoming more 
and more precarious, leading to agricultural crisis…It has greatly increased the cost 
of constructing new wells, as well as of labour and the cost of lifting the water to 
the surface.’   
                                                 
18
 This reliance on irrigation, and the earlier centrality of the state in organising it, led to Wittfogel’s 
(Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 198-207) depiction of Asian societies as ‘hydraulic states’.   
19
 The command area for modern tubewells powered by electric pumpsets is five to ten acres (Frankel, 
2005: 320).  Not only are many plots smaller than this, but land-holding in India often involves fields 
which are scattered, rendering private attempts at irrigation inefficient (ibid.: 319). As noted by Wade 
(1994: 11), scattered holdings reduce the risk of crop loss.  This is due to the varied micro-conditions with 
which geographically distant plots of land may be associated, such as differences in soil type, gradient, 
proximity to water, etc.   
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The balance of soil fertility is particularly relevant in a country such as India which 
has been home to settled agriculture for millennia.  Mukherjee (1926, as cited in 
Roy, 2006: 5394) argued that ‘the introduction of commercial crops…upset the 
ancient system of crop rotation which served very well for fertilising the soil.’  
Similarly, the improper use of fertilisers introduced during the Green Revolution 
has led to an imbalance of soil nutrients and loss of soil fertility (Reddy and Mishra, 
2009: 11).   
 
The commercialisation of agriculture has also introduced new areas of risk.  There 
is an increased exposure of farmers to volatile commodity prices and rising costs 
(Reddy and Mishra, 2010: 55).  Furthermore, changes in cultivation practices and 
crop choices as a result of attempts to secure profitability have affected natural 
processes of fertility restoration. The deforestation associated with the 
commercialisation of agriculture has led to the silting up of rivers, while the dried 
up irrigation tanks which previously provided a fertile field for a second (rabi) crop 
have now become marshes in the dry season and an ideal breeding ground for 
mosquitoes carrying malaria (Roy, 2006: 5394).  This has further reduced 
agricultural viability. 
 
As Frankel (2005: 96) notes, ‘[following Independence], yield levels in India were 
among the lowest in the world.’  This meant that the country was unable to meet the 
consumption needs of its growing population for the first decades after 
Independence and relied heavily on food aid, particularly from the United States 
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(Varshney, 1998: 68-69).  The general stagnation of agriculture at this time meant 
that ‘millions of rural poor [were] precariously subsisting or slipping below the line 
of poverty’ (Frankel, 2005: 97).  Given the differentiation in power relations in the 
countryside, however, not everyone was exposed to the risk of agrarian crisis 
equally, and it is to this aspect of differentiated risk exposure which this chapter 
now turns.   
 
2.3 Caste, Land-holding and Gender in Social Risk Positions 
Given that fifty-five per cent of India’s citizens are classified as poor (Times of 
India, 16/7/2010),20 a technology which delivers economic benefits to the wealthy 
at the expense of the poor cannot be politically or morally legitimated.  It is also 
recognised, however, that the poor are not homogenous, but are characterised by 
their significant differentiation in line with local power structures. This 
differentiation impacts not only upon exposure to risk, but also upon the capacity to 
influence others in risk construction in ways which legitimate the power structures 
themselves.  Renn (2008: 35), too, highlights that risk and the legitimation of power 
are inextricably linked.   
 
The current study highlights the way in which each of the three villages varies 
according to their caste composition and land-holding pattern.  In order to analyse 
vulnerability to risk, this thesis posits that, in the context of the Indian village, the 
                                                 
20
 This figure is derived using a Multi-dimensional Poverty Index developed by the United Nations 
Development Project and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative. This includes indicators 
related to schooling, child mortality, availability of electricity, drinking water, sanitation, cooking fuel and 
assets.  It does not, however, appear to include a measure on indebtedness. 
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key dimensions relevant to differentiating risk exposure and influencing risk 
construction are those related to caste, land-holding and gender.   
 
The current analysis uses the term ‘Risk Coalition’ in order to analytically 
demarcate the ‘social risk positions’ identified by Beck (1992: 23).  This combines 
the idea of a social risk position with Hajer’s (1997: 12-13) concept of a ‘discourse 
coalition.’  This recognises that risk construction as a micro concern and risk 
definition as a wider meso institutional concern are conducted through discourse.  
 
Caste as a Social Risk Position 
Bayly (1999: 1) refers to the Indian caste system as an ‘elaborately stratified social 
hierarchy that distinguishe[s] India from all other societies.’  The term casta 
(derived from the Latin castus meaning chaste) was used in sixteenth century Spain 
and Portugal to denote species or breed (ibid.: 105).  This thesis suggests that the 
caste system in India is a highly complex and sophisticated means of legitimating 
the differentiated exposure to risk associated with the power structures which caste 
represents.21  
 
The race dimension to caste as a desire of the fair-skinned Aryans to maintain pure 
blood lines, and to segregate themselves from the darker-skinned indigenous 
Dravidians, was legitimated through the (now discredited) ‘science’ of ethnological 
studies conducted during British colonialism.  This found that the fair-skinned 
                                                 
21
 This view directly challenges that of the renowned French anthropologist, Louis Dumont.  In his classic 
text, Homo Hierarchicus, Dumont (1972) suggests that the central concern of caste with purity and 
pollution encompassed power and held it in check.  
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Aryans were ethnologically more ‘advanced’ than native Dravidians (Bayly, 1999: 
167-175).  The association also helped to legitimate British colonialism, as ‘fair 
skinned’ became synonymous with ‘advanced.’  This highlights the way in which 
purportedly ‘scientific’ knowledge has historically been used to legitimate power 
relations, and the differentiated exposure to risk which they entail. 
 
The concept of varna relates to the depiction of caste in the vast body of sacred 
texts referred to as the Vedas.22  The Veda texts distinguish between the twice-born 
(dwija) upper castes23 of Brahmin (priests and scribes), Kshatriya (warriors and 
lords) and Vaishya (traders) and the lower caste, non-twice-born Shudra or servile 
class.  Here, status is equated with ritual purity, and detailed rules of interaction 
govern relations between upper and lower castes in order to avoid the potential for 
‘pollution’ which lower castes are purported to represent. These include strict rules 
of connubium (referring to marriage) and commensality (related to the sharing of 
food).24  So-called Untouchables, and the hill and forest populations now commonly 
referred to as ‘tribals’, occupy an ambivalent place below, outside or parallel to this 
varna scheme (Bayly, 1999: 9).   
 
Brahmins, representing the apex of the caste system, were characterised by their 
special privilege.  As Ramakrishna (1983: 4) notes: ‘[a]lthough they [Brahmins] 
                                                 
22
 The Vedas are the earliest records of Indian culture and are estimated to date to between 2,000 and 2,500 
B.C. (Nehru, 2004: 72).  These legitimate the caste system as a form of social organisation given that they 
depict caste as divinely ordained. 
23
 These are associated with the wearing of a sacred thread, the suta.  Only male members of the Brahmin, 
Kshatriya and Vaishya varnas are entitled to undergo the ceremony of upanayana where the sacred thread 
is bestowed upon the bearer (Frankel, 2005: 5).   
24
 A detailed account of these is provided in Dumont’s (1972) Homo Hierarchicus.   
 43 
were a minority, they commanded unchallenged respect and status and acted as the 
arbiters of morals in society by virtue of their monopoly over learning and ritualistic 
supremacy.’ So-called Untouchables, meanwhile, were subject to the most 
pernicious forms of discrimination.  This involved their segregation to the margins 
of the village.25 They were also traditionally denied admittance to schools, shops 
and village shrines, and banned from using wells (Freeman, 1977: 37).  Even the 
shadow of an individual designated as untouchable was said to be defiling (Bayly, 
1999: 197).   
 
The concept of jati refers to the experience of caste in the ‘concrete and factual’ 
domain of everyday social life (Khare, 1983: 85).  The jati formed the basis of the 
jajmani system (Mandelbaum, 1970: 160-180), where occupational services were 
provided in return for a specific proportion of crop share for the service provider.  
As Frankel (2005: 5) observes, the jati refers to ‘smaller, hereditary, endogamous 
groups associated with a traditional occupation and related to one another in terms 
of ritual pollution or purity.’  Jatis in each region number in the hundreds and can 
be grouped within the broad varna categories (with the exclusion of the jatis 
associated with Untouchability).  The Shudra varna, as the non-twice-born service 
providers, contains the most extensive list of jatis.26   
 
                                                 
25
 This segregation continues, and is a characteristic feature of Indian villages.  Beteille (1971: 26-39), 
Freeman (1977: 24), Omvedt (1994: 70), Robinson (1988: 83) and Srinivas (2003: 26) all report a similar 
segregation in villages studied in various states throughout India.   
26
 According to Srinivas (1987: 38), the essential jatis in each village were the carpenter, blacksmith, 
leather-worker, potter, barber and washer-man.   
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While varna categories of caste are universal and common to all areas of India, 
‘caste (as jati) at the local level often contains considerable ambiguity about rank in 
the context of complex economic and social relations’ (Frankel, 2005: 5).27 
Robinson (1988: 20), too, in her study of Medak district in Andhra Pradesh, notes 
that jatis are regionally variable with regard to both naming conventions and 
ranking.   The analysis for the current study suggests that the power associated with 
caste jatis is strongly related to their numerical representation and ownership of 
land within particular villages.   
 
The occupations of alleged Untouchables included those deemed too lowly and 
polluting for the caste Hindus defined within the varna system.  These included that 
of ‘sweepers’ (of roads) and leather workers (Freeman, 1977: 37).  So-called 
Untouchables were also involved in the handling of dung and animal remains and, 
given that death was regarded as particularly defiling, they served as cremation-
ground attendants and tonsurers (head-shavers) of mourners (Bayly, 1999: 192).    
 
It is clear that caste had a significant influence on the ability of social actors to 
negotiate and construct risk.  As Frankel (2005: 5) notes, ‘in pre-modern times, 
rigorous criteria of pollution and purity had qualified only the upper twenty per cent 
or so of the population for even the rudiments of education.’  This meant that upper 
caste Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaishyas were well placed to claim privileged 
positions during imperial rule. This also served to reinforce their elevated 
positioning within the village power structure.  At the other extreme, the heightened 
                                                 
27
 Bayly (1999: 8) notes that the term caste is commonly used to refer to both varna and jati. 
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exposure of purported Untouchables to risk is highlighted by Bayly’s (1999: 195) 
observation that nineteenth-century famine records indicate that village servants 
designated as Untouchable were among the first to perish in times of scarcity.   
 
 Land-holding and Social Risk Positioning 
Ownership of land is particularly central to risk negotiation in a country such as 
India where agriculture often represents the primary means of subsistence. Upper 
castes were in a better position to gain access to land as a result of the allocation of 
land rights to upper caste zamindars and revenue collectors during British rule. This 
meant that higher castes not only enjoyed access to privileged positions of power, 
but also benefitted from greater land ownership.  Landlords came from higher 
castes, while lower castes were often landless (Varshney, 1998: 45).   
 
The revenue-taking associated with British rule, and the poverty of the majority of 
cultivators, led to the strengthened status of the upper caste Vaishya or merchant 
varna. These self-made traders often served as money lenders and were referred to 
in regional vernaculars as banias or saukars (Bayly, 1999: 213).  They often went 
on to buy up land from Brahmins28 and other indebted proprietary groups (ibid.), 
and so materially reinforced their ideologically-sanctioned power.   
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Brahmin Zamindars themselves often fell into indebtedness given the extortionate land rents which they 
were liable to pay to colonial authorities, even in years of crop failure.   
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 Gender and Social Risk Positioning 
Omvedt (1993: 12) argues that the ‘self-sufficient village [was] linked to the 
paternalistic rule of kings.’ Within this, the need for the conduct of women to be 
closely controlled owing to their potential for the destruction of the very 
underpinnings of the caste system is highlighted in the sacred text, the Bhagavad 
Gita, contained within the ancient Mahabharata epic.29  Here, it is stated that ‘when 
women are corrupted, confusion of castes arises’ (as cited in Bayly, 1999: 13). The 
positioning of women is thus legitimated on the basis of caste values which have 
been defined by men.   
 
Females continue to be regarded as a burden in Indian society.  This is asserted by 
Bayly (1999: 54) who claims that caste values define the family of wife-receivers as 
conferring honour on the family of the bride, the wife-givers.  Bayly (ibid.: 332) 
also highlights how, in the case of weddings, the giving of dowry (a payment made 
by the bride’s family to the groom) is considered an upper caste custom, while bride 
price (where the groom’s family pays the bride’s family) is associated with lower 
castes.30   
 
The perception of females as a burden persists despite the fact that they undertake 
the majority of agricultural and household work.  Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu 
                                                 
29
 The Sanskrit epic, the Mahabharata, has been dated to c. 900-800 B.C. (Metcalf and Metcalf, [2001]; 
(2006): xxvi).  It remains a highly influential narrative within Indian society, and discusses the ethics of 
kingship and views on the legitimate exercise of power.   
30
 The practice of the giving of dowry was made illegal under the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 
(Shurmer-Smith, 2000: 89).  As the current research highlights, however, it is still very much a feature of 
Indian life.  The costs of dowry have risen significantly in recent years.  Shurmer-Smith (2000: 91) notes 
the emergence of the term ‘Maruti marriages’ where new Maruti cars are offered in partial settlement of a 
dowry in urban areas.    
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(1999: 71) note the increasing ‘feminisation of agricultural labour’. According to 
Garikipati (2009: 517), a study conducted in 2001 estimated that 43.4 per cent of 
agricultural labourers are women.  However, women’s household status, wages and 
working conditions remain acutely depressed (ibid.).  Similarly, their rights to 
property are also poorly defined (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 209), and property 
remains subject to patrilineal inheritance (Agarwal, 1995: A-39).   As a result of 
their restricted access to assets and to political power, Krishnaraj (2006: 5376) notes 
that women are most at risk from food deprivation.   
 
2.4  Reform and the Renegotiation of Power Relations 
It should be noted that power relations require ongoing negotiation in response to 
repeated attempts at their delegitimation.  This is particularly true in the Indian 
context.  An array of anti-caste and caste reform movements31 arose in line with the 
Independence movement as the diffusion of discourses of freedom and equality 
increasingly served as a basis with which to challenge indigenous forms of 
oppression.  After Independence, power structures were further undermined through 
the abolition of Untouchability32 and of zamindars. 
 
                                                 
31
 These included the anti-Aryan Self Respect Movement (Weiner, 2001: 194), the Dalit movement of 
Untouchables led by B.R. Ambedkar in the 1920s (Omvedt, 1994: 82; 144-58), and the non-Brahmin 
movement in the south during the 1920s and 1930s (Ramaswamy, 1978). The derogatory-sounding 
euphemism of ‘backward caste’ arose from a split in the non-Brahmin movement in the 1930s.  Here, 
members of lower-ranking ‘clean’ Shudra jatis sought to distinguish themselves from upper caste non-
Brahmin groups – namely, Kshatriyas and Vaishyas (Bayly, 1999: 241). 
32
 Untouchability was abolished in Article 17 of the Indian Constitution.  This was strongly influenced by 
the pivotal role of B.R. Ambedkar, a former Untouchable, in the framing of the Indian Constitution (Bayly, 
1999: 269).   
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As part of the attempt to challenge the power structures associated with caste, those 
previously described as Untouchables and India’s indigenous ‘tribal’ populations 
became known as Scheduled Castes and Tribes respectively, owing to their listing 
on a special schedule of the 1950 Constitution.  This identified them as meriting 
special treatment from the state as a result of their particular deprivation.  This was 
delivered through a system of ‘reservations’ in which quotas of educational places 
and government jobs were allocated to the castes listed on the schedule (Brass, 
1990: 5).   
 
During the 1990s, proposals to implement the recommendations of the Mandal 
Commission33 to extend reservations to broader sections of the Indian population 
were violently resisted, particularly by those from the twice-born varnas (Brahmins, 
Kshatriyas and Vaishyas), now known as Forward Castes.  These protests included 
the self-immolations of high-caste student protestors who feared the risks to their 
own education and employment opportunities (Bayly, 1999: 301).  Upper castes 
also argued that quotas for ‘unworthy’ minorities would lower the country’s 
professional and educational standards (Bayly, 1999: 299).    
 
Since the 1990s, Sharma (2011: 113) asserts that caste has become increasingly 
politicised and exploited for political gain.   However, Varshney (2000: 4) argues 
                                                 
33
 The Mandal Commission was established to identify wider sections of India’s population beyond 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes who could be considered in need of positive discrimination measures.  The 
commission published its findings in 1980, recommending that almost half the population could be 
classified as ‘backward’ and, therefore, in need of special treatment by the state (Bayly, 1999: 292).   
Attempts to implement the recommendations did not begin until 1990 given their controversial nature 
(Singh and Verney, 2003: 6). 
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that such politicisation has permitted the power relations associated with the caste 
hierarchy to be challenged, given that lower castes can ‘use their numbers to 
electoral advantage, and fight prejudice and domination politically.’ The analysis in 
this thesis asserts that, at the micro level, the struggle associated with caste is highly 
context-dependent, given the variability in power arrangements arising from the 
caste composition and land-holding patterns of particular villages.   
 
The traditional view of women in Indian society has also been challenged.  Omvedt 
(1993: 97) notes how India’s active women’s movement continues to highlight 
atrocities against women such as dowry deaths34 and female feticide,35 and to assert 
the need for land rights for women (ibid.: 96).  More recently, Amendments 73 
(1991) and 75 (1993) to the Indian Constitution guaranteed thirty-three per cent of 
panchayat (village council) seats for female candidates (Trivedi, 2010: 196).   
 
Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was a key figure in the struggle for India’s 
independence from the British, and served as India’s first prime minister from 1947 
until his death in 1964.  He is most associated with his support for Fabian socialism, 
democracy, and science and technology as the basis for India’s development.  With 
regard to land ownership, Nehru attempted to bring about greater equality in land-
                                                 
34
 Dowry deaths remain a significant problem.  A brief selection from the Andhra Pradesh press during the 
nine month research period highlights reports of female suicide due to harassment for more dowry through 
self-immolations (Deccan Chronicle, 5/10/2010) and hangings from ceiling fans (Deccan Chronicle, 
3/12/2010; Times of India, 13/3/2011), as well as murders by husbands due to dowry disputes (Times of 
India, 3/11/2011; 7/2/2011). 
35
 Verma (ibid.: 30) notes that more than two million foetuses are killed every year because they are female.  
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holding through institutional changes such as land reform, land ceiling legislation36 
and the proposed establishment of cooperative farming. Nehru (as cited in 
Varshney, 1998: 33) argued that ‘[b]y forming cooperatives, [farmers could] pool 
their resources for providing credit and getting their supplies of seeds, implements, 
fertilisers, etc. and can organise the sale of their produce.’  
 
Nehru’s efforts to establish a more collective approach to agriculture were, 
however, largely thwarted by existing rural power holders (Robinson, 1988: 270; 
Varshney, 1998: 42; Frankel, 2005: 202; Kohli, 2009: 86).  Cooperative farming, in 
particular, was strongly resisted due to its purported threat to the private ownership 
of land, as well as its association with coercive implementation in the contexts of 
China and Russia  (Frankel, 2005: 165).   
 
Zamindari abolition enjoyed greater success, but led to the emergence of landlords 
with various sized holdings who rented land to tenants (Rudolph and Rudolph, 
1987: 50).  As Table 2.1 highlights, shortly before Nehru’s death in 1964, forty per 
cent of India’s population operated marginal holdings, while a further twenty-two 
per cent operated small holdings which were vulnerable to risk.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Land ceiling did have some limited success.  By the end of December 1976, approximately 1.1 million 
acres of surplus land had been distributed (Frankel, 2005: 551).   
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Table 2.1  Distribution of Operational Holdings, 1961/62  
 
Category 
of  
holding 
Size group 
(acres) 
1961/62 
% 
Marginal Less than 2.5 39.07 
Small 2.5 – 4.99 22.62 
Semi-
medium 
5 – 9.99 19.80 
Medium 10 – 24.99 13.99 
Large 25 acres and 
above 
4.52 
 
Source: The National Sample Survey, Number 140,  
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation,  
as cited in Frankel (2005: 493). 
 
Following Nehru’s death in 1964, the onset of the technocratic approach to agrarian 
risk further contributed to the renegotiation of power structures in rural India. This 
began with the introduction of high yielding varieties (HYVs) of seeds during the 
Green Revolution throughout the 1960s and 1970s and, more recently, has been 
associated with the onset of the Gene Revolution (Fukuda-Parr, 2007) in which the 
introduction of Bt technology is embedded.   
 
The emergence of farmers as a political force in recent decades has led to claims of 
a ‘new agrarianism’ (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987: 333; Varshney, 1998: 118).37  
The mobilisation of cultivators throughout the 1970s and 1980s heightened their 
political power as lobbyists. Through mass protests, cultivators asserted demands 
associated with the waiver of agricultural loans, as well as higher crop prices and 
                                                 
37
 Varshney (1998: 118) argues that this new agrarianism contrasts with the agrarianism associated with 
authors such as Tolstoy, Rushkin and Gandhi who celebrated the ‘blissful simplicity and spiritual richness’ 
of village life. 
 52 
subsidies (Varshney, 1998: 120-122).  These mobilisations were particularly 
associated with the Shudra (or Backward) castes (Omvedt, 1993: 115). 
 
The changing constellation of power within Indian society is evident from the 
observation that Shudra castes now often represent the new dominant castes in the 
villages.  The concept of a dominant caste was developed by M.N. Srinivas (1987: 
44) who notes that ‘members of a dominant caste are in a privileged position vis-à-
vis the other local castes, and its leaders wield considerable power.  The leaders 
have the greatest stake in the village and, generally, it is they who organise local 
activity, whether it be a festival, general protest, or fight.  They dominate the 
traditional council or panchayat.’   
 
The ongoing upheaval in the rural context led M.N. Srinivas to observe in the early 
1990s (as cited in Omvedt, 1993: 318) that a revolution of ‘shifting dominance’ was 
occurring in the Indian countryside.  Bt cotton has, therefore, been introduced into a 
context which is characterised by its highly contested power structures and ongoing 
agrarian risk.  This context, together with the ambiguity associated with the 
technology itself, has contributed to a plurality of perspectives with regard to the 
technology’s contribution to alleviating the risk of the agrarian crisis.  These will 
now be explored.   
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2.5 The Struggle for Legitimation and Bt Cotton 
The change in approach associated with the introduction of high yielding varieties 
of seeds in the 1960s,38 and the increasingly prevalent need for fertilisers, pesticides 
and assured irrigation on which HYV seeds are reliant, is generally referred to as 
the Green Revolution.39  The adoption of Green Revolution technology saw a shift 
in emphasis from institutional measures, such as land reforms, which sought to 
redistribute resources as a means of addressing the agrarian crisis, to a more 
technocratic approach which focussed on productivity, efficiency and wealth 
generation within the existing distribution of resources.   
 
It is argued that the Green Revolution allowed India to conclude its dependence on 
food aid, particularly from the United States.  This dependence had led to a loss of 
autonomy in risk negotiation due to the imposition of conditionalities in return for 
such assistance (Varshney, 1998: 69; Frankel, 2005: 584).  The argument that the 
United States continues to dominate Indian agricultural policy through powerful 
institutions such as the World Bank, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, and 
multinational companies, such as Monsanto, will be explored in Chapter Three.  As 
a result of the Green Revolution, however, by 1971, India was in a position to 
unilaterally terminate its imports of American PL-480 wheat (Varshney, 1998: 69).  
                                                 
38
 Unlike seed varieties which pollinate naturally, hybrid or HYV seeds are derived from controlled cross-
pollination which selects for favourable traits of specific parent plants.  
39
 Paul Brass (1990: 287) highlights that the most notable success of the Green Revolution was in wheat 
production and, to a lesser extent, rice.  The impact was highly regionally concentrated – in the south, to 
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala and, in the north, to Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh 
(ibid.). The Marxist economist, Utsa Patnaik (2007: 2), argues that the Green Revolution benefitted big 
farmers and rich peasantry, while having ‘ruinous effects’ (ibid.) on the environment and smallholders.  
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As highlighted, the Green Revolution also contributed to shifting power relations in 
the countryside through creating aspirations among small and marginal farmers who 
sought their share of Green Revolution wealth.  In this quest to achieve wealth, 
however, it is argued that cultivators simultaneously increased their vulnerability to 
risk (Shiva, 1991; Reddy and Mishra, 2009: 15).40   
 
The commercial approval of Bt cotton in 2002 began what is widely referred to as 
the Gene Revolution (Shiva, 1991: 210; Fukuda-Parr, 2007).  In many ways, 
legitimation for the Gene Revolution has been a direct result of the Green 
Revolution.  This is due to the observation by Karihaloo and Kumar (2009: 1) that 
the bollworm, a major cotton pest, had developed resistance to the pesticides 
adopted so intensively during the Green Revolution.  This had forced farmers to 
apply as many as ten to sixteen sprays of pesticides per season.  The Bt gene was 
inserted into HYV seeds (Kuruganti, 2009: 32), a modification which was purported 
to render the crop resistant to the bollworm for the first ninety days of the plant’s 
growth.41 
 
Proponents argue that Bt cotton has been a remarkable success and has doubled 
cotton yields (Choudhary and Gaur, 2010: 2).  India has become the world’s second 
largest cotton producer after China (Karihaloo and Kumar, 2009: 1; Choudhary and 
                                                 
40
 As Frankel  (2005: 510) notes, ‘by the 1970s, the growth generated by the new [Green Revolution] 
technology began to slow in the face of depleted soil fertility, shortages and rising prices of fertilisers, 
problems of rust disease and power cutbacks that shut down electric pumps [for irrigation].’  Vasavi (2010: 
76) also notes a decline in productivity, as well as the increasing costs of production and environmental 
destruction associated with Green Revolution belts, such as Punjab.   
41
 Bt cotton cultivators are also required to plant a ‘refuge crop’ of non-Bt cotton surrounding the Bt cotton 
plot to ensure that bollworm feeding on Bt cotton will breed with those feeding on non-Bt cotton, and so 
prevent resistance from developing (Qayum and Sakkhari, 2005: 37).  
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Gaur, 2010: 5). Supporters of Bt cotton argue that the technology has been 
significant in increasing yields and has, therefore, played a major role in 
contributing to India’s economic growth.   
 
Many opponents in the villages argue that the increased cotton volumes are due to 
the more widespread adoption of cotton, and do not relate to yield increases.  
Indeed, as Choudhary and Gaur (2010: 2) note, India has a larger area of cotton than 
any other country in the world. However, as Table 2.2 indicates, the increased 
acreage alone is not sufficient to explain the exponential rise in cotton volumes.  
These are particularly prevalent after the introduction of Bt cotton in 2002, and 
suggest that the introduction of Bt cotton did indeed coincide with yield increases. 
 
  Table 2.2 Cotton Production, Area and Yield, 2001-2012 
 
  
 
Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, as cited in State of Indian 
Agriculture Report 2010-2011, Department of Agriculture and Co-operation online Report 
(2012:8).42 
 
 
                                                 
42
 Available at http://agricoop.nic.in/sia111213312.pdf   
Accessed on 9/3/2013. 
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Of the estimated 9.6 million hectares of cotton in India in 2009, eighty-seven per 
cent were Bt cotton hybrids, of which sixty-four per cent were rain-fed (Choudhary 
and Gaur, 2010: 5).  This represents a significant risk given the reliance on an 
erratic monsoon for the cultivation of a cash crop associated with high expenditure 
on seeds, fertilisers and pesticides.  Nonetheless, by 2009, Bt cotton hybrids had 
been adopted by eighty-eight per cent of the 6.4 million cotton growers in India 
(Choudhary and Gaur, 2010: 7).  This included significant numbers of small and 
resource-poor farmers.   
 
The adoption rate is asserted by proponents as evidence of the success of the 
technology and its alleviation of risk for all classes of farmer.  These views have, 
however, been strongly contested, particularly from many within India’s strong and 
vibrant NGO sector.43  This has led to a struggle relating to the legitimation of the 
risk which the technology represents in terms of the trade off involved in its 
potential to alleviate the existing material risk of the agrarian context.   
 
In terms of this thesis, it is argued that the legitimation of risk involves a material 
dimension related to the technology’s scale neutrality and its potential to alleviate 
poverty through delivering benefits for all classes of farmer, within the existing 
distribution of resources.  The legitimation of risk also entails an ideological 
component, however, given that trade offs associated with decision-making on risk 
are ideologically legitimated through risk construction in discourse.  Both of these 
                                                 
43
 India is referred to as ‘the NGO capital of the world’ (Kudva, 1996: 1, as cited in Katzenstein et al., 
2001: 248).   
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aspects will now be explored with regard to the struggle to secure the legitimation 
of risk which Bt cotton involves.    
 
Poverty and the Legitimation of Bt Cotton 
The ongoing risk associated with the Indian agrarian context is evident from 
Frankel’s (2005: 494) observation that, by 1971, the number of landless workers 
had begun to rise as indebted farmers were obliged to give up their lands.  It is also 
highlighted by the spate of suicides which began to occur in waves from the 1980s 
which are particularly associated with India’s cotton-producing belt (Deshmukh, 
2010: 175).44 One quarter of a million farmer suicides (256,913) were recorded for 
the country as a whole between 1995 and 2010 (The Hindu, 3/07/2012). 
 
Research on Bt cotton has yielded an array of results with regard to the 
technology’s potential to alleviate the risk of agrarian poverty.  A study conducted 
by Morse et al (2007: 44) in the state of Maharashtra during the 2002-03 season 
featured questionnaire-based survey results from sixty-three non-adopting, and 
ninety-four adopting, households of Bt cotton.  This found that Bt plots had 2.5 
times the gross margin of non-Bt plots.  Similarly, Karihaloo and Kumar (2009: 14) 
cite the results of field trials on large plots conducted in 1998-99 by Mahyco45 and 
monitored by the Review Committee on Genetic Modification (RCGM).46 This 
                                                 
44
 Cotton is mainly grown in nine states - Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Karanataka, Gujarat, 
Punjab, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, as well as small areas of Punjab, Orissa, Assam and 
Uttar Pradesh.   
45
 Monsanto bought a twenty-six per cent stake in the Indian seed company, Mahyco, in 1998 (Scoones, 
2005: 252). 
46
 The Review Committee on Genetic Modification is the regulatory body charged with monitoring field 
trials in India.   
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study, which featured twenty-six sites in seven states,47 reported a yield increase of 
forty per cent with Bt cotton hybrids.   
 
Choudhary and Gaur (2010: 20) argued that ‘[i]n terms of income distribution, all 
types of households benefit [from Bt cotton], including those below poverty line.’ 
This purported increase in income for Bt cotton cultivators is associated not only 
with a reduced spend on pesticides, but also with higher yields (ibid.: 17).  Further 
studies also highlight increased labour rates for female agricultural labourers 
(Subramaniam and Qaim, 2010: 295).   Thus, the legitimation of the risk of Bt 
cotton is founded primarily upon its ability to alleviate the risks associated with the 
poverty of the most vulnerable. 
 
Other studies highlight, however, highly variable results in this regard (Bennett et 
al, 200648; Qaim et al, 200649).  A study conducted by Qayum and Sakkhari (2005: 
ii)50 in Andhra Pradesh found that non-Bt yields were higher, and pesticide use was 
the same, for Bt and non-Bt farmers with small land-holdings.  Meanwhile, research 
                                                 
47
 The states featured in these trials were Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. 
48
 The study by Bennett el al. (2006) was carried out on nine thousand Bt and non-Bt cotton plots in the 
state of Maharashtra between 2003-03.  Questionnaires were conducted by Mahyco and monitored by the 
Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC), the apex regulatory authority in India.  This 
highlighted spatial and temporal variation in the performance of Bt varieties (Bennett et al., 2006: 70). 
49
 Qaim et al. (2006) researched three hundred and forty-one cotton farmers in Maharashtra, Karnataka, 
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu in the 2002-03 season.  They found significant variation in the 
performance of the technology associated with agro-ecological differences and variability in farmers’ 
spraying habits (Qaim et al., 2006: 56).  
50
 The research by Qayum and Sakkhari (2005) was conducted in Andhra Pradesh during the 2002-03 
season, and featured one hundred and sixty-four farmers in twenty-seven villages.  Income and expenditure 
data was obtained by means of structured interviews conducted at fortnightly intervals throughout the 
season.  Eleven NGOs assisted with the data collection. 
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conducted by Dev and Rao (2007: 3)51 during the 2004-2005 season in four districts 
of Andhra Pradesh, including Warangal, found negative farm incomes in the case of 
both Bt and non-Bt cotton.  This was despite the better yields obtained by Bt cotton 
farmers – nine quintals per acre as opposed to seven for non-Bt farmers (ibid.: 2).52  
This research indicated that cotton farming itself was non-viable, regardless of the 
seed varieties used.  The variability of results led Subramaniam and Qaim (2009: 
256) to argue that a ‘typical cotton growing village’ does not exist.   
 
It is argued that there are a large number of intervening factors which influence 
crop performance, other than the modification associated with Bt technology.  
Kuruganti (2009: 31) claims that parameters such as a good monsoon, low pest 
pressure and soil type are also highly relevant.  He (ibid.) argues that, in Gujarat, 
increases in cotton production are more likely to be linked to the increase in 
irrigation and to the hybrid varieties themselves, rather than to Bt technology.  
Indeed, the percentage of land area which is irrigated in India has risen significantly 
from 8.2 per cent in 1950-51 (Barik, 2010: 2) to 45.3 per cent in 2008-09.53  This 
difficulty in establishing direct cause and effect relations with regard to Bt 
technology has led Gaurav and Mishra (2012: 6) to argue that it is contributing to a 
‘stochastic production process’ in which agriculture has become a gamble.   
 
                                                 
51
 This research involved focus groups and structured interviews, and featured six hundred and twenty-three 
cultivators (seventy per cent of whom were cultivating Bt varieties). 
52
 It should be noted that, according to Herring (2008a: 147), Mahyco-Monsanto claim that yields of up to 
fifteen quintals per acre are possible with Bt cotton. 
53
 State of Indian Agriculture Report, 2010-2011, p. 13.  Available at: 
http://agricoop.nic.in/sia111213312.pdf Accessed on 9/3/2013. 
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Tripp (2009: 82) highlights the influence of climatic variation on Bt cotton 
outcomes and notes that, even in the same growing environment, different farmers 
have variable capacities in dealing with climatic risk.  He also argues that the risks 
associated with Bt cotton are more difficult to bear for resource-poor farmers given 
that smaller farmers have limited access to irrigation.  Smale et al. (2006: 205) note 
that the more heterogenous the growing environment, the more variable the benefits 
of Bt cotton are likely to be, and argue that India is particularly complex in this 
regard.  These authors (ibid.: 209) claim that, given this variability across time and 
geographical location, economic findings on Bt cotton cannot be generalised. 
 
In terms of seeking to assess this variability, Smale (2012: 117) highlights the trade-
off between the sampling bias associated with smaller samples, and likely 
measurement errors in larger surveys.  Both Smale (ibid.: 115) and Qaim et al. 
(2006: 52) highlight that studies on Bt cotton use average data to present findings 
which often mask the degree of heterogeneity among individual farmers.  The 
current study seeks differentiate average findings on costs, yields and incomes 
between Risk Coalitions.  It also presents this data at the level of individual farmers 
in order to explore the relative micro level impact of Bt cotton variability on 
poverty alleviation and risk exposure in the 2010/2011 season. 
 
Within the wider Indian context, poverty figures are used to alternately legitimate or 
delegitimate the technocratic approach to poverty alleviation.  Many authors argue 
that the Green Revolution had a positive effect on poverty figures overall (Brass, 
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1990: 265; Corbridge and Harriss, 1990: 84; Frankel, 2005: 608; Reddy and Mishra, 
2010: 55).54  A similar claim is made with regard to the Gene Revolution.  The 
Planning Commission reported that ‘from 2004-2005 to 2009-2010, the rate of 
poverty in India fell from 37.2 per cent to 29.8 per cent, which means around 360 
million people currently live in poverty.’55  The number of rural poor in India was 
officially set at thirty-three per cent for 2009-10, as opposed to an urban poverty 
figure of twenty per cent.56 
 
This thesis argues, however, that poverty alleviation cannot be assessed without a 
consideration of debt levels.  Both the Green and Gene Revolutions have been 
associated with the dramatic extension of credit facilities to farmers.  As Varshney 
(1998: 120) argues, the ‘[a]doption of the new [HYV] technology required credit; 
and the government, for its part, vastly expanded its credit operations in order to 
facilitate the Green Revolution.’ The significant costs associated with the fertilisers, 
pesticides and irrigation required for the cultivation of HYVs have led NGOs to 
argue that alternative methods, such as Non-Pesticide Management (NPM) 
(Ramanjaneyulu, 2006) and organic farming (Misra, 2009), are more viable due to 
the lower costs and reduced ecological damage with which they are characterised.   
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 The relation of prices to poverty has always been the main factor in estimating those below poverty level, 
defined by calculating real per capita expenditure on a basket of food items needed to meet minimum 
calorific requirements.  Frankel (2005: 607) highlights that uncertainty exists as to the estimates of poverty 
in the 1980s and 1990s due to concerns for the representativeness of expenditure patterns from the villages, 
shops and markets from which price data was collected.  
55
 Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-17441347  Accessed on 17/3/2013. 
56
 Available at http://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/00957/Poverty_Line_957814a.pdf Accessed 
on 20/4/2013. 
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The Contested Construction of Risk and the Ideology of Development 
Attempts to secure the ideological legitimation of risk are closely related to efforts 
to legitimate the current neo-liberal model of development.  Here, claims of India’s 
growing ‘middle class’ (Kohli, 2009: 10), and the increasing incorporation of a 
rural elite within this (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: xx), are asserted by neo-liberal 
proponents to promote the ideological legitimation of the technocratic approach.   
 
The emphasis on India’s increasing middle class as the basis for the ideological 
legitimation of the neo-liberal development model has also created the impetus for 
India’s burgeoning consumer society.  As Varma (2007: 183) argues, ‘the middle 
class’ ability to consume [has become] an index to progress.’ Similarly, Corbridge 
and Harriss (2000: 257) note that the term ‘middle class’ in India is associated with 
‘the ownership of at least three of four assets: motor vehicle, television set, electric 
pumpset [and] non-agricultural land.’  
 
Proponents of the technocratic approach argue that the greater prosperity associated 
with Bt technology has contributed to allowing more families to keep their children 
at school, and so provides the basis for India’s ongoing development.  Indeed, 
India’s literacy rates have risen from sixty-four per cent for males and thirty-nine 
per cent for females in 1991 (Frankel, 2005: 608) to eighty-two per cent for males 
and sixty-five per cent for females in 2011.57   
                                                 
57
 The rural literacy rate for males was seventy-eight per cent and fifty-eight per cent for females, according 
to 2011 figures.  This was opposed to urban figures of eighty-nine per cent and seventy-nine per cent, 
respectively. Figures from the 2011 Census of India. Available at: http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-
results/paper2/data_files/india/paper2_at_a_glance.pdf Accessed on 5/3/2013. 
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The ideological legitimation of a technocratic approach as the basis for 
development is, however, strongly contested.  Le Mons Walker (2008: 558) argues 
that, since India’s adoption of neo-liberal policies in 1991, the absolute number of 
rural poor is rapidly increasing as the state withdraws from welfare provision.  This 
is highlighted by the stark inequity with which the country continues to be 
associated.  The country was ranked sixty-seventh out of eighty-four countries in 
the Global Hunger Index for 2010 (Times of India, 12/10/2010).  At the same time, 
the number of Indian billionaires rose from nine in 2004, to thirty six in 2007 and to 
fifty-three in 2008 – four of them ranking among the top eight in the world in terms 
of net worth (Kroll, 2008, as cited in Le Mons Walker, 2008: 564).    
 
The high-profile Indian activist, Vandana Shiva (1999: 601), asserts that the 
benefits of Bt technology go to seed and chemical corporations through expanding 
markets, while the costs and risks are exclusively borne by small farmers and the 
landless.  Her view that Bt cotton serves to reinforce existing power structures is 
clear in her assertion that the technology represents a ‘corporate control of seeds’ 
(ibid.).   
 
The ambiguity associated with the technology, and the difficulty in isolating its 
impact from other factors in the agrarian context can be seen from the arguments of 
opponents that the addition of a Cry1Ac gene to HYVs has made little contribution 
to the increase in cotton yields.  Kuruganti (2009: 31) argues, ‘if pest incidence is 
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low due to climatic and other conditions, there cannot be yield increases due to 
protection from crop losses [as a result of] insect-resistant varieties’.   
 
This uncertainty is also associated with the safety of the technology itself.  NGOs 
assert reports of livestock deaths which they argue have occurred as a result of the 
animals having grazed on Bt cotton.  Herring (2008: 155) argues that the idea that 
these deaths could have resulted from the animals having grazed on Bt cotton is 
biologically impossible.58  He observes, however, that ‘the claim itself gets wide 
publicity, is difficult to disconfirm on the ground, and has the ring of authenticity as 
a product of local knowledge.’  The demand for ‘scientific’ proof from scientifically 
uneducated cultivators in order to support their assertions of risk with regard to the 
animal deaths is redolent of the ‘evidence trap’ referred to by Renn (2008: 133).  
Thus, the ideological legitimation of the risk of Bt cotton remains subject to the 
profound ‘non-knowing’ asserted by Beck (2009: 115). 
 
As part of the attempts to secure the ideological legitimation of the neo-liberal 
approach to risk negotiation, government initiatives have sought to institutionalise a 
trickle down effect (Frankel, 2005: 503).  This has included the Public Distribution 
System which was introduced in 1972, as a means of delivering subsided food items 
to the most vulnerable.59  It is noted, however, that these rations require access to 
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 It is argued that Bt cotton is toxic only to organisms which contain receptors to Bt proteins – namely, the 
Lepidoptera and Phthiraptera classes of insects (Karihaloo and Kumar, 2009: 3). 
59
 Under the terms of the Public Distribution System, households with an annual income of less than Rs 
6,000 are issued with white ration cards which entitle them to five kilograms of rice at two rupees per 
person per month from fair price shops.  This is up to a ceiling of twenty kilograms.  Pink card holders are 
also entitled to rations up to a lower ceiling.  Sugar, kerosene and edible oil are also provided at reduced 
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cash, a commodity which the rural poor, by definition, lack.  The PDS has been 
criticised for its inefficient targeting of the poor (Deb, 2009: 70) where it is argued 
that restricting access only to the poor is ‘administratively unachievable and 
expensive’ (ibid.), and for its leakages and waste (Indrakanth, 1997).  It has been 
argued by Varshney (1998: 7) that, given the extent of India’s inequality, food 
surpluses often coexist with hunger.  The situation highlights the impact of power 
relations on the ideological legitimation of an ongoing differentiation of risk 
exposure. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has argued that the risk associated with the agrarian 
crisis in village India is differentiated along dimensions relating to caste, land-
holding, and gender.  The resulting ‘social risk positions’ (Beck, 1992: 23) serve as 
the basis for power relations which are subject to an ongoing legitimation struggle.  
The debate concerning the legitimation of Bt cotton can be seen as symbolic of this 
wider struggle to legitimate power through the assertion by opponents of the 
unequal exposure to risk associated not only with the technology, but also with the 
neo-liberal development model within which the technology is embedded. 
 
Scoones (2005: 302) highlights that mobilisations associated with opposition to Bt 
technology relate to emergent forms of citizenship and, as such, ‘present the 
opportunity to create a new democratic politics.’ They thus represent, he argues, 
‘new images both of hope and anxiety’ (ibid.).   The key question, as Scoones 
                                                                                                                                                 
prices.  According to Le Mons Walker (2008: 572), due to pressure from the World Bank, the ration prices 
for rice rose from two rupees to Rs 3.50 in the 1990s.  The two rupee price has since been restored.   
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(2005: 302) highlights and which this thesis seeks to explore, becomes ‘[w]hat type 
of politics is biotech creating?’ This thesis will now turn to an exploration of the Bt 
cotton debate as a concern of democratic praxis. 
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Chapter Three 
Bt Technology and Democratic Legitimacy  
 in Indian Politics 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, risk definition as a function of institutional decision-making is 
explored.  This is undertaken through, firstly, examining democratic praxis within 
the Indian context.  The chapter then presents the core-periphery model developed 
by the German critical theorist, Jürgen Habermas (1996: 354-359), as the central 
framework adopted to analyse democratic legitimacy.  
 
The core-periphery model is adopted in two ways:  firstly, it is used as a basis to 
explore power relations as the ‘relations of definition’ referred to by Beck (1995: 
43).  Here, definitional power is differentiated according to the model’s empirical 
positioning of actors based upon their decision-making power. Secondly, the model 
is used to explore the relation between democratic praxis and the exercise of power 
as the basis for analysing democratic legitimacy in the Bt cotton debate. This is 
undertaken through adopting the Habermasian depiction of legitimate democratic 
praxis as a ‘circulation of power’ (1996: 356) between the core and periphery.    
 
3.2 The Indian Context and the Institutionalisation of Democracy 
The democratic ideal is defined as self-rule (Dahl, 1989: 3) or self-determination 
(Bohman, 2007: 2). Gandhi referred to self-rule as Swaraj and argued that it 
represented both a political and an ethical project.  In Gandhi’s view, democracy 
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required the ability to learn how to exercise personal power responsibly in order to 
secure the freedom of the collective.  He (1910, as cited in Parel, 1997: 73) claimed, 
‘it is Swaraj when we learn to rule ourselves….If we become free, India is free.’ 
 
The concept of self-rule is particularly meaningful in Indian society.  This is not 
least due to the centuries of imperial rule and colonial oppression which the country 
has endured, and which culminated in a long fight for freedom from British rule.60  
Through the efforts of Mahatma Gandhi and other nationalist leaders, this struggle 
for freedom became a mass movement and serves as the legacy for the formation of 
the contemporary Indian state.  
 
It is also recognised, however, that the realisation of self-rule as a political praxis in 
a country of India’s inequality, complexity and diversity has proved notoriously 
difficult.  In fact, authors argue that India has been undergoing a ‘crisis of 
governability’ (Kohli, 1990: ix; Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 253) for some time.  
The celebrated Indian political analyst, Rajni Kothari (2005: 69), contends that the 
legitimacy of India’s democratic institutions has been slowly eroded since 
Independence.  This ‘deinstitutionalisation’ (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 76) of 
Indian politics is particularly linked with Indira Gandhi’s61 time in office.  Indian 
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 British rule in India is generally regarded to have begun with the Battle of Plassey in 1757.  As a result of 
this conflict, the British East India Company, initially established as a commercial venture, gained the 
power to extract revenues from the local population (Nehru, [1946], 2004: 321).  The British occupation of 
India ended in 1947 following a long struggle for independence.   
61
 Indira Gandhi served as Prime Minister of India for fifteen years (1966-1977; 1980-1984).  She imposed 
Emergency rule on the country between 1975 and 1977 when democratic rights were suspended, and 
political opponents arrested.  This time was associated with a by-passing of the decision-making 
institutions of government, and a subsequent damage to their legitimacy from which they have struggled to 
recover (Sharma, 2010: 79).   
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politics has also been associated with increasing levels of criminalisation, 
corruption and violence (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 95; Mohanty, 2004: 110; 
Frankel, 2005: 21; Sharma, 2010: 68).    
 
And, yet, it is also acknowledged that Indian democracy cannot be lightly 
dismissed.  Instead, the world’s largest democracy is noted for its deeply 
paradoxical nature (Chandhoke and Priyadarshi, 2009: ix).  The country has a free 
press, numerous political parties and free elections, with a voter turnout of around 
sixty per cent (Sharma, 2010: 89).  It is also recognised that grave concerns for the 
institutionalisation of democratic praxis coincide with the diffusion of the 
democratic ideal to increasing sections of Indian society.   
 
Sharma (2010: 67) observes, ‘democracy has become such an indelible part of the 
nation’s political consciousness that – despite the disillusionment with ‘politics as 
usual’ – most Indians continue to maintain a deep philosophical commitment to 
democracy.’ This ‘deepening of democracy’ (ibid.: 68) has, however, created 
problems associated with increasing political fragmentation.  Thus, it is argued that 
India has become ‘increasingly democratic and increasingly difficult to govern’ 
(Manor, 1988: 72, as cited in Corbridge et al., 2013: 125).   
 
India is also the site of an ideological struggle with regard to the country’s 
development and the way in which risk should be negotiated as part of this.  As has 
been noted, this has seen the redistributive focus of the socialist approach favoured 
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by Nehru largely eschewed in favour of a ‘growth first’ (Kohli, 2009: 154) neo-
liberal emphasis on improvements in productivity.  
 
It is recognised that the ideal of self-rule in a country marked by the poverty of the 
Indian context is highly problematic.  It is argued that the ongoing liberalisation62 of 
the Indian economy, rather than occurring as a result of reasoned decision-making 
by India’s leaders in consultation with its citizens, has instead been imposed by 
external powerful structures in return for borrowing and, in the past, for food aid 
(Frankel, 2005: 271).63   
 
The link between self-sufficiency and a country’s ability to define its own decisions 
was noted by Indira Gandhi, who argued that ‘many countries were trying to 
influence India’ as the nation was not self-sufficient (1969, as cited in Frankel, 
2005: 403).  Critics contend that the undue influence of the United States 
government and the reliance on IMF and World Bank funding are exposing India to 
risk, and undermining the autonomy of India’s decision-making institutions 
(Frankel, 2005: 403; Kothari, 2005: 57; Kohli, 2009: 153).  It is also argued that 
food aid was allocated on a ‘short-tether’ basis in 1965 in order to exert pressure on 
India’s leaders to undertake the agrarian reforms associated with the Green 
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 Liberalisation measures include currency devaluation, deregulation, privatisation and trade liberalisation 
(Le Mons Walker, 2008: 559). 
63
 The rupee was devalued by thirty-six per cent by Indira Gandhi in return for food aid in 1966 (Frankel, 
2005: 298).  Similarly, a $5 billion loan from the IMF in 1981 was approved on the basis that India would 
remove trade barriers (Mohanty, 1986: 254; Kohli, 2009: 157).  The more recent structural adjustment 
undertaken as a result of borrowing in 1991 is largely regarded as India’s shift to a more fully neo-liberal 
approach.  This is associated with the further removal of barriers to globalised trade, and the increased 
withdrawal of the state from public spending on welfare measures (Le Mons Walker, 2008: 573; Kohli, 
2009: 39). Talks are also ongoing regarding a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union.  
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Revolution (Varshney, 1998: 70; Corbridge and Harris, 2000: 69; Frankel, 2005: 
286).  This also served to secure the ideological shift away from socialism which 
the US government was keen to secure (Varshney, 1998: 28; Frankel, 2005: 341).   
 
The influence of external actors, such as the United States, on India’s policy-
making with regard to the negotiation of risk remains strong.  In 2005, India entered 
into an Indo-US Knowledge Initiative in agriculture which was signed with 
President Bush as a precursor to India’s ‘second Green Revolution’ (Raina, 2006: 
1622). This aims to foster public-private partnerships between the two countries. 
However, the agreement, which seeks closer collaboration with multinationals as 
part of India’s development, precluded public consultation and is unavailable for 
open perusal (ibid.).   
 
The Indian political analyst, Atul Kohli (2009: 42), argues that the state in India is 
increasingly required to alternate between demands to its legitimacy related to 
economic growth and those related to redistribution.  It should be recognised, 
however, that the discourse of risk also serves as a new basis for challenging the 
legitimacy of the state. This has been reinforced through the protests and civil 
unrest which are an indelible aspect of Indian society.64    
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 The idea that the current development model is strongly contested on the grounds of its risks is evident 
from a brief selection of Indian media reports during the nine months covering the research period.  These 
include protests against a thermal power plant in Sompeta, Andhra Pradesh (Times of India, 15/07/2010), 
claims of unfair compensation and illegalities with regard to land grabs for industry (Times of India, 
8/9/2010; 10/9/2010), the displacement of India’s indigenous tribal populations due to mining activities in 
Srikakulam, Andhra Pradesh (Times of India, 31/01/2011) and demonstrations against the building of 
industries due to ecological destruction and the displacement of communities, such as a $12 billion steel 
mill in Orissa (Deccan Chronicle, 2/2/2011). 
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There are also signs that India’s global positioning has been changing in recent 
years.  This may signal the beginning of a somewhat strengthened, though still 
highly circumscribed, ability to negotiate risk on its own terms.  India’s altered 
positioning in ‘development’ terms was highlighted by the recent announcement 
that the UK intends to stop all aid funding to India by 2015.  The Indian foreign 
minister, Salman Khurshid, asserted the view that ‘[a]id is the past and trade is the 
future.’65 This posturing is significant given that, as has previously been 
highlighted, global power relations exert a significant influence on a state’s ability 
to negotiate risk on its own terms, in ways which respond to the legitimation 
demands of its citizens. 
 
The changing stature of India within global power circles is evident from the 
heightened pressure by India’s politicians on the United States government to 
endorse a permanent seat for India on the UN Security Council in return for trade 
alliances (Sharma, 2011: 120-122; Times of India, 17/11/2010).  This was a 
particularly prominent theme during the visit of President Obama in 2010 (Sharma, 
2011: 120-122), and highlights India’s attempts to re-negotiate its place in global 
power relations.   
 
In light of this wider context, this chapter now turns to a closer examination of the 
Indian democratic process, using the struggle to define the risk associated with Bt 
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 Available at:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20265583 Accessed on 2/4/2013.   
An article in the Times of India (13/3/2011) entitled ‘Post-colonial British angst at Indian disdain for aid’ 
also asserted the view that India would be ‘unmoved’ if British aid money was spent elsewhere.    
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technology as the lens with which to explore the political praxis of Andhra Pradesh 
in greater detail.  This analysis is undertaken using the Habermasian core-periphery 
model (1996: 356-359) as a central analytical framework. 
 
3.3 The Core-Periphery Model and Crisis in Relations of Definition 
Kothari (2005: 1) makes the crucial observation that democracy is both an 
‘institutional and ideological’ concern.  This recognises that democracy is both an 
ideal associated with self-rule and normative principles such as equality, justice, 
liberty and fraternity, and a political praxis which attempts to institutionalise this 
ideal. This thesis argues that the legitimation of democratic praxis entails references 
to the normative principles which serve as the basis for its inspiration.  This relates 
to the idea of ‘internal transcendence’ (Strydom, 1999: 13) where normative 
principles, such as justice and equality, serve as the basis for legitimating the 
exercise of power within immanent democratic praxis.  
 
At the meso level, the analysis seeks to capture the dynamic and contested nature of 
Indian democratic praxis through the use of the core-periphery model (Habermas, 
1996: 356-359).66  This model is adopted due to its illustration of the ideal of 
democracy in terms of a legitimate democratic praxis in a way which is amenable to 
analysis.  
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 Indian analysts have also been attracted to the ideas of Habermas.  For instance, the celebrated Indian 
political theorist, Thomas Pantham, finds much commonality in the works of Gandhi and Habermas in 
terms of their critiques of Western capitalism.  This is discussed in Beyond Liberal Democracy: Thinking 
with Mahatma Gandhi in Pantham and Deutsch (1986: 325-346) and Habermas’ Practical Discourses and 
Gandhi’s Satyagraha in Parekh and Pantham (1987: 292-310). 
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The current exploration of the Indian democratic process is undertaken with a 
particular focus on the power relations involved in the attempts to construct 
knowledge in relation to the definition of risk associated with Bt cotton.  Here, the 
core-periphery model is adopted in two ways.  Firstly, it provides an empirical 
framework for the differentiation of institutional actors according to their decision-
making power within society.  This is used to analyse the ‘relations of definition’ 
described by Beck (1995: 43), as well as the potential for ‘institutional crisis’ which 
Beck (ibid.: 8) suggests attempts to define risk represent.   
 
Secondly, the model is used to analyse the attempts by social actors to negotiate 
their own power as part of knowledge construction in democratic praxis.  This is 
undertaken through adopting the model’s portrayal of the ideal of democracy as a 
‘circulation of power’67 to serve as a normative reference point for the analysis of 
the suggested exercise of power proposed by actors in their own framing of how 
democratic praxis should operate.  Both of these aspects will now be explored with 
regard to the current analysis of the Bt technology debate. 
 
The Core-Periphery Model and Relations of Definition 
The core-periphery model is here used to explore the ‘relations of definition’ (Beck, 
1995: 43) in terms of the differentiation of social actors with regard to their formal 
decision-making power.  This differentiation can be seen as that which exists 
between those who make collective and official decisions on behalf of society 
                                                 
67
 For Habermas (1996: 356), decision-making power is traced through communication flows between the 
core and periphery. 
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(which are formalised through legislation), and those who are in positions to advise 
and influence them, but cannot themselves officially decide.  This recognises 
Strydom’s (2013)68 view that the core-periphery model ‘lays out the actual 
parameters of the ground on which differently positioned actors meet, negotiate and 
struggle.’   
 
It is recognised that institutions vary greatly in terms of the influence which they 
can exert on decision-makers.  This is a primary source of contention within 
contemporary India as influencers from industry seek to assert their power over and 
above the ‘official’ decision-making function of the state.  As this chapter will 
highlight, this contributes to the ‘institutional crisis’ described by Beck (1994: 8).  
This thesis suggests that the potential for an illegitimate exercise of power to be 
institutionalised as part of democratic praxis represents the real potential for a 
‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas, [1973], 1976) at this level. 
 
 The Core as Decision Makers  
The parliamentary bodies and those actors who comprise the incumbent 
government and opposition parties are referred to by Habermas (1996: 354-355) as 
the political core.  The core is distinguished from the periphery by virtue of its 
‘formal decision-making powers’ (ibid.: 355).  In India, the core is comprised of the 
parliamentary complex of the central government in Delhi,69 as well as the 
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 E-mail communication with Piet Strydom, a recently retired Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory at 
University College Cork (4/3/2013).   
69
 As Sharma (2010: 68-73) notes, the key institutions of national governance are the executive (composed 
of the president and the Council of Ministers), the Parliament, and the Supreme Court.   India’s parliament, 
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institutions of democracy associated with the federal states.  Given that it is the 
federal state which is constitutionally responsible for agricultural policy, the 
government of Andhra Pradesh is regarded as the core in terms of the current 
analysis.  However, it is noted that, with regard to the debate on Bt technology, the 
relation of the Andhra Pradesh state to the wider core of Delhi is itself characterised 
by considerable conflict.  This will be explored in Chapter Four. 
 
It has been argued that the government in India privileges science-based decision 
making (Gupta, 2011: 737).  This has led to its being referred to as a ‘laboratory 
state’ (Visvanathan, 1988: 257) and has raised concerns with regard to its 
impartiality.  Similarly, the legitimacy of the core itself is questioned due to the 
perceived influence of global institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and 
World Bank in the state’s development planning.  As the analysis highlights, the 
influence of such external actors is regarded by opponents of Bt technology as 
limiting the core’s ability to take decisions which respond to the demands of its 
own citizens as a concern of legitimation.   
 
In the current study, the core is represented by the incumbent Agricultural Minster 
in Andhra Pradesh (from the Congress Party),70 and the spokesperson for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
the supreme legislative body of the country, consists of a bicameral legislature made up of the Lok Sabha 
(House of the People or lower house) and the Rajya Sabha (Council of States or upper house).  The 
Supreme Court is the highest legal tribunal and the ultimate interpreter and guardian of the constitution.  As 
Sharma (ibid.: 71) highlights, the Supreme Court is an institution of considerable significance in India. 
70
 The Congress Party was at the forefront of India’s struggle for independence from British rule.   It has 
been referred to as ‘an umbrella party’ (Varshney, 1998: 30) given the variety of ideological positions 
which it incorporates. 
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Communist Party (Marxist) or CPM in opposition.71  The Congress Party actor is 
largely supportive of the technology and the neo-liberal ideology72 in which it is 
embedded, while the CPM actor opposes both.   
 
While such competing ideological views between political parties in the core are 
fundamental to the praxis of democracy, it should be noted that there have been 
increasing questions associated with the constitutional legitimacy of the neo-liberal 
ideology from the Supreme Court itself.  Sharma (2011: 71) highlights that the 
Supreme Court has begun to assert its authority with regard to the questioning of 
government policy in recent years.  This was evidenced by the insistence of the 
Court during the research period that food rotting in godowns (warehouses) should 
be distributed for free to the poor (Deccan Chronicle, 7/9/2010).   
 
The response by the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, that the Supreme Court 
should not get involved ‘in the realm of policy formulation’ (Deccan Chronicle, 
7/9/2010) serves to highlight the tension between institutions within the 
parliamentary complex of the core itself.  The Supreme Court has also criticised the 
government’s policy on development, referring to it as ‘blinkered’ (The Times of 
India, 21/07/2010), and arguing that the inequality which it promotes exposes the 
country to the risk of terrorist groups, such as the Naxalites (ibid).73   
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 The communists are the largest opposition party in national politics (Frankel, 2005: 210).  Kohli (2009: 
35) argues that the CPM are essentially ‘social democratic’ in their approach.    
72
 The concept of ideology used in this thesis is adopted in the neutral sense posited by Van Dijk (1998) and 
O’Mahony (2011: 167) where it does not necessarily denote false consciousness.  Instead, ideologies here 
represent the ‘principles that form the basis of…beliefs’ (Van Dijk, 1998: 8).  
73
 The Naxalites, Maoists, or Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), were formed from a split in the CPM in 
1969 (Brass, 1990: 299).  They are strongly inspired by the ideas of Chairman Mao and the Chinese 
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Finally, there has also been conflict within the core itself between the competing 
development priorities and ideological preferences associated with different 
government departments. In the case of Bt technology, a Department of 
Biotechnology under the Ministry of Science and Technology has aggressively 
promoted the development and adoption of transgenic crops, in contrast to a more 
cautious Ministry of Environment and Forests (Gupta, 2011: 737).  Thus, the debate 
on Bt technology is increasingly resulting in confrontation between institutions 
themselves as democratic praxis is called upon to transform itself in response to the 
demands of risk society.  
 
 The Inner Periphery as Advisors 
According to Habermas (1996: 355), the inner periphery is comprised of 
institutions ‘equipped with oversight and law-making functions as delegated by the 
state.’  In the case of Bt technology, the inner periphery includes the regulatory 
authorities whose function it is to advise the government on legislation.  The 
analysis in the current study features a member of the Review Committee for 
Genetic Modification (RCGM) who is also a senior research scientist at ANGRAU, 
the agricultural university in Andhra Pradesh.74 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
revolution.  Naxalites assert that the state serves only as an instrument of ‘compradore-bureaucrat 
capitalism’ (Mohanty, 1986: 253), and thus blocks the realisation of a true democracy of the people.  They, 
therefore, seek the state’s violent overthrow.  Naxalites are explored in more detail in Chapter Four given 
their presence in Telangana.   
74
 India has a vast network of state agricultural universities which are regulated by the Indian Council of 
Agricultural Research (ICAR).  As Scoones (2005: 121) notes, these were modelled on the land grant 
universities of the US, and their academic programmes are strongly influenced by the US system.  Due to 
their increasing collaboration with the corporate sector, however, Raina (2006: 1622) describes them as 
‘quasi-public’. 
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The Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) is the apex regulatory 
authority for Bt technology and reports to the Ministry of Environment and Forests 
(MoEF).  The Review Committee on Genetic Modification (RCGM) forms part of 
the Department of Biotechnology under the Ministry of Science and Technology 
and reports to the GEAC. The RCGM is mandated to oversee small-scale field 
trials, while the GEAC is the final point of regulatory approval for GM crops in 
India (Lianchawii, 2005: 4287).    
 
The early experience of Bt cotton in India highlighted serious concerns with regard 
to the Indian regulatory process.  As previously highlighted, though Bt cotton was 
‘officially’ approved in India in 2002, the crop had, in fact, been grown illegally 
since 1999 (Herring, 2012: 48).75  Since then, illegal and spurious76 seed varieties 
have proliferated (Herring, 2008b: 154).  This has been widely regarded as evidence 
of regulatory failure (Lianchawii, 2005: 4285; Kuruganti, 2006: 4246).  
 
The idea that the challenge of regulating Bt cotton has placed an extra burden on 
India’s judicial institutions is clear.  The legality of the field trials of Bt cotton 
conducted in 1998 is still pending a Supreme Court decision, given that it is argued 
that initial field trials were approved by the RCGM, without being passed by the 
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 As highlighted previously, Mahyco was granted permission to import one hundred grams of Bt cotton 
seed as part of an agreement with Monsanto as early as 1995 (Scoones, 2005: 252).  However, the RCGM 
did not become involved in the monitoring of field trials until 1998 (ibid.).  This illustrates the difficulties 
faced by political institutions in attempting to keep track of Bt technology, given the reach of 
multinationals and their potential to by-pass national processes of legitimation.   
76
 Herring (2008b: 151) notes that spurious seeds are often locally referred to as ‘duplicates’.  These are 
sold by unscrupulous dealers as Bt seeds when they do not, in fact, contain the Bt gene.  Alternatively, they 
may be F2 second generation seeds gathered from the seed saving of a Bt cotton crop in which the genetic 
modification will be associated with a weaker expression (ibid.).  
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GEAC (Ramanjaneyulu, 2005: 5). The Research Foundation for Science, 
Technology and Ecology (RFSTE) also challenges the lack of biosafety procedures 
during these trials (Scoones, 2005: 315-323).   In more recent times, the NGO 
reports of animal deaths are asserted by opponents as indicating serious 
shortcomings in the biosafety testing in India, given the failure to test the impact of 
Bt crops on livestock (Kuruganti, 2006: 4246).   
 
The conflict between institutions in the core and inner periphery in terms of 
decision-taking on risk was highlighted in the latest controversy regarding attempts 
to extend Bt technology to a food crop, Bt bringal (aubergine).  Bt bringal was 
officially approved for commercial cultivation in India by the GEAC in 2009, 
making it India’s first food crop to receive such approval.  However, the then-
Minister of State for Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, announced in 
February, 2010, that the GEAC’s ‘decision’ should be seen as a recommendation 
only, and asserted the primacy of his power in the core by claiming that the ultimate 
authority for decision-making in this regard lay with his department in government.  
He then imposed an indefinite moratorium on the cultivation of Bt bringal pending 
the findings of future research. 
 
 The Periphery as Influencers 
The outer periphery (referred to simply as the periphery in the current research) is 
comprised of India’s highly politicised and diverse civil society.  According to 
Habermas (1996: 355), these include ‘public agencies and private organisations, 
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business associations, labour unions and interest groups’ (ibid.).  As discussed, 
actors on the periphery are so designated because they do not possess ‘official’ 
decision-making power.  They are, therefore, obliged to lobby the core in order to 
have their interests recognised.   
 
It is acknowledged that institutional actors vary greatly in terms of their ability to 
exert influence on the core.  For the purposes of examining this differentiation, 
certain key actors have been selected to represent the polarity of views which Bt 
technology represents on the model’s periphery.  These include the multinational, 
Monsanto, which is associated with the development and promotion of Bt 
technology, and three non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who are strongly 
opposed to the technology.   
 
 Monsanto 
Monsanto77 has been the focus of much of the public opposition to Bt technology.  
In India, the distrust with which the organisation is perceived by many is 
heightened due to the traditional aversion to capitalists asserted by Nehru and 
Gandhi.  As Frankel (2005: 14) highlights, Gandhi argued that the capitalist was 
committing ‘the moral equivalent of theft.’  Gandhi (as cited in Frankel, 2005: 15) 
also predicted the threat to democracy which capitalism presented, arguing that the 
‘moneyed classes would control political parties, the legislatures and the media so 
that democracy existed in name only.’  
                                                 
77
 Monsanto’s headquarters are in St Louis, Missouri, in the United States.  The company’s net profits in 
2011 were $1.6 billion.  Available at:  
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2012/snapshots/11092.html Accessed on 8/10/2013. 
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Nehru ([1946], 2004: 620), too, maintained that ‘[t]he competitive and acquisitive 
characteristics of modern capitalist society, the enthronement of wealth above 
everything else…add[ed] to the ill health of the mind and produce[d] neurotic 
states.’ The hostile approach to Monsanto78 has been heightened due to the 
organisation’s association with scientific innovations such as Agent Orange79 and 
PCBs80 which have subsequently been linked with damage to health (Smith, 2004: 
115).  
 
The company’s strategy with regard to Bt technology has been described as a ‘PR 
disaster’ (Scoones, 2005: 108).  This has contributed to fears that the company is 
seeking to gain corporate control of the food chain in ways which will lead to the 
commodification of seeds, and pass the power of the world’s food supply to the 
multinational (Shiva, 1999: 75; Weis, 2007).  The lack of trust with which the 
company is regarded by opponents has fuelled concerns that Bt food crops will 
form part of a ‘reforms by stealth’ (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 121) approach.  
This relates to the potential for Monsanto’s economic power to be used to by-pass 
the process of legitimation in ways which undermine the democratic process.   
                                                 
78
 A ‘Monsanto Quit India’ day was observed in New Delhi on 9th August, 2011.  Available at: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/india/en/Press/Monsanto-quit-India-day-observed-across-the-nation/  
Accessed on 14/4/2013. 
79
 Agent Orange, a herbicide and defoliant developed by Monsanto, was used by the US military as part of 
a strategy of chemical warfare during the Vietnam War.  Thousands of veterans and tens of thousands of 
Vietnamese developed health problems, which included cancer, neurological disorder and birth defects 
(Smith, 2004: 115). 
80
 The synthetic chemicals, PCBs (poly-chlorinated biphenyls), developed by Monsanto, were adopted in a 
variety of ways following assurances of their safety.  Uses included insulation of electrical equipment and 
serving as a flame-retardant in paint. The chemicals are now outlawed due to their links with cancer and 
birth defects (Smith, 2004: 115).   
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It is argued that the economic power of Monsanto, the employment which the 
organisation provides81 and its access to expensive research equipment and highly 
qualified specialists, provide it with significant influence in its lobbying of the core.  
This also allows the company to gain more widespread legitimation for its 
ideological positioning.  As Glover (2002: 2736) highlights, ‘through their political 
influence, [transnational companies] serve as a ‘‘transmission belt’ for the 
penetration of norms, values and practices from their home countries.’   
 
When such a transmission belt concerns the diffusion of technologies which could 
potentially expose citizens to risk, however, then the legitimacy of the state itself is 
threatened, as is the epistemic dimension of democratic praxis.  This leads to a 
situation where, as Beck (1992: 227) observes, ‘[b]usiness is not responsible for 
something it causes, while politics is responsible for something over which it has 
no control.’  Chapter Four will explore the ways in which the organisation has 
specifically challenged the Andhra Pradesh state government’s attempts to regulate 
its operations and contributed to conflict in centre-state relations.    
 
The awareness of its own problems with legitimation has been a crucial factor in 
Monsanto’s linking up with high-profile, well-established and trusted Indian 
concerns (Scoones, 2005: 161).  These include the affiliation with the Indian seed 
company, Mahyco, as well as elite public sector science institutes in India (ibid).  
The company has also sought to reorient its business around sustainability (Glover, 
                                                 
81
 The company employs twenty-one thousand staff globally. 
Available at: http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Pages/default.aspx Accessed on 15/4/2013. 
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2007: 855).  This explicitly links Bt technology with small farmers in the 
‘developing’ world, and with an attempt to alleviate world hunger (Glover, 2007: 
855).  Similarly, in a ‘pledge’ announced in 2000, Monsanto committed to dialogue, 
transparency and respect in its business dealings (ibid.).   
 
 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
As has been highlighted, the NGO sector in India is a large and vibrant one.  The 
first official estimate of the number of NGOs in the country was 3.3 million in 
2009, which translated into one NGO for every four hundred Indians (Shukla, 
2010).82  The significance of NGOs in Indian society is highlighted by Katzenstein 
et al. (2001: 247) who argue that ‘it would be a mistake to ignore the burgeoning 
NGO sector in any analysis of social activism in India.’   
 
It is recognised that NGOs are highly diverse in their activities, orientation and 
scale (Adeney and Wyatt, 2010: 149).  They are also markedly different in their 
degree of political activism and their approach to the state.  It is noted, too, that the 
sector has been the subject of much critique.  This includes the argument by 
Deshpande (2004: 403) that NGOs serve to depoliticise society through their co-
opting by the state and their enlistment in rolling out the state’s development model.  
Similarly, Mehta (2007, as cited in Corbridge et al, 2013: 148) asserts the view that 
NGOs represent a type of ‘post-democracy’ given that they are unaccountable to the 
people they seek to represent.  There are also concerns that Indian NGOs in receipt 
                                                 
82
 Available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/first-official-estimate-an-ngo-for-every-400-people-in-
india/643302/  Accessed on 23/3/2012. 
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of foreign funding are simply pursuing the interests of foreign donors (Adeney and 
Wyatt, 2010: 149) in ways which threaten the legitimacy of the institutions of the 
state.  Finally, Corbridge et al. (2013: 148) note that NGOs, as ‘proselytising 
organisations’, can be ‘divisive’ (ibid.).   
 
The analysis in the current study involves three NGOs who are actively engaged in 
the Bt technology debate in Andhra Pradesh.  These are the Centre for Sustainable 
Agriculture (CSA), the Deccan Development Society (DDS) and Crops Jangaon 
(CJ).  The study by no means seeks to promote an uncritical view of the activity of 
these NGOs.  The research revealed a certain dogmatic approach with regard to the 
engagement of DDS with villagers in Nandanapuram and their use of NPM 
practices.  Similarly, the involvement of Crops Jangaon with Orgampalle village 
was noted as being particularly controlling.  Each research trip to the village had to 
first be cleared with the NGO, and representatives from the NGO had to be politely 
requested to leave research interviews so that the researcher and her translator could 
interact independently with villagers. Nonetheless, the analysis suggests that many 
of the critiques levelled against NGOs generally cannot be considered valid in terms 
of the functions performed by the organisations featured here.   
 
Firstly, as Chapter Two has highlighted, far from serving to depoliticise Indian 
society, these NGOs are central to politicising it.  This is achieved in a number of 
ways: through enabling the articulation of an alternative construction of risk to that 
propounded by power holders in Indian society; through facilitating alternative 
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cultivation methods which emphasise farmer choice; and through engaging villagers 
in wider mobilisations against the technology. In this regard, they are pivotal to 
problematising the mainstream model of neo-liberal development, and the power 
structures which support it.  This activity is central at the micro level given the 
inadequacy of the institutionalised forum of village democracy, the Gram Sabha 
meeting, to address risk which will be explored in later chapters.   
 
Secondly, as the analysis of this meso level indicates, these NGOs represent the 
‘consciousness of crisis’ (Habermas, 1996: 357) of many cultivators, in terms of 
their assertion of risk.  This suggests that, rather than representing a type of post-
democracy, they are crucial to democratic praxis given their role in securing the 
representation of marginal cultivators who would otherwise fail to gain recognition 
as part of the democratic process.   
 
Thirdly, while all of the NGOs involved in this study are funded by international 
donors, they seek neither to by-pass the Andhra Pradesh state government, nor to 
undermine it, but rather to transform it in ways which seek to enhance its legitimacy 
when assessed according to the theoretical analysis of democratic legitimacy 
presented here.   
 
Finally, while the analysis highlights that the NGOs involved in this study are most 
certainly proselytising and divisive, and very much committed to their own 
ideological positions, it is posited that this is central to their function in confronting 
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the power structures in Indian society.  In adopting their ideological positions, they 
seek to transform democratic praxis in ways which are strongly informed by the 
representation of the ideal of democracy as a ‘circulation of power’ described by 
Habermas (1996: 356).  It is to this aspect of the activity of NGOs which this 
chapter now turns.     
 
3.4 Democratic Legitimacy as a Circulation of Power in Knowledge Construction  
As highlighted, the core-periphery model posits that legitimate decision-making can 
be regarded as a ‘circulation of power’ between the core and the periphery 
(Habermas, 1996: 356).  This ‘circulation of power’ illustrates the ideal of 
democracy as self-rule (Dahl, 1989: 3) and self-determination (Bohman, 2007: 2) 
discussed earlier, and forms the basis of a decision-making praxis which can be 
regarded as democratically legitimate. According to Habermas (1996: 356), such a 
circulation of power is traced through the unimpeded and inclusive communication 
flows between the core and periphery.  This is portrayed in Figure 3.1 overleaf.   
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Adapted from Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (1996:  354-359). 
 
 
Given their opposition to Bt technology, the NGOs and the CPM actor are referred 
to as the Non-Bt Coalition83 in the current study.  The Monsanto, Congress Party 
and ANGRAU (who sits on the Review Committee on Genetic Modification) actors 
form the Bt Coalition due to their support for the technology. The analysis of 
democracy at this level examines the way in which these actors seek to negotiate 
the power associated with their institutional positioning in attempts to construct 
knowledge with regard to defining the risk of Bt cotton.   
 
The study highlights the way in which the selected NGOs are engaged in 
identifying areas where potential concentrations of power in knowledge 
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 This draws on the idea of Hajer’s (1997: 12-13) discourse coalitions. 
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construction represent an illegitimate impediment to democratic praxis as informed 
by the idea of a circulation of power.  While the opposition to Bt cotton entails rural 
mobilisations, this thesis argues that it stands separate to the farmers’ movement 
given the more reformist demands which the latter entails.  It is argued that 
opposition to Bt cotton is more revolutionary in that, while it does incorporate a 
concern for a more just distribution of resources, this forms part of a discourse 
which seeks to challenge the risk differentiation, values and rationality associated 
with the neo-liberal ideology, and the power structures which seek to legitimate this 
perspective.   
 
Opposition to Bt technology entails a strong normative focus on the way in which 
power should be exercised in democratic praxis as part of a concern for the 
inclusion of discourses of risk asserted by cultivators in knowledge construction 
related to the definition of risk.  NGO activism with regard to Bt technology asserts 
the demand for a transformation of democratic praxis.  This argues for the need for 
a broadly inclusive, and therefore more legitimate, exercise of power in democratic 
praxis both in knowledge construction concerning risk, and in the material 
distribution of resources as a concern for risk negotiation.  
 
While the material component to democratic legitimacy is acknowledged in relation 
to the links between social justice and state intervention in resource distribution, 
this thesis focusses more strongly on the epistemic dimension of political praxis at 
the meso level.  This is due to the recognition that the ideological negotiation of the 
epistemic gap of risk at the meso level as a concern for epistemic justice has direct 
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implications on the way in which material resources are distributed, and risk 
differentiated, as part of the institutionalisation of power in democratic praxis.   
 
The analysis of the ideological struggle in Chapter Eight highlights that the 
delegitimation of Bt cotton and the neo-liberal ideology in which it is embedded is 
incorporated within attempts to redefine the basis of Indian development in ways 
which are more inclusive of the indigenous, experiential knowledge of cultivators.  
In undertaking this activity, NGOs also seek to reinforce the need for a circulation 
of power in decision-making as the basis for the legitimate exercise of power 
through the democratic process.   
 
This thesis argues that attempts by NGOs to secure a circulation of power 
problematise the potential for closure associated with the privileging of scientific 
expertise as a means of taking decisions on risk.  Such closure, it is argued here, is 
associated with the illegitimate use of power, and can contribute to the ‘epistemic 
injustice’ identified by Fricker (2007).   
 
Fricker (2007) argues that the closure associated with epistemic injustice can occur 
in two ways:  firstly, prejudice can be directed against actors in ways which give 
rise to credibility deficits.  This leads to ‘testimonial injustice’ (Fricker, 2007: 159).  
Or, secondly, prejudice can be structurally determined given that the ‘whole engine 
of social meaning can be geared towards keeping [certain world views] out of 
sight’ (ibid.: 153).  Fricker (ibid.: 150) refers to this form of prejudice as 
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‘hermeneutic injustice’ given that perceptions and meanings cannot be articulated 
owing to the absence of discourse structures with which to do so.   
 
Fricker’s ideas also bear a close relation to those of ‘uncomfortable knowledge’ and 
‘the social construction of ignorance’ referred to by Rayner (2012).  Here, certain 
epistemologies which do not support the power structures associated with a 
particular paradigm are suppressed.  As the analysis highlights, the potential for 
epistemic injustice has significant implications for the way in which knowledge is 
constructed as part of attempts to negotiate the epistemic gap which risk represents 
and, hence, represents a significant concern for humanity’s ontological survival.  
 
It is recognised that NGOs, like social movements, ‘can capitalise on their social 
power only insofar as they can advertise their interests in a language that can 
mobilise convincing reasons and shared value orientations’ (Habermas, 1996: 364).  
This has led to claims that the debate on Bt cotton has become ‘an unproductive 
ideological clash’ (Pearson, 2006: 314) between NGOs and multinationals.  While 
this thesis recognises the centrality of the ideological clash to the Bt technology 
debate, it argues that it is far from unproductive.  Instead, it asserts that the struggle 
regarding Bt technology serves to ensure that power is contested, and seeks to 
redefine democratic praxis in a bid to prevent the reduction of epistemology itself as 
part of the purported ‘development’ of society.   
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The half-hearted and uncoordinated efforts to gain greater clarity on the animal 
deaths which NGOs assert are linked to their having grazed on Bt cotton has led to 
the narrative of these deaths becoming incorporated into the ideological struggle to 
define risk.  Within this, they are variously dismissed as scientifically impossible by 
Bt technology proponents, or asserted as a source of uncertainty and ‘non-knowing’ 
(Beck, 2009: 115-128) by farmers and NGOs.  The efforts of NGOs to assert the 
reality of the risk of these animal deaths serves to ensure that the views of farmers 
are represented.84 It also exerts pressure on the regulatory authorities to include tests 
on the safety of the crops for animals in trials, and raises doubt as to the certainty 
expressed by power holders regarding the safety of the technology.   
 
 Legitimate Decision-making in Democratic Praxis 
The recognition that Indian society, despite its considerable dysfunction, remains 
strongly influenced by the framing of the democratic ideal as a circulation of power 
was highlighted in the series of public consultations undertaken by Jairam Ramesh 
as part of his attempt to take an informed and balanced decision on Bt bringal 
(aubergine).  A detailed scientific report on Bt bringal requested by the minister to 
facilitate independent decision-making from India’s six premier scientific 
institutions ‘was revealed to have been plagiarised in parts’ (Gupta, 2011: 740).  
The incident led the Times of India (2010, as cited in Gupta, 2011: 740) to ask, ‘can 
science and scientists be trusted to play an arbiter’s role in society?’   
                                                 
84
 While Herring (2008b: 155) argues that ‘new narratives of catastrophe [ie., the reports of animal deaths] 
serve the interests of local NGOs’, the analysis highlights, however, that the village of Bantala is not 
affiliated with an NGO for agricultural purposes.  Yet, villagers here also claim that buffaloes have died 
due to their grazing on Bt cotton. 
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The idea that attempts to secure a circulation of power in praxis are central to 
contestations with regard to the design of institutions to deal with risk is clear from 
the controversy triggered by the proposal from the Ministry of Science and 
Technology to have a ‘single-window approval system’ (Chaturvedi, 2004: 3696; 
Gupta, 2011: 739) for GM crops.  The suggestion for a Biotechnology Regulatory 
Authority of India (referred to as the BRAI Bill 2013) formed of eminent scientists 
in which the government would serve in an advisory capacity only is strongly 
contested by NGOs and civil society activists.  These actors insist that such a move 
would eliminate the checks and balances between various ministries which the 
current system involves (Gupta, 2011: 739).  It would also remove decision-making 
on Bt technology from the process of legitimation associated with democratic 
praxis.  The BRAI Bill remains the subject of controversy, with ongoing protests 
demanding its withdrawal.  
 
The activity of NGOs on the Indian periphery has also seen the adoption of 
innovative forms of deliberative and participatory democracy, such as consensus 
conferences and citizens’ juries.85 Such democratic innovations are increasingly 
highlighted by deliberative democrats as significant in the definition of the risk of 
new technologies associated with ambiguity and risk, such as genetically modified 
crops (Goodin, 2008: 11; Renn, 2008: 303; Dryzek, 2009).  In terms of the current 
thesis, they also serve to promote the wider engagement of a wider critical public as 
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 A citizens’ jury seeks to ensure that those who would normally be excluded from institutionalised 
democratic practice are politically engaged through serving as a ‘jury’ in a courtroom format.  This 
involves a staged cross-examination of ‘expert’ witnesses by a ‘public’ (Scoones, 2005: 325).  Though not 
observed directly during this research, citizens’ juries are particularly associated with NGO activism in 
opposition to GM crops in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka (ibid.: 308).   
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a ‘third point of view’ (Strydom, 1999: 13) in the struggle for the legitimation of 
risk and democracy and, thus, enhance democratic legitimacy. 
 
The high degree of mobilisation on the periphery, together with the 
deinstitutionalisation of politics previously discussed, suggests that India’s 
democracy could be characterised as a ‘radical’ (Lummis, 1996),86 ‘aversive’ 
(Norval, 2007)87 or ‘agonistic’ (Mouffe, 2000)88 form of praxis, in which decision-
making itself has become problematic.  This contributes to concerns that too much 
politicisation, radicalisation and participation of the periphery can diminish a 
society’s decision-making capacity (Renn, 2008: 313) and lead to stalemate. Thus, 
Renn (ibid.) argues that participation ‘opens up the process, but does not provide 
closure.’  
 
This thesis recognises that radical forms of democracy, in which conflict and 
ideological struggle are central, have served to open up deliberative spaces in the Bt 
cotton debate to those who would otherwise not have been recognised in decision-
making. These ‘deinstitutionalised’ forms of democracy are, therefore, central to 
ensuring that the views of a marginalised minority which is at risk are recognised 
and addressed within democratic praxis as part of a concern for social and epistemic 
                                                 
86
 Defined by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), radical democracy challenges the hegemony of decisions, arguing 
instead for a politics of difference where power structures can be made visible and challenged.  In light of 
this, radical democracy takes place ‘outside the sphere of institutions’ (Lummis, 1996: 116). 
87
 Norval (2007: 185) asserts the need for the development of an aversive democracy which ‘problematises 
the given.’  Here, the goal is the understanding of perspectives other than one’s own as the basis for a 
transformation of identities and societies.   
88
 Mouffe (2000: 102) proposes a form of ‘agonistic’ democracy in which any form of consensus should 
only be seen as a secondary objective, and a temporary respite, in the ongoing conflict between political 
adversaries.   
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justice.  Such mobilisations also serve as a counter-weight to the economic and/or 
political power of power holders. Thus, non-institutionalised civil society activation 
is endogenous to the illustration of democratic praxis outlined by Habermas in the 
core-periphery model, and is crucial to securing its legitimacy.   
 
The thesis also acknowledges, however, that radical forms of democracy need to 
work in conjunction with attempts to establish a legitimate institutionalised praxis 
in which multiple perspectives can be taken into account in decision-making.  The 
ability to take collective decisions is central to the social transformation which 
democratic praxis facilitates.  This recognises that a collaborative decision-making 
function is crucial to any form of social organisation, be it a village council or a 
nation-state, and serves to protect the collective from the risks to its survival.  It is 
important, however, that such decision-making should involve a legitimate exercise 
of power, if the differentiation of risk, and the marginalisation of those affected by 
it, is to be prevented, and the best available knowledge to take decisions on risk is 
to be established. 
 
The recognised dysfunction of democratic praxis in Indian society and the 
deinstitutionalisation of politics clearly represent serious obstacles to decision-
making which NGOs themselves recognise and seek to redress through their 
protests.  It could be argued that the failure to take a final decision on Bt bringal 
illustrates the extent of the dysfunction of the epistemic function of Indian 
democratic praxis.   
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This thesis, however, argues the opposite.  The moratorium on Bt bringal and the 
way in which the ‘decision’ was reached posits that, even in the midst of significant 
democratic dysfunction, the democratic ideal, as a circulation of power, remains 
influential.89 Thus, even given its significant dysfunction, this thesis argues that 
Indian democratic praxis was functional enough to recognise that the information 
needed to make a legitimate case in support of Bt bringal is currently unavailable.  
It is argued that this absence of a final decision does not imply democratic 
dysfunction or a failure of participation.  Instead, it indicates that power is 
contested, and an epistemic gap is recognised which can be ideologically debated, 
but cannot be bridged given the demands for legitimation instilled by the 
democratic ideal.   
 
It is argued that the moratorium on Bt bringal represents a decision, even if it is one 
which asserts the need to postpone final decision-making given the lack of 
epistemic clarity.  This study asserts that it is through this ongoing ideological 
struggle to legitimate risk both as a material and epistemic concern, in the midst of 
significant epistemic uncertainty, that Andhra Pradesh society is being constituted.   
It also argues that the crucial concern of legitimation in risk society is not the 
securing of a final decision; instead, it is the struggle to guard against the potential 
                                                 
89
 The reasoning of the minister’s statement in announcing the moratorium provides a perfect illustration of 
the operation of a circulation of power in legitimate decision-making, and is worth citing at length: ‘Based 
on all the information and when there is no clear consensus within the scientific community itself, where 
there is so much opposition from the state governments, when responsible civil society organizations and 
eminent scientists have raised many serious questions that cannot be answered satisfactorily, when the 
public sentiment is negative and when Bt bringal will be the very first genetically modified vegetable to be 
introduced anywhere in the world and when there is no overriding urgency to introduce it here, it is my 
duty to adopt a cautious, precautionary principle-based approach and impose a moratorium on the release 
of Bt bringal’ (Ramesh, 2010: 17, as cited in Gupta, 2011: 738).  
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emergence of an illegitimate exercise of power in the midst of the profound 
epistemic uncertainty and anxiety which risk represents.  
 
The analysis also highlights that the moratorium on Bt bringal cannot be taken to 
indicate that the struggle to define the risk associated with Bt cotton has eased.  On 
the contrary, this thesis asserts that the struggle associated with Bt cotton has 
instead intensified.  The study will now turn to an exploration of the struggle to 
legitimate risk and democracy with regard to Bt cotton in the volatile region of 
Telangana where the research for this thesis is based. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has explored the ‘relations of definition’ (Beck, 1995: 
43) with regard to Bt technology in terms of the Habermasian (1996: 356) core-
periphery model.  It has examined the way in which the ideological struggle to 
define the risk of Bt bringal has intensified the focus on Bt cotton.  The chapter has 
highlighted the direct impact of the attempts to define the risk of Bt bringal upon 
the institutionalisation of the exercise of power in democratic praxis, and illustrated 
the way in which these attempts are contributing to the potential for ‘institutional 
crisis’ envisaged by Beck (1994: 8).  The chapter has also examined the crucial role 
of the NGOs in the current study in seeking to secure the type of ‘circulation of 
power’ which Habermas (1996: 356) argues is illustrative of legitimate democratic 
praxis.  This seeks to mitigate the potential for ‘epistemic injustice’ (Fricker, 2007) 
in decision-making on risk.   
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Chapter Four 
 
Bt Cotton and the Struggle for Legitimation 
in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the state of Andhra Pradesh as a site of research into Bt 
cotton.  It examines the way in which Bt technology is embedded within a neo-
liberal development model which is legitimated through claims of its contribution to 
poverty reduction.  This is contrary to the assertions of opponents who argue that 
both neo-liberalism and Bt cotton are contributing to significant risks, not least 
those related to indebtedness and the farmer suicides with which Andhra Pradesh is 
particularly associated. 
 
The particular context of the Telangana region as the location for the current 
research is examined. This region is characterised by its acute agrarian crisis and 
volatility.  Here, the conflict which Bt technology represents is embedded within a 
wider historical struggle to legitimate risk and democracy as a concern for social 
and epistemic justice in the negotiation of risk.  The agitation in the region led to an 
agreement to its secession in July, 2013, and the new state is due to be created in 
2014.  However, protests against the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh are ongoing. 
This chapter explores the way in which the particular precariousness of the region 
significantly influenced the approach of the Andhra Pradesh government to the 
opposition to Bt cotton emanating from Telangana as a concern for its own 
legitimacy.   
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4.2 Bt Cotton and the Legitimation of Neo-liberalism in Andhra Pradesh 
The state of Andhra Pradesh is located on the south-east coast of peninsular India.  
It is the fourth largest of India’s twenty-eight states by area (two hundred and 
seventy-five thousand square kilometres), and fifth by population (eighty-four 
million inhabitants).90  Andhra Pradesh is comprised of three Telugu-speaking 
regions – Telangana, Rayalseema and Coastal Andhra.  Following decades of 
struggle, the government announced on 31 July, 2013, that Telangana will become 
India’s twenty-ninth state, to be formed early in 2014.91  As highlighted previously, 
given that the state of Telangana had not been created at the time of writing, Andhra 
Pradesh continues to be referred to in the present tense for the purposes of this 
thesis.   
 
Sixty-six per cent of the population of Andhra Pradesh lives in rural areas, and the 
state is home to 28,123 villages.92  It is also regularly exposed to cyclones, floods 
and droughts. The Disaster Management Department of the Andhra Pradesh 
government reported fifty-five natural disasters related to flooding, droughts and 
cyclones in the thirty-three years from 1977 to 2010.93   
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 All population figures for Andhra Pradesh are taken from the 2011 Census data. Available at:  
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/paper2/data_files/AP/4-fig-6.pdf Accessed on 21/4/2013. 
91
 Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-state-that-must-fulfil-a-higher-
purpose/article4971018.ece Accessed on 31/07/2013.  It will take six to eight months for the formalities to 
be completed.  Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/telangana-bill-not-
coming-in-monsoon-session/article4978082.ece Accessed on 29/8/2013. 
92
 Available at: http://states-of-india.findthedata.org/q/1/4243/How-many-districts-are-there-in-Andhra-
Pradesh  Accessed on 24/4/2013. 
93
 Available at: http://disastermanagement.ap.gov.in/website/history.htm Accessed on 10/8/2013 
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A large variety of Backward Caste jatis account for forty-six per cent of the 
population (Srinivasulu, 2002: 4).  The Reddy jati is among the most powerful 
(Wade, 1994: 31). Forward Castes account for twenty-nine per cent of the 
population.  There is only a small number of Brahmins - just three per cent of the 
total population (Srinivasulu, 2002: 4). Scheduled Caste jatis (formerly 
‘Untouchables’) are known as Madigas and Malas in Andhra Pradesh. Malas 
account for 9.7 per cent of the total population of the state, while Madigas form 7.3 
per cent (Srinivasulu, 2002: 4).  In Telangana, however, Madigas predominate 
(ibid.).  Omvedt (1994: 90) notes that Malas are ritually higher than Madigas, and 
that Madigas are poorer, and more of them are landless (ibid.).  Similarly, 
Srinivasulu (2002: 4) highlights that the Scheduled Castes form the bulk of the 
agricultural labour in Andhra Pradesh.   
 
Andhra Pradesh is renowned for its high suicide numbers.  In 2010, both Andhra 
Pradesh and Maharashtra accounted for 11.8 per cent of the total number of suicides 
in India, and were second only to Tamil Nadu, in which 12.3 per cent of suicides 
occurred (Bhamathi, 2011: 171).  In the case of Andhra Pradesh, the percentage 
represented 15,901 suicides (ibid.).94 Of these, 2,525 (fifteen per cent) were suicides 
                                                 
94
 Available at http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/95-farm-suicides-month-andhra-pradesh Accessed 
on 30/4/2013. It should be noted that India has one of the highest suicide rates in the world, particularly 
among the fifteen to twenty-nine age group. Available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/most-
suicides-in-india-in-1529-age-group-study/965259/ Accessed on 23/9/2013. In 2010, 134,599 people 
committed suicide in the country (Bhamathi, 2011: 169).  This was an increase of 5.9 per cent over the 
previous year (ibid.). A wide variety of reasons are cited including family problems (23.7 per cent), illness 
(twenty-one per cent), dowry abuse (2.3 per cent), poverty (2.3 per cent), bankruptcy (two per cent), exam 
failures (1.8 per cent), barrenness (0.5 per cent) and ideological causes (0.1 per cent) (Bhamathi, 2011: 
177).  While not directly the focus of this thesis, the scale of these suicides suggests wider existential 
problems which are not being addressed by the focus on economic growth as the basis for development.   
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by farmers.  The state is among the top five in India with regard to farmer 
suicides.95   
 
Farmer suicides in India have typically been associated with areas of capital-
intensive agriculture which have become known as ‘suicide belts’ (Le Mons 
Walker, 2008: 572).  Suicides began to occur most prominently among cotton 
farmers in Andhra Pradesh in 1987-88.  During this season, a spate of cotton 
farmers took their lives due to the widespread failure of the cotton crop as a result 
of drought and a pest attack (Reddy et al., 1998: 1; Rao and Suri, 2006: 1546).   
 
The shift to a neo-liberal approach in the state was outlined in a document entitled 
‘Vision 2020’ published in 1999.  This initiative was funded through a major loan, 
referred to as the Andhra Pradesh Economic Restructuring Project, as part of a 1996 
agreement with the World Bank (Frankel, 2005: 618). The Vision 2020 
development plan included a commitment to eradicate poverty by 2020.  This was 
to be achieved through the adoption of policies focussed on the promotion of wealth 
creation, globalisation and technological innovation (Bandyopadhyay, 2001: 900; 
Frankel, 2005: 616-617).  
 
As part of Vision 2020, it was envisaged that agriculture’s share of employment 
would be reduced from seventy to forty-five per cent by 2020 (Frankel, 2005: 623).  
                                                 
95
 The other states associated specifically with farmer suicides are Maharashtra, Karnataka, Madhya 
Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.  These account for over half of all farm suicides in India.  Available at  
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/sainath/farmers-suicide-rates-soar-above-the-
rest/article4725101.ece Accessed on 24/5/2013.  
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This would occur as a result of the availability of non-farm employment in a 
service-led economy (ibid.). Central to the objective of poverty alleviation was the 
creation of the ‘twin revolutions of rising expectations and information-
communications’ (Gupta, 2002: 88). The declining emphasis on agriculture was 
reflected in a reduction in public investment, which decreased from an average of 
six per cent in the 1980s, to 1.5 per cent throughout the 1990s (Galab et al., 2009: 
189). 
 
Biotechnology was emphasised as a key strategy in addressing agrarian risk.  The 
Vision 2020 document states: ‘We will need to be far more aggressive in acquiring 
and applying advanced technologies in a wide range of fields, including agriculture’ 
(Gupta, 2002: 12).  The centrality of biotechnology to the state’s development plans 
was evident from the construction of a three hundred and eighty-four kilometre 
‘Genome Valley’ (Rajan, 2006: 77) in and around Hyderabad.  The development, 
which claims to be the ‘biotech hub’ of India (ibid.), aims to attract multinationals 
involved in research into all areas of biotechnology, including Bt crops.   
 
As has been highlighted, the construction of Genome Valley was facilitated through 
aid funding from the UK government, despite the resistance to Bt crops in the UK, 
and their ongoing ban due to safety concerns (Harding and Vidal, 2001).  The 
international support for the location of research into this globally controversial 
technology in India suggests that the potential for a ‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas, 
[1973], 1976) in the political system was passed to India, along with the funding.   
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The increased cultivation and productivity of cotton in the state has been 
significant.  The area under cotton in Andhra Pradesh increased by seventy per cent 
between 2002-03 (when Bt cotton was officially introduced) and 2007-08 (Barik, 
2010: 120).  The production of cotton in the same period more than trebled (ibid.).  
The state now accounts for fourteen per cent of India’s total cotton production, and 
is second only to Punjab.96  In 2010, nearly ninety per cent of the total area under 
cotton in Andhra Pradesh was cultivated using Bt seed varieties (Gaurav and 
Mishra, 2012: 2).  
 
Proponents of the neo-liberal approach argue that the market rationale which it 
incorporates has significantly contributed to the alleviation of the ontological risk 
associated with absolute poverty in the state.  In 2013, the state ranked sixth out of 
fifteen major states in India in terms of overall prosperity, with an average annual 
growth rate of 9.27 per cent.97 Similarly, figures from the Planning Commission 
indicate that the average poverty level in Andhra Pradesh declined from 29.6 per 
cent in 2004-05 (32.3 per cent of the rural, and 23.4 per cent of the urban, 
population) to 21.1 per cent in 2009-10 (22.8 per cent: rural; 17.7 per cent: urban). 
This was below the average poverty level for India of 29.8 per cent (33.8 per cent: 
rural; 20.9 per cent: urban).98   
 
                                                 
96
 Available at: http://www.spectrumcommodities.com/education/commodity/statistics/cotton.html 
Accessed on 30/4/2013. 
97
 Available at: http://www.deccanchronicle.com/130126/news-current-
affairs/article/ap%E2%80%88ranks-sixth-economic-growth 
Accessed on 15/5/2013. 
98
 Available at: http://planningcommission.nic.in/data/datatable/0904/tab_45.pdf Accessed on 18/5/2013.   
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Supporters of Bt technology assert that it is scale-neutral, and that the purported 
benefits associated with reduced costs and higher yields are relevant for all classes 
of land-holder (Karihaloo and Kumar, 2009: 15; Choudhary and Gaur, 2010: 20).  
And, yet, the government has also faced strong resistance to the technology as 
opponents challenge the technology’s ability to alleviate risk in an equitable and 
sustainable manner.99   
 
In the rural context, inequality is most clearly evident in the case of land ownership.  
The centrality of land to the negotiation of agrarian risk is highlighted by Agarwal 
(2003: 193) who argues that there is a well established relationship between ‘the 
risk of rural poverty and land access.’100  By 2000-01, the proportion of marginal 
and small holdings (ie., less than five acres) in Andhra Pradesh was eighty-three per 
cent, and the area under these holdings accounted for half of the total operated area 
(Galab et al., 2009: 172).101   
 
                                                 
99
 Attempts to delegitimate the neo-liberal approach in which the technology is embedded also involve 
challenges to the government’s figures on poverty reduction.  Utsa Patnaik (2007: 3132) argues that nearly 
half of the rural poor have been excluded from Planning Commission figures, and asserts that rural poverty 
in India is closer to eighty-seven per cent (ibid.).  This appears to be supported by the finding from the 
2011 Census that ninety-five per cent of the population of Andhra Pradesh possess white ration cards, 
associated with below poverty line (BPL) households, for supplies from the Public Distribution System.  
Available at:  
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/95-per-cent-below-poverty-line-andhra-pradesh/1/164651.html  
Accessed on 18/5/2013. Although there are recognised issues with PDS targeting, the profusion of ration 
cards in the state suggests that rural poverty is more of an issue than Planning Commission figures would 
indicate.  
100
 Access to land is a significant aspect of the differentiated exposure to risk associated with caste and 
gender.  However, it is argued that the power relations associated with caste and gender are also determined 
by wider socialisation and cultural factors.      
101
 This was higher than the all-India average where 81.8 per cent of cultivators operated small and 
marginal holdings, and owned 38.9 per cent of the land.  Available at:  
 http://planningcommission.gov.in/sectors/agri_html/selagri/T1.3.xls Accessed on 19/5/2013. 
 105 
According to Reddy et al. (2012: 57), by 2008-09, 37.72 per cent of land was 
owned by the top five per cent of land-owners in the state.  Ramachandran et al. 
(2010: 4) note that, in 2003, 53.77 per cent of households did not own land other 
than their homesteads. Absolute landlessness in Andhra Pradesh (which generally 
entails residing with relatives) stood at fourteen per cent (ibid.).102 
 
Mitchell and Hanstad (2008: 1) highlight the extreme risk associated with 
landlessness in Andhra Pradesh, arguing that ‘[l]andless families who depend on 
agricultural wage labour are almost always the poorest of the poor.’ These risks are 
highly differentiated by caste given that sixty-three per cent of Scheduled Caste 
households in the state own no land other than homesteads (Ramachandran et al., 
2010: 4). Similarly, as Agarwal (2003: 184) notes, land reform has privileged 
males, and the issue of land rights for women, who have little direct access to land, 
remains peripheral.    
 
The emphasis on the benefits offered by Bt technology to small and marginal land-
holders (Glover, 2007; 2010) has meant that it is used to legitimate the ‘existing 
distributional practice’ (Renn, 2008: 133) associated with the current allocation of 
resources.  As Frankel (2005: 616) highlights, ‘no part of the [Vision 2020] plan 
directly addresses the structural inequalities in the state.’  This has led to claims that 
wealth creation in Andhra Pradesh coincides with extreme rural indebtedness.   
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 For India as a whole, less than one per cent of the population owned thirty-seven per cent of the land in 
2000-01.  Available at http://planningcommission.gov.in/sectors/agri_html/selagri/T1.3.xls Accessed on 
19/5/2013.  Absolute landlessness in the country stood at ten per cent in 2003 (Ramachandran et al., 2010: 
4).  
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Galab et al. (2009: 191) argue that the situation of indebtedness of farmers in 
Andhra Pradesh is worse than in other states.  The Times of India (12/10/2010) 
reported that ninety-three per cent of Andhra Pradesh’s rural poor is in debt.  It is 
also recognised that there is a high dependence on non-institutional sources of debt, 
with loans from moneylenders accounting for fifty-four per cent of debt in the state 
in 2003 (Galab et al., 2009: 191).  Given this, many NGOs seek to promote 
alternative methods, such as those associated with organic103 and Non-Pesticide 
Management  (NPM) farming practice,104 which they argue represent a more viable 
farming praxis than that associated with Bt cotton.   
 
It is also noted that the cross-pollination needed to produce the high-yielding 
varieties of Bt cotton seeds is performed manually on seed farms in the state. As 
Venkateshwarlu and da Corta (2001) highlight, this laborious process is often 
undertaken by females between the ages of seven and fourteen in bonded conditions 
(ie., they are not free to leave at will).  In a personal interview with Davuluri 
Venkateshwarlu (14/9/2010), he confirmed that companies such as Monsanto and 
Syngenta have begun to address this problem due to the ongoing campaigning work 
of NGOs, including his organisation, Glocal.  Nonetheless, by 2010, there were still 
                                                 
103
 Eyhorn (2007: 29) claims that, by 2005, organic cotton projects in Andhra Pradesh, promoted by the 
NGOs, Chetna and Oxfam, had been initiated on two thousand, four hundred acres.  This accounted for 
approximately 0.01 per cent of the cultivation area in Andhra Pradesh.   
104
 Ramanjaneyulu (2006: 563) argues that NPM methods are being used on more than ten thousand acres 
across different districts in Andhra Pradesh.  This accounts for just over 0.05 per cent of the total cultivated 
area.  Misra (2009: 22) claims that, of the three thousand NPM villages in Andhra Pradesh in 2007, not a 
single suicide death was registered.   
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169,000 children below the age of fourteen working on cotton seed farms in Andhra 
Pradesh.105   
 
The villages involved in the current research are located in the region of Telangana, 
and the district of Warangal within it.  The historical context of risk in Telangana 
and Warangal will now be explored as a basis for understanding the contemporary 
struggle which Bt cotton represents in the region.   
 
4.3 The Negotiation of Risk and the Telangana Armed Struggle 
Concerns related to the legitimation of risk and democracy are particularly 
prominent in Telangana, given the historical struggle with which the region is 
associated.  Telangana has a population of thirty-five million people which accounts 
for forty-one per cent of the population of Andhra Pradesh.106  It is distinct from the 
other two regions of the state - Rayalseema and Coastal Andhra – in that it was 
never colonised by the British, but instead remained part of the Muslim State of 
Hyderabad under the rule of the Nizam-ul-Mulk (Kakar, 1995: 11; Mehta, 2005: 
144).107  
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 Venkateshwarlu’s  (2010: 8-14) report entitled ‘Seeds of Child Labour: Signs of Hope’ provides details 
of his research into the use of child labour in Bt seed production in Andhra Pradesh.  Available at: 
http://www.indianet.nl/pdf/signsofhope.pdf Accessed on 2/11/2013.  
106
 Available at http://www.news.nom.co/telangana-turmoil-andhra-pradesh-stares-6520289-news/ 
Accessed on 8/10/2013.   
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 Warangal city served as the capital of the Kakatiya Empire (1083-1323), when a distinctive Telugu 
culture began to develop in Telangana (Rao, 1988: 11-12). Hyderabad State was established in 1724, 
following the capture of the city of Warangal in 1687 by the Emperor Aurangzeb from Delhi.  The title 
Nizam-ul-Mulk was granted to Chin Qulich Khan Asaf Jah, and was retained by successive members of the 
Asaf Jahi dynasty who ruled Hyderabad as an independent princely state until a year after India’s 
Independence from Britain (Kakar, 1995: 11; Mehta, 2005: 144).  
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Hyderabad State was predominantly agrarian (Vaikuntham, 2004: 98).  Exposure to 
risk was acute, and differentiated in accordance with the ability to access key 
resources, most notably land.  As Srinivasulu (2002: 6) highlights, a class of landed 
gentry, consisting of Muslim Jagirdars108 and Hindu Doras109 belonging to the 
Reddy and Brahmin castes constituted the support base of the Nizam’s rule.  This 
landed gentry inflicted severe suffering through ‘the illegal eviction of farmers, the 
extraction of free goods and services (known as vetti), and…the denial of people’s 
dignity and self-respect’ (ibid.).   
 
Access to employment represented a significant means of negotiating risk, given the 
potential to escape rural poverty.  Mulki (nativity) rules, which gave preference to 
the local population in accessing employment opportunities, were adopted by the 
Nizam as early as 1868 in response to local protests against an influx of migrants to 
Hyderabad State (Brass, 1990: 233).   
 
As a semi-arid region, access to irrigation was central to the negotiation of agrarian 
risk.  Drought and famine were common in Hyderabad State (Vaikuntham, 2004: 
115), yet investment in irrigation was limited.  As Roosa (2001: 58) notes, the 
Nizam ‘squeezed taxes out of the 10,300 villages of Telangana, invested very little 
back into them, and gave free rein to [the state’s] hereditary village-level officials to 
build their own fiefdoms through land-grabbing and the use of [bonded] labour.’  
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 Jagirdars were feudal lords who held administrative posts and rendered military services to the Nizam 
(Robinson, 1988: 49).   
109
 As highlighted previously, ‘Dora’ was the name give to landlords, particularly in the Telangana region 
(Omvedt, 1994: 67). 
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The result was a highly differentiated ability to negotiate risk. According to 
Barrington Moore (1966: 381), the debt slavery in Hyderabad State was worse than 
in other parts of India.   Meanwhile, the last ruler of Hyderabad, Nizam Mir Usman 
Ali Khan (r. 1911-48), was one of the world’s wealthiest individuals (Roosa, 2001: 
58).  
 
This explicitly illegitimate exercise of power in a context of acute risk led to the 
Telangana armed struggle for which the region is renowned.110  This was a 
communist-led rebellion which focussed initially on the injustices associated with 
vetti (bonded labour), and corruption in the grain levy collection (Brass, 1990: 296-
297; Omvedt, 1993: 24; Roosa, 2001: 63; Frankel, 2005: 64).   
 
The conflict later extended to a concern with securing ‘land to the tiller’ 
(Srinivasulu, 2002: 6).  Landlords were violently driven out, and their lands 
distributed among the poor (Sundarayya, 1972: 2).111  Barrington Moore (1966: 
381) highlights that, by 1947/48, more than two thousand villages had been 
‘liberated’ from the exploitation of the Nizam’s power structures.  Many of these 
were in the district of Warangal (Sundarayya, 1973: 4).  
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 Roosa (2001: 60) notes three phases in the revolt: the first phase (1946-47) was an unarmed defensive 
struggle against large landlords; the second (August 1947 to September 1948) occurred as a result of the 
delegitimation of the Nizam’s rule due to his refusal to accede to the Indian Union.  At this point, the 
insurgents took up weapons.  The third phase began in September 1948 and ended in 1951when the Indian 
army entered Hyderabad, overthrew the Nizam and launched a counter-insurgency against the communists.   
111
 Srinivasulu (2002: 6) highlights the differentiation in the distribution of lands, even during the rebellion.  
Powerful upper-caste Kapu-Reddys were granted the fertile lands of the doras, while the waste lands were 
distributed to the landless Dalits and lower castes (ibid.).    
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The invasion of Hyderabad State by the Indian Army in 1948 aimed not only to 
overthrow the Nizam; it also, as Roosa (2001: 80) notes, sought to suppress the 
violent attempts by communists to redistribute resources, and to define an 
alternative form of democratic praxis to that associated with the Indian state. As 
Corbridge and Harriss (2000: 65) highlight, Nehru’s Congress government adopted 
a more conciliatory approach to land-holders, and Gandhi’s principle of trusteeship 
was used to urge wealthy land-holders of their moral duty (dharma) to give up 
some of their lands to the poor (Frankel, 2005: 39).  There was also a reversal of the 
distributional practice which the rebellion had secured.  Whole villages where the 
communists had redistributed land were burned down (Roosa, 2001: 83), and the 
land was re-assigned to its original owners.  
 
The clash between the communists and the Congress Party also involved competing 
interpretations as to the way in which the ideal of democracy could best be 
translated into praxis.  Roosa (2001: 81) highlights that the Andhra Provincial 
Committee responsible for Telangana was controlled by radical communists who 
advocated ‘prolonged civil war in the form of agrarian revolution, culminating in 
the capture of political power by a Democratic front.’  This was in contrast to the 
parliamentary democracy advocated by the English-speaking elite of the Indian 
state (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 139).  Here, a non-violent democratic praxis 
was urged as a means of promoting justice through a legitimate exercise of power.  
The communist rebellion was eventually suppressed and Nehru sought to secure 
 111 
legitimation for the Indian state through achieving socialist land reform by peaceful 
means.112  
 
Some land reform did occur in Telangana.  All jagirs (large land-holders) were 
abolished, and the Nizam’s sarf-e-khas (Crown lands claimed by the Nizam’s 
family) were taken over by the state (Agnihotri and Subramaniam, 2002: 12).  
Srinivasulu (2002: 6) highlights that there was a substantial decline in dora 
dominance after the struggle, given that many large land-owners were disinclined to 
reside in the villages, and so disposed of their lands to former tenants.  In 1950, the 
Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act was passed with the objective of 
protecting the interests of tenants (Agnihotri and Subramaniam, 2002: 13; Melkote, 
2010: 8).   
 
Limited land redistribution also occurred as a result of the land ceiling legislation.  
A Human Development Report compiled by the Centre for Economic and Social 
Studies in Hyderabad (2008: 65, as cited in Ramachandran et al., 2010: 4) found 
that ‘against an estimated surplus land of twenty lakh acres in Andhra Pradesh, only 
7.9 lakh acres were declared as surplus, of which 6.47 lakh acres were taken into 
possession by the government and 5.82 lakh acres were distributed.’113  This 
represented only four per cent of the net sown area in the state.  Venkateshwarlu 
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 There is, however, an ongoing presence of Naxalites in Telangana as is evident from headlines such as 
‘Maoist terror resurfaces in T’ [Telangana] (Times of India, 3/12/2010).  These radical communists not only 
refuse to recognise the legitimacy of the state, but also violently challenge the development model which it 
seeks to implement.  Naxalite killings by the state police and military are common (Kohli, 2009: 399). 
113
 In terms more familiar to Europeans, this meant that of an estimated two million surplus acres, only 
790,000 acres were declared as surplus.  647,000 acres of this were claimed by the government, of which 
582,000 acres were distributed to the poor and landless. 
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and Srinivas (2000: 10) note that the number of large land holdings (twenty-four 
acres and above) decreased from 4.3 per cent to 1.3 per cent between 1970-71 and 
1995-96.  The percentage of the area operated by large farmers also declined during 
this period, from 31.1 per cent to eight per cent (Venkateshwarlu and Srinivas, 
2000: 10).   
 
Meanwhile, the proportion of small and marginal land-holders (ie., with less than 
five acres) rose from 66.9 per cent in 1970-71 to eighty-two per cent in 1995-96, 
and the proportion of land cultivated by these categories of land-owner rose from 
19.8 per cent to 45.7 per cent in the same period (Venkateshwarlu and Srinivas, 
2000: 10).  Despite these changes, however, significant inequality remains.  By 
2008-09, five per cent of cultivators in Telangana owned thirty-two per cent of the 
land, and 44.72 per cent of the Telangana population were landless (Reddy et al., 
2012: 57).114    
 
This history of exploitation, together with the ongoing inequity in Telangana, raises 
questions regarding the ability of Bt cotton to alleviate agrarian risk for the 
population of the region as a whole as a concern for social and epistemic justice.  
This chapter will now turn to a closer examination of agrarian risk in Telangana and 
Warangal. 
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 Figures cited here represent an average of the figures provided for North and South Telangana by these 
authors.   
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4.4 Agrarian Risk in Telangana and Warangal 
In order to understand the basis for the legitimation of the adoption of Bt cotton in 
Warangal, it is necessary to appreciate the inherent risks of the context.  The 
ongoing, highly differentiated exposure to risk with which Telangana continues to 
be characterised is evident from the disproportionately high numbers of farmer 
suicides with which the region is associated.  Both Ramachandran et al. (2010: 8) 
and Galab et al. (2009: 166-167) cite data produced by the Andhra Pradesh Rythu 
Sangam (APRS) (2007), a farmers’ association, which claims that Telangana 
accounted for 66.47 per cent of the 4,403 farmer suicides in the state between 1998 
and 2006.115   
 
Within Telangana, Warangal is highlighted as being one of the region’s worst 
affected districts (Rao and Suri, 2006: 1546).116  Warangal has a population of 3.5 
million people, of which seventy-two per cent live in rural areas.117  Galab et al. 
(2009: 166-167) claim that seven hundred and sixty-six suicides occurred in 
Warangal between 1998 and 2006. This was significantly higher than the next 
highest district, Mahabubnagar, in which four hundred and sixty-seven suicides 
were recorded.  
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 The number of suicides reported from the Telangana region during this time was 2,927.  For 
Rayalseema, the number was nine hundred and thirty-one, while for Coastal Andhra it was five hundred 
and forty-five. 
116
 Telangana is comprised of nine districts.  See Map 1, p. xvii. 
117
 Available at: http://www.census2011.co.in/census/district/126-warangal.html 
Accessed on 8/10/2013. 
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Herring (2008: 150) highlights that the risk of cotton cultivation in Warangal is high 
given that the district is drought-prone, and cotton is often grown on unirrigated, 
thin red soils.118 Nevertheless, Warangal is particularly dependent on cotton, and 
the crop is cultivated on twenty-six per cent of the cultivated area.119  This makes it 
the second largest crop after paddy (which accounts for thirty-two per cent).120   
This reliance on cotton has been linked to the high numbers of farmer suicides in 
the district (Stone, 2011: 390).  
 
Herring (2008b: 148) notes that the extent of Bt cotton adoption in Warangal is 
contested.  The Andhra Pradesh Seed Certification Agency in Hyderabad estimate 
that Bt cotton accounts for eighty-five to ninety per cent of cotton cultivation in the 
district, while Warangal’s Department of Agriculture claims that the figure is closer 
to ninety-five per cent.  Either way, it is clear that the adoption of Bt cotton is 
widespread.  It is also evident that adoption coincides with significant opposition.  
This is led by a significant NGO sector in a district which, as Herring (ibid.: 155) 
observes, appears ‘especially densely populated by NGOs’.   
 
The region of Telangana is associated with particular risk factors with regard to 
cultivation, irrespective of the choice of crop. As highlighted previously, it is 
drought-prone; hence, access to water is a crucial factor in the negotiation of 
agrarian risk.  Vakulabharanam (2004: 1421) highlights that the withdrawal of state 
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 Warangal also includes thick black soils which retain moisture and are, therefore, considered ideal for 
the cotton crop (Stone, 2011: 390).  In the current study, cotton is cultivated on both red and black soils.   
119
 Available at: http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Agriculture_in_Warangal,_India Accessed on 
30/4/2013.   
120
 Paddy refers to rice still in the husk (Wade, 1994: 40). 
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support for irrigation has led to the expansion of borewell irrigation in the region.  
This is largely being funded through credit.   
 
In Telangana, irrigation through borewells increased by forty-four per cent between 
1997 and 2002 (Reddy, 2010b: 245).  It is recognised that this dependence on 
ground-water as a means of irrigation is unsustainable due to a declining water table 
(Galab et al., 2009: 175).121  A citizen’s report (Centre for Environmental Studies, 
1998, as cited in ibid.: 168) which investigated fifty households of deceased cotton 
farmers in the Warangal district found that, in all cases, suicides coincided with 
crop failure due to inadequate water supply.   
 
Deshmukh (2010: 188) argues that agriculture has become increasingly unviable.  
This is not least due to rising cultivation costs, which Reddy (2010b: 246) claims 
increased by fifty per cent in Andhra Pradesh during the 1990s.  Sridhar (2006: 
1563) asserts that the prices of inputs in Andhra Pradesh are among the highest in 
the country due to the fact that input suppliers also provide credit to farmers, a 
power relation which obliges farmers to accept the higher prices charged.   
 
It is claimed that these increasing costs are not being off-set by higher returns.  
Galab et al. (2009: 181) note that, while incomes and yields associated with cotton 
grew until the mid-1990s, these have been declining.  Variations in output prices for 
cotton also lead to a high degree of volatility in profits (ibid.: 183).  Deshmukh 
                                                 
121
 Alternative forms of irrigation involve rain-water harvesting through canals and tanks, in which the 
ground-water table is maintained. 
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(2010: 182) argues that cotton brokers offer preferential prices to more influential 
farmers.  Similarly, cultivators are exposed to the risks of a speculative global 
commodity market over which they have no control (Rao and Suri, 2006: 1546).122  
 
Numerous studies have found that the single most important cause of suicides 
among cultivators is debt (Sridhar, 2006: 1560; Galab et al., 2009: 169; Deshpande 
and Arora, 2010b: 24; Deshpande and Shah, 2010c: 134; Iyer and Arora, 2010: 266; 
Sreedhar, 2010: 227). It is noted that the risk of suicide is exacerbated through 
accessing credit from non-institutional sources, such as money lenders (Iyer and 
Arora, 2010: 279).  
 
This was particularly evident in the controversy surrounding Micro-Finance 
Institutions (MFIs)123 during the current study.  The coercive attempts of MFIs to 
recover loan repayments in the midst of a catastrophic 2010/2011 season, which 
was associated with widespread flooding, resulted in farmer suicides (Times of 
India, 17/10/2010).  It was reported that thirty farmers took their lives in forty-five 
days in Andhra Pradesh as a direct result of the approach adopted by MFIs (ibid.). 
                                                 
122
 This lack of control over prices also applies to the local context.  This was noted during a trip to Jangaon 
market with an Orgampalle research participant (Field note extract, 26/11/2010).  The hessian sacks in 
which the cotton was transported by auto-rickshaw to the market were slit with a slash hook in order to 
check the luster and staple length of the cotton which would determine the price. Once the sack was slit, 
however, no other trader would offer a price on the cotton.  Hence, the farmer was obliged to negotiate the 
price with the original trader, rather than being free to seek a better price elsewhere.   
123
 Andhra Pradesh has been described as a ‘leader in the MFI movement’ (Deccan Chronicle, 14/10/2010).  
Commercialised MFIs have been associated with a credit crisis in the state given the influence of the neo-
liberal rationale on these institutions (Shylendra, 2006: 1961).  This has seen the charging of interest rates 
of between twenty-four and thirty per cent (Times of India, 14/10/2010).  MFIs have also been associated 
with unethical methods of debt recovery, such as the confiscation of title deeds and the use of intimidation 
(Shylendra, 2006: 1959). This has led Weber (2004: 356) to argue that the micro-credit approach is 
strategically embedded within efforts to implement financial sector liberalisation on a global scale.  
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These included three farmer suicides in two months in Warangal (Times of India, 
13/10/2010). 
 
It should be noted that the experience of MFIs is in stark contrast to the favourable 
assessment of Self-Help Groups (SHGs) by many female village participants.  
SHGs are group savings schemes which are predominantly associated with females 
(Galab and Rao, 2003; Tesoriero, 2005).  These have been linked to female 
empowerment (Tesoriero, 2005: 329).  In the current study, the organisation of 
SHGs in the villages coincides with the presence of NGOs. 
 
Land Ownership and the Negotiation of Risk in Telangana and Warangal 
The significance of land ownership with regard to risk negotiation is highlighted by 
the profile of farmers who have taken their lives in Warangal. A sample survey 
conducted by Revathi (2007, as cited in Galab et al., 2009: 171) analysed secondary 
data on farmer suicides in four districts, including Warangal. This found that the 
overwhelming majority (91.2 per cent) of suicides in Warangal was undertaken by 
small and marginal farmers.   
 
Galab et al. (2009: 193) argue that the higher incidence of suicides among small and 
marginal farmers is associated with their ‘moving from subsistence agriculture to… 
high-value crops with a strong motivation to improve their social and economic 
status.’ This has been referred to as ‘the tragedy of the upwardly mobile’ (Rao, 
2009: 109).  This thesis argues, and the analysis highlights, that this can be seen as a 
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result of the ‘revolution of rising aspirations’ (Gupta, 2002: 86) created by the 
gradual liberalisation of the state. 
 
Galab et al. (2009: 191) note that the risk of non-institutional credit is particularly 
linked to small and marginal farmers given ‘an inverse relationship between the size 
of land-holding and access to institutional credit.’ The idea that the risks associated 
with the agrarian crisis are more acute for small and marginal land-holders is also 
asserted by Galab and Revathi (2009: 187) who found that, according to income 
and expenditure levels in 2002-03, agriculture was viable only for cultivators with 
holdings of ten acres (four hectares) or more.124   
 
Access to land is also associated with improved access to other assets.  Wade (1994: 
34) observed that tractor ownership was confined to the wealthiest land-owning 
castes.  Similarly, the economist and anthropologist, Scarlett Epstein (1973: 99), 
highlighted the impact of the additional costs of hiring oxen or tractors for 
cultivators who lack ownership of such assets.   
 
Access to land has also been constrained by the reduction in the net sown area in 
Telangana as a result of land degradation and soil erosion (Galab et al., 2009: 173).  
Attempts by small farmers to enhance the viability of cultivation through leasing 
                                                 
124
 This found that farmers within the category of four to ten hectares (ten to twenty-four acres) earn an 
average monthly income level of Rs 5,479 per month, as opposed to consumption levels of Rs 4,133 per 
month (Galab et al., 2009: 187).  It should be noted, however, that farmers receive their income in three or 
four instalments at the end of the agricultural season as the crop is harvested and brought to market.  This 
makes the management of their income particularly difficult.  Similarly, the extent to which the 
consumption levels cited here include debt repayments is not clear.  Fieldwork for the current study 
highlighted that income from the harvest is often first used to pay some of the most pressing of debts. 
 119 
land heighten their exposure to risk in the event of crop failure.  This is due to the 
fact that the land lease charge is payable even if the crop fails.  A study conducted 
by Reddy (2010: 250) in four districts of Andhra Pradesh, including Warangal,125 
found that twenty-five per cent of farmers who committed suicide were tenants.   
 
Liberalisation and the Changing Nature of Risk 
Rao and Suri (2006: 1546) note that, while debt in rural Andhra Pradesh is not new, 
suicides due to indebtedness are.  They (ibid.) argue that this highlights a qualitative 
difference in the nature of indebtedness in contemporary times which is evident in a 
number of ways.   
 
Firstly, it is claimed that there has been an increased ‘individualisation of 
agriculture’ (Deshpande and Arora, 2010a: 409; Vasavi, 2010: 79; 2012).  This is 
associated with the decline in cooperation in terms of the sharing of assets, and the 
increased commodification of agrarian activity, which is reinforced through 
cultivators accessing credit as individuals (ibid.).  Deshpande and Shah (2010c: 
125) assert that this individualisation of rural life is contributing to the collapse of 
the village as an institution, given the erosion of the patron-client ties associated 
with the jajmani (occupational) relations of the caste system (ibid.: 132).126  
 
                                                 
125
 This study featured the households of twenty-two deceased farmers, three of which were in Warangal.    
126
 As Chapter Two highlighted, the patronage associated with such jajmani ties served to legitimate power 
structures and, in cases of extreme scarcity, the most vulnerable would be the first to suffer.  The contested 
legitimacy of the caste system has also, however, contributed to a general sense of anomie as norms 
associated with the exercise of power are increasingly challenged (Deshpande and Shah, 2010: 132).   
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Secondly, as part of neo-liberal reforms, many public institutions which had 
previously focussed on encouraging collective behaviours have been eroded.  These 
include state cooperatives such as the Andhra Pradesh Irrigation Development 
Corporation, the Andhra Pradesh Seeds Development Corporation, and the 
Cooperative Spinning Mills (Galab et al, 2009: 190).  The reduction in government 
investment on extension services, and their increased privatisation, as part of neo-
liberal reforms (ibid.: 189) has also reduced the social supports available to farmers 
in their attempts to negotiate risk.   
 
Finally, there has been an increased impetus to take risks given the heightened 
aspirations of farmers (Revathi and Galab, 2010: 195). These raised expectations 
have led to an increase in expenditure associated with, for instance, dowries and 
house construction (Rao and Suri, 2006: 1552; Galab et al., 2009: 169; Deshpande 
and Shah, 2010c: 129).  Likewise, the ongoing privatisation associated with 
education and health has seen increased expenditure related to these ‘public’ 
services (Galab et al., 2009: 170; Reddy, 2010: 257).  
 
The Ambiguity of Bt Cotton and Agrarian Risk  
Opponents of Bt cotton argue that, quite apart from the contested potential for 
increased wealth for cultivators, the ambiguity associated with the technology has 
added to the general uncertainty of an already precarious agrarian context.  Gaurav 
and Mishra (2012: 19) note that the proliferation of Bt cotton hybrids on the market 
 121 
(estimated at five hundred and twenty-two in 2009) has rendered seed choice 
increasingly difficult.   
 
Pest risks have also been found to be greater in districts such as Warangal where 
there is a high incidence of mono-cropping and a large area under non-food crops 
(Revathi and Galab, 2010: 207).  There is also the issue of spurious Bt cotton seeds 
with which Warangal is particularly associated (Revathi and Galab, 2010: 211; 
Sridhar, 2006: 1562).  Sales of spurious seeds led to widespread suicides in the 
district in 1997-98 (Sridhar, 2006: 1562), and resulted in protests which involved 
the burning of seed outlets in Warangal city (Qayum and Sakkhari, 2005: 5).  
 
Beck’s (2009: 115) assertion that risk society is associated with an  ‘ineradicable 
non-knowing’ is evident from the lack of certainty regarding farmers’ claims that 
animals have died as a result of their grazing on Bt cotton. Anxiety in this regard 
was exacerbated by the advice of the former Director of Animal Husbandry in 
Warangal that farmers should not permit their animals to graze on the crop.127  It is 
also recognised that the choice of cultivating non-Bt cotton is severely limited due 
to the difficulty in obtaining non-Bt seeds (Stone, 2011: 390).128   
                                                 
127
 The former Director confirmed in a telephone interview (17/2/2011) that his advice was offered as a 
precautionary measure as a response to NGO protests and that, in his view, the sporadic reports of such 
deaths meant that they were more likely to be due to pesticide residues.  It should be noted that all farmers 
in the current study asserted that the animals which died had escaped, and would not have been grazing on 
the cotton fields as a standard practice.  The fact that pesticide use has declined since the introduction of Bt 
cotton suggests either that there has been a change in the strength of the pesticides which farmers are using, 
or that the deaths are due to a broader spectrum of toxicity in the plant than is asserted by proponents.  
Either way, reports of the deaths raise concern for the farming praxis associated with Bt technology in 
relation to food crops.  
128
 This restricted supply was noted in a personal interview (22/11/2010) with a seed dealer in Warangal 
who asserted that he had stopped supplying Bt seeds due to reduced demand.  He also noted, however, that 
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This thesis argues that the framing of the opposition to Bt technology in Telangana 
has a strong resonance with the wider discourse of injustice associated with the 
struggle for a separate state, and that this wider unrest also influences the response 
of the Andhra Pradesh government to the opposition to Bt cotton in the region.   
 
4.5 The Telangana Movement and Bt Cotton 
 
Agitations for a separate Telangana represented an attempt to gain an improved 
recognition for, and resolution of, the risks inherent in the Telangana context. 129  In 
this way, these protests illustrated Renn’s (2008: 135) view that ‘risk issues have 
become battlegrounds for substantial conflicts about resource allocation, social 
justice and future economic development.’ They also entailed attempts to redefine 
democratic praxis in terms of the way in which political power was exercised.   
 
It should be noted that the initial proposal that Telangana should form part of 
Andhra Pradesh was strongly resisted by many in the region.  It was argued that the 
deprivation of Telangana as a result of its oppression under the Nizam’s rule would 
negatively impact upon its ability to compete for resources.  This concern was 
                                                                                                                                                 
the commission for a packet of Bt seeds was Rs 80 to Rs 100 depending upon the size of the order whereas, 
for non-Bt seeds, it was just Rs 50.  This absence of non-Bt seeds in the market is highlighted in a 2011 
documentary entitled Bitter Seeds, produced by Micha Peled.  This explores the experience of Bt cotton 
farmers in Maharashtra.  Details of this documentary are available at: http://www.itvs.org/films/bitter-seeds 
Accessed on 15/12/2013. 
129
 The struggle for a separate state was associated with ongoing protests throughout the research period.  
These included regular bandhs (strikes) which involved the closure of schools, shops and cinemas (Times 
of India, 22/2/2011; 23/2/2011), a rail roko (blockade) (Deccan Chronicle, 2/3/2011), non-cooperation 
(Times of India, 17/2/2011), student agitations (Times of India, 10/1/2011; 25/1/2011), gherao 
(encirclement) of a minister’s home in Warangal (Deccan Chronicle, 9/1/2011), relay hunger strikes (Times 
of India, 22/1/2011) and sporadic violence, including the burning of public transport (Times of India, 
22/2/2011; 24/2/2011).  The protests also included a number of suicides through self-immolation (Times of 
India, 12/2/2011), hanging (Times of India, 17/10/2010; 29/1/2011) and pesticide consumption (Times of 
India, 11/3/2011; Deccan Chronicle, 16/8/2010).   
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particularly acute due to the relative affluence of the formerly British-ruled region 
of Coastal Andhra, and the inability of many of those in Telangana to speak English 
given that Urdu had been the language of officialdom in Hyderabad State 
(Kannabiran et al., 2010: 72-78; Maringanti, 2010: 34).  
 
The formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956 took place on the basis of an informal 
‘Gentleman’s Agreement’ (Brass, 1990: 234). This included stipulations that one-
third of government jobs and educational places would be reserved for those from 
Telangana and that, after a proportional sharing of revenues among the regions, the 
balance would be spent on the development of Telangana (Melkote et al., 2010: 9).  
It is argued, however, that these safeguards have not been respected (Brass, 1990: 
234; Melkote et al. 2010: 10), and that the merger has significantly impacted upon 
the ability of those in Telangana to access key resources in their negotiation of risk.  
This led to the refrain of Maadi maaku kaavaale (‘we want what is ours’) in the 
struggle for secession (Kannabiran et al., 2010: 69).   
 
Given the centrality of irrigation to the negotiation of risk in the region, access to 
water represented a primary concern of the Telangana movement.  A significant 
portion of the catchment areas of two major rivers in south India, the Krishna and 
Godavari, lie in Telangana (Kannabiran et al., 2010: 72).  Likewise, the world’s 
largest stone masonry dam, the Nagarjuna Sagar dam, is located in the region.  
However, it was argued that Telangana received much less than its allocation, and 
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that this was instead diverted to the politically powerful Coastal Andhra region 
(Kannabiran et al., 2010: 72; Melkote et al., 2010: 9).   
 
Similarly, a major student protest, known as the Mulki (nativity) agitation, occurred 
in 1952.  Three students were killed by police during protests against the huge 
numbers of ‘outside people’ taking government jobs in Telangana (Melkote et al., 
2010: 11).  The protest began in Warangal, but soon spread to other areas (ibid: 8). 
It was also claimed that, even prior to the formation of Andhra Pradesh, those 
resident in Coastal Andhra districts had obtained false Mulki certificates which had 
allowed them to purchase large tracts of land in Telangana (Melkote et al., 2010: 8).   
 
As Kannabiran et al. (2010: 80) claim, the appeal for a separate Telangana state 
came to encapsulate ‘the demand for justice and equality, for freedom from want, 
for security, for a meaningful life.’ In terms of this thesis, the struggle for a separate 
state directly illustrates the inter-connectivity of the attempts to secure the 
legitimation of risk and democracy given that a legitimate democratic praxis was 
increasingly regarded as one which would alleviate the differentiated exposure to 
risk, through recognising the claims for justice of those who were at risk.  
 
Maringanti (2010: 37) describes the Andhra Pradesh government’s approach to 
development as ‘populism with streaks of fascism’.  The state has adopted a number 
of populist measures in order to secure its legitimation.  These have included the 
imposition of a moratorium on the recovery of farms debt by commercial banks and 
private money lenders (Rao and Suri, 2006: 1552; Sridhar, 2006: 1564).  It has also 
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announced an ex-gratia payment of one lakh rupees,130 and fifty thousand rupees 
towards the liquidation of debt associated with families of farmers who have taken 
their lives (Sridhar, 2006: 1564).131   
 
In 2006, the government launched the Indiramma (Integrated Novel Development 
in Rural Areas and Model Municipal Areas) initiative which aimed to upgrade the 
houses of all of those who had ration cards and who lived in kacha houses (those 
made from mud with roofs of rice straw or other thatching material).  At a national 
level, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA) was also passed in 2006.132  This seeks to enhance rural food security 
by providing at least one hundred days of guaranteed wage employment to every 
household member who is willing to undertake unskilled manual work, particularly 
when agricultural work is limited (between April and June). The scheme has 
attracted criticism with claims of late payments,133 and arguments that the increase 
in incomes in which it has resulted are leading to a rise in alcohol abuse among 
males in rural Andhra Pradesh (Deccan Chronicle, 20/10/2010).   
 
The authoritarian approach of the government which Maringanti (2010: 37) 
highlights is evident in the case of the ‘land seizures’, particularly for ‘Special 
                                                 
130
 One hundred thousand rupees. 
131
 The onus is on the family to provide evidence that the indebtedness was due to ‘farm-related causes’ in 
order to secure the compensation (Sridhar, 2006: 1564). 
132
 This is popularly referred to as NREGS, or the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. 
133
 Available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nrega-benefits-are-mixed-oxford-
study/article1-1146429.aspx.  Accessed on 14/12/2013. 
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Economic Zones’ (Le Mons Walker, 2008: 587).134 These are often violently 
resisted by Naxalites and tribal populations whose source of livelihood is claimed 
by the state with little or no compensation (ibid.).  It is estimated that two hundred 
thousand acres of land have been acquired for industrial development in this way in 
Andhra Pradesh (Balagopal, 2007: 3833). 135   
 
The conflicting demands of legitimation with which the state in Andhra Pradesh is 
associated are clearly evident in the case of Bt cotton.  Despite its clear support for 
a neo-liberal approach, the state government has been obliged to confront Monsanto 
and the central government in Delhi with regard to Bt cotton as a concern for its 
own legitimation.  This has led to the Andhra Pradesh government being referred to 
as ‘the most troublesome’ in India (Jishnu, 2010).136  The state has been involved in 
conflict with regard to Bt cotton in a number of ways. 
 
Firstly, in 2005, the state government banned certain varieties of Bt cotton from the 
market due to their association with widespread crop failure.137 In that same year, 
                                                 
134
 Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are duty-free enclaves for investors and are deemed to be ‘foreign 
territory’ within the state (Le Mons Walker, 2008: 588).  Instead of attracting industry and creating 
employment, however, Le Mons Walker (2008: 588) argues that they have become the basis for real estate 
speculation, and are often unused. 
135
 The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Act 2013 will come into effect in 2014.  This commits to increasing the compensation payable for land, and 
stipulates that private developers will need to gain the consent of eighty per cent of the population affected 
by land acquisition for private purposes.  However, it also legislates for the right of the government to 
acquire public land for private industrial purposes.   It remains to be seen how stringently its stipulations 
will be adhered to. 
Available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-16/news/43107324_1_monsoon-
session-jairam-ramesh-new-land-acquisition-act  Accessed on 17/10/2013.   
136
 Available at: http://business.rediff.com/column/2010/apr/01/guest-bt-cotton-monsanto-is-back-in-
courts-over-royalty.htm Accessed on 27/4/2013. 
137
 This related to three varieties of Mahyco-Monsanto’s Bt cotton seeds – Mech 12, Mech 162 and Mech 
184. 
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the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Commissioner ordered Mahyco-Monsanto to pay 
compensation of ten thousand rupees per acre to farmers who had lost their Bt crop 
in Warangal, Nalgonda and Khammam districts.138  Monsanto challenged the order 
in the Andhra Pradesh High Court, claiming that the Andhra Pradesh government 
was ‘harassing’ them (Kumar, 2010: 9).139   
 
Nevertheless, according to Herring (2008b: 151), Mahyco-Monsanto was forced to 
pay Warangal farmers thirty million rupees in compensation as a result of the crop 
failure linked to the withdrawn varieties.140 As Herring (2008b: 150) notes, 
Warangal remains the only district in India where compensation for crop failure has 
been awarded.  He (2008: 154) argues that this is due to the sensitivity of the 
district’s administration to ‘rural political protest because of a history of Naxalite 
activity,’ as well as the district’s NGO sector (ibid.: 155).  This thesis asserts that 
these factors are also relevant to the state government’s response to Bt cotton 
protests in Warangal.   
 
Secondly, the state was involved in a successful bid to force Monsanto to reduce its 
seed prices in 2006 from Rs 1,800 per 425 gram packet (sufficient for one acre) to 
Rs 750 per packet.141 Monsanto have argued that the value of the trait fee which it 
charges is an intellectual property right whose regulation is outside the jurisdiction 
                                                 
138
  Available at: http://www.global-sisterhood-network.org/content/view/705/76/ Accessed on 27/4/2013. 
139
 Available at: http://agrariancrisis.in/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/SEED-BILL-2010-an-analytical-
view.doc Accessed on 27/4/2013. 
140
 Herring (2008: 154) argues that these successful demands for compensation have contributed to ongoing 
fabricated (in his view) claims of crop failure and animal deaths.  
141
 Available at http://business.rediff.com/column/2010/apr/01/guest-bt-cotton-monsanto-is-back-in-courts-
over-royalty.htm Accessed on 22/7/2013. 
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of the state government.142 However, the Andhra Pradesh government has 
responded through passing legislation referred to as the Andhra Pradesh Cotton 
Seeds (Regulation of Supply, Distribution, Sale and Fixation of Sale Price) Act, 
2007, asserting its power to regulate the sale and pricing of Bt technology within 
the state.143   
 
Finally, a proposed move by the central government in Delhi to introduce an All-
India Seed Bill which would involve less stringent regulation than that currently 
required in existing state legislation has been strongly resisted by the state 
government and activists alike (Kumar, 2010: 10).144  This has also seen relations 
between the centre and the state government become increasingly fraught.   
 
In conclusion, this chapter has highlighted the way in which science and technology 
have become central to the neo-liberal approach to development adopted in Andhra 
Pradesh.  This chapter explored the way in which the emphasis on scientific 
knowledge as the means to development in the state has been associated with a 
reduced focus on the redistribution of resources, which was a central concern of the 
Telangana armed struggle.  The ongoing agrarian crisis and inequality in Telangana 
                                                 
142
 Available at: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/tp-agri-biz-and-commodity/monsanto-
ap-govt-cross-swords-over-royalty-payment/article1731571.ece?ref=archive  Accessed on 2/5/2013.  
143
 Details of the act can be found at http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ind119055.pdf Accessed on 27/4/2013.  
This legislation followed the deletion of cotton from the Essential Commodities listing by the central 
government in 2007.  Given that commodities listed as essential require the issuing of trade licences by 
states, the removal of cotton from the list limited the ability of state governments to regulate the prices of 
Bt cotton seeds.  Many states responded through the passing of their own more stringent legislation as part 
of their constitutional right given that agriculture is stipulated as an area which falls within their 
jurisdiction.  A release from the Press Information Bureau of the central government announced the re-
inclusion of cotton on the Essential Commodities list in 2009, following a storm of protest from NGOs. 
Available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=54255 Accessed on 27/4/2013.  
144
 Available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=54255  Accessed on 27/4/2013. 
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is increasingly linked to farmer suicides.  The chapter examined the conflicting 
demands for legitimacy associated with governance in Telangana, where appeals for 
economic growth as a means of poverty alleviation compete with protests calling 
for greater social and epistemic justice in the negotiation of risk. 
 
In the next chapter, the methodological approach adopted in order to research these 
issues during a nine-month stay in Andhra Pradesh will be explored.  This will also 
examine the particular ethical issues involved in studying risk within a vulnerable 
and volatile region such as Telangana.    
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Chapter Five 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The Social Construction of Research 
 into Risk 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the methodology used to explore the legitimation of risk and 
democracy with regard to Bt cotton in Andhra Pradesh.  It discusses the ontology of 
risk and the critical constructionist approach to the research.  This recognises that 
efforts to construct knowledge are central to wider attempts to define the future 
development of society.  This view is asserted by Strydom (2011: 144) who argues 
that ‘[k]nowledge production…is but a part of a much more encompassing process 
which includes the constitution of society.’   
 
The research process is presented, and the impact of the ‘positionality’ (Pearson, 
2006: 308) of the researcher upon the research is discussed.  The differences in the 
use of discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1989; 1992; 1995, 2003; Van Dijk, 1997; 
1998) between the two levels of analysis in this thesis are explored, as is the 
adoption of the conceptual framework of legitimation (Van Leeuwen, 2007; 2008).  
The chapter also explores the decision to reject, for the most part, the use of 
computer programmes as a means of analysing the data for the study.  Finally, but 
importantly, the particular ethical issues related to research into risk are examined.  
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5.2  The Social Construction of Knowledge and the Ontology of Risk 
  
The constructionist approach adopted by this thesis asserts that knowledge related 
to risk is a social construction (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Osborne, 1998; 
Strydom, 2002: 105-122).  Given that it has been highlighted that attempts to 
construct knowledge with regard to Bt cotton are highly polarised, the research 
seeks to guard against the adoption of a strongly normative position which would 
implicate the researcher too strongly within the struggle itself.   
 
Instead, the approach to critique posited within Critical Theory is adopted.  Critical 
Theory is associated with the Institute of Social Research established in Germany in 
1923, and later with the Frankfurt School (Held, 1980; Agger, 1991; Strydom, 
2011).  As a school of thought, it is strongly informed by Marxist, Left Hegelian 
and Kantian influences.  It is particularly concerned with critique which focusses on 
promoting freedom from ideology (as false consciousness) and epistemic 
oppression (Rasmussen, 1996), and which seeks to promote a legitimate exercise of 
power as part of democratic praxis (Fraser, 1989: 19-33; Habermas, 1994: 94; 
Young, 2000).  
 
Critical Theory asserts that critique has both ‘a negative exposing and positive 
disclosing form’ (Strydom, 2011: 137).   Within Critical Theory, therefore, critique 
not only seeks to critically check ‘the self-understanding of actors, their 
orientations, practices, relations and institutions’ (ibid.); it also aims to disclose 
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‘new possibilities, interpretations, orientations, modes of organization or protest or 
transformative potentials’ (Strydom, 2011: 137).   
 
The critical, constructionist approach does not mean to imply that the research is 
value-free, or that the researcher’s values are not clearly in evidence throughout. 
Nor does it deny that certain conclusions with a normative dimension have been 
reached as a result of the analysis.  However, the central aim is to foreground the 
struggle as it is occurring within Andhra Pradesh society, and to emphasise the 
normative positions which are being adopted by the social actors themselves.  This 
seeks to highlight the wider sociological ramifications of the struggle with regard to 
the constitution of Andhra Pradesh (and, as of 2014, Telangana) society.   
 
The focus on presenting the debate as it is occurring recognises Luhmann’s (1993: 
xi-xii) view that, ‘[a] sociological investigation cannot seek to take sides, let alone 
decide the issue.  The aim can only be to find out what is going on.’  Similarly, 
Strydom (2000: 89) asserts that, within the constructionist approach, ‘the whole 
plural range of participants relevant to a given constructive context [must] be taken 
into account without any tendency to favour one and hence to identify with it.’   
 
The constructionist position is a difficult one to maintain, particularly given that the 
discipline of sociology, and the approach of Critical Theory within it, operates with 
an inbuilt critique of capitalism.  It could be argued, therefore, that rather than being 
constructionist in its approach, this thesis is more ‘legitimationist’ (Strydom, 2000: 
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89) given that it identifies with (and thus inherently legitimates) the normative code 
of NGOs.   
 
The legitimationist dimension to the study is acknowledged.   This asserts that the 
contestation of power, rather than its concentration, represents the very basis of 
legitimacy in democratic society.  However, it is also argued that, in terms of the 
analysis, the approach is constructionist, given that it seeks to present ‘the dynamic 
interplay of the normative codes of all the participants within their common setting’ 
(Strydom, 2000: 89).  This acknowledges that the perspectives of social movements 
are not ‘privilege[d]’ (Giri, 2012: 191) within the wider struggle in which they are 
engaged in praxis.   
 
As has been highlighted in Chapter One, ontologically, this thesis adopts a position 
of ‘weak naturalism’ (Strydom, 2011: 10).  This posits that, while social knowledge 
is constructed, there is a natural reality which exists beyond the attempts of 
humanity to construct knowledge pertaining to it.  This thesis takes the view that 
risk represents an epistemic gap.  Risk, therefore, involves humanity in complex 
attempts to construct knowledge in the present which pertains to an unknown 
future, which will itself be determined by contemporary attempts at knowledge 
construction.  As in the case of risk definition, attempts to construct knowledge in 
research into risk are mediated by power relations.  This will now be explored with 
regard to the research process in the current study. 
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5.3 Ethnographic Research and a Bi-Level Constructionist Approach  
This thesis adopts a bi-level ethnographic approach as a means of exploring the Bt 
cotton debate in Andhra Pradesh.  
 
The Micro Level 
The data on which this thesis is based was collected using a triangulated,145 
ethnographic approach adopted during nine months of fieldwork in Andhra Pradesh 
between June, 2010 and March, 2011.  This duration was chosen to coincide with a 
cotton season.  The district of Warangal was selected given that it has been of 
interest to the researcher since 2002 when an internet search on GM crops revealed 
the widespread protests against the official approval of Bt cotton in the district.   
 
A ‘mixed methods’ (Johnson et al., 2007: 112) approach, which combines both 
quantitative and qualitative data, has been adopted at the micro level.  This is given 
the view asserted by Miller and Fox (2004: 36) that ‘looking at an object from more 
than one standpoint provides researchers…with more comprehensive knowledge 
about the object.’ This thesis argues that the attempt in triangulation ‘to consider 
multiple viewpoints, perspectives, positions, and standpoints’ (ibid.) is highly 
conducive to a constructionist approach, and is essential for a sociological 
investigation into a controversial theme, such as Bt cotton.  
 
                                                 
145
 Triangulation involves the use of a number of methods in order to permit the corroboration of data 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 214; Johnson et al., 2007: 113).  Methods used in the current study 
included interviews, texts, questionnaires, field-notes, and observations.  A significant database of 
newspaper clippings was also collected over the nine month period of the research.  
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Quantitative data is used to explore the influence of power relations on the 
differentiation of risk as a material concern at the micro level, as well as to provide 
a substantive basis for the exploration of the ideological legitimation of perspectives 
offered by participants at both the micro and meso levels.  Selective results from a 
questionnaire administered as part of the research process are also presented to 
highlight the aggregate perspectives associated with the villages.146  It is recognised 
that the quantitative data used in this study is also constructed given that it is 
derived from qualitative interviews with cultivators.  However, this data has been 
corroborated through observations, further qualitative interviews, and academic 
research, as well as cross-referencing within and between villages. 
 
The desire to have both sides of the debate represented as part of the constructionist 
approach entailed the selection of three villages with different perspectives on Bt 
cotton.  These are as follows: 147 
 
• Bantala –all cotton is cultivated using Bt varieties; 
• Orgampalle – all cotton is organically grown using non-Bt varieties, and  
chemical fertilisers and pesticides are prohibited in farming praxis; 
• Nandanapuram – cotton is cultivated using Bt varieties with chemical 
fertilisers and pesticides.  However, a small number of villagers have also 
                                                 
146
 Interview guides used for the semi-structured interviews at the micro level are included as Appendices 
5.4 (pp. 366-368) and 5.5 (pp. 369-371).  Results of the questionnaire are included as Appendix 7.2 (395-
398).  Due to space constraints, only selective findings from this questionnaire have been featured in the 
analysis.   
147
 The names of micro level participants and the villages have been changed in order to protect identities.  
The pseudonyms of the villages have been formulated with the aim of assisting the reader in identifying 
which village is associated with each cultivation method.   
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adopted Non-Pesticide Management (NPM) which utilises non-Bt varieties 
and chemical fertilisers, but prohibits the use of pesticides. 
 
The villages of Bantala and Orgampalle were first visited by the researcher with the 
NGO, Crops Jangaon, as part of a seven-day pilot study conducted between March 
and April, 2010.  During this pilot study (29/03/2010 - 05/04/2010), affiliation with 
Hyderabad Central University (HCU) was secured as part of the requirement for a 
research visa, and a local supervisor within the university’s Sociology Department, 
Professor Purendra Prasad,148 was identified.   
 
Following discussions with Professor Prasad, a decision was taken to focus on 
Bantala for the micro level analysis.  It was felt that the absence of NGO affiliation 
in the village, and the fact that it had not previously been the subject of research, 
would allow the researcher to gain fresh insights into the material reality of Bt 
cotton.  Similarly, the assertion by villagers that twenty buffaloes had died in 2008 
as a result of their escaping and grazing on the Bt cotton fields presented the 
opportunity to allow this dimension of the Bt cotton debate to be more closely 
explored.   
 
Bantala was visited weekly from the end of June, 2010. As this village had not 
previously been the subject of research, information on the village composition had 
to be defined with the help of ‘key informants’ (LeCompte and Schensul, 1999: 86). 
                                                 
148
 Professor Prasad, who specialises in Indian development, was a key source of advice in Andhra Pradesh.  
The researcher met with him five times throughout the research period, and he has remained an important 
guide since her return to Ireland. 
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These included the Village Secretary (a Panchayat position) and the head-master of 
the village school.  This pre-work was essential to identifying a valid cross-section 
of participants along the dimensions of caste, gender and land-holding.  Initial visits 
were also spent in the fields, and allowed villagers to become accustomed to the 
presence of a Western researcher and her translator, as well as permitting the 
researcher herself to acclimatise. The researcher also included participants 
encountered randomly in the fields in an attempt to mitigate the potential for village 
power holders to define the research.   
 
Many informal interviews were conducted with villagers in Bantala who did not 
subsequently become part of the formal research process because their caste, gender 
or land-holding were already represented. There were also further recorded 
interviews conducted with villagers whose animals had died (23/8/2010; 
24/8/2010), the Agricultural Mediation Officer (13/9/2010), and those who had 
received land during land reform (5/2/2011).  Interviews were also held with the 
village vet (12/9/2010), and the Mandal Parishad Development Officer in the wider 
Mandal office (4/10/2010).  These have not been included as part of the formal 
analysis, though they inform the research.   
 
Given the absence of opposition to Bt cotton in Bantala, however, and the lack of a 
basis of comparison for participants’ claims of the higher yields and incomes 
associated with the technology, the decision was taken, following consultation with 
supervisors, to extend the breadth of the research.  This followed three months of 
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fieldwork in Bantala.  Orgampalle and Nandanapuram were selected given that 
opposition to the technology was known to exist in these villages.  (Nandanapuram 
was first visited in July, 2010 with the NGO, the Deccan Development Society).   
 
In Orgampalle and Nandanapuram, the task of participant selection was undertaken 
with the assistance of NGO employees resident in the villages.  The experience 
gained in Bantala meant that the establishment of the research in Nandanapuram 
and Orgampalle was far more straightforward.  The researcher was clear on the 
general structure of the villages, and on the information she required.  She was also, 
by this time, more acclimatised to Indian village life.  These factors, combined with 
the fact that information on the village composition was already available for 
Orgampalle and Nandanapuram, meant that formal research could commence 
immediately after the introductory visit.   
 
The power of ‘gatekeepers’ who have the authority to ‘grant or refuse access’ to 
participants in ethnographic research is noted by Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 
64).  At the micro level, consent to conduct the research was sought from the 
sarpanch (head person) of each village.149 While the researcher was introduced to 
the villages by NGOs, care was taken to highlight to participants that she was keen 
to learn of the farmers’ own perspectives on Bt cotton, both positive and negative.   
 
                                                 
149
 The form used in this regard is attached as Appendix 5.1 (p. 363). The consent form used for village 
participants is also attached as Appendix 5.2 (p. 364).  These were verbally translated into Telugu for micro 
level participants (and the Crops Jangaon actor at the meso level) prior to signing.   
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Given the decision to broaden the scope of the research to three villages, and the 
desire to avoid being positioned within village power structures, the decision was 
taken not to stay in any one village.  Instead, the researcher spent three days per 
week on field trips. These involved pre-dawn journeys to the villages by bus and 
auto-rickshaw, as most interviews had to be completed by 10am when the villagers 
started work in the fields. Given the early starts, the researcher would arrive from 
Hyderabad the day prior to the village visits, and undertake library research at 
Kakatiya University in Warangal.  A basic hotel close to Warangal city frequented 
by Indian NGO researchers served as a base during field trips. This was equidistant 
between Nandanapuram in north Warangal, and Bantala and Orgampalle in the 
south of the district.   
 
For the remainder of the week, the researcher was based at Hyderabad Central 
University.  Classes from the Master’s Sociology syllabus were attended between 
July and October, 2010.  These included bi-weekly seminars on ‘The Sociology of 
India’ and ‘Science, Culture and Society.’150  This allowed the fieldwork to be 
contextualised within wider academic debates occurring within Indian society itself. 
 
Twenty-six villagers were interviewed in their homes with the help of a translator in 
semi-structured interviews which lasted from one to one and a half hours in length 
                                                 
150
 Research was also conducted at the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT), the Center for Sustainable Agriculture (CSA), the National Institute for Rural Development 
(NIRD), and the Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS), all in Hyderabad. Two conferences were 
also attended in other states – an All-India Sociological Conference in Cuttack, Orissa (27 - 29/12/2010), 
and an international conference entitled ‘Visions of Asia and the Challenges of Creative Social Theorizing’ 
held in Bangalore, Karnataka (21 - 24/2/2011).  The researcher also presented a paper on her work at the 
Madras Institute of Development Studies in Chennai, Tamil Nadu (11/11/2010).   
 140 
(this includes the time taken for the translation).  Most village participants were 
interviewed two or three times.151  All interviews were recorded using a digital 
dictaphone, and transcribed using a laptop by the researcher.   
 
The task of transcribing was performed in Hyderabad between field trips.  This took 
up to two or three hours per day, and was undertaken between university classes, or 
following evening meals.  Entire interviews were transcribed verbatim. While this 
was often tiring, it was also crucial to ensuring that the research stayed on track.  
Regular transcribing between village visits meant that omissions could be 
identified, and addressed with participants in the following visit.  It also permitted 
new areas of interest to emerge, and meant that the researcher was familiar with her 
data (and details of the participants’ lives) throughout the research process. This 
facilitated rapport building with village participants.  
 
Private Telugu lessons were undertaken at the university three times per week 
between July and September, 2010.  These followed three months spent learning the 
language using CD tutorials prior to leaving for India.  Due to the pressures 
associated with the research itself, the frequency of these classes gradually 
decreased.  Hours spent transcribing translated interviews, however, meant that the 
researcher became adept at recognising key words.  This allowed her to check for 
omissions when translations were being provided.  
 
                                                 
151
 The interview schedule for the villages is attached as Appendix 7.1 (pp. 393-394).  
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Nothing can prepare a neophyte researcher for fieldwork in rural India, and this was 
undoubtedly the most challenging aspect of the study.  This involved extensive 
travel, and hours spent at crowded railway stations awaiting delayed trains, as well 
as uncomfortable, often terrifying, pre-dawn trips to the villages on rickety buses 
travelling at breakneck speeds along uneven rural roads.   
 
There was also the heat and repetitive questioning by strangers (‘where are you 
from?’; ‘why are you here?’), hazards related to scorpions, king cobras and floods, 
the inability to drink village water (and, initially, reluctance to eat village food due 
to health concerns), the limited availability of hygienic toilet facilities, and the 
constant fear of Naxalite attacks on train journeys, as well as concerns regarding the 
political agitation in the region.  Fieldwork was often a lonely experience, given 
that much rural travel was undertaken in the absence of a translator and, thus, 
involved the researcher in a struggle to make herself understood in her limited 
Telugu, spoken with an Irish accent.   
 
Despite this, the time spent in the villages represents the most special dimension of 
this study.  The beauty of the Indian country-side, the hospitality of the villagers, as 
well as their sense of fun and wisdom, meant that the discomfort which field trips 
entailed was more than compensated for by the richness of the fieldwork 
experience.  It was in the trips to the villages that a greater appreciation emerged of 
the way in which India’s ancient philosophical and imperial heritage continues to 
inform the contemporary struggle to negotiate risk.  Similarly, the heightened sense 
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of alertness and fear which characterised village trips was also, inexplicably, at 
times accompanied by a profound feeling of peace.   
 
At the end of the research, a leaving ceremony was held in each village.  This 
involved the presentation of a large cake to the entire village, and the presentation 
of a ‘Certificate of Thanks’ which was translated into Telugu, and which featured 
photographs specific to each village.  A thank you speech was also made and 
simultaneously translated where the purpose of the research was again clarified, and 
humorous stories were exchanged relating to the researcher’s time in the village.   
 
In Bantala, these stories often referred to the researcher’s perceived Irish 
eccentricity in wearing wellington boots in the midday sun, in conjunction with the 
elegant Indian attire of a salwar kameez, when walking in the cotton fields.  These 
boots were kept at the home of the sarpanch and collected on the way to the fields.  
They were actually worn due to the researcher’s fear of the king cobras which 
inhabited the village, the sight of which had resulted in the resignation of a 
translator (a business graduate).  It should be highlighted that the wearing of 
wellington boots offers little in the way of protection against cobras.  Nonetheless, 
their comforting weight served to instill a relatively solid, though utterly flawed, 
sense of security in the researcher.  
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The Meso Level 
The impact of the meso level upon the micro level is recognised by Bolognani 
(2007: 281) who asserts that ‘micro-contexts [are]…deeply influenced by 
meso…politics’.  However, this thesis also explores the way in which competing 
risk constructions at the micro level are represented within meso level attempts to 
define the risk of Bt cotton.   
 
The meso level is again informed by the constructionist requirement to ensure the 
inclusion of social actors on both sides of the debate.  Here, the ideological struggle 
between participants is explored through the grouping of participants into coalitions 
on the basis of the similarity of their views.  At the meso level, the coalitions are as 
follows: 
 
• A Bt Coalition formed of representatives from the Congress Party in 
government, the Review Committee on Genetic Modification (a scientist 
from ANGRAU, the agricultural university in Andhra Pradesh), and 
Monsanto; 
 
• A Non-Bt Coalition involving representatives from the Communist Party 
(Marxist) in opposition, and three NGOs – the Deccan Development 
Society, Crops Jangaon and the Centre for Sustainable Agriculture. 
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Research at the meso level involved ten participants. Each participant was 
interviewed once, in interviews ranging from one to three hours.152 These were 
mainly conducted in Hyderabad.153  Research venues at this level were in stark 
contrast to those at the micro level, and included hotel meeting rooms, the 
Secretariat in Hyderabad, and the participants’ own offices in Hyderabad and 
Jangaon. The researcher was also accompanied by the Crops Jangaon participant on 
a visit to Orgampalle, and by the DDS participant on a trip to Nandanapuram. Apart 
from one NGO,154 all of the interviews at the meso level were conducted in English. 
This highlights the association of the English language with definitional power in 
Andhra Pradesh.   
 
Telangana protests also impacted upon the meso level of the study.  The interview 
with the ANGRAU actor in Hyderabad was inadvertently arranged during a bandh 
(strike) for Telangana.  This required that all government employees stopped work 
for the day.  (ANGRAU is a state university).  The interview was interrupted when 
a large group of angrily chanting protestors, patrolling campus to check that the 
faculty were respecting the bandh, could be heard approaching the building where 
the meeting was taking place.  The researcher was quickly moved to a backroom, 
while some of the faculty reassured the protestors that no official work was being 
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 The interview schedule for meso level participants is included as Appendix 8.1 (p. 404). 
153
 One interview with a Monsanto representative was conducted in Monsanto’s Bangalore office, and 
involved two further Monsanto employees via a teleconference link to the organisation’s Mumbai office.  A 
further interview was conducted with a Monsanto employee from Mumbai who was visiting Hyderabad for 
a conference.  The interview with the Crops Jangaon actor was undertaken in his office in Jangaon, a town 
eighty kilometres from Hyderabad.    
154
 The interview with the rural NGO, Crops Jangaon, involved the use of a translator. 
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undertaken.  It was with some relief that the researcher heard the protestors moving 
on to the next building. 
 
Other interviews conducted at the meso level included those with Dr Sharma from 
the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) 
(2/9/2010), Davuluri Venkateshwarlu from Glocal (14/9/2010), and Professor 
Revathi from the Centre for Economic and Social Studies (7/10/2010).  While these 
interviews are not directly cited, they greatly added to the researcher’s knowledge 
of the topic.   
 
The constructionist approach informed the way in which interviews at both levels 
were conducted.  Care was taken in the phrasing of questions to ensure that they 
were not biased towards a particular ideological positioning in ways which would 
lead to a similar bias in responses, or to defensiveness in participants with opposing 
views.  At the micro level, translators were also instructed to avoid biased language.   
 
5.4 Researcher Positionality in the Research Process 
It is recognised that efforts to construct knowledge in research are mediated by 
power relations arising from the researcher’s positionality, as well as by the 
ideological positioning of the researcher herself.  These aspects must, therefore, be 
problematised as part of the research process itself, and will now be dealt with in 
turn.  
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Positionality and the Negotiation of Power in Fieldwork 
Positionality relates to characteristics of the researcher such as gender, race, class 
and nation (Pearson, 2006: 308), as well as the personality of the researcher and the 
general approach adopted to the research process (Wolf, 1996: 17).  These aspects 
impact upon the way researchers are positioned in power relations as part of the 
research process.  While the positionality of the researcher cannot be changed, this 
thesis argues that its impact can be negotiated and reflexively monitored as part of 
the knowledge construction entailed in research.    
  
Wolf (1996: 11) notes that positionality is multi-faceted, and that different aspects 
off-set each other.  In the current study, it is acknowledged that the researcher’s 
gender certainly represented a hindrance in certain aspects of the fieldwork, most 
notably in the finding of accommodation deemed safe for a lone female.  It is also 
rare for females to travel alone in India which meant that the researcher attracted 
considerable attention, particularly in rural areas.  However, it is also argued that 
her elevated status as middle-aged and ‘foreign’ mitigated some of the potential 
obstacles which her gender presented.  
 
The observation by Pemunta (2010: 4) that ‘we can either disqualify our 
subjectivity as a hindrance to proper research, or turn it into our main research tool’ 
is particularly insightful.  It was recognised that, as a foreign female, the researcher 
attracted significant attention.  The heightened respect often granted to Westerners 
in rural India should not be under-estimated, and serves to explain the way in which 
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the colonial enterprise was capable of securing a high degree of legitimation within 
the Indian context.  This appeared to be related to the initially pale (Irish) skin of 
the researcher, and the association of fairness with Brahmanical purity.  
 
The respect with which the researcher was perceived in Indian society was 
reinforced to her when an unknown elderly male approached and touched her feet (a 
sign of deep respect) while she was awaiting an auto-rickshaw to take her to 
Bantala.   Similarly, her visit to Jangaon cotton market was reported in a local 
newspaper where she was described as an American scientist.  This elevated status, 
once recognised, was used to gain access to high-profile political figures, a 
possibility which would have been much more limited in her own society. 
 
It also eventually became clear that there are numerous advantages associated with 
being a female researcher.  It was felt that her gender served to ease the potential 
power imbalance which villagers perceived with regard to her positionality as a 
Westerner.  The view that females are seen as ‘unthreatening or not official’ in 
fieldwork is also asserted by McDowell (1988: 85).  The researcher also took 
obvious pleasure in, and encouraged, the growing ease with which she was treated 
at the micro level of the study.  This was highly conducive to her desire to listen to, 
and learn from, the perspectives of villagers.   
 
The enhanced access associated with being a foreign female researcher in India is 
also highlighted by the American anthropologist, Marguerite Robinson.  She (1988: 
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269) notes how she was welcome ‘in both mud huts and marble mansions’ during 
her research in Andhra Pradesh. This, she (ibid.) argues, presents Western 
researchers in India with ‘an unusual opportunity to listen, to learn, and to be heard 
in varied environments.’   
 
Given the strict rules which govern commensality (eating together) between castes, 
the taking of food with participants was particularly seen as a mark of respect by the 
researcher to members of different castes.  This is explored in detail by Dumont 
(1972: 119-130; 181-194).  Her sharing of food with a broad spectrum of castes, 
from Brahmins to Madigas, was possible only because of her status as a foreigner.  
Her initially gauche attempts to eat food with her fingers while sitting in lotus 
position, and to speak Telugu during these informal meal-times, also served to 
foster friendships which transcended the research process.  
 
It became apparent that the potential disadvantages associated with working with 
translators could be offset by allowing the experience to inform the research itself.  
Mackenzie et al. (2007: 304) argue that translators can hinder ‘mutual 
understanding’ and ‘potentially undermin[e] the validity of the research’ (ibid.).  
Similarly, Jacobsen and Landau (2003: 193) highlight that there is a risk that the 
involvement of translators will lead to the ‘transgressing [of] political, social or 
economic fault-lines of which the researcher may not be aware.’  
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The current researcher worked with five different translators throughout the course 
of the research.  These were all accessed through contacts at Hyderabad Central 
University, and were all from Telangana.155 The deliberate attempt to avoid 
translators from Coastal Andhra was due not only to the recognised differences in 
Telugu dialect between the regions, but also to the concern that villagers would feel 
uncomfortable with a translator from Coastal Andhra as a result of the tension 
between the regions discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
It is acknowledged that the experience of working with translators requires a great 
deal of patience, and adds an extra degree of complexity to fieldwork, not least 
given the practical consideration that the availability of translators must be secured 
before field trips can be undertaken.  The involvement of translators also 
contributes to a significant loss of control over the research process.156   It was 
found however that, in the current study, the positionality of translators with regard 
to their caste served to highlight caste power relations in ways which the researcher 
would otherwise have failed to capture given the strict segregation of castes within 
the villages.   
 
It was noted, for instance, that Scheduled Caste Madiga and Mala translators would 
refer to Brahmin and Reddy participants in the polite form of Telugu, while other 
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 They included four males and one female who were aged between twenty and thirty years.  Of the 
males, one was a Master’s student in Anthropology, one a PhD student in Economics, one a Master’s 
student in Sociology, and one a Business graduate. The female was a PhD student in Hindi, and a Hindi 
teacher.  The female, the male PhD student and the Business graduate were all Backward Castes.  The 
Anthropology and Sociology Master’s students were a Scheduled Caste Mala and Madiga, respectively. 
156
 This relates not only to the mediated rapport with participants, but also to concerns for the anonymity of 
villages and participants.  In this regard, each translator was required to sign a confidentiality agreement 
which is included as Appendix 5.3 (p. 365).   
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participants would be addressed in the more familiar form.157  There was also a 
marked reluctance by the Mala translator to interrupt Brahmin and Reddy 
participants in order to provide the translation for fear he would be ‘scolded’ (Field 
note extract, 15/8/2010).   
 
Similarly, the Madiga translator mentioned that he had attempted to fool a Brahmin 
participant into believing he himself was a Brahmin by using Sanskrit words in his 
Telugu.  This is redolent of the ‘Sanskritization’ described by Srinivas (1966: 6) 
where a ‘‘low’ Hindu caste…changes its customs, ritual, ideology and way of life in 
the direction of a high…caste’ (ibid.).  Here, the Sanskritization of the Telugu 
language was ostensibly adopted as a means of manipulating caste assumptions.  It 
also, however, signaled the deeper insecurity of the translator given that, according 
to the norms of the caste system, he would not normally have been welcome inside 
the Brahmin’s home.   
 
The hierarchy between the Scheduled Castes themselves was reinforced by the 
Mala translator’s refusal to eat a meal at the home of a Madiga participant where 
the researcher was having lunch.  This was because, he argued, ‘his mother would 
scold him’ (Field note extract, 6/9/2010).  Further clarification established that this 
refusal to eat was due to the perceived potential for pollution through sharing food 
with a Madiga research participant.   
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 Like many European languages, Telugu has a polite form of ‘you’ which is used for the elderly or those 
deemed socially superior.  In Telugu, ‘meeru’ is the polite form, while ‘nuuvu’ is used for those deemed to 
be at an equal or socially inferior level.   
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The inclusion of a meso level meant that the researcher herself was positioned 
differently in power relations between the two levels.  Wolf (1996: 2) asserts that 
‘[s]tudying up’ is an important way of subverting the power of the researcher 
involving countries in the Global South.  However, it is argued that working with 
both a micro and meso level in one study significantly enhances the researcher’s 
sensibility for the way in which power is differentiated within a given society.  It 
should also be recognised that the research experience is very different between the 
two levels, and requires a great deal of flexibility from the researcher herself. 
 
It was noted that power holders at the meso level sought to establish a greater 
degree of control over the research process than other participants.  This was 
evident in a number of ways: the careful restriction of the time allocated to the 
research interview (Monsanto and Congress Party actors); the refusal to allow the 
interview to be tape-recorded (the ANGRAU actor); the use of ‘no comment’ to 
questions related to organic farming by one Monsanto actor; and the ‘vetting’ of the 
researcher by a representative from Monsanto’s Public Affairs department prior to 
the interview.   
 
While these are, of course, all perfectly justifiable practices given the right to 
autonomy of all research participants, the point here is that there was a notable shift 
in the positioning of the researcher given the different demands made on her by 
participants.  With power holders, she was more often obliged to work within 
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boundaries set by the participants themselves, rather than those self-imposed at the 
micro level as a result of her own ethical and methodological commitments.   
 
Research as a Challenge to and Consequence of Ideological Positioning 
This thesis argues that the research process should be designed in ways which will 
ensure that researchers are confronted with their own ideological assumptions, and 
challenged to alter them.  In this way, researchers learn and, in doing so, transform 
their self-understanding.   As Levi-Strauss (1963, as cited in Baszanger and Dodier, 
2004: 14) observed, research should represent a genuine ‘internal revolution’ for the 
researcher.   
 
In the current study, the attempt by the researcher to challenge her own ideological 
assumptions was facilitated by her removal from her own cultural context, and by 
her search for competing perspectives.  This sought to confront the epistemic 
boundaries associated with her cultural positioning as an Irish European, where GM 
technology has been banned due to safety concerns, and to learn from the 
perspectives of those in a context where Bt cotton had been cultivated for some 
time.  
 
One of the primary motivations for the study was the researcher’s desire for 
epistemic certainty as to whether or not the technology was associated with 
ecological and epidemiological risk.158  The researcher’s concern for the safety of 
                                                 
158
 The researcher had undertaken a smaller-scale study for her Master’s thesis in Sociology at University 
College Cork in 2008.  This had involved a critical discourse analysis of interviews with two politicians, a 
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GM crop cultivation given the cultural conditioning of her European origins was 
immediately challenged by her visits to Warangal where Bt cotton is pervasively 
cultivated in an open environment.   
 
Her ideological positioning was also challenged through early interaction with 
villagers in Bantala who all asserted that Bt cotton had contributed to (though was 
not fully accountable for) improved living standards and enhanced access to food.  
Thus, based upon early fieldwork, it appeared that the focus of the thesis would be 
an exploration of the ethical conflict arising from a technology which was 
associated with uncertain risk globally, but which was also contributing to the 
alleviation of the material risks of poverty in Warangal.  It was recognised, 
however, that these assertions of increased wealth did not explain farmer suicides, 
or the opposition to the technology which was known to exist.   
 
Her positioning changed again when the debt levels of participants in Bantala were 
explored, and the case of the animal deaths was more closely analysed.  As the 
awareness of the village power structures grew, and the research was broadened to 
include Orgampalle and Nandanapuram, the enhanced realisation of the ideological 
and material complexity of the theme emerged, as did its broader sociological 
implications. As a result of this changed perspective, the search for epistemic 
certainty has been replaced with a sociological interest in the way in which societies 
                                                                                                                                                 
Monsanto representative, and two NGOs, and was entitled ‘Identity, Ideology and Political Will Formation: 
A Case Study of GM Crops in Ireland.’  Due to the fact that GM crops were banned in Ireland at the time 
of the research, however, it was impossible to undertake a material analysis as a substantive basis for 
assessing the competing ideological perspectives in the study. 
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are formed through the legitimation struggle involved in the negotiation of the 
epistemic uncertainty associated with risk.   
 
The researcher’s initial desire for answers with regard to Bt technology was 
motivated by the ambiguity of her positionality as a former employee of Syngenta, 
one of Monsanto’s major competitors in the research and development of GM 
technology.159 The merging of competing perspectives at the meso level of this 
study reflects the researcher’s attempts to resolve her own internal conflict 
regarding the technology.  The research has, however, resulted in a broadening of 
her perspective to incorporate wider concerns related to equity, justice and the 
exercise of power in knowledge construction associated with attempts to define the 
risk of the technology. 
 
Finally, the researcher is conscious of the Eurocentric analytical concepts and 
methods which she has adopted in order to explore the research data.  This would 
appear to reinforce the argument of Sinha (1997: 177) that ‘the West is perceived as 
the locus of theoretical and conceptual endeavours [while] the non-Western world is 
seen to provide empirical grounding.’  
 
                                                 
159
 The researcher led teams of Logistics Managers in Syngenta for seven years from 1995 to 2002, both in 
the UK and Switzerland.  The development of GM technology was still in its infancy at the time of the 
researcher’s leaving the organisation.  However, her uncertainty regarding the technology was a factor in 
her loss of commitment to Syngenta’s corporate ideology.  This previous work experience has, 
nevertheless, provided her with an understanding of the way in which the ideological commitment of 
corporate actors to their employers informs the ethical positioning of these actors.    
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The choice of European authors to provide the theoretical and analytical framework 
is undoubtedly the result of the researcher’s European academic conditioning.  
However, it is also recognised that there is an absence of analytical frameworks 
developed by Indian authors.  This is highlighted by Parekh (1992, as cited in 
Pantham, 1995: 189) who notes that the critique of the Western ethnocentrism of 
political theory in India ‘has not been matched by the formulation of alternative, 
original, non-Western political theories.’ 
 
5.5   Power and Ideology in Critical Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis has been selected to analyse the qualitative data in this study due 
to the recognition of the centrality of discourse in the social construction of 
knowledge as part of the wider constitution of society.  The choice of discourse 
analysis also supports the ontological position of weak naturalism and 
constructionism given the view highlighted by Burkitt (1998: 123) that there is ‘one 
reality with many different epistemic and discursive positions upon it.’   
 
It should be highlighted that the analysis incorporates two very different 
applications of discourse analysis.  Given that the discourses at the micro level have 
been translated, the analysis at this level is less directly critical of the language 
used.  The aim here is to foreground the discourse of the villagers, and to use the 
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concept of legitimation in order to allow the risk constructions of villagers to be 
presented in their own (translated) words.160   
 
It is noted that participants at the meso level are using English as a second 
language.161  However, the degree of proficiency of these actors allows the analysis 
to become more directly critical of the language used.  Here, the use of critical 
discourse analysis permits a particular focus on the way in which power is 
ideologically negotiated through discourse.  Fairclough (1992: 12) argues that 
‘critical approaches [to discourse analysis] show…how discourse is shaped by 
relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has upon 
social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief.’  In this way, 
critical discourse analysis not only permits an analysis of the ideological struggle in 
which social actors are engaged; it also enables a critique of the naturalised 
assumptions social actors adopt in their attempts to legitimate and delegitimate their 
ideological positioning.  This recognises that, as Breeze (2012: 4) highlights, 
‘legitimation is an essential aspect of the way that ideologies function through 
discourse.’   
 
The focus at the meso level is, therefore, on the ‘de-structuring’ (Fairclough, 1989: 
171) of ideological assumptions which have become ‘naturalized’ (ibid.: 33) as part 
of existing power arrangements.  The discourse analysis at this level also seeks to 
                                                 
160
 The researcher’s Telugu reached a standard where she was able to engage in basic conversations, and 
check aspects of the translation.  However, it remained inadequate to conduct research interviews without 
the assistance of a translator. 
161
 With the exception of the Crops Jangaon actor whose interview was translated.   
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examine the dual role of ideology in both ‘reproduc[ing] and challeng[ing] aspects 
of…institutional norms and power relations’ (Skillington, 1997: 507).  Hence, 
theoretical concepts from critical discourse analysis are adopted far more rigorously 
at the meso level than at the micro level. 
 
The discovery of the ‘categories of legitimation’ developed by Van Leeuwen (2007; 
2008) represented a key turning point in the thesis, and led to the centrality of 
legitimation as a key analytical and theoretical concept.  The adoption of the 
categories of legitimation as a central analytical framework is highly conducive to 
the constructionist approach in that it allows the normative standards immanent in 
the social context itself to emerge through the discourse of participants.  The use of 
legitimation as an analytical device also importantly allows the researcher to 
remove herself from the struggle itself in order to gain the type of broader (though 
still necessarily subjective and imperfect) perspective necessary for a sociological 
analysis.  
 
The categories of legitimation (Van Leeuwen, 2007; 2008: 105-123) adopted as the 
analytical framework for the thesis are as follows: 
 
Authorization: legitimation by reference to persons in whom authority is 
vested.  In the current study, this relates to an exploration of the way in which 
legitimation is mediated through power relations; 
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Moral evaluation: legitimation by reference to ‘discourses of values’ (Van 
Leeuwen, 2007: 91).  In terms of the current research, this relates to the ‘life 
[which people have] reason to value’ (Sen, 1999: 74) as part of normative 
conceptualisations of development; 
 
Rationalization: legitimation by reference to the ‘goals, uses and effects’ of 
practices (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 113).  With regard to the current study, this 
relates to the reasons given for the legitimation and delegitimation of Bt 
technology; 
 
Mythopoesis:  legitimation by reference to narratives that reward legitimate 
actions.  In terms of this thesis, democracy is explored through an examination 
of the narratives of participants with regard to their views on the way in which 
power should legitimately be exercised within democratic society.   
 
At the meso level, the use of ‘counterframing’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 617) 
supports the ‘negative exposing’ (Strydom, 2011: 137) and ‘positive disclosing’ 
(ibid.) approach to critique which has been discussed previously.  The ‘diagnostic 
framing’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 615) as ‘problem identification’ (ibid.) is part 
of the ‘negative exposing’ (Strydom, 2011: 137) critique undertaken by the Non-Bt 
Coalition as a delegitimation of the Bt Coalition.  Here, the emphasis is on gaining 
recognition for the ‘‘victims’ of…injustice and amplify[ing] their victimization’ 
(Benford and Snow, 2000: 615).   
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The ‘prognostic framing’ which Benford and Snow (2000: 616) describe is linked 
to the articulation of solutions.  Here, the thesis seeks to undertake the ‘positive 
disclosing’ (Strydom, 2011: 137) function of critique in highlighting the alternative 
normative and material solutions offered by the Non-Bt Coalition as part of an 
alternative conceptualisation of development.   
 
As a method critical discourse analysis obliges analysts to be reflexive with regard 
to their own ideological assumptions.  The process of ‘de-structuring’ (Fairclough, 
1989: 171) ideological assumptions, and the researcher’s attempts to critique 
perspectives as part of this reconstruction is, of course, strongly influenced by the 
researcher’s own ideological positioning.  As Fairclough (1989: 171) notes, 
‘restructuring’ requires ‘a strategy for dealing with the problematization of one’s 
position to be creative, to put together familiar discourse types in novel 
combinations’ (ibid.).   
 
The analysis of competing perspectives requires that researchers are flexible enough 
in their own thinking to gain the type of in-depth insight into a perspective which is 
required.  As Savin-Baden (2004: 367) highlights, such a struggle for interpretation 
involves ‘messiness, self-critique and pain’, particularly when the research entails 
highly polarised perspectives.  It is also, as Scheper-Hughes (1995: 147)  notes, 
‘necessarily flawed’ given the researcher’s imperfect self-awareness and inability to 
fully transcend her positionality; however, it is argued that it is ‘good enough’ 
(Scheper-Hughes, 1995: 147) if it seeks to push the boundaries of the researcher’s 
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self-awareness further, and leads to new insights, not only on the theme of the 
research, but also on the process of knowledge construction itself.  
 
 The current research entailed quantitative and qualitative data obtained from ninety 
recorded interviews. (This relates to cited interviews only. In total, the research 
involved over one hundred interviews).  The corpus of data comprised more than 
seven hundred pages of single-spaced, typed material.  In order to undertake the 
analysis of such a large volume of data, training on data analysis software (SPSS 
software for the quantitative work, and NVIVO for the qualitative analysis) was 
undertaken between January and March, 2012.  Despite a further three months spent 
inputting and categorising the data using these programs, however, both were 
subsequently largely abandoned.   
 
These programs were found to be useful in terms of gaining familiarity with, and 
organising, the data.  However, the subsequent decision to almost totally reject them 
was due to the fact that their use became increasingly problematic given the depth 
of understanding and creativity which the analysis required.   (SPSS remained 
crucial as a database for the easy referencing of quantitative data on individual 
participants).  Seidel (1991: 114) notes that ‘some computer programs’ diminish the 
‘close involvement and interaction with their data’ (ibid.) which many researchers 
value.   Similarly, Bazeley (2007: 8) asserts that certain software packages can lead 
to a ‘loss of context’ and ‘alienation’ (ibid.) from the data.   The experience with 
this thesis suggests that researchers should be guided by their research objectives 
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and their own sense of their data when taking decisions on the use of software.  
They should also be flexible enough to abandon such tools if they become an 
obstacle to gaining more in-depth access to the data later in the research process. 
 
5.6 Ethics and the Legitimation of Research into Risk 
Ethical principles of ‘beneficence, integrity, respect for persons, autonomy and 
justice’ (Mackenzie et al., 2007: 299) represent the cornerstone of legitimate 
research practice.  However, it is also recognised that, as Mackenzie et al. (ibid.: 
300) note, ‘the articulation of these principles in ethics guidelines is often highly 
abstract.’ This means researchers are constantly obliged to reflexively legitimate 
their own research and their approach to it, both in the field and away from it.  It is 
argued that this is particularly true of research into risk, given that it explores 
ambiguity, and involves participants who are vulnerable.  Here, the distinction 
between ‘procedural ethics162 and “ethics in practice”’ noted by Guillemin and 
Gillam (2004: 261) is especially significant.   
 
Ethical concerns are relevant from the very earliest stage of obtaining informed 
consent from participants (Mackenzie et al., 2007: 299) given that the ambiguity of 
risk and the uncertainty related to the consequences of the research.  The objectives 
of the research were translated in Telugu to all participants in the initial interview, 
as was the consent form (Appendix 5.2, p. 364).  Participants were then asked to 
                                                 
162
 Procedural ethics relates to the ethical requirements of funding bodies or academic institutions.  In the 
case of the current research, this involved seeking ethical approval for the project from the Social Research 
Ethics Committee as part of the ethics procedures of University College Cork, and as a requirement of the 
Irish Research Council funding.  This approval was granted on 31/5/2010. 
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sign or, in the case of illiteracy, to place of thumb print on the form.  The 
acceptance of a thumb print as consent is, in itself, ethically questionable given the 
potential for exploitation which it highlights.  In the case of risk research, however, 
it is the input of these most vulnerable of participants which is of the most vital 
significance.  Hence, the ethical concerns regarding their inclusion in this research 
have to be balanced with the questionable ethics entailed in their exclusion from it.  
Pseudonyms have been used to eliminate the possibility for any unintentional harm 
to the participants as a result of the research itself.   
 
The heightened awareness of the differentiation of risk exposure between the 
researcher and researched is ethically problematic. The privileged position of the 
researcher who can simply leave the site is highlighted by Wolf (1996: 10) as 
evidence of the differentiated power between the researcher and the researched.  It 
is argued, however, that researchers leave the site, but the site does not leave them.  
Instead, the experience continues to inform the ethical commitments which 
underpin all future work.  In the case of the current study, this relates to an ongoing 
commitment to highlight the need for social and epistemic justice, and a legitimate 
exercise of power, in the negotiation of risk. 
 
The concern raised by feminist researchers that research itself is exploitative 
(Chase, 1996: 49) is particularly heightened in research into risk.  Here, the 
complex issue of reciprocity and how participants should be compensated for their 
involvement (Skeggs, 1994: 81; Wolf, 1996: 19; Pittaway et al., 2010: 238) is 
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particularly acute, given the poverty of many of the research participants at the 
micro level.   
 
The researcher refrained from offering financial recompense for interviews given 
the fear that this would impact negatively upon the validity of the research.  This is 
also highlighted by Bolognani (2007: 283) who argued that ‘[m]onetary reward, 
which has become more popular recently in social research…could have secured 
more interviews but not necessarily honest accounts.’  However, the researcher 
found other ways to provide financial assistance to those who particularly required 
it. This involved sharing auto-rickshaws with landless participants, and passing 
them significantly more than her share of the fare.  Similarly, gifts of cash and sari 
material were made to vulnerable participants when leaving the site.   
 
Concerns for exploitation are also related to issues of representation and authorship 
(Patai, 1991: 139; Wolf, 1996: 33-34; Bolognani, 2007: 288).  This is particularly 
true when participants are geographically distant from the researcher, and where 
prior representation has been limited.   Here, the researcher is obliged to recognise 
herself as a ‘definer’ who is responsible for the representation of her participants.  
To this end, the current researcher has committed to post a summary of the 
conclusions of the thesis, translated into Telugu by a former translator, to the key 
informants and sarpanches in the villages for onward dissemination to research 
participants.163   She has also committed to sending a summary of the conclusions 
                                                 
163
 The researcher maintains limited contact with the villages through the mediation of this translator.   
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of the thesis in English to meso level participants.  (This will be translated into 
Telugu for the Crops Jangaon actor). 
 
It is also recognised that researchers are questioned by research participants.  As 
Geleta (2013: 9) highlights in his ethnographic study in Ethiopia, ‘I was not only 
interviewing my informants, but they were actively engaged in interviewing me.’ In 
the case of studies into risk, however, this can present particular ethical dilemmas.  
This was particularly evident in the questions from Bantala cultivators regarding the 
experience of Bt farmers in Ireland.  Without wishing to add to the anxiety which 
these participants were already expressing, the researcher was obliged to respect 
their autonomy, and to respond honestly that the technology was banned in her 
home country due to uncertainty regarding its safety.   
 
It is impossible for the researcher to predict the ways in which her encounter with 
participants impacted upon their perspectives, any more than participants could be 
sure of the way in which their individual contributions informed the conclusions of 
the research.  It was noted, however, that many cultivators in Nandanapuram were 
notably moved to learn that it was internet reports of protests in their village which 
had come to the researcher’s attention many years earlier in Switzerland, and which 
had inspired the current study.  This highlights the incredible inter-connectivity of 
risk society, and the powerful force for collective learning which it represents.   
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In conclusion, this chapter has explored the use of a constructionist approach in this 
bi-level analysis of legitimation and Bt cotton.  It has also examined the way in 
which attempts to construct knowledge in social research are mediated through 
power relations associated with the ‘positionality’ (Pearson, 2006: 308) of the 
researcher.  It has illustrated, however, that reflexivity on this positionality can 
become part of the knowledge construction of the research itself.  The differing 
adoption of discourse analysis between the levels of the study is highlighted.  
Finally, the chapter explores the particular ethical dilemmas associated with 
research into risk, but argues that these need to be balanced against the significant 
ethical repercussions of a failure to undertake such work. 
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Chapter Six 
ANALYSIS  
PART I 
 
A Comparative Analysis of the Differentiated Risk Exposure  
of Village Participants in the 2010/2011 Cotton Season 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the differentiated exposure to risk as a material concern of selected 
participants in three Warangal villages is explored.  This entails a quantitative 
analysis of actual cost and income data related to the cultivation of Bt cotton, when 
compared with NPM and organic cultivation.  Data for this analysis was collected 
using a structured interview guide which is provided as Appendix 5.5 (pp. 369-
371).  This chapter also introduces the Risk Coalitions which form the basis of the 
analysis of the differentiated risk exposure within and between the villages in the 
next three chapters.   
 
The comparative data permits a multi-faceted analysis which explores:  
a) the relative risk exposure of the Risk Coalitions within each of the villages; 
b) the relative risk exposure of the Risk Coalitions across the villages as a means 
of quantitatively comparing the experience of Bt cotton cultivators with those 
using organic and NPM methods; 
c) the relative risk exposure of Bt cotton farmers in Nandanapuram and Bantala 
as a means of analysing the variability of Bt cotton farming in two dispersed 
villages in Warangal. 
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6.2 Village Overview 
Full details of the village compositions are available in Appendices 6.1 to 6.3 (pp. 
373-375).  Key information is summarised below: 
 
Table 6.1: The Villages at a Glance 
 
Village Bantala Nandanapuram Orgampalle 
Population 2,800 people (428 
households) 
 
3,500 (971 households) 
 
202 (52 households) 
Caste 
composition 
 
FC –   1 per cent; 
BC – 59 per cent; 
SC – 40 per cent 
 
FC – 1 per cent; 
BC – 59 per cent 
SC – 40 per cent 
FC – 0  
BC – 100 per cent 
SC – 0  
Dominant 
Caste 
BC Kuruma (fifty-one per 
cent of land holding) 
No one caste dominant.  
Majority of village land 
held by SC Madigas (thirty-
seven per cent) and BC 
Gowdas (twenty-six per 
cent). 
 
BC Mudhiraj (eighty-
two per cent of land 
holding) 
Sarpanch 
 
BC Kuruma female BC Gowda female 
(previously SC Madiga 
male) 
 
BC Mannuru Kapu 
male (in neighbouring 
village) 
Percentage of 
land allocated 
to cotton 
61 (all Bt) 63 (90 per cent Bt; 10 per 
cent NPM) 
17 (all organic) 
Percentage of 
population 
landless 
5 (21 households) 10 (97 households) 0.5  
(1 household) 
FC: Forward Caste; BC: Backward Caste; SC: Scheduled Caste 
 
Pseudonyms have been used for the villages and participants in order to preserve 
their anonymity.  Bantala and Orgampalle are located approximately ten kilometres 
from each other in south Warangal, while Nandanapuram is located one hundred 
kilometres from the other two villages in the north of the district. 
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Village One: Bantala 
The village of Bantala is comprised of two thousand eight hundred people. This is 
large by Indian standards.  Details of the village composition are available as 
Appendix 6.1 (p. 373).  The majority of the village is comprised of Backward 
Castes (sixty per cent), with a limited number of Forward Caste Vaishyas (one per 
cent).  The dominant caste is the Backward Caste Kuruma who own fifty-one per 
cent of the village land, and account for just over twenty per cent of the total 
number of households (see Appendix 6.1, p. 373).  The current sarpanch is a 
Backward Caste Kuruma female.  However, it is her husband (Pallav) who is 
dominant in managing village affairs.   
 
As can be seen from Appendix 6.1 (p. 373), Bantala has a large population of 
Scheduled Castes (forty per cent).  Of these, the majority are Madigas (eighty-eight 
per cent), while Malas account for twelve per cent.  Despite the numerical strength 
of the Madigas, they own only fourteen per cent of village land, most of which is 
waste land allocated to them as part of land reform, and half of which is unfit for 
cultivation.  They are not mobilised along caste lines, not least due to the control 
exerted by Pallav over many aspects of village life.   
 
Cotton is the main crop cultivated in the village and accounts for just over sixty per 
cent of the cultivable area.  Only Bt cotton varieties are cultivated.  The other main 
crops are paddy, pulses and chilli.  In the case of larger land-holders, these crops are 
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grown for the market, as well as for personal consumption, while many small and 
marginal land holders grow some paddy for personal consumption only. 
 
All households, apart from four (which includes Pavan, the Forward Caste 
participant), have ration cards which entitle them to subsidised food from the Public 
Distribution System.  There is evidence of house construction in all caste wards.  A 
large canal has been excavated for irrigation.  However, it cannot be used as the 
tributaries to bring water to the fields have not been completed due to lack of 
funding.  A red Communist Party (Marxist) flag flutters aloft a flagpole in the 
centre of the village. 
   
There is no direct involvement between Bantala and NGOs for agricultural 
purposes.  In December 2008, thirty buffaloes escaped and grazed on the Bt cotton 
fields.  By morning, more than half were dead.  The villagers link the deaths with 
the animals having grazed on the Bt cotton fields.  Although scientists, politicians 
and NGOs visited the village and conducted post mortems, the animal owners have 
not been advised of the test results.  Shortly after the deaths, the Director of Animal 
Husbandry in Warangal issued his advice that farmers should not graze their 
animals on Bt cotton fields.     
 
Nandanapuram 
The village of Nandanapuram is very large, with a population of three thousand five 
hundred inhabitants.  The village composition is provided as Appendix 6.2 (p. 374).  
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Like Bantala, it is comprised mainly of Backward Castes (fifty-nine per cent), with 
a small population (one per cent) of Forward Castes.  Unlike in Bantala, the 
Forward Caste population in Nandanapuram includes Brahmins.   
 
As can be seen from Appendix 6.2 (p. 374), the Scheduled Castes in Nandanapuram 
also comprise forty per cent of village households.  Unlike in Bantala, however, the 
Scheduled Caste population is comprised entirely of Madigas.  The Madigas in 
Nandanapuram are characterised by a far higher degree of caste identification and 
mobilisation than was the case in Bantala.  Their strong position in the village is 
under-pinned by their ownership of thirty-seven per cent of the village land.  
Interviews with villagers also highlighted, however, that there is a high 
concentration of agricultural labourers among the Madiga population.  The greater 
dispersal of land among a variety of castes in Nandanapuram (with a significant 
portion of it being in the ownership of a Scheduled Caste) means that no one caste 
is identified as being dominant.  Instead, power is highly contested. 
 
Cotton cultivation in Nandanapuram is slightly higher than in Bantala at sixty-three 
per cent of the cultivable area.  The majority of the remaining land is sown to 
paddy.  Inter-cropping, which involves the simultaneous sowing of a number of 
crops on the same land and is associated with enhanced soil fertility, is practised to 
a far greater extent than in Bantala.   In the case of Nandanapuram, not all of the 
cotton is sown to Bt varieties.  Instead, ten per cent is cultivated using Non-
Pesticide Management (NPM) methods, involving non-Bt seed varieties.    
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Unlike Bantala, Nandanapuram has a strong association with NGOs for agricultural 
purposes, primarily with the Deccan Development Society.  Like Bantala, there is 
evidence of house construction throughout the village, as well as an incomplete 
canal excavated for irrigation purposes. Nandanapuram is also associated with 
sporadic reports of sheep deaths over a number of years which, farmers argue, have 
been caused by their escaping to graze on Bt cotton fields.   
 
Orgampalle 
The caste composition of the organic village, Orgampalle, is included as Appendix 
6.3 (p. 375).  The village is small, with a population of just two hundred and two 
inhabitants (fifty-two households).  For administrative purposes, it is a hamlet to a 
neighbouring village, where the sarpanch and panchayat office are also located. 
Unlike both Bantala and Nandanapuram, Orgampalle is characterised by its caste 
homogeneity and the population is comprised entirely of Backward Castes.  Ninety-
two per cent of households (all except four) are from the Mudhiraj caste which is 
the dominant caste and owns eighty-two per cent of the village land.  The remaining 
four households are two each from the Chakali and Yadava Backward Caste jatis.   
 
Crop diversity is higher in Orgampalle than in the other villages.  Cotton cultivation 
accounts for just seventeen per cent of cultivable land.  Other crops cultivated 
include paddy (twenty-four per cent of cultivated land), red gram164 (fifteen per 
                                                 
164
 Cajanus cajan or pigeonpea.  Red gram is a staple pulse of India where it has been cultivated for three 
thousand five hundred years, and is an important source of protein.  It is used in the making of dal.   
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cent) and smaller areas sown to sesame,165 maize,166 green gram,167 black gram168 
and vegetables.  It is important to note that Orgampalle is supported not only by a 
local NGO, Crops Jangaon, but also international NGOs, such as Oxfam.  This 
NGO network serves to alleviate the risks of organic cultivation for this village, 
providing invaluable extension services, as well as employment to some villagers, 
and contributing to the communal philosophy which defines Orgampalle’s approach 
to risk negotiation.    
 
The cultivation of Bt cotton is banned as part of the ‘rules’ agreed upon between 
Crops Jangaon, a local NGO, and the villagers.  These rules are painted in Telugu 
on the wall of a house on entry to the village.  (They have been translated and 
included as Appendix 6.4, p. 376).  All households in the village have a ration card 
which entitles them to PDS rations.  There is also evidence of house construction 
along the one main street of which Orgampalle is comprised.   
 
The village map of Orgampalle, provided as Appendix 6.7 (p. 379), highlights that 
there is less caste segregation in Orgampalle than in the other two villages.  
Although caste jatis are grouped together, all participants live in greater proximity 
to each other than is the case in the other two villages (see Appendices 6.5 and 6.6, 
pp. 377-378).   
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 Sesamum indicum.  Highly drought resistant, sesame is the oldest oilseed crop known to man.   
166
 Zea mays or corn.  Known for its ability to grow in diverse climates. 
167
 Vigna radiata or mung bean is used in the making of crepes and dal and is a rich source of low-fat 
protein.  Evidence indicates the crop has been cultivated in India for three thousand five hundred years. 
168
 Known as Vigna mungo, black gram is used to make dal, and is one of the most prized pulses in India.  
After paddy, Andhra Pradesh is known for its cultivation of black gram, particularly Coastal Andhra. 
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6.3 The Village Risk Coalitions 
The distribution of participants across the villages is as follows: 
         Table 6.2  Participants – Cultivators: Landless 
 
Village Cultivators  Landless 
Bantala 6 2 
Nandanapuram 8 2 
Orgampalle 7 1 
TOTAL 21 5 
 
Participants were selected in order to provide a cross-section of the particular 
composition of each village in terms of the dimensions of caste, gender and land-
holding.  As highlighted in the previous chapter, the selection process was 
undertaken with the help of key informants in the villages, as well as through 
spontaneous encounters with cultivators in the fields in the case of Bantala.   
 
The categories of land ownership used in the current study are: 
Marginal: 0.1 – 2.5 acres 
Small: 2.6 – 5 acres 
Semi-medium: 5.1 – 10 acres 
Medium:  10.1 – 20 acres169 
 
The majority of farmers cultivate cotton on marginal and small-holdings (forty-two 
and thirty-three per cent, respectively).  As has been highlighted in Chapter Four, 
these categories are most at risk from suicide, and so the benefits of Bt cotton for 
these cultivators are central to the technology’s wider legitimation.   
                                                 
169
 These categories are adapted from the land classification used by Mishra (2007: 5) and Omvedt (1994: 
329), but have been converted from hectares to acres. 
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Twenty-eight per cent of participants operate mixed holdings (ie., partly owned and 
partly leased). Details of the participants who lease land can be found in 
Appendices 6.11 to 6.13 (pp. 383-385). In the current study, the differentiation 
between leased and owned land is not considered significant in terms of analysing 
the performance of Bt cotton in comparison with the other methods; where leasing 
becomes more directly relevant, however, is in the exploration of the way in which 
the negotiation of risk differs between the coalitions, as well as in the calculations 
of the profits and losses associated with individual participants.   
 
At the village level, the power of social actors is indicated by their location within 
the village.  The high caste and influential actors in the study are located in or 
around the centre of the village, where the majority of the facilities are also to be 
found.   The Scheduled Caste participants are segregated to less well-maintained 
wards on the outskirts of the village.  In order to provide a graphic portrayal of the 
relative power of participants, details of their locations are provided in the village 
maps included as Appendices 6.5 to 6.7 (pp. 377-379). 
 
Based upon the dimensions of differentiation, participants have been assigned to 
Risk Coalitions as follows: 
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 Bantala  
Table 6.3 Bantala Risk Coalitions 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
Name Caste Gender Total Land-
holding170 
Land 
Allocated 
to Cotton 
Pavan Forward Caste 
(Vaishya) 
 
Male 20 acres (17 
leased) 
20 acres 
Sudhakar 
 
Backward Caste 
(Reddy) 
Male 16 acres (4 
acres leased) 
5 acres 
R
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Chitta Backward Caste 
(Dominant) 
Male 10 acres (5 
acres leased) 
7 acres 
Natesh 
 
Backward Caste 
(Gowda) 
Male 6.5 acres (4 
acres leased) 
4 acres 
Ashna 
 
Scheduled Caste 
(Madiga) 
Female 3 acres 2 acres 
R
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a
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n
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e) 
Sudeep 
 
Scheduled Caste 
(Mala) 
Male 1 acre 1 acre 
Abani 
 
Backward Caste 
(Padmashali) 
Female Landless - 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
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e 
 
(A
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) 
Nipa 
 
Scheduled Caste 
(Madiga) 
Female Landless - 
 
Risk Coalition One (Least Vulnerable) 
Pavan, Sudhakar and Chitta can be regarded as the three most powerful participants 
in Bantala.  As a Forward Caste Vaishya male, owner of the village shop and a 
farmer of twenty acres (seventeen of which is leased), Pavan is one of the most 
influential actors in the village.  He was also one of the first farmers to introduce Bt 
cotton to the village.  As a member of the powerful Reddy caste, Sudhakar is also 
powerful.  He is a medium land-holder (sixteen acres, four of which is leased).  
                                                 
170
 References to the category of land-holding in the analysis of the cultivation methods refer to the 
participants’ land-holding of cotton.  When discussing the relative power of participants, however, their 
total land-holding is emphasised. 
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Chitta, a member of the dominant caste, is the director of the co-operative bank in 
the village and a farmer of ten acres (of which five are leased).    
 
All of these actors reside near the centre of the village (see Appendix 6.5, p. 377).  
They are also associated with a greater access to assets than the other participants.  
This is evident from their ownership of oxen (Pavan owns four oxen, while Chitta 
owns two) and a tractor (Sudhakar).  This lowers their costs of cultivation, as other 
actors are obliged to hire these.  Similarly, actors in Risk Coalition One are the only 
participants in Bantala with access to irrigation (see Appendix 6.8, p. 380). 
 
Risk Coalition Two (Vulnerable) 
As a village elder, Natesh is highly influential in the village.   He has a land-holding 
of 6.5 acres, four acres of which are leased.  He is assigned to the more vulnerable 
coalition given that he has previously contemplated suicide due to his indebtedness, 
but instead chose to sell six acres of land.  Over time, therefore, Natesh’s exposure 
to risk has become more acute.  As Appendix 6.17 (p. 389) highlights, this has 
largely arisen as a result of dowry payments for his sisters and daughter, medical 
expenses for his son, and high cultivation costs in conjunction with poor yields. 
 
The two Scheduled Caste land-owners, Ashna (female) and Sudeep (male) are small 
and marginal land-holders (three acres and one acre, respectively).  Their risk 
exposure is somewhat alleviated by the fact that Ashna’s husband works in 
construction (he holds the title of the land, though Ashna is the sole cultivator in the 
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household), and Sudeep is also an auto-rickshaw driver. (He purchased an auto-
rickshaw for one hundred and thirty thousand rupees under a hire purchase 
arrangement a number of years ago.  It was a lucrative investment as his is the only 
auto-rickshaw in the village).  As Appendix 6.5 (p. 377) indicates, both Ashna and 
Sudeep reside in the Scheduled Caste ward on the outskirts of the village.  They 
own neither oxen nor tractors.  None of the Risk Coalition Two participants in 
Bantala have irrigation access (see Appendix 6.8, p. 380). 
 
Risk Coalition Three (Highly Vulnerable) 
The two female landless workers (Abani and Nipa) can be regarded as the most 
vulnerable participants in Bantala.  This is due to their lack of assets, limited social 
standing and reliance on daily wage labour for their livelihood.   Nipa resides with 
her elderly husband in her sister’s home in the Scheduled Caste ward.  She is in 
poor health, which impacts upon her ability to work in the fields.   
 
Although she is landless, Abani is from a ritually significant Backward Caste jati 
(Padmashali).171 This is indicated by her location close to the village centre 
(Appendix 6.5, p. 377).  Her situation highlights the way in which dimensions of 
caste and land-holding intersect, with a relatively high caste status lending a certain 
degree of prestige, even in the absence of material access to land.   Abani has a 
well-maintained home. Her vulnerability results from her material circumstances 
                                                 
171
 The traditional occupation of the Padmashali caste jati is weaving.  Despite being classified as an ‘Other 
Backward Caste’ due to their economic deprivation within the Backward Caste category, the jati is 
noteworthy ritually, with males of the caste wearing the sacred thread or suta traditionally reserved for 
Brahmins. 
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given that her husband is unable to work due to illness and, of her three children, 
two are still in education.  Thus, the family is largely reliant on her daily wages 
from agricultural labour. 
 
 Nandanapuram 
The Risk Coalitions associated with the village of Nandanapuram are as follows: 
Table 6.4 Nandanapuram Risk Coalitions 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
Name Caste Gender Total Land-
Holding 
Land 
Allocated to 
Cotton 
Charan Forward Caste 
(Brahmin) 
Male 12 acres 
 
8 acres 
Nikhil Backward Caste 
(Reddy) 
Male 10.5 acres 10.5 acres 
R
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Nand Backward Caste 
(Yadava) 
Male 6 acres* 3 acres 
Anshul Backward Caste 
(Gowda) 
Male 5 acres 
 
2 acres 
Rajiv Backward Caste 
(Gowda) 
Male 4 acres (2 
acres leased) 
4 acres 
Nishok Scheduled Caste 
(Madiga) 
Male 3 acres* 
 
2 acres 
Rashi 
 
Forward Caste 
(Brahmin) 
Female 4 acres 2 acres 
R
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Ambu Scheduled Caste 
(Madiga) 
Female 4 acres 
 
3 acres 
Ranjan 
 
Backward Caste 
(Chakali) 
Male Landless - 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
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io
n
 
Th
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e 
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t 
R
isk
) 
Salma 
 
Scheduled Caste 
(Madiga) 
Female Landless - 
*  NPM Farmers 
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 Risk Coalition One (Least Vulnerable) 
 
In Nandanapuram, Charan is powerful given his Forward Caste (Brahmin) status.  
He and his sons are all priests, and live directly across from the village temple in the 
centre of the village (see Appendix 6.6, p. 378).  Charan has a total land-holding of 
twelve acres and owns two oxen, but does not have access to irrigation (see 
Appendix 6.9, p. 381).  Nikhil, the Reddy participant in Nandanapuram, is a land-
owner of 10.5 acres.  Like Sudhakar in Bantala, he is the only participant who 
possesses a tractor.  He also owns two oxen, has access to irrigation, and lives in a 
large home close to the village centre.   
 
Nand is a softly-spoken NPM farmer of six acres.  Although he is relatively young 
(thirty-five), he has earned significant standing in the village given his university 
education, comparative wealth, and success with his farming methods.  For these 
reasons, and despite his land-holding at the lower end of the semi-medium category, 
he has here been assigned to the least vulnerable Risk Coalition One.  He also has 
income from NGO employment.  Nand strongly advocates the use of, and provides 
extension services for, NPM methods in the village.  He owns neither oxen nor a 
tractor, and does not have access to irrigation.   
 
 Risk Coalition Two (Vulnerable) 
Risk Coalition Two is comprised of two Backward Caste males, one with a total 
land-holding of five acres (Anshul), and the other of four acres (Rajiv).  The 
coalition also includes Nishok, a Scheduled Caste male small-holder of three acres.  
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Nishok practises NPM farming using Nand’s help.  None of these actors own oxen 
or tractors.  Rajiv, however, has access to irrigation (see Appendix 6.9, p. 381). 
 
The other two members of Risk Coalition Two in Nandanapuram are females.  
Despite her high ritual status as a forward-caste Brahmin, Rashi has been assigned 
to the more vulnerable Risk Coalition Two due to her small land-holding (four 
acres), the fact that she is a widow, and her lack of title to the land.  The remaining 
female, Ambu, is a Scheduled Caste small-holder of four acres who is also a widow, 
and does not have title to the land.  She is, however, the only Scheduled Caste 
cultivator in the current study to have access to irrigation (which she shares with her 
deceased husband’s brothers), and to own oxen (she has two).  Both females 
cultivate the land with the help of hired labour only - Rashi’s sons are priests, and 
Ambu’s son is in education, while her daughters are married and live in other 
villages.   
 
 Risk Coalition Three (At Risk) 
In Nandanapuram, Risk Coalition Three is comprised of two landless actors, one, 
Ranjan, a Backward Caste male (a washer-man from the Chakali jati), and Salma, a 
Scheduled Caste Madiga female.  Ranjan is elderly and lives with his wife on the 
outskirts of the village.  Both are in poor health.  Salma is a young widow with 
three children who lives with her parents in the Scheduled Caste ward (see 
Appendix 6.6, p. 378).   
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 Orgampalle: Risk Coalitions 
Table 6.5 Orgampalle Risk Coalitions 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
Name Caste Gender Total 
Land-
Holding 
Land 
Allocated 
to Cotton 
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e)  Pradnesh 
 
 
 
 
 
Backward Caste 
(Dominant) 
 
 
Male 
 
20 acres 
 
4 acres 
Akhil 
 
Backward Caste 
(Dominant) 
Male 5 acres 1.5 acres 
     
Nirmal Backward Caste 
(Yadava) 
Male 5 acres 
 
3 acres 
Achanda 
 
Backward Caste 
(Chakali) 
Male 4 acres 
(all 
leased) 
3 acres 
Prakash 
 
Backward Caste 
(Yadava) 
Male 1.5 acres 1.5 acres 
Aruni Backward Caste 
(Dominant) 
 
Female 4 acres 1.5 acres R
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Amita Backward Caste 
(Chakali) 
Female  4 acres 
 
1 acre 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
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n
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e 
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t 
R
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) 
Ranjan 
 
 
 
 
Backward Caste  Male Landless - 
   
 
Risk Coalition One (Least Vulnerable) 
In Orgampalle, Risk Coalition One is comprised of one actor, Pradnesh, a village 
elder and land-holder of twenty acres, and the most influential person in the village.  
He owns both a tractor and four oxen, but has no access to irrigation (see Appendix 
6.10, p. 382).  His social standing is clear from the fact that he was the ward 
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member of the village for more than twenty years (the ward member in Orgampalle 
is the political representative of the hamlet within the panchayat meetings in the 
neighbouring village).  Given Pradnesh’s retirement from his panchayat role, a 
young ward member has now been elected.  Pradnesh remains, however, strongly 
influential.    
 
Risk Coalition Two (Vulnerable) 
Given the proliferation of small-holders in the Orgampalle population, the majority 
of villagers in Orgampalle fall within the category of Risk Coalition Two.  All Risk 
Coalition Two research participants are Backward Castes – however, they have 
been selected from the three different jatis in the village.  All, apart from one, are 
small-holders of between 2.6 and five acres.  Two members of the coalition (Aruni 
and Amita) are female.  Although they are both identified as farmers, neither owns 
the title to the land. One (Amita) is a widow, and a small-holder of four acres.  The 
other (Aruni) is the wife of a herder, so she cultivates the family’s four acres of 
land, while her husband tends the animals.  Prakash, a male marginal land-holder of 
one and a half acres, also has an income from NGO employment.   
 
Risk Coalition Three (At Risk) 
Sajan, an elderly male from the dominant Mudhiraj jati, represents the only non-
land holding household in Orgampalle.  He is in ill health and does not own a home.  
Instead, he stays in the house of a relative who resides in Hyderabad.  Both he and 
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his wife survive on his pension of Rs 200 per month, and the rations from the Public 
Distribution System, as well as on donations of rice from others in the village.   
 
6.4 Actual Results for the 2010/2011 Season 
 
A number of general points need to be made prior to the presentation of the results 
of the 2010/2011 season.  Firstly, it should be noted that, due to the small sample 
size (twenty-one cultivating participants across the three villages), claims for wider 
statistical significance cannot be made.  It is also recognised that there is 
considerable variability in cotton seasons, so these results cannot be generalised 
across time.  Nonetheless, the quantitative analysis seeks to highlight the material 
impact of the differentiation of risk as a result of village power relations, and to 
explore the potential of NPM and organic cultivation to alleviate the material 
experience of risk within the Risk Coalitions, when compared with Bt cotton.  
Finally, results here provide a material basis for the analysis of the legitimation 
struggle in the next two chapters. 
 
Secondly, it has been highlighted that the 2010/2011 season in which this research 
was conducted was characterised by extensive flooding which resulted in 
significant crop loss.172 This led to general unrest among cotton cultivators173 and a 
                                                 
172
 The Deccan Chronicle (9/12/2010) reported that around twenty-five thousand hectares (sixty thousand 
acres) of cotton were damaged due to flooding.  Farmers claimed that thirty per cent of the crop had been 
lost (Times of India, 7/1/2011).   
173
 Farmers in Warangal were involved in an altercation with cotton traders because of the low prices which 
they were being offered (Times of India, 30/10/2010). 
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spate of farmer suicides.174 These suicides were exacerbated by the 
uncompromising stance of Micro-Finance Institutes (MFIs) in their pursuit of debt 
repayments.  The largest number of MFI-related suicides was in Warangal (Times of 
India, 23/11/2010).   
 
Thirdly, the cost and profit/loss data is presented for Risk Coalitions One and Two 
only, given that Risk Coalition Three is comprised of landless participants who 
were not directly engaged in cultivation.  As the study highlights, however, landless 
agricultural labourers are significant to the analysis, given that the labour costs 
incurred by cultivators are determined by the wage rates paid to agricultural labour.   
 
Finally, the quantitative analysis featured in this chapter focusses on the aggregate 
data associated with the Risk Coalitions.  Full details of the findings for individual 
cultivators are provided in the Appendices (6.8 to 6.19, pp. 380-391).  These are 
frequently referred to throughout the analysis.  
 
Cultivation Costs in the Village Risk Coalitions 
A comparison of the average cultivation costs for the Risk Coalitions in each of the 
villages is provided in Table 6.6 overleaf.   
 
 
                                                 
174
 Following the flooding, farmer suicides were reported frequently in the media (Deccan Chronicle, 
18/12/2010; 26/12/2010; 27/12/2010; 5/1/2011; Times of India, 8/10/2010; 9/12/2010; 10/12/2010; 
18/12/10; 20/12/2010; 30/12/2010).  
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Table 6.6 Average Cultivation Costs, 2010/2011 
 
 Risk Coalition One Risk Coalition Two 
 BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR 
Average 
Cultivation 
Costs per 
acre 
 
18,600 
 
21,150 
 
12,800 
 
9,100 
 
14,866* 
 
20,800 
 
11,750 
 
10,500 
BT = Bantala; NP (Bt) = Nandanapuram Bt farmers; NP (NPM) = Nandanapuram NPM 
farmers; OR = Orgampalle (organic) 
 
* Within Risk Coalition Two in Bantala, Ashna’s entire crop was lost mid-way through the season.  
Her lower costs as a result of this loss have reduced the average for Bt cotton cultivation in Bantala’s 
Risk Coalition Two by an estimated two to three thousand rupees.   
 
 
As Table 6.6 shows, cultivation costs were significantly higher for Bt cotton 
farmers in both Bantala and Nandanapuram than those associated with NPM 
cultivators in Nandanapuram and organic farmers in Orgampalle.  Average costs 
per acre are similar for both coalitions in each village, although the average for 
Bantala’s Risk Coalition Two is reduced due to Ashna’s (the female Scheduled 
Caste small-holder) crop loss mid-way through the season.   It is acknowledged, 
however, that such early crop loss is a characteristic feature of the regular 
catastrophic seasons which characterise the agrarian crisis in Andhra Pradesh, and 
so are reflected in the costs here. 
 
Bt cotton farmers in Nandanapuram incurred the highest cultivation costs in both 
coalitions (Rs 21,150 for Risk Coalition One, and Rs 20,800 per acre for Risk 
Coalition Two).  The lowest cultivation costs for both coalitions were found in 
Orgampalle, the organic village (Rs 9,100 for Risk Coalition One, and Rs 10,500 
for Risk Coalition Two).  As Table 6.6 highlights, the organic farmer in Risk 
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Coalition One in Orgampalle (Pradnesh), spent less than half (Rs 9,100) that of Bt 
farmers in both Bantala (Rs 18,600) and Nandanapuram (Rs 21,150) in the same 
coalition.    
 
For vulnerable cultivators in Risk Coalition Two, the costs of organic farmers were 
less than half (Rs 10,500) those of Bt cotton farmers in Nandanapuram (Rs 20,800).  
Similarly, NPM farmers in Nandanapuram’s Risk Coalition Two spent almost half 
(Rs 11,750) the spend of Bt cotton farmers in the same village.   
 
The total cultivation costs per acre for each participant, as well as details of 
individual access to irrigation, are available as Appendices 6.8 to 6.10 (pp. 380-
382).  It can be seen that six of the twenty-one cultivating participants (twenty-eight 
per cent) have access to irrigation.  Two-thirds of these are Risk Coalition One 
participants, with a land-holding of more than ten acres.  All are Bt cotton farmers.  
(The organic farmer, Achanda, uses irrigation for paddy only). 
 
 Break-down of Main Cultivation Costs in Village Coalitions 
 
A break-down of the main costs associated with the cultivation methods for each of 
the coalitions is now provided. These are available for individual participants in 
Appendices 6.11 to 6.13 (pp. 383-385).   
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Seed Costs  
Table 6.7 provides the average cost of seeds per acre for each village coalition.   
 
Table 6.7 Average Seed Costs, 2010/2011 
 
 Risk Coalition One Risk Coalition Two 
 BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR 
Seed 
costs 
per acre 
750 1125 0 450 820 780 500 500 
 
BT = Bantala; NP (Bt) = Nandanapuram Bt farmers; NP (NPM) = Nandanapuram NPM 
farmers; OR = Orgampalle (organic) 
 
Average seed costs are higher for Bt cotton farmers, particularly in 
Nandanapuram’s Risk Coalition One.  While the ‘official’ rates for seeds are Rs 
450 for non-Bt seed varieties, and Rs 750 for Bt varieties, costs quoted by 
participants showed some variance (see Appendices 6.11 and 6.12, pp. 383-384), 
particularly in the case of Nandanapuram’s Bt cotton farmers.  Participants asserted 
that this price variance resulted from the fact that stocks of Bt seeds at seed dealers 
were often bought up by wealthy land-holders early in the season, and then sold for 
higher prices on the ‘black market’ (the risk of spurious seeds is also greater on the 
black market, given the lack of traceability).   
 
Both organic and NPM methods use non-Bt seed varieties which are secured 
through the co-ordination of seed demand across a number of villages by NGOs.  
Nand, the NPM cultivator in Risk Coalition One, obtains non-Bt seeds for free as a 
result of his NGO employment. 
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 Input Costs 
Cost differentials between the methods arose largely due to the varied input usage 
associated with each method.  Table 6.8 shows the average input costs for each 
village coalition. 
 
Table 6.8 Average Input Costs, 2010/2011 
 
 Risk Coalition One Risk Coalition Two 
 BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR 
Pesticide 
Costs per 
acre 
3,733 4,125 0 0 2,500* 
(N = 2) 
3,875 0 0 
Number of 
Sprays 
8 5.5 0 0 5 8 0 0 
Fertiliser 
Costs per 
acre 
2,150 3,100 1,000 0 2,000* 
(N = 2) 
2,500 700 0 
Number of 
uses 
4 4 2 0 4 4 1 0 
BT = Bantala; NP (Bt) = Nandanapuram Bt farmers; NP (NPM) = Nandanapuram NPM 
farmers; OR = Orgampalle (organic) 
 
* Due to Ashna’s crop loss, she did not incur pesticide or fertiliser costs, so she has been removed 
from these calculations. Average pesticide and fertiliser figures for Bantala’s Risk Coalition Two, 
therefore, relate to Natesh and Sudeep only (N=2).   
 
As Table 6.8 highlights, the use of chemical inputs associated with Bt cotton 
cultivation entailed an average spend of Rs 3,500 per acre for pesticides, and Rs 
2,400 per acre for fertilisers.175  NPM farmers did not incur pesticide costs, while 
organic farmers incurred neither pesticide nor fertiliser costs.   
 
Both Bt cotton and NPM farmers use chemical fertilisers as part of their cultivation 
praxis. Table 6.8 highlights that NPM cultivators used fertilisers, on average, half as 
                                                 
175
 Both figures represent the mean of the average costs for these inputs presented in Table 6.8 for both 
coalitions of Bt farmers in Nandanapuram and Bantala. 
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often as Bt cotton farmers. This was associated with a lower cost for NPM 
cultivators who spent an average of Rs 850 per acre on fertilisers, as compared to 
Rs 2,400 per acre for Bt cotton farmers.176   
 
Table 6.8 also highlights that Bt cotton farmers used pesticides an average of 6.5 
times in the 2010/2011 season.177  Spending on pesticides, therefore, continues to 
represent just over one-fifth of the total costs of Bt cotton farmers.  NPM and 
organic farmers relied instead on solutions devised by NGOs and key farmers 
(Nand in Nandanapuram and Pradnesh in Orgampalle) to treat pests and diseases as 
they occurred.   
 
Labour Costs 
 
Table 6.9 presents the average labour charges for each of the village coalitions. 
Table 6.9  Average  Labour Charges, 2010/2011 
 
 Risk Coalition One Risk Coalition Two 
 BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR 
Labour 
Costs per 
acre 
8,433 10,587 10,200 7,300 8,133* 9,775 7,500 7,583 
BT = Bantala; NP (Bt) = Nandanapuram Bt farmers; NP (NPM) = Nandanapuram NPM 
farmers; OR = Orgampalle (organic) 
 
* Ashna’s labour costs are included here, but do not represent those for a full season.  
 
The analysis highlights that expenditure on labour is a significant cost for all 
cultivators.  This is despite the fact that the majority of cultivators are assisted by 
                                                 
176
 These costs are calculated through taking a mean of the average costs in Table 6.8 for both coalitions of 
NPM and Bt cotton cultivators. 
177
 This represents a mean of the average pesticide uses across both coalitions in Bantala and 
Nandanapuram in Table 6.8. 
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(mainly female) family members.  Only Pavan and Ashna in Bantala, and Ambu, 
Charan and Rashi in Nandanapuram operate their holdings without family 
assistance.   It is clear that, given the high labour charges associated with employing 
non-family farm labour, decisions related to the seeking of non-farm employment, 
and keeping children in education, must be balanced against the increased costs of 
labour which will be incurred as a result.  Given the particularly high labour costs 
associated with the 2010/2011 season, farmers hoped (in vain) that the government 
would contribute to payments for agricultural labour as part of the NREGS 
initiative (Times of India, 19/11/2010).  
 
It is recognised that labour costs are incurred independently of cultivation method.   
However, it is argued that higher labour costs exacerbate the risk which Bt cotton 
represents, given the already high inputs costs associated with Bt cotton cultivation.  
The official minimum wage rate in Andhra Pradesh for the 2010/2011 season was 
Rs 112 for agricultural labour (Kolamkar, 2010: 30).178  However, as Table 6.9 
shows, labour charges per acre are variable between villages.  
 
Nandanapuram has the highest average labour costs (Rs 9,515), while Orgampalle 
has the lowest (Rs 7,440). The average labour costs in Bantala (Rs 8,283) are 
                                                 
178
 This was an increase from the minimum rate of Rs 35 per day in 1996.  Available at: 
http://labourbureau.nic.in/REP_MW_2010.pdf. (Table 3).  Accessed on 22/7/2013.  Although this report 
does not differentiate between male and females, it was noted that wages for males were up to fifty per cent 
higher than females in the current study.  It was argued by villagers (both male and female) that this was 
due to the generally heavier work undertaken by men, such as ploughing with oxen.  Despite being back-
breaking, the work undertaken by females, such as sowing and weeding, was regarded as less strenuous.   
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almost on a par with those in Orgampalle.179  Many participants in Nandanapuram 
reported that they had paid daily wage rates of up to Rs 150 for females and Rs 250 
for males at the peak time of harvesting, while those cited by participants in Bantala 
rarely went above Rs 100 for females from the village.  In Orgampalle, all 
participants claimed to pay just Rs 70 per day for daily labour in the village.  These 
variances in labour costs arise as a result of the differing power arrangements and 
approaches to risk negotiation in the villages, and will be analysed more closely as 
part of the discussion in Chapter Nine.   
 
 Tractor and Oxen Hire 
 
Table 6.10 presents the costs associated with tractor and oxen hire in the village 
coalitions. 
 
Table 6.10  Average Tractor and Oxen Hire, 2010/2011 
 
* Ashna’s hire costs were reduced as a result of her crop loss.   
 
 
Details of tractor and oxen ownership for individual participants are available in 
Appendices 6.8 to 6.10 (pp. 380-382).  It can be seen that only three of the twenty-
one participants (fourteen per cent) own tractors, one participant in each village.  
                                                 
179
 These figures represent a mean of the average village costs for both coalitions (for both methods in the 
case of Nandanapuram). 
 Risk Coalition One Risk Coalition Two 
 BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR 
Tractor 
Hire 
 666 1,000 1,200 0   666* 1,400 1,800 1,316 
Oxen Hire 0 0 1,500 0   933* 2,400 1,560    500 
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All are in Risk Coalition One (one is Pradnesh in Orgampalle, and the other two are 
the Reddy participants, Sudhakar in Bantala and Nikhil in Nandanapuram).    
 
Sixty-one per cent of participants (thirteen cultivators) own oxen.  Of these, almost 
half (six) are from Orgampalle (one in Risk Coalition One and five in Risk 
Coalition Two).  Four of the seven cultivators (fifty-seven per cent) in Bantala own 
oxen.  Three of these are in Risk Coalition One, one in Risk Coalition Two 
(Natesh).  Natesh was, however, obliged to sell his oxen mid-way through the 
season to cover cultivation costs. Only three of the eight cultivators in 
Nandanapuram (thirty-seven per cent) own oxen, two of whom are in Risk 
Coalition One.   
 
Asset ownership is highly differentiated by caste and gender.  Ambu in 
Nandanapuram’s Risk Coalition Two is the only Scheduled Caste female to own 
oxen in the current study.  The only other female oxen owner, Aruni in Orgampalle, 
is from a Backward Caste.  
 
Table 6.10 highlights the impact of asset ownership on the costs of participants. 
Given the generally lower asset ownership associated with Risk Coalition Two, hire 
costs are particularly significant for this coalition.  (Oxen are hired a variety of 
times to assist with sowing and weeding.  Their usage was noted as being 
particularly high in 2010/2011 given the sodden soils, and extensive weeds, 
resulting from the rains).  The higher oxen ownership in Orgampalle’s Risk 
Coalition Two, however, means that costs of oxen hire are particularly low in the 
 193 
village.  Meanwhile, the generally low asset ownership in Nandanapuram 
significantly exacerbates the risk exposure of cultivators, particularly in the case of 
Risk Coalition Two participants. 
 
Land Lease 
Land lease is viewed as a means of increasing the viability of holdings through 
expanding the area which is cultivated.  It is a particularly high risk strategy given 
that the costs of the lease are payable whether the crop fails or not.  Tenants are also 
unable to access subsidies and credit given that the title for the land is not in their 
name, and owners are often reluctant to have any involvement in supporting the 
cultivation practice of their tenants.  Land lease costs are provided for the village 
coalitions in Table 6.11. These are available for individual participants in 
Appendices 6.11 to 6.13 (pp. 383-385). 
 
Table 6.11  Land Lease Charges, 2010/2011 
 
 Risk Coalition One Risk Coalition Two 
 BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR BT NP 
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR 
Land Lease 
(total 
average 
cost) 
24,666 0 0 0 3,333 2,500 0 1,083 
 
 
Table 6.11 highlights that land lease is most common in Bantala, particularly 
among Risk Coalition One participants. These participants also lease more 
expensive irrigated land (see Appendix 6.11, p. 383).  Natesh, the vulnerable elder 
in Bantala’s Risk Coalition Two, leases (dry) land.  In Bantala, costs of land lease 
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vary from between Rs 2,000 and Rs 3,000 per acre.  The costs of land lease in 
Nandanapuram are particularly high (Rs 5,000 per acre) which no doubt explains 
why only one participant in the village, Rajiv, leased land (Appendix 6.12, p. 384).   
 
There are a variety of arrangements associated with land lease. Thus, Pavan, the 
Risk Coalition One participant in Bantala, pays Rs 3,000 per acre, and shares half 
the costs and profits with the land-owner.  Meanwhile, the one participant who 
leases land in Orgampalle, Achanda, shares half the profit, but covers all of the 
costs (see Appendix 6.13, p. 385). 
 
Average Yields in Village Coalitions, 2010/2011 
Table 6.12 provides details of the average yields within the village coalitions.   
 
Table 6.12 Average Yields, 2010/2011 
 
 Risk Coalition One Risk Coalition Two 
 BT NP  
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR BT NP  
(Bt) 
NP  
(NPM) 
OR 
Yields per 
acre 
(quintals)180 
5 
 
4.75 9 6 3.5 4.75 4.5 4.4 
BT = Bantala; NP (Bt) = Nandanapuram Bt farmers; NP (NPM) = Nandanapuram NPM 
farmers; OR = Orgampalle (organic) 
 
Cultivators in all villages asserted that yields were lower than had been expected as 
a result of the extensive flooding.  Many participants reported crop loss of up to 
fifty per cent.  The break-down of the yields obtained by individual participants is 
available in Appendices 6.14 to 6.16 (pp. 386-388).   
                                                 
180
 One quintal is equivalent to one hundred kilograms. 
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Table 6.12 shows that the average yields for NPM and organic cultivators were 
higher than those for Bt cotton farmers in Risk Coalition One.  The highest yield of 
the study was obtained by the NPM farmer in Nandanapuram (Nand) who managed 
to secure nine quintals per acre.  The yield of six quintals per acre obtained by the 
organic farmer (Pradnesh) was higher than the average yield of approximately five 
quintals obtained by Risk Coalition One Bt cotton farmers in both Bantala and 
Nandanapuram.  The highest yield among Bt cotton farmers in Risk Coalition One 
was the 6.5 quintals per acre obtained by Pavan, the medium land-holder of twenty 
acres in Bantala (Appendix 6.14, p. 386).  No Bt cotton farmer in Risk Coalition 
One obtained a yield of lower than four quintals (see Appendices 6.14 to 6.15, pp. 
386-387).   
 
For the more vulnerable participants in Risk Coalition Two, however, the situation 
was different.  All methods produced similar average yields (between 4.5 and five 
quintals).  However, among Bt cotton farmers, these were associated with 
significant extremes.   
 
Rashi, the female Forward Caste Bt cotton cultivator in Nandanapuram, obtained 
the highest yield for Bt cotton farmers - eight quintals per acre - from a land-
holding of just two acres (Appendix 6.15, p. 387).  However, Ashna, the female 
Scheduled Caste marginal cultivator in Bantala, lost her entire crop (Appendix 6.14, 
p. 386), while the female Scheduled Caste small-holder in Nandanapuram, Ambu, 
lost her crop of Bt cotton on two acres, and managed to harvest three quintals from 
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her remaining acre (Appendix 6.15, p. 387). The lowest yields associated with 
alternative methods in Risk Coalition Two, however, were 4.5 quintals per acre for 
Nishok, the NPM farmer (Appendix 6.15, p. 387), and 2.5 quintals per acre for 
organic farmers (Appendix 6.16, p. 388).   
 
 Average Prices Obtained for Cotton, 2010/2011 
The average selling prices associated with the village coalitions are presented in 
Table 6.13.  These are provided for individual participants in Appendices 6.14 to 
6.16 (pp. 386-388). 
Table 6.13 Average Prices received for Cotton, 2010/2011 
 
 Risk Coalition One Risk Coalition Two 
 BT NP  
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR BT NP  
(Bt) 
NP  
(NPM) 
OR 
Best Selling 
Price per 
quintal 
4,600 4,600 5,300 5,600 4,725* 
(N=2) 
4,437 4,650 4,200 
BT = Bantala; NP (Bt) = Nandanapuram Bt farmers; NP (NPM) = Nandanapuram NPM farmers; 
OR = Orgampalle (organic) 
 
*Ashna is not included due to her crop loss. 
 
Table 6.13 indicates that the highest average prices received for cotton in Risk 
Coalition One were obtained by NPM and organic cotton farmers. The claim by 
these farmers that their cotton is of better quality than that associated with Bt cotton 
is not, however, supported by the higher average prices obtained for Bt cotton by 
Bantala’s Risk Coalition Two. 
 
Table 6.13 highlights that the prices obtained by Risk Coalition Two participants 
were generally lower (apart from Risk Coalition Two in Bantala) than those 
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obtained by farmers in Risk Coalition One.  The higher prices in Risk Coalition 
One were due, to a large extent, to the greater capacity of these participants to store 
their harvest awaiting higher prices.  
 
Pavan, the powerful Bt farmer in Bantala, managed to secure the highest price of Rs 
6,000 per quintal (Appendix 6.14, p. 386).  Both he and Nand (the NPM farmer) 
sold their entire harvest at the end of the season (February, 2011).  Nand obtained 
Rs 5,300 (Appendix 6.15, p. 387).181  This strategy was less of an option for more 
vulnerable participants in Risk Coalition Two, many of whom had a pressing need 
for cash in order to pay labour, and to satisfy the more demanding of their debtors. 
 
Average Net Profit/(loss), 2010/2011 
Table 6.14 presents the average net profits and losses associated with the village 
coalitions. These are available for individual participants in Appendices 6.14 to 
6.16 (pp. 386-388). 
Table 6.14 Average Net Profit/(Loss), 2010/2011 
 
 Risk Coalition One Risk Coalition Two 
 BT NP  
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR BT NP  
(Bt) 
NP  
(NPM) 
OR 
Average Net 
Profit/ 
(Loss) 
33,700 (13,900) 104,500 56,600 (4,800) (7,125) 20,300 11,530 
BT = Bantala; NP (Bt) = Nandanapuram Bt farmers; NP (NPM) = Nandanapuram NPM farmers; 
OR = Orgampalle (organic). 
 
 
                                                 
181
 Due to the supply shortfall as a result of the flooding, prices did indeed soar later in the season, and were 
reported to have reached a record Rs 7,000 per quintal by February, 2011. Available at: 
http://vidarbhacrisis.blogspot.ie/2011_05_01_archive.html Accessed on 8/10/2013. 
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As Table 6.14 highlights, the higher costs associated with Bt cotton cultivation 
significantly exacerbated the material experience of risk of Bt cotton cultivators in 
the catastrophic 2010/2011 season.  Almost half of the Bt cotton cultivators (five 
out of twelve) made a loss.  These included three of the seven vulnerable 
participants from Risk Coalition Two (Ashna in Bantala; Rajiv and Ambu in 
Nandanapuram). 
 
The highest net profit was associated with the NPM cultivator in Risk Coalition 
One (Nand) who managed a return of Rs 104,500 despite the catastrophic season.  
Similarly, the organic farmer in Risk Coalition One (Pradnesh) made a net profit of 
Rs 56,600.  Meanwhile, Bt cotton farmers in Nandanapuram’s Risk Coalition One 
made an average net loss (Rs 13,900), while those in Bantala’s Risk Coalition One 
managed to make an overall profit (Rs 33,700), due largely to Pavan’s net profit of 
Rs 102,000 (see Appendix 6.14, p. 386).   
 
Table 6.14 indicates that Risk Coalition Two Bt cotton cultivators in both Bantala 
and Nandanapuram made an average net loss. The lower costs associated with NPM 
and organic cultivation, however, meant that Risk Coalition Two participants 
adopting these methods made an average net profit (Rs 20,300 and Rs 11,350, 
respectively), despite the catastrophic season.  This was still considerably lower 
than the average net profits secured by their Risk Coalition One counterparts, 
however, due to their lower levels of land-ownership and reduced ability to off-set 
crop losses through awaiting higher prices.  
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At an individual level, not a single NPM or organic cultivator made a loss 
(Appendices 6.15 and 6.16, pp. 387-388). This was even in cases where yields were 
extremely low, such as Akhil’s 2.5 quintals per acre in Risk Coalition Two 
(Appendix 6.16, p. 388).  The generally high cotton price associated with the poor 
season, as well as the low cultivation costs associated with organic and NPM 
cultivation methods, allowed all organic and NPM farmers to at least break even, 
despite the low yields.  
   
Average Debt Levels in Village Coalitions, 2010/2011 
Table 6.15 presents the average debt levels associated with the village coalitions.  
Here, the Risk Coalition Three participants are again included given that many of 
these participants are also in debt, despite their landlessness and lack of assets.  
Details of debt levels for individual participants are provided in Appendices 6.17 to 
6.19 (pp. 389-391).   
Table 6.15 Average Debt Levels, 2010/2011 
 
 Risk Coalition One Risk Coalition Two Risk Coalition Three 
 
BT NP  
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR BT NP  
(Bt) 
NP 
(NPM) 
OR BT NP OR 
Debt 
Level 
 416,000 
 
180,000 0 0 38,333 127,500 25,000 56,500 62,000 5,000 0 
BT = Bantala; NP (Bt) = Nandanapuram Bt farmers; NP (NPM) = Nandanapuram NPM farmers; OR = 
Orgampalle 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 6.15, the average indebtedness of participants is 
significant. All of these debts (apart from those of Nishok, the NPM farmer in 
Nandanapuram, Akhil, the organic farmer in Orgampalle, and Ashna, the female Bt 
cotton cultivator in Bantala, all from Risk Coalition Two) have been accumulated 
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over a number of years. Sudeep is the only Bt cotton farmer who is not in debt 
(Appendices 6.17 and 6.18, pp. 389-390).   
 
Table 6.15 highlights that debt levels are significantly higher for Bt cotton farmers 
than for organic and NPM farmers, particularly for Risk Coalition One participants.  
Bantala’s average debt for Risk Coalition Two is relatively low given that, as 
mentioned, Sudeep is debt-free (he has income from his auto-rickshaw driving) and 
Ashna has incurred debt only in the 2010/2011 season (her husband earns an 
income from construction work).  Similarly, Natesh has previously sold six acres of 
land in order to clear debt.   
 
The powerful Risk Coalition One cultivators in Bantala are the most indebted of the 
study.  The average debt levels of these participants are more than ten times higher 
than those associated with Risk Coalition Two participants in the same village.  As 
Appendix 6.17 (p. 389) highlights, Sudhakar (the Reddy, Risk Coalition One 
participant in Bantala) is the most indebted participant of the study, with debts of Rs 
700,000.  In contrast, both the NPM and organic farmers in Risk Coalition One 
(Nand and Pradnesh, respectively) are debt-free (Appendices 6.18 and 6.19, pp. 
390-391).   
 
In the case of Bantala’s Risk Coalition One, drilling for borewells and the buying of 
land, as well as cultivation costs (labour, inputs, seeds), are cited as the main 
reasons for indebtedness (Appendix 6.17, p. 389).  Nandanapuram’s Risk Coalition 
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One participants also cite cultivation costs and expenditure on education (Appendix 
6.18, p. 390).  From Appendices 6.17 and 6.18 (pp. 389-390), it can be seen that 
Risk Coalition One participants in Nandanapuram and Bantala rely on both banks 
and non-institutional sources of credit, such as commission agents, private money 
lenders, and unspecified people in the village.182   
 
In the case of Risk Coalition Two, exposure to debt is prevalent across the three 
villages.  It is highest for Bt cotton farmers in Nandanapuram (Rs 127,500).  As 
Appendices 6.17 to 6.19 (pp. 389-391) indicate, there is some limited borrowing 
from banks; however, there is a greater reliance upon other institutional sources, 
including MFIs, as well as non-institutional sources, such as family and/or members 
of the same caste, among Risk Coalition Two participants in all three villages.  
Cultivation charges, dowry payments, and healthcare are the most frequent reasons 
cited for debt among Bantala’s Risk Coalition Two participants (Appendix 6.17, p. 
389), while those in Nanadanapuram’s Risk Coalition Two also cite house 
construction costs (Appendix 6.18, p. 390).   
 
Given the low costs of cultivation in Orgampalle, the extent of indebtedness among 
Risk Coalition Two participants (Rs 56,500) is surprisingly high. The most common 
reason cited for the indebtedness among Orgampalle participants was dowry costs. 
Many participants cite Rs 100,000 as a ‘standard’ dowry.  Irrigation expenditure, 
                                                 
182
 It was noted that, while participants were forthcoming with the amount of their debt, they were more 
reticent regarding the sourcing of their non-institutional debt.   
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house construction and healthcare costs were also mentioned (Appendix 6.19, p. 
391).   
 
In the case of Risk Coalition Three participants, the landless participants, Sajan in 
Orgampalle and Ranjan in Nandanapuram, are debt-free.  As they assert, their lack 
of assets, and poor income, means that nobody would lend to them.  Ranjan has 
previously sold his buffalo to pay for hospital care for his wife, but no longer has 
assets to offer as collateral for further borrowing.   
 
The debts of the two female participants in Bantala’s Risk Coalition Three have 
largely been incurred due to the costs of health care in private hospitals (Appendix 
6.17, p. 389).  Loans have been accessed from non-institutional sources described 
as ‘landlords’ in the village.  The indebtedness of these females means that they 
must work in semi-bonded conditions – ie., they are free to work for others, but 
must prioritise their creditor, and work for reduced daily wage rates, until their debt 
is repaid.  
 
Salma, the widowed landless participant in Nandanapuram, has borrowed from the 
Self-Help Group of which she is a member in order to lease land to cultivate paddy.  
The crop failed, however, and she is now left with debt of Rs 10,000 (Appendix 
6.18, p. 390).  This must be paid from a widow’s pension of Rs 200 per month, and 
income from daily wage labour, while providing for her children.   
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In conclusion, this chapter has provided an analysis of the differentiation of the 
material risks associated with Bt cotton cultivation, when compared with organic 
and NPM cultivation, in the 2010/2011 season.  In this catastrophic season, the 
higher costs related to Bt cotton were not off-set by higher yields.  This meant that 
more than half of the Bt cotton farmers made a loss while, due to the lower costs 
involved, not a single NPM or organic farmer did so.  Yields for the more 
vulnerable cultivators in Risk Coalition Two were also found to be particularly 
variable among Bt cotton farmers.  Debt levels for Bt cotton cultivators were, on 
average, significantly higher than those associated with organic and NPM farmers, 
particularly for Bantala’s Risk Coalition One participants. However, Risk Coalition 
Two cultivators in Orgampalle and many Risk Coalition Three participants are also 
exposed to high debt levels due to expenditure in non-agricultural areas such as 
hospital care, dowry payments and house construction.   
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Chapter Seven 
ANALYSIS  
PART II 
 
Legitimation and the Micro Level  
Construction of Risk in the Villages 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.1 An Overview of Perspectives on Bt Cotton by Village 
In this chapter, the ideological legitimation and delegitimation of Bt cotton by 
cultivators themselves is explored. This is undertaken using the categories of 
legitimation defined by Van Leeuwen (2007: 91).  The thesis argues that the 
legitimation of particular constructions of risk as a micro level concern of material 
practice is mediated through power relations in the villages.  Thus, this chapter 
examines the impact of the Risk Coalitions upon the ‘perception of risk [as] a social 
process’ (Douglas, 1983: 6).   
 
Selected results of a questionnaire administered as part of the interview process 
have been adopted in order to provide overviews of perspectives in each village.183  
Numbers in parentheses after interview extracts relate to the interview schedule in 
Appendix 7.1 (p. 393-394).   
 
                                                 
183
 Participants were asked to rank statements according to a Likert scale which ranged from ‘strongly 
agree’, ‘agree’, ‘don’t know’, ‘disagree’, ‘strongly disagree’.  The category ‘unaware of Bt’ denotes that 
the participant claimed to be unable to complete the questionnaire due to a lack of awareness regarding Bt 
cotton (and other possible names, such as Bollgard or GM cotton).  The complete results of the 
questionnaire are available as Appendix 7.2 (pp. 395-398).  As highlighted previously, due to space 
constraints, only excerpts of the questionnaire results have been included in the current analysis. 
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 Bantala 
As Figure 7.1 below illustrates, four of the six cultivating actors in Bantala strongly 
agree with the statement, ‘I want to grow Bt cotton’ (Appendix 7.2, Q.1, p. 395).  
Of the remaining cultivating actors, one claims she is unaware of what Bt cotton is 
(Ashna in Risk Coalition Two. Her husband confirmed that she cultivates Bt 
cotton), and the other is uncertain of whether he wishes to continue to grow Bt 
cotton or not, given the declining yields (Sudhakar in Risk Coalition One). The 
questionnaire was not administered to the landless participants due to the fact that 
they do not take decisions on which crops to cultivate, and claimed to have little 
knowledge of Bt cotton. 
 
Figure 7.1: Questionnaire Results, Q. 1 
Bantala, 2010/2011 
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The results of the questionnaire (Appendix 7.2, pp. 395-398) also highlight that 
eighty-three per cent of Bantala participants strongly agree with the statements that 
Bt cotton has led to an increase in crop yields (Q. 3, p. 395) and their household 
income (Q. 2, p. 395), and that it has led to a reduction in pesticide use (Q. 10, p. 
397).  However, there is also a high degree of uncertainty as to the ecological 
impact of the crop, with eighty-three per cent of participants claiming not to know if 
Bt cotton is damaging to the environment (Q. 5, p. 396).  
 
 Nandanapuram 
As Figure 7.2 overleaf illustrates, despite the fact that ninety per cent of 
Nandanapuram farmers cultivate Bt cotton, the majority of cultivating actors (five 
out of eight) strongly disagree with the statement ‘I want to grow Bt cotton’ 
(Appendix 7.2, Q.1, p. 395).  This includes many farmers who currently cultivate Bt 
varieties.   
 
Of the remaining actors, one (Ambu in Risk Coalition Two) agrees with the 
statement, though not strongly.  She argues ‘I just want to have a better crop and to 
live a better life’ (29).  Charan (Risk Coalition One) expresses uncertainty as to 
whether he wants to grow Bt cotton or not due to his disappointment with the 
season’s crop.  He, too, claims, ‘we just want a crop that grows’ (38).  Finally, the 
female who obtained the highest yield in the current study (Rashi in Risk Coalition 
Two) cultivates Bt cotton seed varieties, but is unaware of Bt cotton (her son 
confirmed they were Bt seed varieties).  She claims, ‘I copy the brand names of the 
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seeds used by my neighbours’ (23).  Again, the two landless actors have not been 
included. 
Figure 7.2: Questionnaire Results, Q.1 
Nandanapuram, 2010/2011 
 
 
 
The results of the questionnaire (Appendix 7.2, pp. 395-398) reveal that 
perspectives on Bt cotton in Nandanapuram are almost the complete reverse of 
those in Bantala.  Seventy-five per cent of participants strongly disagree that Bt 
cotton has increased their household income (Q. 2, p. 395), while sixty-three per 
cent strongly disagree that Bt seed varieties are associated with higher yields (Q. 3, 
p. 395).  Fifty per cent strongly disagree with the statements that Bt cotton has 
resulted in reduced pesticide use (Q. 10, p. 397) and does not damage the 
environment (Q. 5, p. 396).   
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 Orgampalle 
As Figure 7.3 below highlights, more than half of the cultivating actors in 
Orgampalle (four out of seven) strongly disagree with the statement ‘I want to grow 
Bt cotton’ (Appendix 7.2, Q. 1, p. 395).  This is not surprising given that Bt cotton 
cultivation is banned as part of the ‘rules’ of the village (Appendix 6.4, p. 376).  
Perhaps more surprising, however, given the purported ‘agreement’ to ban it, is the 
high level of unawareness among participants in Orgampalle as to what Bt cotton 
actually is.  Three of the seven cultivators (forty-two per cent), including two 
females (Amita and Aruni), and one male (Nirmal) from Risk Coalition Two, claim 
to be unaware of Bt technology.  The questionnaire was not administered to Sajan, 
the landless participant. 
 
Figure 7.3: Questionnaire Results, Q.1 
Orgampalle, 2010/2011 
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Forty-two per cent of participants in Orgampalle claimed to be unable to complete 
the questionnaire due to their lack of awareness of Bt cotton, hence, questionnaire 
results relate only to fifty-eight per cent of participants.  Of these, twenty-eight per 
cent strongly disagree that Bt cotton increases yields and household incomes (Q. 2 
and Q. 3, p. 395).  Of the fifteen per cent who strongly agreed that it increased 
yields and incomes, it was argued that these increases decline over time.  Forty-
three per cent of respondents strongly disagree with the statement that Bt cotton is 
not damaging to the environment (Q. 5, p. 396). 
 
There is little legitimation for Bt bringal (aubergine) in the villages, with half the 
respondents in all three villages strongly disagreeing with the statement that they 
would have no health concerns with regard to eating Bt bringal (Appendix 7.2, Q. 7, 
p. 396). 
 
7.2  Legitimation and the Construction of Risk by Village Participants 
Van Leeuwen’s (2007; 2008) categories of legitimation will now be used to explore 
the legitimation and delegitimation of Bt cotton by cultivators in their attempts to 
negotiate the risk of their context.  
 
AUTHORISATION 
According to Van Leeuwen (2007: 91), authorisation refers to legitimation by 
reference to ‘persons in whom institutional authority is vested.’  Cultivators referred 
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to a variety of authorities in forming perspectives on their legitimation or 
delegitimation of Bt cotton.  These were as follows: 
 
Bantala 
Risk Coalition One 
As mentioned previously, Pavan was one of the first cultivators to introduce Bt 
cotton to Bantala.  For this actor, the widespread adoption of the technology is 
evidence of its popularity.  He asserts, ‘[n]obody is opposed to Bt cotton.  
Everybody is growing it’ (6).  He claims that he heard about Bt cotton through ‘the 
market.’ ‘Market’, ‘market rate’ and ‘money’ are some of the limited English words 
which most cultivating participants in Bantala know. 
 
Chitta claims that he took the advice of seed dealers in opting for Bt varieties.  He 
asserts, ‘when the seeds came to the shop, the dealers told us’ (1).  Bt cotton is also 
regarded as the approach to agriculture recommended by the government.  Chitta 
claims, ‘[t]he government is praising those who opt for cotton.…Cotton farmers are 
richer farmers’ (2).  Sudhakar also highlights the influence of advertising.  He 
states, ‘we have seen the difference [between Bt and non-Bt yields] in newspapers 
and through TV advertising’ (4).  
 
Risk Coalition Two 
Natesh also asserts the view that the government supports Bt cotton cultivation.  He 
claims, ‘once the government introduced Bt, we started growing it’ (16).  The 
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Scheduled Caste participants in this coalition, however, highlight their tendency to 
copy others.  Thus, Sudeep asserts, ‘[b]ecause others were getting more yields with 
Bt, I also tried it’ (9).  Similarly, Ashna claims, ‘[e]verybody is growing Bt, so I am 
also growing it’ (13). (This interview took place after her husband confirmed to her 
that she cultivated Bt varieties).  She also asserts, ‘I don’t know Bt.  I just pick up 
whatever the dealer sells me’ (13). 
 
Risk Coalition Three 
Both female landless actors in Bantala work as daily wage labour.  They have little 
interest in the crops which land-holders cultivate.  Abani simply observes, ‘many 
people are growing it [cotton]’ (21).  Nipa claims, ‘[i]f we get work on Bt fields, 
we’ll work on Bt’ (19). Neither reports any health issues as a result of their work on 
Bt cotton fields. 
 
Nandanapuram 
Risk Coalition One 
Charan asserts, ‘I have seen the other farmers who have grown it.  It gives higher 
yields with lower water consumption.’ The tendency to take the advice of others in 
deciding which seed varieties to use is highlighted in his statement, ‘I would check 
with ten people what they are growing and then decide’ (38). 
 
Nikhil recalls that he first heard about Bt cotton from the fertiliser dealers.  He 
claims, ‘[t]he farmers in the village were very concerned about the impact of Bt 
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cotton at the beginning.  But some one or two have bought it and tried it.  There was 
still a concern that the soil might get eroded if we grew Bt cotton.  But a trend was 
created.  Some were trying it and the yield was increasing.  Now I think half of 
India is growing Bt cotton’ (30).  Nand, the NPM cotton farmer, asserts his 
frustration at his limited authority in persuading others to opt for non-Bt varieties.  
He claims, ‘I insisted with farmers of the village not to use Bt cotton.  Still they 
have used it’ (33). 
 
 Risk Coalition Two 
In Risk Coalition Two, the idea that Bt cotton has become something of a trend is 
also highlighted by Anshul who argues, ‘everyone is cultivating Bt, so I am also 
cultivating it….We expected a higher yield with the Bt varieties so we started 
growing those’ (24).  A strong, gregarious and charismatic Gowda caste member 
from Risk Coalition Two, Rajiv, introduced Bt cotton to the village. He now 
actively campaigns against the technology along with Nand, even as he continues to 
cultivate Bt varieties.  Rajiv recalls how the females of his household were initially 
concerned when he purchased Bt cotton seeds, arguing ‘you can’t enter the field 
safely if it’s a Bt crop’ (27). 
   
The reliance of Nishok, the NPM farmer in Risk Coalition Two, on Nand, the NPM 
farmer in Risk Coalition One, is clear.  He states, ‘Nand gets the seeds for me….I 
use the solutions which Nand gives to us’ (35).  Nishok has never grown Bt cotton, 
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though he used to apply pesticides.  He argues, ‘[b]ecause of the solutions given to 
us by Nand, the problem of pests has reduced’ (35).   
 
Of the two females in Risk Coalition Two, only Ambu, the Scheduled Caste 
Madiga, is aware that she is cultivating Bt cotton.   She claims to try different 
varieties on each of her three acres, arguing ‘I want to see which variety gives me 
more yield’ (28).  The Brahmin female, Rashi, claims, ‘I’ll see [the variety] the 
majority goes for’ (22).   
 
 Risk Coalition Three 
One of the landless actors, Ranjan, a washer-man (Backward Caste Chakali), relies 
on the availability of laundry work for his income.  He notes little difference in his 
livelihood since the adoption of Bt cotton.   A dispute with the sarpanch has led to 
the loss of his pension.184  He claims, ‘[n]ow, since we lost our pension, we can’t 
even get a proper meal’ (32).  The other landless actor, Salma, works as a daily 
wage labourer.  She highlights the impact of the weather on the inherent risk of her 
context.  She claims, ‘[n]ow there is heavy rainfall so we have regular work.’   
 
Orgampalle 
Risk Coalition One 
Pradnesh, the influential village elder in Orgampalle, became aware of problems 
with Bt cotton through his interaction with farmers in other villages.  He claims, ‘Bt 
                                                 
184
 Pension payments for villagers are passed to the sarpanch for distribution.  The alleged with-holding of 
this participant’s pension by the sarpanch highlights the way in which village power structures continue to 
have a direct impact on the material experience of risk by villagers. 
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cotton farmers who had problems took me to the fields and showed me.  Because of 
that, I came to know about their problems’ (55).  He campaigns actively against Bt 
technology.  He asserts, ‘I am telling farmers in meetings not to grow Bt varieties’ 
(55).    
 
 Risk Coalition Two 
Achanda asserts his faith in the NGO, Crops Jangaon, as a reason for not growing 
Bt cotton.  He claims, ‘we would check with Crops [Jangaon] for their advice [with 
regard to cultivation decisions]’ (44).  He also relies heavily on the advice of the 
elder, Pradnesh, from Risk Coalition One.  He asserts, ‘[u]ntil now, we are 
following Pradnesh’s wish. We follow his opinion….The people accept his 
seniority.  They have gained so many good things from him’ (43).   
 
The alternative methods advocated by Crops Jangaon have gained legitimacy for 
Akhil given their results.  He claims, ‘the debt problem has eased since these Crops 
[Jangaon] people have started working with us’ (49).  Nirmal also asserts his faith 
in Crops Jangaon, stating ‘I don’t grow it [Bt cotton] because I believe in Crops 
[Jangaon] and I do according to what they say’ (59).   
 
Prakash claims to have witnessed the negative effects of Bt cotton in other villages.  
He asserts, ‘I haven’t observed it [the negative impact] directly, but I have met 
people and I have seen video clips….I have also witnessed the way animals died in 
Bantala’ (53).  Prakash also claims ‘the [seed] companies, through electronic media 
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and advertisements, have convincingly deceived the farmer into believing that it [Bt 
cotton] gives a higher yield’ (53). 
 
As highlighted previously, both females in Risk Coalition Two are unaware of Bt 
cotton.  Amita states, ‘I don’t know about Bt [cotton].  I’m not aware of anything to 
do with it’ (47).  Aruni claims to rely on village elders, like Pradnesh, to advise the 
villagers.  She asserts, ‘the village elders will know’ (40). 
 
Risk Coalition Three 
As a landless participant who is elderly and in poor health, Sajan’s sole income is a 
monthly pension of Rs 200 per month, and he depends upon PDS rations to survive.  
The inadequacy of his income to cover his food requirements for a month, however, 
means that he is obliged to accept rice from others.  He asserts this dependency, 
claiming ‘[i]f someone obliges, I would get some rice on their ration card’ (52).   
 
These different positions with regard to legitimation through authorisation are 
summarised for Bt and Non-Bt farmers across the Risk Coalitions in the villages in 
Appendix 7.3 (p. 399).   
 
 MORAL EVALUATION 
Van Leeuwen’s (2007: 91) second category of legitimation refers to legitimation by 
reference to ‘discourses of values.’  Here, the legitimation and delegitimation of Bt 
cotton is embedded within a wider normative struggle to legitimate and delegitimate 
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the development model in which it is embedded.  This entails the assertion of 
aspects of the participants’ reality which are valued as evidence of development 
when compared to past conditions. In the case of the technology’s delegitimation, 
however, valued aspects which are perceived as under threat as a result of the wider 
development model which Bt cotton represents are instead asserted. 
 
 Bantala 
 Risk Coalition One 
Pavan asserts, ‘on TV, the news and the whole world are mainly concentrating on 
money.  Earning more money, getting work to earn more money’ (6).  Here, the 
English word ‘money’ is used in conjunction with Telugu’s ‘dabbu’ to highlight his 
assertion.  This actor also notes the increased concentration of land, claiming ‘we 
used to cultivate three or four acres.  Now it has increased to twenty’ (6).  The 
increased emphasis on money and land is asserted by this actor as evidence of 
progress.   
 
Chitta observes, ‘there was scarcity of food because of drought….Now we have 
borewells.  Earlier we used to have huts….[n]ow it has become like this [cement or 
pakka houses]’ (1).  Sudhakar notes the significance of land ownership as a means 
of gaining access to credit.  He argues, ‘you only get money [from banks] if you 
have land’ (4). He also highlights that, although he receives rations from the Public 
Distribution System, he does not require them.  He claims, ‘since the government 
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supplies it [a ration card], we have to take it.  Without a ration card, too, we can 
survive’ (4).   
 
 Risk Coalition Two 
Natesh asserts, ‘it was difficult to get food to eat.  Nowadays, it’s easy.  The 
government has given support’ (15).  However, he delegitimates the reduced crop 
diversity associated with the contemporary development model claiming, ‘[w]e 
used to grow jowar,185 wheat, things like that.  Now we mainly grow paddy and Bt 
cotton’ (15).   
 
Sudeep notes tangible ways in which the village has developed.  He observes, 
‘earlier there were no bt [bitumen or asphalt] roads, only concrete.  And the school 
building…gram panchayat [office] and water plant we initiated’ (9).  He also 
highlights the contribution of government funding to local development.  He claims, 
‘[t]he government is distributing wasteland to poor people’ (9).  Ashna asserts, 
‘[e]arlier we used to strive hard.  Now we are living happily’ (12).  
 
 Risk Coalition Three 
Abani claims, ‘earlier, we used to have huts.  Now we have concrete houses.  
And…some people have become rich’ (21).   Both argue that there has been more 
work since cotton cultivation became more widespread.  The landless actors also 
note the improved wages.  Nipa claims, ‘[l]ast year we used to get fifty to sixty 
rupees per day.  Now we get one hundred’ (19).  Her view that this has contributed 
                                                 
185
 Sorghum bicolor.  An edible drought-resistant grain used in the making of Indian breads (rotis).   
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to an improvement in her life is asserted in her claim, ‘[n]ow we eat three times a 
day’ (18). 
 
 Nandanapuram 
 Risk Coalition One 
Charan argues, ‘I have entered agriculture, but not because of profit.  It’s only more 
and more investment, more and more indebtedness’ (37).  However, Nikhil, the 
Reddy participant, asserts, ‘[t]here was a time when there was food scarcity in the 
village.  Now there’s a lot of development.’  He claims, ‘[t]here has been a lot of 
government policies, so we are getting benefit.  The other thing is crops….Earlier 
we used to cultivate one acre and get Rs 5,000….Now we get Rs 20,000 at times’ 
(30).  He also notes, however, that not everyone is able to benefit in this way.  He 
observes, ‘[a] lot of them [farmers] can’t bear the losses so…they have to sell the 
land in order to clear their debts’ (30).   
 
The NPM farmer, Nand, also notes the decrease in crop diversity.  He claims, ‘in 
my grandfather’s time, we used to have roti186 and ragi.187…Now, people have 
changed to commercial crops’ (33).  He also asserts the health problems associated 
with pesticide use, claiming ‘[m]ost of the money we are earning is going to the 
hospitals because we are getting diseases we have never heard of before’ (34).     
 
 
                                                 
186
 Bread made from wholemeal flour. 
187
 Eleusine coracana or finger millet.  Often inter-cropped with other crops to improve soil fertility. 
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 Risk Coalition Two 
In Risk Coalition Two, Anshul claims, ‘[t]here are instances of farmers being 
unable to carry on with agriculture because of debts.  They have sold off land and 
turned to agricultural labour’ (24).  Similarly, Rajiv’s concerns for the sustainability 
of Bt cotton cultivation lead to fatalistic fears for the future.  He claims, ‘[t]he soil 
fertility will be lost so future generations will have nothing to eat’ (27). Like Nand, 
Nishok, the NPM farmer, also argues that there has been a decrease in crop 
diversity in recent years.  He claims, ‘[b]efore cotton, I used to grow green gram, 
maize, turmeric,188 red gram and ground nut’ (35).189  He also notes improvements, 
however, arguing ‘earlier we used to go for daily wage labour and live in huts.’ 
 
Rashi, the Brahmin widow in Risk Coalition Two, is concerned that labour rates 
have increased.  She also indicates the house that she is constructing with her sister, 
claiming ‘[b]y the time I finish it, I will be four or five lakhs in debt.  That will be 
for my life’ (22).  (The new house under construction is sizable).  She also 
highlights the expenditure on private health care.  She claims, ‘my sister’s daughter 
was lacking red blood corpuscles.  It cost us somewhere around one lakh (22).’  
 
Ambu, the Scheduled Caste Madiga female, is also building a home, part of the 
government funding for which she was obliged to spend on her daughter’s health in 
a private hospital.  She is proud of her leadership of a Self-Help Group.  She claims, 
‘I am the leader of a women’s society...It consists of fifteen members and each 
                                                 
188
 Curcuma longa.  Has been used in Indian cooking for thousands of years and is recommended in 
Ayurvedic practice for its medicinal value. 
189
 Arachis hypogaea or peanut.  A species of legume.   
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woman saves fifty rupees per month….It is my duty to collect the money and 
deposit it in the bank’ (28).   
 
 Risk Coalition Three 
Ranjan notes that ‘[there is] a lot of implementation of policies going on.  In the 
Indira scheme,190 a lot of them have got homes.  A school has been constructed and 
new cc [cement concrete] roads are being laid’ (32).  He also asserts that things 
have been better since the PDS was implemented.  He claims, ‘now we get rice and 
other things so we feel more comfortable than in the past’ (32). 
 
Like Ambu, Salma, too, is a leader of a women’s Self-Help Group.  Through it, she 
has learned how to write.  She claims, ‘I started a Self-Help Group for Scheduled 
Caste women so that they could receive the benefits from saving in small groups 
and obtain loans’ (39).   
 
Orgampalle 
 Risk Coalition One 
Pradnesh argues that Bt technology is a short-term solution only, claiming ‘[i]t [Bt 
cotton] seems to be increasing wealth for some time, but it will deteriorate sooner or 
later’ (56).  He asserts instead the value of sustainability, arguing ‘[w]e have to look 
for long-term benefits’ (56).  He questions, ‘what is the point of increasing yields of 
                                                 
190
 This refers to the Indiramma (Integrated Novel Development in Rural Areas and Model Municipal 
Areas) initiative launched to upgrade the housing of all those with ration cards.   
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poisonous food?’ (56), and also asserts that farmers are losing their ability to 
choose.  He claims, ‘there is no availability of non-Bt so Bt is a compulsion’ (56).   
 
He highlights the mutual co-operation among the villagers, claiming ‘[w]e help 
each other in terms of sharing water’ (55).  He also values the knowledge associated 
with organic farming, stating ‘recognising the disease [in the plant] is an art and 
giving the correct solution is a different art.  You need different solutions for 
different diseases….I have eighty-nine kinds of solutions’ (56). 
 
 Risk Coalition Two 
Akhil claims, ‘it [Bt cotton] might increase returns but damage health….What is the 
point of having higher returns when it doesn’t help health?’ (50). Similarly, he 
asserts, ‘[w]ith any kind of technology, we should see the use of it.  If it’s 
something like Bt cotton or GM food, if it’s not useful then what’s the point of 
developing it?’ (50). He also claims, ‘[n]ow we are able to grow crops with low 
costs so that helped to ease our situation’ (49). 
 
Nirmal asserts his desire for profit as a basis for not cultivating Bt cotton.  He 
claims, ‘[i]f I chose Bt seeds, I would have to use chemicals in crop production.  It’s 
very expensive.  That’s why I am using normal cotton seeds’ (58).  He also asserts 
the constraint associated with water availability.  He claims, ‘[b]ecause of lack of 
water, we are unable to improve our profit level’ (58).  
 
 222 
Achanda values the co-operation in the village, particularly with regard to keeping 
labour rates low.  He argues, ‘We don’t want to increase the rates.  It’s a mutual 
understanding’ (43).  Like Sudhakar in Bantala, this actor also receives PDS rations, 
although he claims that he does not require them.  He asserts, ‘[t]hey [the 
government] are giving [PDS rations], so we are receiving them.  If they do not give 
them, it is also not a problem’ (43). 
 
Prakash, the marginal cultivator, argues that farmers should have greater control 
over setting prices for their produce.  He asserts, ‘[a]ll companies have the right to 
decide their own prices for their products….[W]hat kind of situation are we in, 
when we, as producers, don’t have the right to decide the rate for our own product?’ 
(53). 
 
Amita highlights the improvement in the knowledge of farming methods which, she 
claims, has enabled them to obtain better yields.  She asserts, ‘[e]arlier, we didn’t 
get good crops.  The crops failed often.  Now the situation has improved.  We know 
how to grow crops better, we gained in knowledge.  Also, the climate has 
improved’ (46).  
 
 Risk Coalition Three 
Sajan is acutely aware of the precariousness of his situation.  He claims, ‘maybe 
tomorrow I will have to start begging for food’ (52).  He also notes the changes in 
the houses in the village, but highlights that he is excluded from accessing them.  
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He asserts, ‘they have shown me the land but I can’t build a house on my own, and 
the help the government gives won’t be sufficient’ (52).   
 
The differing positions in terms of legitimation through moral evaluation are 
summarised for Bt and Non-Bt farmers across the Risk Coalitions in the villages in 
Appendix 7.4 (p. 400).   
 
RATIONALISATION  
 
Van Leeuwen’s (2007) third category of legitimation is rationalisation.  Here, 
legitimation is not primarily concerned with whether an action is morally justified – 
though, as Van Leeuwen (ibid.: 100) recognises, no rationalisation can be regarded 
as legitimate without some appeal to morality. The primary focus in legitimation 
through rationalisation, however, is on whether the action (here, relating to the 
adoption or rejection of Bt cotton) can be justified in terms of cognitively valid 
reasons. 
 
 
Bantala 
 
Risk Coalition One 
Pavan states, ‘[t]here has been a twenty-five per cent increase in income with Bt 
cotton’ (6).  He also claims, ‘[b]ecause fewer pesticide sprays are required, Bt 
cotton is better for the land’ (6).  Over time, however, Pavan’s discourse also 
reveals his significant uncertainty.  He claims, ‘[m]any people say the land becomes 
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spoilt (6).  And states, ‘I don’t know specifically [if Bt cotton damages the soils].  It 
is something I feel’ (7).   
 
Sudhakar claims, ‘[t]hough we are yielding more, labour costs have increased’ (4).  
He also argues, ‘[t]he non-Bt fellow will say Bt is harmful.  We listen and that’s it.  
We don’t know if it’s really harmful or not’ (5).  Likewise, he notes the animal 
deaths and claims, ‘once buffaloes ate Bt cotton and twenty of them died’ (4).  
Chitta also states, ‘I heard the land is getting spoiled, so in the future we may not 
get good yields.’ (1). This has led to concerns for the future.  He questions, 
‘[e]verybody grows cotton.  But tomorrow what will happen?’ (1).   
 
 Risk Coalition Two 
Natesh argues, ‘[w]e’re growing Bt cotton because if we go for ground-nut or 
something else, insects…will attack and we’ll incur loss’ (15). He also notes 
pesticide use has declined.  He claims, ‘I used to spend more on pesticides’ (15).   
Sudeep, too, notes that vegetable crops are prone to other predators.  He claims, 
‘there are a lot of monkeys, so there is no safety in growing vegetable items [crops]’ 
(9).  Both marginal land holders assert the increased profitability of Bt cotton.  
Ashna claims, ‘[w]e are getting more yield, so we are getting more money’ (12).  
Likewise, Sudeep asserts, ‘[f]inancially we benefitted.  We’re sending my brother 
to school, we’ve built a house and we’re not relying on others for loans’ (9).  
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Nonetheless, the discourse of these actors also highlights their profound uncertainty 
with regard to the viability and sustainability of the technology.  Natesh claims, ‘we 
feel that we are spending more, and it’s too costly.  And if we get a low price when 
we sell, we feel it’ (15).  Actors in this coalition also assert their view that yields are 
declining.  Natesh claims, ‘[t]he height of the plant is reducing, so yields are 
declining’ (15).  He also highlights, ‘buffaloes died from eating the cotton’ (15).  
Similarly, Ashna asserts, ‘we get more, but our expenses are more’ (12).  She also 
claims, ‘people told me that it [Bt cotton] damages the environment, but I don’t 
know if that’s true or not’ (13). The potential risk is rationalised, however, as a 
legitimate gamble.  She claims, ‘[i]t’s pure luck.  If you get the crop, you benefit.  
Otherwise you lose’ (13). 
 
Risk Coalition Three 
Nipa claims, ‘[i]f I can go to work, I can live.  Otherwise, it’s difficult’ (19).  She 
also asserts, ‘[t]he government does nothing….We are living day by day but there is 
no hope of things getting better….It has been like this for years’ (20).  Abani, on the 
other hand, claims, ‘[i]t’s better now….Some people became rich’ (21).  Thus, 
while her own situation remains precarious, she notes the development of others as 
evidence of the legitimacy of the system overall.  This is also due, however, to her 
reliance on the success of others as a means of alleviating her own exposure to risk.   
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Nandanapuram 
 
 Risk Coalition One 
 
Charan notes, ‘I made thirty five thousand rupees profit last year….This year, the 
labour rates have gone high and, after the rains, the cotton rates have dropped 
(37).’191  Charan claims he started to grow Bt cotton because he does not have 
access to irrigation.  He asserts, ‘Bt cotton needs less water [than paddy]’ (37).  
Nikhil notes that ‘in the last ten to twelve years, there has been high productivity 
and high rates in cotton’ (30).  He also argues that his ability to undertake crop 
rotation is limited due to lack of water.  He asserts, ‘I tried crop rotation in one part 
of my land, but I couldn’t try it elsewhere because there is no water’ (30).  He 
claims, ‘if everyone is growing Bt cotton and making money, then I must also do it 
to live.  I’m just following the blind’ (31).   
 
Nand, the NPM farmer, argues, ‘[t]he height of the crop has been decreasing…[and] 
the quality of the soil is deteriorating day by day.  He also claims that the bollworm 
has developed resistance and argues that ‘sucking pests have doubled’ (34).  
However, he asserts the constraints of cultivators, arguing ‘they have actually seen 
the animals dying…but still they have no alternative.’ This is not least due to the 
difficulty in obtaining non-Bt seeds.  ‘To get hold of non-Bt [seeds],’ Nand claims, 
‘you have to pay [a part payment] in advance. If you’re growing in June, you have 
to pay in February….We would pay ten to fifteen thousand rupees in February [in 
                                                 
191
 This interview was conducted prior to the flooding when the plentiful rains seemed to signal a bumper 
harvest – hence, the rates for cotton declined. 
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part payment] and book one hundred packets of non-Bt seeds,192 then distribute 
them to whoever is interested (33).’   
 
 Risk Coalition Two 
Anshul argues that yields were higher with non-Bt cotton.  He claims, ‘with non-Bt, 
we used to get ten to twelve quintals.  Now with the Bt variety it has dropped to six 
or eight’ (24).  However, he argues, ‘because this cotton is rain-fed, I grow cotton’ 
(24).  He also asserts, ‘because of the increase in costs [with Bt], I am not able to 
get back my investment sometimes’ (24).  He states, ‘when I spray pesticides, it’s 
affecting my health’ (24).  He knows he should wear protective equipment, but 
claims, ‘it’s an unnecessary delay, so I just go’ (24).  He also states, ‘[b]ecause of 
the borewells, the [ground] water levels have come down….Now we have to dig 
much deeper [for water]’ (24).   
 
Similarly, Rajiv claims, ‘the Bt crop yields have declined, but my expenditure keeps 
increasing because of pesticide use’ (27). Nishok, the NPM farmer in Risk 
Coalition Two, asserts that yields are lower with Bt than with non-Bt cotton.  He 
claims, ‘[c]ompared to non-Bt, Bt produces less’ (35).  He has also notes the 
damage to his soils from growing non-Bt cotton for twenty years consecutively.  He 
claims, ‘[s]oil fertility is declining because of the consecutive cultivation of cotton.  
That’s why I am doing crop rotation again with maize and ground nut’ (35).   
 
                                                 
192
 This is sufficient for one hundred acres. 
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Both females argue that yields are higher with Bt cotton.  Rashi, the Brahmin 
marginal land-holder, claims, ‘[l]ast time I got around twenty quintals.  I didn’t 
even get fifteen quintals this time’ (22).  Like Ashna in Bantala, she argues ‘[w]hen 
it’s luck, I get profit.  When it’s unfortunate, I don’t get anything’ (22).  Ambu 
claims, ‘I’m getting eight quintals for the Bt variety, and I used to get five or six for 
the non-Bt’ (28).  She also asserts, however, ‘sometimes it is just sufficient to pay 
back the costs that are incurred during cultivation’ (28).  She also claims, ‘[t]he soil 
is totally destroyed’ (29).   
 
 Risk Coalition Three 
Salma contends that people in the villages are better off financially.  She claims, 
‘[o]verall, there is an improvement’ (39).  However, she notes that the ability to 
profit does not apply to everyone.  She asserts, ‘[e]veryone is trying, but a few are 
getting higher returns, while others are making losses’ (39).   
 
Orgampalle 
 
 Risk Coalition One 
Pradnesh claims, ‘[t]hey [farmers] are being cheated by the seed companies’ (55).  
He argues that the risks associated with non-Bt cultivation are lower given the 
greater stability of yields.  He states, ‘non-Bt cotton has a constant yield.  You get 
eight quintals and it’s eight quintals every time. With Bt, initially it shows a ten 
quintal hike, but over time, it decreases’ (56).  He also claims the Bt cotton plant 
itself is toxic, stating, ‘chemicals have poisoned the seed and that is carried in the 
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plant’ (56).  His awareness of his leadership of Orgampalle as a counter-systemic 
tendency in Andhra Pradesh is clear in his statement, ‘[c]ompared to outside 
[society beyond the village], we may be backward in terms of our development.  
But my philosophy is, let them do what they want.  They may be going in circles, 
but let’s stick to our own path’ (55).   
 
 Risk Coalition Two 
Akhil claims, ‘I believe it [Bt cotton] affects the land so I don’t grow it’ (50).  He 
also fears for human health, arguing ‘it might increase returns but damage health’ 
(50).  He is aware that the village is being used as a demonstration of an alternative 
life-style to challenge the current development model, and claims, ‘they [Crops 
Jangaon] want to create this village as a role model for the entire country’ (49).   
 
Akhil argues, ‘soil fertility comes down [when Bt cotton is used].  After you grow 
Bt cotton for two consecutive years, then change to another crop, yields will be 
lower [for the subsequent crop].  Even if you try to grow non-Bt, it will not help 
you….[A]nimals die from grazing on Bt [cotton] fields’ (49).   
 
Nirmal rationalises that cotton is a less risky crop choice than others.  He claims, 
‘depending upon the weather, there are good chances of losing chilli and maize and 
some other crops.  Cotton is giving a good price.  That’s why we grow it’ (58).  He 
also claims, ‘[f]armers commit suicide because they are paying for chemicals….The 
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production cost is twenty thousand rupees per acre….It’s very difficult to survive’ 
(58). 
 
Achanda notes the impact of the weather on the ability of villagers to live 
comfortably.  He claims, ‘[t]en years ago, we faced many problems.  There was no 
water.  We moved to other villages for work….Now the rains are good.  We are 
comfortable’ (43).  He notes, too, the impact of the cotton price on their livelihoods, 
claiming ‘[s]ince cropping cotton, we don’t have problems.  We are getting a good 
income’ (43).   
 
Prakash, the marginal land-holder, argues that Bt cotton does not increase yields.  
He claims, ‘the first thing the farmer should realise is that Bt [technology] is not for 
increasing yields.  The crop only has a higher resistance for ninety days to the 
American bollworm….The bollworm may not happen every time’ (53).  He claims 
the cultivation area of Bt cotton has increased because of media advertisements.193  
He also notes the helplessness of the farmers themselves in ascertaining the cause of 
the animal deaths.  He argues, ‘our [farmers’] limitation is that we can’t analyse 
scientifically’ (53). 
 
As highlighted earlier, the two females in Risk Coalition Two are unaware of Bt 
cotton.  For Aruni, her choice of crop is determined by water availability.  She 
claims, ‘six years back, we spent Rs 40,000 on a borewell….[N]ow we are not 
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 Brightly coloured Telugu advertisements for Bt cotton adorn trees, bus shelters, public transport and 
shop stalls throughout Warangal.   
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getting any water from that’ (40).  Amita notes, ‘[e]veryone stopped growing 
tobacco [and started cultivating cotton] so I also changed.’ (46). 
 
 Risk Coalition Three 
Sajan’s priority in the legitimation of any development model is clear: ‘I would 
look to people who can give me food, nothing else’ (52). 
 
The differing positions in terms of legitimation through moral evaluation are 
summarised for Bt and Non-Bt farmers across the Risk Coalitions in the villages in 
Appendix 7.5 (p. 401).   
 
MYTHOPOESIS 
Van Leeuwen’s (2007: 105) final category of legitimation, mythopoesis, refers to 
legitimation which is conveyed through narratives which define ‘legitimate social 
practices’. This category is used to explore the ‘vernacularization of democratic 
politics’ (Michelutti, 2007: 639) as narratives related to perspectives on the 
legitimate exercise of power as a concern of democratic praxis.  At the village level, 
this focusses on the Gram Sabha meeting as the institutionalised forum of 
decentralised democratic praxis.  
 
As has been highlighted, the demand for the secession of Telangana was the subject 
of widespread mobilisations in the villages at the time of the research.  These 
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included mass protests and relay hunger strikes.194  This meant that the issue was 
guaranteed to secure animated engagement from most participants in the discussion 
of politics, and permitted significant insight into normative views on democratic 
praxis.   
 
Bantala 
All participants in Bantala vote in panchayat, state and parliamentary elections.   
However, only thirty-seven per cent (three of eight) of participants attend the Gram 
Sabha meeting.  Two of the five male participants claim to attend the meetings, and 
one of the three females.  Of the two male attendees, one is from Risk Coalition 
One (Chitta), and the other from Risk Coalition Two (Natesh).  The female 
Scheduled Caste attendee, Ashna, is from Risk Coalition Two.195   
 
The uncertainty with which Bt cotton is associated in Bantala has not led villagers 
to participate in mobilisations against the technology.  Instead, the ambiguity forms 
the basis for its legitimation, given the trade-off of the uncertainty with which it is 
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 During the research period, colourful pagodas could be seen throughout the Telangana countryside, 
beneath which relay hunger strikers would sit, draped in a jasmine garland to indicate their fast. The 
researcher spent some time sitting with male hunger strikers during one such protest organised by Pallav in 
Bantala (Field note extract, 4/2/2011).  Villagers took turns in ‘fasts’ which involved eating breakfast, 
missing lunch, and taking an evening meal.  Males and females participated on alternate days.  These 
protests were an exciting social occasion, with protest songs and speeches in Telugu blaring from loud 
speakers.   
195
 Of the participants involved in this study, only one (Natesh) was at the Gram Sabha meeting attended by 
the researcher in Bantala in October, 2010.  Twenty-five males sat on benches assembled in the courtyard 
of the Panchayat office.  The sarpanch and a representative from the Mandal were seated at a head-table 
(accompanied by, on this occasion, the researcher and her translator).  Five females stood silently in the 
background.  Discussion revolved around the need to remove the names of deceased villagers from the 
pension list, as well as the requirement for new drains, road widening and water tank.  There was also 
heated debate from some villagers who argued that plans to widen a road would cause damage to nearby 
properties (Extract from Translator’s Notes: 4/10/2010).   
 
 233 
associated with the initially high yields and incomes which all participants in the 
village assert. The discourse of the participants also indicates, however, that the 
legitimation of the technology is waning due to its declining yields and higher costs.  
This increasing delegitimation is also evident in the claim by the Crops Jangaon 
actor that village elders in Bantala have expressed an interest in visiting Orgampalle 
in order to assess the potential of organic cultivation. 
 
 Risk Coalition One 
Pavan does not participate in Gram Sabha meetings.  He argues, ‘[a]ll this [Gram 
Sabha meetings] comes under politics, so since I’m a farmer I have to go for my 
work [in the fields]’ (6).  Despite his disavowal of politics, he nonetheless claims, 
‘[w]e’ll fight until we get Telangana’ (6).  Chitta participates in meetings and votes.  
He claims, ‘[e]verybody who has the right will cast their vote’ (1). He repeatedly 
uses the Telugu word desam (meaning country) to refer to Telangana, claiming 
‘[i]t’s [Telangana] our country, desam, so we should get that’ (1).  Sudhakar asserts, 
‘if I cast my vote, I may get benefit’ (4). He does not, however, attend Gram Sabha 
meetings.   
 
 Risk Coalition Two 
Natesh claims, ‘I’ll participate in every activity as I’m an elder in the village’ (15).  
He takes a cynical view of the Indian democratic process, however, arguing, ‘[i]f 
we spent the amount which is spent on elections in constructing a dam…, that 
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would be more beneficial’ (15). He strongly supports Telangana, arguing ‘[i]f we 
get Telangana, our children will get jobs’ (15).   
 
Sudeep supports Telangana, because ‘[i]t [Telangana] means my place’ (9).  He 
argues, ‘[s]ince we are living in a democratic country, this has given us the right to 
ask for our rights and fight for our rights.  Now I have enough freedom to go and 
ask what rate I’m getting [for my cotton] and why I’m getting it.  I can fight for my 
own sustenance’ (10).  Ashna is one of the few females in the current study who 
claims to attend Gram Sabha meetings (though she was not present at the meeting 
attended by the researcher). Unlike most participants in Bantala, she takes a cynical 
view of Telangana, arguing ‘[e]verybody is saying we should get Telangana, but it 
won’t do anything’ (12).   
 
 Risk Coalition Three 
Neither of the two female participants in Risk Coalition Three attends Gram Sabha 
meetings, though both vote.  Abani claims ‘I don’t have time [to attend meetings]’ 
(21).  She is cynical about Telangana, stating ‘[w]hether we get Telangana or not, 
I’ll not get anything.  But my children may get something’ (21).  Similarly, Nipa 
does not attend Gram Sabha meetings.  She argues, ‘I’m too busy with my work’ 
(19).  She highlights the compulsion of voting as a social norm, however, arguing, 
‘[i]f they say to cast my vote, I’ll go and cast my vote’ (19).   
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 Nandanapuram 
Nandanapuram is highly mobilised in its opposition to Bt technology.  The 
involvement of villagers in protests against the technology is coordinated by the 
NGO, the Deccan Development Society (DDS).   
 
All participants in Nandanapuram vote.  However, only thirty per cent (three out of 
ten) of participants in the village attend Gram Sabha meetings.  Of these, two of the 
seven males, and one of the three females, attend.   Of the males who attend, one is 
from Risk Coalition One (Nand), and the other from Risk Coalition Two (Anshul).  
The female attendee is Salma who is the only landless Risk Coalition Three 
participant of the study to claim to attend the Gram Sabha meeting.  However, 
given that her now deceased husband was a former sarpanch of Nandanapuram, she 
is very politically engaged.   
 
 Risk Coalition One 
Charan, the elderly Brahmin, votes in panchayat, state and parliamentary elections.  
He claims, ‘[t]he person who gets elected may be of some use’ (37).  He also 
highlights, ‘[t]hey bribe me for my vote.  I don’t take any bribe but I vote’ (37).  He 
notes the delegitimation of the power of Brahmins, claiming ‘[t]hat was our time.  
This is not our time’ (37). The Reddy participant, Nikhil, claims ‘we are under a 
compulsion to vote….Otherwise, we wouldn’t’ (30).  This actor, too, highlights the 
challenge to power structures in Nandanapuram, arguing ‘during my grandfather’s 
time, there used to be respect for Reddys as a higher caste….[N]ow no one listens 
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to us’ (30).  He argues, ‘king’s rule is preferable [to democracy], because the 
electoral system is too corrupt’ (30).   
 
As an active campaigner against Bt cotton, Nand participated in a meeting when the 
then Minister for Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, visited Hyderabad in 
January, 2010, to gather views on Bt bringal. He claims, ‘[i]f the farmers are 
protesting in huge numbers [against Bt cotton], that is one kind of force.  But the 
government uses force through lathi196 charge…to undermine or repress the 
movement’ (33).  He argues that ‘[t]he government is influenced by the 
multinationals who produce Bt cotton’ (33).  He claims, ‘India is trapped….It is 
unable to say to America that our farmers don’t want Bt cotton’ (34).  He is in 
favour of Telangana because he argues, ‘when we have a smaller state…the 
government can actually listen to people and make policies with the consensus of 
the people’ (33).  
 
 Risk Coalition Two 
Anshul votes and attends Gram Sabha meetings.  He asserts directly to the 
researcher in Telugu, ‘One hundred per cent kawali! [we one hundred per cent need 
Telangana!]’ (24). He argues, ‘[i]f Telangana comes, there would be abundant 
opportunities’ (24).  Rajiv argues that the protests of farmers are ineffectual because 
the political system is so corrupt.  He claims, ‘once, some years ago, the cotton 
seeds didn’t germinate [due to the issue of spurious seeds]…so the farmers went on 
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 Lathi is Hindi for a stick which may be topped with metal.  The lathi is commonly used by the Indian 
police as a means of crowd control.   
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a…huge protest.  They stopped buses and burned them….The concerned police 
officer…said he would do justice but he took a bribe’ (27).  Nishok, the NPM 
farmer, votes but states, ‘[i]f I keep attending these [Gram Sabha] meetings, I will 
not have much time to tend to my fields’ (35).  He is uncertain about Telangana 
claiming, ‘I’m not sure whether they [increased employment opportunities] will 
really come or whether it will be the same as it is now’ (35). 
 
Rashi, the female Brahmin, votes and is a strong advocate of a separate Telangana.  
She argues, ‘[t]hough [the Nagarjuna Sagar dam] is located in Telangana, more than 
half of the water goes to Andhra’ (22).  Ambu, the Madiga female, states, ‘I don’t 
attend panchayat meetings.  I go to the meetings held for women [self-help group 
meetings]’ (28).  She is cynical about Telangana, arguing ‘those who are in politics 
will benefit out of a separate Telangana’ (28).   
 
 Risk Coalition Three 
Salma votes and, as has been noted, also attends Gram Sabha meetings.  She 
supports Telangana, arguing ‘I believe Telangana would bring jobs for my children’ 
(39).  Ranjan also votes.  He claims, ‘[i]f I didn’t vote, somebody would come and 
make me’ (32).  He claims he used to attend Gram Sabha meetings but asserts, ‘I 
never used to understand anything.  I used to just go and stand there and listen’ 
(32).  He also notes the bribery associated with voting.  He claims, ‘[t]hey [political 
campaigners] offer fifty, sixty rupees for my vote….Every party bribes, usually 
with alcohol.  I don’t drink, so they give me money’ (32). 
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Orgampalle 
Villagers such as Pradnesh (Risk Coalition One) and Prakash (Risk Coalition Two) 
actively take part in mobilisations against Bt technology.  This involvement is 
organised in conjunction with Crops Jangaon.  Pradnesh has also voiced his 
opposition to the technology directly to Jairam Ramesh on his visit to Hyderabad.  
As the analysis has highlighted, however, almost half of the participants in the 
village are unaware of what Bt technology is, and simply follow the leadership of 
Pradnesh.   
 
All participants in Orgampalle vote.  Gram Sabha attendance is also higher among 
Orgampalle participants than in the other two villages.  Sixty-two per cent (five of 
the eight participants) claim to attend the meeting.  All of these are male.  Four of 
the male attendees are from Risk Coalition Two. The fifth is Pradnesh from Risk 
Coalition One.   
 
 Risk Coalition One 
As an elder, Pradnesh attends the Gram Sabha meetings.  He also votes.  He claims, 
‘[o]nly if I vote, will I be able to ask for my rights’ (55).  Pradnesh asserts, ‘I 
campaign vigorously against Bt bringal.  I have even argued with Jairam Ramesh’ 
(55).  He is concerned about the civil disobedience associated with the Telangana 
movement, arguing ‘[t]he students are staging protests, they are being 
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jailed….There’s no need for all this conflict.  We have the right to vote every five 
years, so let’s make use of that’ (55).197 
 
 Risk Coalition Two 
Akhil votes and attends meetings.  He links village democracy directly with 
development activities, claiming ‘[w]e talk about the problems in the village in the 
Gram Sabha meetings’ (49).  He argues, however, that money is leading to a 
distortion of the wider democratic process, claiming ‘[w]hoever is richer is stronger.  
The government favours them, not us’ (50).   
 
Akhil supports Telangana because he claims, ‘once we get separated, we can have 
our own…resources’ (49).  Nirmal, too, votes and attends meetings.  He supports 
Telangana, arguing ‘now we are paying high prices to private hospitals.  If 
Telangana becomes its own state, government hospitals will be improved’ (58).  
Likewise, Achanda votes and attends the Gram Sabha meetings.  He argues, 
‘[e]very election is good for democracy’ (43).   
 
Prakash also campaigns against Bt technology.  He questions, ‘[t]here are thousands 
of farmers fighting on the streets against Bt.  Why does the government not listen to 
them?’ (53). He also claims ‘[i]t [the proposed Seed Act] favours 
companies….[W]hen there are farmers fighting against amendments, why doesn’t 
the government take heed?’ (53). 
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 As highlighted in this thesis, theoretically the emphasis on democracy as voting expressed by Pradnesh 
represents a reductionist view of democratic praxis given the strong reliance on active mobilisation as a 
means of securing legitimacy in the exercise of power. 
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As highlighted previously, neither of the two females in Risk Coalition Two attend 
the Gram Sabha meetings.  Although Aruni votes, she argues, ‘[t]his [attendance at 
the Gram Sabha] is not my level….Women like me never attend such meetings’ 
(40).  Similarly, Amita votes, but does not attend meetings.  She highlights the 
compulsion of voting as a social norm, arguing ‘[e]veryone votes, so I also vote’ 
(46).   
 
 Risk Coalition Three 
Sajan votes.  He claims, ‘I have the right to vote so I exercise that right’ (52).  He 
links the vote to the obtaining of benefits, arguing ‘we get benefits like ration cards, 
and pensions have come of late’ (52).   
 
The differing positions with regard to legitimation through mythopoesis are 
summarised in Appendix 7.6 (p. 402).  In conclusion, this chapter has explored the 
way in which perspectives on Bt cotton are embedded within differing evaluations 
of development.  These are strongly informed by the influence of village power-
holders.  The chapter has also highlighted that the Gram Sabha meeting as the 
primary locus for village democracy, is poorly legitimated, and largely male-
dominated.  The meeting is primarily regarded as a means of securing access to 
resources, a concern which is also central to the framing of the demand for a 
separate state of Telangana.  There is also, however, evidence of a rights discourse 
which serves as a precursor to the mobilisations which are an integral part of village 
democracy.  (While Bantala villagers were not mobilised in opposition to Bt 
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technology, they were highly mobilised with regard to the need for a separate 
Telangana). These protests seek reform of the institutionalisation of democratic 
praxis as a concern for social justice in the negotiation of risk.   
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Chapter Eight 
ANALYSIS  
PART III 
 
Legitimation and the Meso Level Struggle to  
Define Risk in Andhra Pradesh State Politics 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter adopts the Habermasian (1996: 356-359) core-periphery model to 
explore the legitimation struggle to define risk as a concern of the meso institutional 
level.  Democratic praxis is here examined through an exploration of the negotiation 
of the decision-making power of actors arising from their core-periphery model 
positioning.  This also highlights the way in which the political process is itself 
being re-defined through competing narratives related to ideas on development, 
knowledge construction, and the way in which the exercise of power should 
legitimately be institutionalised within democratic society.   
 
8.2 The Discourse Coalitions 
At this level, participants have been grouped into ‘discourse coalitions’ (Hajer, 
1997: 12-13) based upon the commonality of their positioning with regard to Bt 
cotton.  Although participants at this level agreed that their identities could be 
disclosed, names have not been used.  This is due to the fact that the focus here is 
on the institutional positions which these actors occupy, rather than on the 
individuals themselves. In light of this agreement to disclosure, however, the 
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identities of actors at this level are less closely guarded than was the case with 
participants at the micro level.   
 
As highlighted, the selection of participants at the meso level has been informed by 
the desire to have both sides of the debate represented in line with the 
constructionist approach.  The Bt Coalition has a favourable view of the technology 
and is comprised of a Congress Party actor from the core, a research scientist from 
the state agricultural university, ANGRAU (who is also a member of the Review 
Committee for Genetic Modification (RCGM) here representing the inner 
periphery,198 and four employees from Monsanto.  Their functions include a Sales 
and Marketing Manager for Bt crops, the Lead for Regulatory Affairs, a Lead 
Scientist in Bt technology research, and the Technology Development Lead in 
vegetable seeds.  Monsanto are located on the periphery of the Habermasian 
model.199 For the purposes of the analysis, the Monsanto actors are often treated as 
a group.  The majority of this coalition is male (five Indian males, and one 
American female) and all, except the American female, are agricultural scientists.  
She is a toxicologist. 
 
The Non-Bt Coalition is so described due to the opposition of its members to Bt 
technology.  This coalition is comprised entirely of male agricultural scientists.  
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 Permission was not granted to record the interview with this actor, so the analysis features extracts from 
shorthand notes taken during the meeting.   
199
 This should not be taken to indicate that Monsanto is in any way a peripheral actor in the sense of being 
socially marginalised.  In fact, as this thesis has highlighted, it is Monsanto’s undue influence which is the 
subject of scrutiny.  The term ‘periphery’ is used here in the very specific sense adopted within the 
Habermasian model, where it refers to the positioning of actors relative to the core of government. 
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Participants have again been selected to represent the core and periphery of the 
Habermasian model.  Here, the core is represented by the Communist Party India 
(Marxist) or CPM actor as an opposition party in the Andhra Pradesh core, while 
the periphery of the model is represented by three NGOs.  These include the Centre 
for Sustainable Agriculture (CSA), the Deccan Development Society (DDS), both 
based in Hyderabad, and Crops Jangaon (CJ), based in Jangaon.  Given the 
similarity of their positions, the NGO actors are often analysed as a group within 
the Non-Bt Coalition.  The DDS and CSA actors are both ANGRAU graduates.   
 
In the current study, the definition struggle is, therefore, being waged between 
scientists who could be regarded as epistemic equals, but who are positioned 
differently – the Bt Coalition are power-holders (either by virtue of their political or 
economic positioning), and the Non-Bt Coalition are challenging the legitimacy of 
this power through their framing of risk.  The analysis explores the way in which 
the different positioning of these actors within the core-periphery model contributes 
to different normative perspectives on the knowledge construction, values and 
exercise of power which should inform risk definition in the future development of 
Andhra Pradesh society.   
 
8.3 Legitimation in the Meso Level Definition of Risk 
At this level, Van Leeuwen’s (2007; 2008) categories of legitimation are adopted as 
a means of exploring the attempts by actors to secure legitimation for their 
ideological positions as part of the struggle to define risk.  Figures in parentheses 
 245 
after interview excerpts relate to the interview schedule included as Appendix 8.1 
(p. 400).  Summaries of the critical discourse analysis associated with each category 
of legitimation, as well as an overall summary of the meso level analysis, are 
presented in Appendices 8.2 to 8.6 (pp. 405-409). 
 
 AUTHORISATION 
As Fairclough (2003: 124) notes, ‘[d]ifferent discourses are different perspectives 
on the world, and they are associated with the different relations people have to the 
world, which in turn depends on their positions in the world.’  According to Van 
Leeuwen (2007: 94), ‘legitimate authority is vested in a person because of their 
status or role in a particular institution.’   
 
In critical discourse analysis, the use of pronouns is an important indicator of the 
way in which social actors orientate themselves in relation to others (Fairclough, 
2003: 150).  With regard to risk definition, this involves the assertion by actors of 
their epistemic authority in order to establish the relative legitimacy of their 
ideological positioning when compared to those with alternative perspectives.   
 
The Bt Coalition 
The Congress Party actor emphasises his particular epistemic standing by asserting 
his authority within the core.  This is highlighted through his ability to speak on the 
government’s behalf – as in, for instance, ‘[t]he government has endorsed Bt 
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cotton’ (5) or ‘the government feels that the PDS200 is a social obligation’ (5). He 
also seeks to establish solidarity for his support of biotechnology with his use of the 
‘you’ pronoun, as in his claim, ‘[s]uppose you want to scale up the protein levels [in 
food], maybe you can use intervention.’  This seeks to secure legitimation for the 
potential of Bt technology through highlighting the benefits of innovations 
associated with the broader field of biotechnology, which are unrelated to Bt 
technology itself.  
 
The ‘we’ position is frequently used to emphasise this actor’s inclusion in the 
decision-making core; for instance, ‘[w]e have to make farming profitable’ (5) or 
‘[w]e want to give all tenant farmers in this state a loan eligibility card’ (5).  This 
establishes his position as a power-holder with responsibility for alleviating the risk 
exposure of others.  His rare use of the first position asserts his personal 
commitment to the government’s pledges as in, for instance, the use of the first 
position possessive pronoun in, ‘[m]y vision is to have the farmer net realising [ie., 
making a net profit] from agriculture’ (5).   
 
A ‘they’ position which seeks to establish distance from, and a delegitimation of, 
alternative ideological positions, is used to highlight this actor’s view that NGOs 
exaggerate the risk of Bt cotton.  He claims, ‘[i]t’s [Bt cotton] not as damaging as 
they [NGOs] advocate, and it helps the farmer to cut costs’ (5).  This latter ‘benefit’ 
of reducing farmer costs is important to this actor’s legitimation within the core, 
particularly given the links of farmer suicides to indebtedness.   
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The ANGRAU actor’s dual roles as a ‘government scientist’ in a state university, 
and a regulator with the RCGM, are regularly emphasised as an indication of his 
ability to secure a broader, more balanced perspective than others involved in the 
debate.  His use of the ‘we’ position frequently extends to the whole of humanity in 
as in his view that ‘[w]e can’t control pests and save the environment 
simultaneously’ (7).   
 
His desire to be seen as epistemically neutral is asserted in his claim ‘[i]f I say 
certain facts, I’m considered as belonging to a group either opposing or promoting 
it [Bt cotton]’ (7).  Here, the rare use of the ‘I’ position is highlighted to emphasise 
this actor’s belief in his personal ability to establish ‘facts’ which transcend group 
interests, and his frustration at those in wider society for failing to recognise this 
capacity for neutrality.    
 
The ‘you’ position is frequently used in metaphors.  According to Fairclough (1989: 
119), ‘different metaphors have different ideological attachments’ and ‘imply 
different ways of dealing with things’ (ibid.: 120).  This actor asserts, ‘when you are 
taking a driving test, you don’t ask everyone to watch’ (7).  This seeks solidarity for 
the legitimacy of his position as a regulator, and emphasises his view that, by virtue 
of his role, he should be trusted to conduct trials in the absence of widespread 
participation.  The value he places on his own ostensible objectivity lends itself to a 
dismissal of NGOs.  He argues, ‘[i]t was too difficult to find an unbiased NGO’ [to 
sit on the RCGM] (7). 
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In the case of the Monsanto actors, their epistemic standing is strongly reinforced 
by their identification with their employer.  This is highlighted by the use of the 
exclusive corporate ‘we’ position as in, ‘we operate as per the regulations of the 
country’ (4) or ‘we’re a global company with global obligations’ (8).  The ‘I’ 
position is far more frequently used by these actors than the others in the Bt 
Coalition.  This highlights that, despite the significant economic power of their 
organisation, its positioning on the periphery of the Habermasian model means that 
these actors cannot rely on the authority of ‘their office’ to assert their epistemic 
standing.  It is also likely to be related to the awareness of these actors of 
Monsanto’s wider delegitimation in many sections of Indian society, and the 
uncertainty regarding the researcher’s own positioning in this regard. 
 
The sales and marketing actor claims, ‘I’m working fourteen years on Bt cotton’ (8) 
and ‘I spend almost a week every month in farmers’ fields’ (8).  This close contact 
with cultivators is used as a means of asserting the legitimacy of this actor to 
represent their views.  The epistemic authority of the Monsanto actors is also 
emphasised by the purportedly widespread legitimation for Bt technology, as in the 
claim by the Lead for Regulatory Affairs that ‘we get lots of invitations to talk to 
scientists, as well as farmers, on our technology’ (8).  The use of the possessive 
pronoun with reference to Bt technology emphasises the degree of personal 
ownership which these actors feel for the company’s product.  
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The use of the ‘you’ position by the Lead for Regulatory Affairs in her statement 
‘as you can probably tell, I have varied experience on safety being a toxicologist’ 
seeks to establish solidarity with her own assertion of her epistemic authority in the 
definition of the risk of Bt technology.  The ‘they’ position is used by these actors 
to highlight their closure to the ideological positions of NGOs.  One actor claims, 
‘[g]enerally those people [NGOs] don’t do dialogue.  They have their own agenda’ 
(4). 
 
The Non-Bt Coalition 
As spokesperson for the Communist Party (Marxist) in Andhra Pradesh, the CPM 
actor is accustomed to speaking on behalf of the party.  This is evident in his use of 
the ‘we’ position to refer to the CPM as in, ‘we are not against any technological 
improvement’ (3) and ‘we want technology, but technology in the interests of 
people and the environment’ (3).  His use of the ‘I’ position seeks to establish his 
authority on agrarian issues given his rural origins in his assertion, ‘I belong to a 
rich peasant family’ (3). 
 
This actor uses the ‘they’ position to refer to the government, multinational 
corporations and NGOs.  He asserts, ‘they [the government] are making this 
technology an instrument of profit-making for MNCs’ (3).  Similarly, with regard to 
NGOs, he claims, ‘[s]ometimes we may not agree with them [NGOs], especially the 
extreme environmental positions’ (3).   
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As in the case of the ANGRAU actor, the ‘you’ position is used in metaphors such 
as, ‘[y]ou can use a knife to cut a bringal and you can use the knife, that same knife, 
to cut a throat’ (3).  The metaphor is stark and seeks solidarity with this actor’s 
ideological position as a Marxist that technology itself is neutral, and that it is the 
differing interests of people which render its use problematic.  (The Marxist 
position is belied, however, by this actor’s insistence on the need for more adequate 
testing of Bt technology which will be discussed later).   
 
The ‘we’ position is used by NGO actors to refer to their organisations, ‘[w]e found 
there were trials happening with Bt cotton in 1998.  No information, no regulation’, 
(CSA) (6); ‘[w]e don’t want them spraying [pesticides] at all.  We are offering them 
an alternative with the NPM programme’ (DDS) (1); and ‘[w]e organise NPM 
programs in the villages’ (Crops Jangaon) (2).  The rare use of the ‘I’ position is, 
like the Monsanto actors, used to emphasise their ethical commitment to their work, 
as in the assertion by the Crops Jangaon actor: ‘I felt if I worked for farmers that 
would be best.’  
 
The greater frequency of the use of the ‘you’ position in the discourse of the DDS 
and CSA actors, in particular, indicates their central concern with seeking solidarity 
for their alternative positioning in order to establish its legitimacy.  Thus, the CSA 
actor uses the ‘you’ position to highlight the framing of responsibility which serves 
as his main challenge to the prevailing neo-liberal ideology.  He questions, ‘if you 
are faced with a problem, no-one is responsible?  What is this?’ (6).   
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He also seeks solidarity for his view of the irrationality of providing biosafety data 
conducted in the United States for the approval of a technology which is to be used 
in India.  He asserts, ‘you submit data which says that since animals are not dying 
in America, they will not die in India’ (6). These actors also use the ‘you’ position 
to emphasise their concern for the narrowing of epistemology as in, ‘if you are 
giving ninety per cent of your research funds only for genetic engineering, that’s 
what people will do’ (CSA) (6).  
 
The ‘adversarial framing’ (Gamson, 1992: 178) of NGOs is conducted through their 
use of the ‘they’ position. Such positioning highlights a number of ‘injustice 
frames’ (ibid.) which directly challenge the legitimacy of their opponents in the Bt 
technology debate.  The CSA actor identifies Monsanto as an adversary given the 
injustice of their assertion of their epistemic standing over that of farmers and 
NGOs.  He argues that Monsanto responded to claims of animal deaths due to Bt 
technology with a simple categorical denial, claiming ‘[t]hey [Monsanto] said 
animals will not die’ (6).   
 
The DDS actor highlights the government as an adversary given the perceived 
injustice with which their lack of transparency is framed.  He asserts, ‘government 
here is not very open.  What they are doing is deciding somewhere in closed 
meetings’ (1). The CSA actor challenges the unjust partiality of the Genetic 
Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC), arguing ‘[t]he GEAC allowed them 
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[multinationals] to do the field trials whereas the local monitoring system was not 
established’ (6).   
 
A summary of the critical discourse analysis of legitimation through authorisation is 
provided in Appendix 8.2 (p. 405). 
 
In order to analyse the next three categories of legitimation, the study seeks to 
destructure the ideological positioning of the actors.  The use of modality as 
described by Fairclough (1989: 126-127) is significant in this regard.  As Reyes 
(2011: 796) notes, modality signals the degree to which speakers commit 
themselves to the validity of what they are saying.   
 
According to Fairclough (1989: 126), ‘expressive modality’ indicates a speaker’s 
evaluation of truth. ‘[C]ategorical modality’ (Fairclough, 1992: 159), expressed in a 
simple present tense form, signifies the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the 
proposition as a ‘fact’ (Fairclough, 1989: 129) and, thus, represents a claim to 
knowledge (ibid.).  This can relate to an epistemic or moral ‘truth’ depending upon 
the context.  Moral statements are often expressed using ‘deontic modality’ 
(Fairclough, 2003: 170) to highlight obligation.  This is indicated through the use of 
modal auxiliary verbs, such as ‘must’, ‘should’, ‘have to’, ‘cannot’, etc.  These 
highlight assumed values (ibid.: 173), and express the actor’s normative belief in 
how things should be (ibid.: 176-177).   
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MORAL EVALUATION 
According to Van Leeuwen (2008: 109), ‘legitimation through moral evaluation is 
based on values, rather than imposed by some kind of authority.’ It also refers to the 
relation of actors to themselves as ‘moral subjects’ (Fairclough, 2003: 29).  In the 
current study, a concern for cultivators and self-sufficiency are two common values 
asserted by actors in both coalitions.  The markedly different normative approaches 
to these values, however, form the basis of the struggle for legitimation through 
moral evaluation between the coalitions.   
 
Bt Coalition 
In the case of the Congress Party actor, his village origins are asserted in order to 
provide a validation of his desire to represent farmers (though as a member of the 
Reddy caste and from a prominent medical family, he is unlikely to have been 
among the poorest in his community).  For this actor, his concern for farmers is 
interpreted as a desire to facilitate access to credit, particularly for tenant farmers, to 
cut costs and to secure the ‘best possible prices’ (5) for agricultural produce.  His 
strong commitment to this position is highlighted in successive deontic modality as 
in, ‘[f]armers cannot be neglected.  They have to be supported’ (5); ‘we should help 
tenant farmers to avail of loans’ (5); ‘farmers are to be given the best possible price 
for their produce (5).  
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The Congress Party actor emphasises the importance of self-sufficiency in order to 
eliminate a reliance on others in the negotiation of risk.  This lends itself to a 
favourable view of the Green Revolution.  He argues, 
But for the Green Revolution, we would not have produced this [surplus] food.  
Earlier, when the population of this country was thirty crores,201 we used to 
import wheat from America (5).  
 
The ANGRAU actor also asserts the need to support farmers.  However, in his 
view, this can best be achieved through providing farmers with information which 
they can trust.  He asserts, ‘information should be put before the farmer and he 
should decide’ (7).  The use of deontic modality highlights an evaluative statement 
which prioritises information, and the freedom of the farmer to choose. Given the 
passive construction, however, agency is obfuscated (Fairclough, 1989: 125) and it 
is not clear who should provide the information and by what means.  This actor is 
unique in this coalition in emphasising the importance of the self-sufficiency of 
farmers themselves in their negotiation of risk.  He argues, ‘[f]armers should be 
able to produce their own seed and be self-sufficient in inputs’ (7). 
 
Like the other actors in the Bt Coalition, the Monsanto actors assert their concern 
for farmers.  This is highlighted in the deontic modality of the sales and marketing 
actor’s claim that, ‘he [the farmer] is the one who bears all the risk…so he must 
receive the maximum benefit’ (4).  The linking of Bt cotton with farmer suicides is 
taken as a personal affront by this actor who claims, ‘it cannot be more lies that 
people would link Bt cotton and farmer suicides.  I feel very strongly on that’ (4).  
                                                 
201
 Three hundred million.  India now has a population of 1.2 billion people. 
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The affective language and the use of the ‘I’ position (‘I feel’) highlights this 
actor’s ethical commitment to the technology, and his anger at attempts by 
opponents to unfairly, in his view, delegitimate it through linking it with farmer 
suicides.  
 
For the Monsanto actors, the needs of farmers can best be met through the operation 
of the market mechanism.  These actors use an injustice frame to delegitimate the 
intervention of the Andhra Pradesh government in the pricing of Bt cotton seeds, 
arguing ‘why should the Indian farmer pay a tenth of the costs of the rest? Because 
they’re competing in the same market [as other cotton farmers globally] at the end 
of the day.’  
 
Their concern for farmers is also adopted as a means of seeking legitimation for the 
neo-liberal market rationale as in the sales and marketing actor’s claim: 
Seed companies develop cold feet in terms of putting in more money in 
developing new genetics [if the government enforces lower prices]….So, in the 
long run, it is the farmer who will suffer (8). 
 
 
For these actors, self-sufficiency is viewed as an economic concern which can best 
be achieved through a macro economic focus on globalised trade.  As the 
Technology Development Lead observes, ‘[i]f you look at 2002, India was a net 
importer of cotton.  Now we are an exporter’ (4).   
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The Non-Bt Coalition 
The Non-Bt Coalition delegitimates the means by which the purported concern for 
farmers and self-sufficiency expressed by the Bt Coalition is being translated into 
practice.  In doing so, they assert an alternative normative perspective as the basis 
for  future development.  Here, Benford and Snow’s (2000) concepts of ‘diagnostic’ 
and ‘prognostic’ (ibid.) framing are used as a means of giving structure to the 
‘negative exposing and positive disclosing’ (Strydom, 2011: 137) critique which is 
being conducted by the Non-Bt Coalition. 
 
Diagnostic Counter-framing of the Non-Bt Coalition  
The diagnostic counter-framing of the Non-Bt Coalition involves them in 
identifying the problems of, and attributing blame for, the current situation with 
regard to the agrarian crisis. Here, the emphasis on the provision of credit and the 
reduction in costs as the basis for the Congress Party actor’s concern for farmers is 
delegitimated.   
 
The strategy of a focus on credit is, firstly, challenged on the grounds of its 
viability.  Hence, the CSA actor asserts, ‘if indebtedness is the problem, credit 
cannot be the solution’ (6).  Similarly, the emphasis on costs is counter-framed with 
a concern for safety.  This is clear in the use of deontic modality by the CSA’s 
assertion of his moral commitment to safety as a primary consideration.  He argues, 
‘[w]hy do you need it [the technology] first? Second, whether it suits clear 
situations.  And then inform people properly.…Apart from all these things, it should 
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be safe’ (6).  Despite the fact that cotton oil is widely used for cooking in India, the 
CSA actor asserts, ‘[i]t was never tested for human safety.  What is this?’ (6). He 
also highlights the animal deaths which remain unresolved, arguing ‘[i]f the tests 
are unable to explain the disease, then it should be an emergency’ (6).  Similarly, 
the general lack of transparency and regulatory stringency with regard to field trials 
is asserted in his claim, ‘in 2006, we accidentally stepped into a Bt field trial.’ 
 
The CPM actor argues, ‘[i]t [technology] should not subjugate or it should not make 
us dependant on outside forces. It should not be left to the kindness of those forces’ 
(3).  This directly challenges the legitimacy of a dependence on a technology 
marketed by a US multinational as a means to achieving self-sufficiency.  In the 
CPM actor’s discourse, the technology is nominalised in a declarative sentence 
structure which attributes the technology itself with agency (Fairclough, 1989: 125-
126) – here, a potentially malevolent force capable of constricting freedom.   
 
The discourse of freedom is further used to delegitimate the Indian government’s 
alliance with the United States.  The CPM actor asserts ‘our government is forcing 
these [Indian research] institutes to have tie-ups with multinational companies 
[through the Indo-US Knowledge Initiative].  Why should it?’ (3).  The use of the 
verb ‘forcing’ highlights this actor’s view that the government is compelling 
research institutes into an alliance with private businesses with an implied threat to 
epistemology.  The actor’s discourse also raises the question of which forces are at 
work in compelling the government itself to take such a step. 
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The DDS actor asserts his concern that current agricultural praxis directly threatens 
food self-sufficiency.  He claims, ‘if the trend of cotton – any cotton, Bt or non-Bt – 
continues like this, within five to six years India will go around the world with a 
bowl begging for food’ (1).  Here, the country of India is nominalised and takes on 
the persona of a beggar.  The rhetorical device seeks to gain resonance through an 
emotive reference to India’s historic struggle for freedom from poverty. 
 
Prognostic Counter-framing as Articulation of an Alternative World View 
The prognostic aspect of counter-framing involves an articulation of proposed 
solutions. The CPM actor asserts, ‘science and technology should be used for the 
good of the community and humanity and the environment’ (3).  He argues, ‘[i]f a 
certain technology is only useful to a certain community or to a certain section of 
the people, then we should make it equitable or we should abandon it’ (3).  This 
concern for equity leads him to argue that India should build alliances with states 
such as China who are regarded as prioritising equity as a value.  He asserts, ‘[w]e 
can have tie-ups with Chinese agricultural research institutes.  Why is it a US 
initiative only?’ (3). 
 
The CSA actor was directly involved in challenging the composition of an expert 
committee formed to look into the safety of Bt bringal.  He claims, ‘the chairman of 
the expert committee was a crop developer himself….We said you are beneficiaries 
of the process so you cannot test it’ (6).  The use of direct speech to highlight the 
role of this actor in asserting his own values within Indian society indicates his 
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sense of empowerment as a watchdog of institutional praxis.  He asserts the need 
for greater regulation, arguing ‘[w]e should have price regulation, we should have a 
compensation mechanism, [for crop failure], we should also have an increased fine 
[for illicit trading practices]. 
 
The Crops Jangaon actor challenges the Congress Party actor’s solution to the 
problem of high costs, claiming ‘they [farmers] should stop using fertilisers and 
pesticides’ (2).  He also claims, ‘[i]f they [farmers] grouped together, their choices 
would be freer.  They could grow non-Bt if they wanted to’ (2). This relates to the 
need for NGOs to co-ordinate demand for non-Bt cotton seeds across a number of 
villages in order to secure supply. 
 
The DDS actor urges the need for greater intervention by the government in 
planning agriculture.  He claims, ‘[w]hy should we not give equal importance to the 
[cultivation of] food grains?  For crop planning, the government should take up 
something like a kanban202 in the villages’ (1).  That such a move would potentially 
be opposed on the grounds of being totalitarian indicates the tension which exists 
between discourses of development and democracy at state level.   
 
A summary of the critical discourse analysis of legitimation through moral 
evaluation is provided in Appendix 8.3 (p. 406). 
                                                 
202
 Kanban is a Japanese system aimed at identifying areas in a production process where bottlenecks are 
occurring, and where greater management attention should be focussed.  This actor is suggesting that 
agricultural praxis could be improved through state planning aimed at ensuring greater balance in crop 
cultivation. 
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RATIONALISATION 
In legitimation through rationalisation, Van Leeuwen (2008: 113) distinguishes 
between ‘instrumental rationality’ which legitimates practices by ‘reference to their 
goals, uses and effects’ (ibid.), and ‘theoretical rationality’ which legitimates 
practices by ‘reference to a natural order of things.’ For the purposes of this thesis, 
both aspects are explored together in order to analyse the way in which ideological 
assumptions related to the concept of development provide the basis for the struggle 
for legitimation through rationalisation with regard to Bt cotton.   
 
Bt Coalition 
The Congress Party actor’s over-arching concern for Indian development is that 
agriculture should be profitable.  This is clear from his statement, ‘farming…has to 
be a profitable enterprise, like any other business’ (5).  This assertion indicates the 
‘marketization of language’ (Chouliaraki, 1999: 83), and the fusion of a neo-liberal 
world view with a development discourse.  The use of deontic modality signals the 
purported obligation of such a form of development. 
 
Within this, the Congress Party actor is categorical in his support for Bt technology.  
He claims, ‘I don’t have any limitations [with regard to Bt technology], but if it is a 
food crop generally people may have a lot of apprehensions.  We have to sort those 
out’ (5).  Here, his use of the ‘I’ position separates him from the ‘people’ with 
‘apprehensions’. The perceived obligation ‘to sort out’ apprehensions as indicated 
 261 
by the deontic modality (‘have to’) indicates his assessment of the centrality of Bt 
technology within his perspective of development.   
 
The obligation imposed by the rationalisation of a development model in which 
science and technology are central is clear from the deontic modality in his 
assertion, ‘science and technology should and will help society and farmers’ (5). 
This universalised view of ‘development’ is legitimated by virtue of its very 
inevitability, as highlighted in the assertion, ‘[g]lobalisation, because it has to 
happen, is happening’ (5). 
 
The ANGRAU actor is clear in his factual assertion, ‘I support Bt transgenic 
technology as it has reduced the need for pesticides’ (7).203  The centrality of 
scientific knowledge for this actor is evident in his claim that ‘things are logical 
which are scientifically decided’ (7).  Despite this assertion of the logic of science, 
however, this actor’s ‘rationalisation’ of Bt technology often tends towards 
irrationality.  This is evident in statements such as, ‘[t]echnically Bt [technology] is 
safe.  But if mutation happens, no-one can foretell’ (7), and ‘[s]o far, it [Bt 
technology] is not killing us.  Tomorrow if it kills us, let us find out’ (7).   
 
His faith in science is, nonetheless, asserted through ‘factual’, categorical 
statements such as, ‘[t]hese are the facts, you decide’ (7), and ‘it [Bt technology] is 
not toxic to humans or to animals’ (7).  This actor again makes use of metaphor to 
                                                 
203
 This is despite this actor’s preference that farmers should be self-sufficient in inputs.  This indicates that 
Bt technology is only partially legitimated by this actor due to its contribution to the reduction in pesticide 
use within the existing development paradigm. 
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highlight the centrality of risk-taking in modern society, asserting ‘[a]ir travel is 
risky, but people still fly.  They are intelligent so they prioritise’ (7).  There is no 
suggestion that intelligent people can be manipulated by those who seek 
legitimation of their power as a primary concern. 
 
Monsanto actors use categorical statements to support their unambiguous assertions 
of the benefits of Bt cotton in claims such as, ‘farmers’ income has…more than 
doubled [as a result of Bt technology]’ (8), ‘[e]very farmer benefits’ (8), ‘[t]he 
technology is scale-neutral’ (8). It is also clear that this commitment to Bt cotton is 
embedded within a particular rationalisation of human development.  This is 
highlighted in the Sales and Marketing actor’s assertion: 
most of this money made by the farmers [through Bt cotton cultivation] has been 
used…[for] buying more land, putting…land under irrigation, buying more 
[agricultural] implements….Farmers have…either married their children [relating 
to the payment of dowry] or paid for their school education or maybe started 
another venture.…Or buil[t] a…concrete house (8).   
 
 
The knowledge construction which legitimates Bt technology is clear in the Lead 
Scientist’s assertion that, ‘[g]enes to a scientist are just DNA’ (8).   This actor also 
recognises, however, that this view lacks more widespread legitimation in his 
assertion, ‘[t]here are people in this world who have difficulty with an animal gene 
in a plant product.  So we [Monsanto] have pledged not to use animal genes in any 
of our plant products’ (8).   
 
The awareness of their delegitimation by sections of the public leads to an emphasis 
on the need for scientific education as a means of enhancing the legitimation of 
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their world view.  This is clear from the discourse of the female Regulatory Affairs 
Lead who claims: 
People have realised that public education is going to be important.  There’s the 
Indian Council of Agricultural Research and the state agricultural universities 
where we try very hard to help with all kinds of symposium workshops.  Many of 
our technologies we have applied through government research institutes (8). 
 
The idea that the form of epistemology associated with biotechnology has been 
rationalised as central to the future development of Indian society is highlighted in 
her claim, ‘[t]he amount of research that is going on [in India] in the development 
of biotech crops is just mind-boggling.  Six hundred million dollars (8).’  The 
amount signals not only the government’s commitment to biotechnology as central 
to Indian ‘development’; it also indicates its commodification, here notably 
calculated in dollars.   
 
Non-Bt Coalition 
 
The Non-Bt Coalition assert their counter-framing of the Bt Coalition in order to 
delegitimate not only Bt cotton, but also the wider development model in which it is 
embedded. 
 
Diagnostic Counter-framing of the Development Rationale 
The CPM actor challenges the farming praxis which the neo-liberal development 
model promotes.  He questions, ‘[w]hy should you cultivate cotton every year….  
You can change.  It is not the fault of the technology; it’s the fault of the whole 
system’ (3). He also challenges the epistemic authority asserted by Monsanto and 
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ANGRAU scientists, claiming ‘[a]ll the knowledge gained by the farmers is equally 
important as science and technology’ (3).   
 
The implicit legitimation of capitalism within classical Marxism as a necessary step 
in the teleological progression to socialism is evident in the discourse of the CPM 
actor.  He argues: 
it [the Green Revolution] transformed the farmers’ community into a modern 
community, a modern consumer.…Now if you go to any village you can see the 
motorcycles, cars, TVs, even computers.  Everybody will have a cell phone and 
everybody is sending their children to schools, English medium.…These are the 
good things (3).   
 
Here, the farmer as a consumer is linked unproblematically to the farmer as 
‘modern,’ a ‘transformation’ which is categorically assessed by this actor as a social 
good.  
 
 The CPM actor also, however, delegitimates the provision of credit advocated by 
his Congress Party counterpart, claiming ‘a major problem is it [the Green 
Revolution] made the farmers dependant on credit institutions in a big 
way.…That’s why the suicides are taking place’ (3) and ‘[t]hese small farmers who 
are forced to take credit, I think they are mainly the losers, not beneficiaries’ (3).  
Nonetheless, his commitment to Marxism precludes him from making the link 
between the farmers’ compulsion to seek credit, and the encouragement of a 
consumer society as part of a development model which he himself partially 
legitimates.   
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The counter-framing adopted by NGOs picks up on this contradiction to launch a 
far more damning critique of the rationalisation of the neo-liberal development 
model.  The CSA actor questions, 
You want to fix farmers into some boxes so you are eligible for a ten foot by ten 
foot  house,204 you are eligible for thirty-five kilos of rice205 and you are eligible 
for one hundred days employment.206 That’s it....You cannot aspire for anything 
else?  And if you are faced with a problem, no-one is responsible.  What is this? 
(6). 
 
Here, the ‘you’ position is used to gain solidarity for a counter-framing which 
challenges the restriction of freedom (‘you want to fix farmers’) and the use of 
patronage to gain political legitimacy for a development model which, this actor 
argues, constrains human flourishing and homogenises human needs. This directly 
undermines the Bt Coalition’s rationalisation of development through asserting its 
reductive nature.  It also challenges the meaning of ‘development’ itself. 
 
The CSA actor continually emphasises the need for responsibility, arguing ‘[w]hen 
there are two lakh207 farmer suicides in this country, no-one takes responsibility, no-
one feels responsible’ (6).  The two clauses at the end of this assertion highlight the 
distinction between responsibility as a procedural concern and as a moral one, both 
of which are currently lacking in Indian society in this actor’s view.  He challenges 
the linking of the technology with higher yields, arguing ‘the yield increase is not 
because of Bt cotton.  It is because of increased irrigation facilities [and]…hybrids’ 
(6).  He also argues it is lower than the company has claimed. 
                                                 
204
 A reference to the stipulated size of houses within the Indiramma Housing Scheme. 
205
 This relates to the food subsidies associated with the Public Distribution System. 
206
 This refers to the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). 
207
 Two hundred thousand. 
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The DDS actor asserts that Bt cotton is contributing to farmer indebtedness, 
claiming ‘[i]t is not because of Bt cotton they [farmers] are committing suicide.  
The only thing is the quantity of the loan has increased’ (1).  Similarly, the CSA 
actor challenges the centrality of Bt cotton as part of the development model, 
arguing ‘[i]f Bt cotton can solve all the problems, why do cotton farmers in the US 
need so many subsidies?’(6).  
 
The NGOs also problematise the ‘science’ of the technology.  The CSA actor 
argues that ‘gene transfer is imprecise’ (6) and that there is no ‘testing for other 
changes happening in the plant’ (6).  Likewise, the DDS actor argues that the plant 
itself is toxic.  He claims, ‘[e]verybody is saying there are types of cancer because 
of the toxins and pesticides’ (1).  The ‘everybody’ is unspecified and the statement 
seeks to mobilise others through appealing to the emotion of fear (Reyes, 2011: 
790).   
 
Prognostic Counter-framing as an Alternative View of Development 
As part of the counter-framing involved in the delegitimation of the Bt Coalition’s 
rationalisation of the current development model, the Non-Bt Coalition frame 
solutions in which an alternative model for development is articulated.  The CPM 
actor argues against the commodification of knowledge which Bt technology 
exemplifies, claiming ‘if you have joint agreements with other research institutes 
where they share their knowledge and we share our knowledge with them, they are 
not going to demand any royalties or any proprietary rights’ (3).  
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The CPM actor asserts the requirement for a longer-term focus in development 
planning.  He claims, ‘you [need to] realise the problem that may come in twenty 
years and take remedial action in the present. This is one type of visionary 
development’ (3). He also urges that technologies need to be tested in the 
environmental conditions in which they will be adopted, arguing ‘[y]ou have to 
research seed suitable for different soils and environmental conditions’ (3).  The 
CSA actor asserts the requirement for animal testing, claiming ‘[n]one of the tests 
conclusively say it [Bt technology] is safe for animals’ (6).   
 
The CSA actor urges the need for greater attention to power relations in the 
communication regarding new technologies.  He argues,  
why do you need it [a given technology] first….Second, [does] it suit clear 
situations?  Then inform people properly about the whole dynamics of the 
technology, who has the control and how serious is the control?  What would be 
its impact? (6).   
 
The NGOs also challenge the rationality of commercial farming through 
emphasising collective farming measures – notably, through the co-ordination of 
the supply of non-Bt seeds for farmers across villages. They also assert NPM 
cultivation as a more viable alternative to Bt cotton.  The DDS actor claims, ‘[w]e 
are giving them [farmers] an alternative with NPM [methods]’ and asserts, ‘our 
objective is to create awareness [of NPM practices] in the villages’ (1).   
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The influence of the Gandhian ideology on the discourse of NGOs is clear from 
their assertion of village self-sufficiency as central to India’s development.  The 
CSA actor claims,  
[w]e established a cotton processing unit where cotton can be spun in the village.  
The entire value chain of ginning, spinning, weaving, from seed production to 
cloth, will be done in the village itself (6). 
 
The strong delegitimation of globalisation and multinationals within this approach 
is clear in the CSA actor’s further assertion, ‘[i]nstead of so many big companies, 
we’ll have villages’ (6).   
 
A summary of the discourse analysis of legitimation through rationalisation is 
presented in Appendix 8.4 (p. 407). 
 
 
MYTHOPOESIS 
According to Van Leeuwen (2007: 91), the category of legitimation which he 
describes as ‘mythopoesis’ refers to ‘legitimation conveyed through narratives 
whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions.’  This 
thesis argues that interpretations of the democratic ideal serve as culture-specific 
narratives which relate to normative perspectives on the way in which power should 
legitimately be exercised, and democratic praxis defined, within a given society.   
 
These narratives will now be explored through the diagnostic and prognostic 
framing (Benford and Snow, 2000: 615-616) of the actors themselves within their 
Habermasian core-periphery model positioning.  This examines their normative 
 269 
problematisation of, and preferences for, the way in which power should be 
exercised as part of democratic praxis.   
 
The Bt Coalition 
The Congress Party actor is clearly concerned at the increasing mobilisation of 
Indian civil society which he fears is contributing to a general state of lawlessness 
and disorder.  He argues, ‘we have to respect society, we have to respect civic 
responsibilities, we have to be more rule-abiding.…We need to improve upon that’ 
(5).  The successive deontic modality of these statements suggests a series of 
normative evaluations as to how democratic society should operate.  
 
The Congress Party actor further claims, ‘[p]eople complain we have excess 
democracy’ (5).  While the ‘people’ who complain of such ‘excess democracy’ are 
left unspecified, it is clear that this actor has some sympathy with their view.  He 
also recognises a need to negotiate with NGOs in their ongoing assertion of risk 
with regard to Bt cotton.  He claims, ‘I do hear about some NGOs still talking 
[about the risks of Bt cotton]…but we have to have some sort of compromise’ (5).   
 
In the struggle to legitimate his own position as a regulator and decision-maker, the 
ANGRAU actor’s discourse highlights a much stronger preference for closure than 
that expressed by the Congress Party actor.  He emphasises his decision-making 
power in the inner-periphery in a series of categorical statements, ‘[w]e [regulators] 
are policy-makers.  We decide.  Farmers need us to decide’ (7) and claims ‘[w]here 
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confidentiality is required, we cannot be democratic’ (7).  He asserts that his 
legitimacy as a decision-maker is a direct result of his formal education given that 
he claims ‘[t]he average illiterate may not worry about the environment or future 
generations’ (7).  This actor’s preference for closure is asserted in his view that not 
all aspects of government activity can be made public. This includes the location of 
field trials which, he argues, is a matter for ‘the government and private companies’ 
(7).  In a categorical statement of truth, he also asserts, ‘regulation is the most 
democratic way’ (7).   
 
This actor’s views on NGOs are divided.  He, firstly, recognises the value of their 
grassroots connections, claiming ‘NGOs are nearer to the farmers so we take their 
help for [agricultural] extension’ (7). However, with regard to his role as a 
regulator, he also clearly views NGOs as unnecessarily interfering.  This is evident 
in his claim, ‘[t]here was a hue and cry that companies were using data from their 
own labs.  Although these labs are authorised by the government, the government 
has asked for independent tests to satisfy NGOs’ (7).   
 
As a multinational located on the periphery of the Habermasian model, Monsanto 
is, despite its economic power, legally obliged to abide by the decisions of the 
Andhra Pradesh government.  In the view of the actors in this study, however, the 
state government used its power illegitimately in order to force the company to 
reduce Bt seed prices.   The Sales and Marketing actor claims that this was ‘a very 
arbitrary decision by some of the stakeholders, very political’ (8).  
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The use of the phrase ‘very political’ is strongly negative, and implies that the 
government’s responsiveness to the demands of civil society is associated with a 
populism which renders its decisions unpredictable and illogical. These actors argue 
that the legitimacy of the state should instead be secured through policies which 
incentivise private research in scientific innovation. This is asserted in his claim, 
‘[g]overnment can always, through policies, help the development of new 
technologies’ (4). 
 
Despite their assertions of openness, the discourse of the Monsanto actors indicates 
a strong degree of closure. This is clear from statements such as, ‘[a]s a company, 
we are willing to answer questions scientifically’ (4).  Their dismissal of NGOs is 
evident from one actor’s claim, ‘[w]e have people who are there to answer their 
[NGO’s] questions [a Public Affairs Department]’ (4).   
 
 Non-Bt Coalition 
Actors in the Non-Bt Coalition problematise the interpretations of democracy 
asserted by the Bt Coalition through asserting the illegitimacy of the exercise of 
power with which their framing of democracy is associated. Through the emphasis 
on social and epistemic justice in the counter-framing of the Non-Bt Coalition, 
these actors seek to define a more legitimate exercise of power in democratic 
praxis. 
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Diagnostic Counter-framing of Democratic Praxis 
The CPM actor claims, ‘because there are inequalities in society, these are being 
imposed on democracy’ (3).  He also recognises, however, that the power of the 
CPM to organise mass mobilisations secures the party’s ability to influence policy 
making.  He claims, ‘[o]ur grassroots mobilisation is very strong.  And because of 
that we are able to influence many decisions of the government and institutions’ (3). 
He asserts the pressure which the CPM exerted on the government to force 
Monsanto to reduce the price of seeds.  He claims, ‘our experience reducing the 
price of the cotton seed…[was] because of the pressure of the mass movement on 
the state government, and the state government’s interest in providing seeds at an 
affordable price’ (3).   
 
The increased politicisation of civil society is highlighted as the primary basis for 
the legitimation of democracy by the CPM actor given the increased opportunities 
for more inclusive deliberation which such politicisation provides.  He claims, 
‘[t]here are public hearings.  People are realising the importance of public 
hearings.…At times, government is forced to return to the table’ (3).  He notes the 
role of NGOs in this regard, arguing ‘[s]ome of the mass organisations and NGOs 
hold their own public hearings in contrast to the officially secret government 
hearings.  In these public hearings, many people are participating and that contrast 
is being shown in the media’ (3).208   In a series of categorical statements, he argues, 
‘NGOs raise crucial questions.  They raise public awareness, they bring important 
questions to the notice of the public’ (3).   
                                                 
208
 This relates to the citizens juries referred to by Scoones (2005: 325). 
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Decision-making in the core is delegitimated by NGOs on the grounds that it lacks 
transparency.  The CSA actor claims, ‘[t]here should be a transparent process of 
decision-making’ (6).  He also asserts the need for responsibility in his claim, ‘[i]f I 
have a problem with your product, you should be responsible’ (6).  Similarly, he 
problematises the reduction of alternatives through the absence of non-Bt seeds as a 
negation of democratic rights, claiming ‘I should have a right to say no’ (6). 
 
Despite these concerns, however, NGOs do not regard the core as completely 
closed to the periphery.  Like the CPM actor, the DDS actor notes the role of the 
core in supporting the work of NGOs in seeking the price reduction of Bt cotton 
seeds.  Both the DDS and Crops Jangaon actors also emphasise the visit of Jairam 
Ramesh to Andhra Pradesh.  The DDS actor asserts, ‘[h]e [Jairam Ramesh] was in 
Hyderabad collecting peoples’ opinions’ (1).  This actor uses direct speech to 
highlight an excerpt of his conversation with the Minister.  He claims, ‘[w]e told 
him, sir, it is not that we are against better production.  What we are worried about 
is that you eliminate the toxin’ (1).   
 
Prognostic Counter-framing of an Alternative View of Democratic Praxis 
In terms of their framing of solutions to the problems associated with the Indian 
democratic process, the CPM actor asserts, ‘[i]f you want democracy to work, you 
have to eliminate inequity in society, or at least control it through the democratic 
process’ (3).  He, therefore, supports aspects such as proportional representation 
and more extensive reservations which seek to minimise the impact of the inequity 
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of Indian society on the political process.  He also supports widespread inclusion in 
decision-making, arguing ‘if the government and the peoples’ representatives want 
to take advantage of Bt technology, one of the important ways it should be done is 
involvement of the people.’   This directly challenges the Monsanto and ANGRAU 
actors’ desire for closure. 
 
The NGO actors all assert their commitment to the cause of promoting an 
alternative world view within Indian society.  The Crops Jangaon actor claims, 
‘[w]e [NGOs] will convince the farmers…the agricultural department and the 
political leaders also.  We want to show the government our field experiences and 
case studies’ (2).  The DDS actor asserts, ‘[w]e are definitely showing them [the 
government].  They are not responding, but they are conscious of it’ (1).  
 
The assertion of the legitimation of the world view of NGOs in wider society is 
asserted by the CSA actor who argues, ‘[t]here are movements building up across 
the country.  That’s what stopped Bt bringal’ (6).  The legitimation of the federal 
state by NGOs as the relevant core for political decision-making is clear in the CSA 
actor’s assertion, ‘[t]here cannot be a uniform policy at the national level.  It should 
be localised.  Every state should be in a position to decide’ (6).   
 
A summary of these views can be found as Appendix 8.5 (p. 408).  An overall 
summary of the discourse analysis presented in this chapter is provided in Appendix 
8.6 (p. 409).   In conclusion, this chapter has highlighted the way in which the 
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debate regarding Bt cotton represents a power struggle which is at the core of 
attempts to define development itself.  This centres on the way in which knowledge 
should be constructed, and power legitimated and institutionalised as part of 
democratic praxis, as a concern for the ongoing constitution of society.   
 
Monsanto and ANGRAU actors valorise scientific knowledge, and Monsanto actors 
urge globalised trade, as the basis for reinforcing their own epistemic and economic 
positions of power.  However, scientists in the Non-Bt Coalition argue instead that 
the basis of knowledge construction in risk definition needs to incorporate the 
experiential knowledge of cultivators, and to be informed by values associated with 
equity and the localised negotiation of risk.  These competing world views must be 
carefully negotiated by the Congress Party actor as a concern not only for the 
legitimacy of his own power, but also for the legitimacy of the state itself.   
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Chapter Nine 
DISCUSSION 
 
Power Relations and the  
Legitimation of Risk and Democracy 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the micro and meso level analysis undertaken in the preceding three 
chapters is discussed. This highlights that, within the struggle to secure the 
legitimation of risk and democracy with regard to Bt cotton, the normative concern 
with the exercise of power is central.   
 
The relative performance of Bt cotton cultivation when compared with NPM and 
organic methods is explored in terms of the differentiation in the material 
experience of risk arising from power relations.  The chapter then examines the 
influence of micro level power structures on the legitimation of the different 
constructions of risk in the villages.  The variations in power arrangements arising 
from differences in the village compositions are found to contribute significantly to 
the way in which agrarian risk is negotiated and in the villages. The activity of 
NGOs in seeking to mediate between the micro and meso levels in asserting the risk 
discourse of cultivators is also explored.   
 
Finally, the chapter examines the impact of power relations on the attempts to 
define risk as a meso level concern of state politics.  This pertains to struggles 
regarding the way in which knowledge concerning risk should be constructed, and 
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democratic praxis institutionalised, as part of the concern for social and epistemic 
justice within the definition of the future development of society.   
 
9.2 Differentiated Risk Exposure: A Comparative Analysis of Bt Cotton 
The analysis in Chapter Six highlights that Bt cotton cultivation is a high-cost 
strategy for risk negotiation when compared with organic and NPM methods. The 
average costs associated with Bt cotton cultivation across the coalitions (N = 12) 
were Rs 18,854 per acre.209  These costs were higher than the average of Rs 16,975 
per acre cited by Dev and Rao (2007: 2) in their 2004-05 study in Andhra 
Pradesh.210  This tends to support the assertion by cultivators that costs were 
particularly high for the 2010/2011 season due to the extra labour required for 
weeding as a result of the rains.  The higher costs may also indicate support for the 
widespread view that cultivation costs in Andhra Pradesh are rising (Sridhar, 2006; 
Galab et al., 2009: 177; Reddy, 2010b: 243), though this would require further 
longitudinal research.   
 
The costs associated with Bt cotton cultivation were significantly higher than those 
associated with alternative methods.  As Table 6.6 (p. 185) shows, the average costs 
for NPM farmers in both coalitions were Rs 12,275 per acre. Organic farming was 
                                                 
209
 All figures cited in the discussion relate to a mean of the averages for each method taken from the 
relevant tables in Chapter Six.   
210
 This involved a random sample of six hundred and twenty-three farmers, seventy per cent of whom were 
Bt cotton cultivators, and thirty per cent non-Bt cultivators.  The study covered four districts of Andhra 
Pradesh, including Warangal.  It should be borne in mind that this cost comparison has not been adjusted 
for inflation.  Between 2002 and 2005, inflation in Andhra Pradesh was particularly low at 2.2 per cent.  
This was compared to average inflation rates in the state of between seven to nine per cent. Available at: 
http://www.aponline.gov.in/Apportal/HumanDevelopmentReport2007/APHDR_2007_Chapter4.pdf  
Accessed on 14/12/2013. 
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the lowest cost method with an average cost of just Rs 9,800 per acre. These 
variances were largely due to differences in the input usage associated with each 
method.   
 
As Table 6.8 (p. 188) highlights, Bt cotton cultivation entailed an average spend of 
Rs 3,500 per acre for pesticides, and Rs 2,400 per acre for fertilisers.  These costs 
accounted for almost a third of the total cultivation costs of Bt cotton farmers.  
NPM cultivators did not incur pesticide costs, while organic farmers incurred 
neither pesticide nor fertiliser costs.  NPM cultivators also used fertilisers only half 
as often as Bt cotton farmers, so minimising their input spend, as well as limiting 
the potential for soil infertility.   
 
Table 6.8 (p. 188) highlights that Bt cotton farmers used pesticides an average of 
6.5 times in the 2010/2011 season. All Bt cotton farmers asserted this was a 
significant decrease on the fifteen to twenty sprays which they claimed had been 
necessary with non-Bt cotton.  This reduction supports the finding by Stone (2011: 
391) which showed that pesticide use had decreased by fifty-four per cent in 
Warangal between 2003 and 2007 as a result of Bt technology, from an average of 
ten to five sprays per season (ibid.: Table 3).  
 
The analysis also highlights that pesticide use is again increasing due to the 
prevalence of sucking pests211  and bollworm resistance. This is also supported by 
Stone (2011: 391) who argues that the introduction of Bt cotton in Warangal has 
                                                 
211
 Sucking pests include thrips, whiteflies, aphids, mites and bugs. 
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been associated with a change in insect ecology.  The analysis of the discourse of 
cultivators in Chapter Seven highlights that the increasing need for pesticides is 
weakening the basis for the technology’s legitimation, as is the reduced capacity of 
cultivators to absorb these increasing costs due to declining yields. 
 
It is noted that all farmers reported significant crop loss as a result of the 
widespread flooding which occurred in the 2010/2011 season.  However, as Chapter 
Four highlighted, erratic monsoons are a characteristic feature of the Indian agrarian 
crisis.  Indeed, Glover (2010: 482) argues that ‘the strenuous effort to rule out the 
effect of ‘externalities’’ in seeking to ‘scientifically’ ascertain the performance of 
Bt cotton represents a serious methodological flaw in many studies given the 
‘importance of [these] contextual factors in a complex socio-technical system’ 
(ibid.).   
 
The analysis highlights that in the catastrophic 2010/2011 season Bt cotton did not 
offer any particular yield advantage when compared to the alternative methods.  
This was despite the higher costs which were incurred in its cultivation.  The 
reasonable performance of the alternative methods within a catastrophic year 
provides some support for the view of Ramasundaram et al. (2007, as cited by 
Glover, 2010: 494) that non-Bt cotton hybrids ‘perform…better in rainfed 
conditions and so produce…a more dependable, albeit less spectacular, yield.’  As 
Table 6.12 (p. 194) highlights, average yields were higher for NPM and organic 
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farmers in Risk Coalition One, while Risk Coalition Two cultivators for all methods 
obtained an average yield of approximately four quintals per acre.212  
 
While it is clear from the experience of individual participants (Appendices 6.14 to 
6.16, pp. 386-388) that yields were variable for all methods, the analysis also 
indicates that the variance was highest among Bt cotton farmers in the more 
vulnerable Risk Coalition Two.  The standard deviation for Bt cotton cultivators in 
this coalition across both Bantala and Nandanapuram (N = 7) was eight quintals 
(where yields ranged from zero to eight quintals).  This compared with a variance of 
two quintals (N = 5) for Risk Coalition One Bt cotton farmers in the two villages 
(where yields ranged from 4.5 to 6.5 quintals), and 3.5 quintals (N = 6) for Risk 
Coalition Two organic farmers in Orgampalle (with yields ranging from 2.5 to six 
quintals).213   
 
The study, therefore, appears to suggest that the yields associated with Bt cotton 
cultivation are more variable for the vulnerable Risk Coalition Two participants 
than they are for Risk Coalition One Bt cotton cultivators or for organic cultivators 
in Risk Coalition Two.  However, this would require further comparative research 
with a larger sample. 
 
The analysis provides some evidence of the scale-neutrality of Bt technology which 
is asserted by proponents (Subramaniam and Qaim, 2009: 256; Choudhary and 
                                                 
212
 The average for Bantala is just below four quintals given Ashna’s crop loss. 
213
 The study involved only one NPM farmer in both Risk Coalitions One and Two, and one organic farmer 
in Risk Coalition One, so variances within these coalitions are not available for these methods.  
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Gaur, 2010: 20).  Rashi, the female high-caste (Brahmin) from Nandanapuram’s 
Risk Coalition Two, secured a yield of eight quintals per acre from a holding of just 
two (dry) acres.  This was the highest yield obtained by a Bt cotton cultivator in the 
current research.  The next highest yield for a Bt cotton farmer was that obtained by 
Pavan, the high-caste (Vaishya) Risk Coalition One participant in Bantala, who 
secured 6.5 quintals per acre from twenty acres of irrigated land (Appendices 6.14 
to 6.15, pp, 386-387).   
 
A focus on this potential for scale neutrality with regard to Bt technology, however, 
would fail to recognise the risks associated with the higher cultivation costs, 
particularly for Risk Coalition Two participants.  Ashna, the female Scheduled 
Caste (Madiga) participant in Bantala’s Risk Coalition Two, lost her entire crop on 
her two acres.  It could be argued that, apart from the seed costs associated with Bt 
cotton, Ashna’s total loss of Rs 19,600 (Appendix 6.14, p. 386), would have been 
incurred regardless of method, given that it arose as a result of labour costs, and 
oxen and tractor hire for two acres (Appendix 6.11, p. 383).   
 
The same is not true, however, of Ambu, the Scheduled Caste (Madiga) widow in 
Nandanapuram’s Risk Coalition Two.  Ambu lost her crop on two acres and 
managed to obtain three quintals from her third.  This was after an expenditure of 
almost Rs 21,000 (Rs 7,000 per acre) on pesticides and fertilisers, leading to a total 
loss of Rs 49,000 (see Appendix 6.12, p. 384 and 6.15, p. 387).  Thus, despite 
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obtaining a small harvest, Ambu’s risk exposure was significantly greater than 
Ashna’s due to her additional spend on inputs. 
 
The finding that both Bt cultivators who obtained the highest yields were high-caste 
participants, while those who obtained the lowest were Scheduled Caste (Madiga) 
females may also suggest that there is differentiation in the land quality (soil 
fertility, proximity to irrigation, gradient, etc.) associated with the participants.214 
This would require closer analysis in conjunction with an agricultural scientist in 
order to ascertain the way in which land quality itself may be differentiated in line 
with power structures in the villages, and so contribute to a differentiated exposure 
to risk. Such differentials would, of course, be relevant regardless of method, but 
would be particularly pertinent in the case of Bt cotton given the significantly 
higher costs with which it is associated, and the exacerbated exposure to risk in the 
event of crop loss.   
 
The mutual dependence between Risk Coalitions Two and Three in their risk 
negotiation is highlighted in relation to labour costs.  While Subramaniam and 
Qaim (2010: 295) claim that Bt cotton leads to higher returns for labour, this fails to 
acknowledge the impact of increased wage rates on vulnerable cultivators.  This is 
also highlighted by Frankel (2005: 577) who notes the ‘conflicting interests 
                                                 
214
 Participants used a number of different Bt seed varieties: Rashi used Rocket and Niraja varieties, Ashna 
cultivated Brahma and Tulasi, Ambu adopted Brahma, Niraja and Marvel, while Pavan used a large range 
which included Brahma, Rocket, Niraja, Mallika, Agit and Jackpot.  All were farming on black soil which 
is considered ideal for cotton, and Pavan and Ambu had access to irrigation.   
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between agricultural laborers pressing for higher wages and owners of small and 
marginal holdings who [are] not able to absorb such increases.’ 
 
The analysis highlights that, while higher wage rates served to somewhat alleviate 
the risk of agricultural wage labourers in Risk Coalition Three, they also 
significantly exacerbated the risks of marginal and small cultivators in Risk 
Coalition Two.  Thus, Ashna, the Bt cotton cultivator in Bantala’s Risk Coalition 
Two, was obliged to take a loan for labour charges, as was Nishok, the NPM 
cultivator in Risk Coalition Two in Nandanapuram.  Meanwhile, Natesh, the Risk 
Coalition Two Bt cotton cultivator in Bantala, was obliged to sell his oxen in order 
to cover his labour costs.  
 
The heightened exposure to risk associated with Bt cotton cultivation is evident 
from the finding that almost half of the Bt cotton cultivators in the current study 
(five out of twelve) made a loss.  Despite the catastrophic season, however, not a 
single NPM or organic cultivator made a loss due to their significantly lower 
cultivation costs.   
 
It could be argued that these findings relate to one poor season and so cannot be 
generalised.  The analysis of the significant debt exposure of Bt cotton cultivators in 
both Bantala and Nandanapuram highlights, however, that the debt levels of most 
Bt cotton farmers have been accumulating over a number of years.  In the current 
study, the average debt level for Bt cotton farmers across the two villages (N = 12) 
 284 
is Rs 209,500.  This is higher than the average loan of Rs 127,300 cited by Reddy 
(2010b: 257) in his study on farmer suicides in four districts in Andhra Pradesh, 
including Warangal.215   
 
This suggests that Bt cotton farmers have been failing to off-set their expenditure 
with incomes from cultivation for some time.  The effect of this accumulated risk 
exposure is asserted by Rao and Suri (2006: 1552) who argue that ‘[i]t is not the 
crop loss in one year but recurrent losses that ruin the economic conditions of 
farmers.’ While the analysis of the reasons for indebtedness (Appendices 6.17 to 
6.19, pp. 389-391) suggests that the additional cultivation costs associated with Bt 
cotton are not the only reasons for debt, the significantly higher debt levels of Bt 
cotton cultivators suggest that the additional risk-taking associated with this form of 
cultivation praxis exacerbates their exposure to the risks of indebtedness.   
 
Herring (2008b: 146) observes that ‘it is hard to imagine farmers spreading a 
technology that is literally killing them.’ This thesis asserts, however, that such a 
simplistic view fails to take account of the trade offs associated with risk-taking in 
an agrarian crisis, the impact of wider ideological influences, and the way in which 
the ecological consequences and debt exposure associated with such risk-taking 
become more acute over time.  It also neglects the impact of power structures not 
                                                 
215
 This involved an analysis conducted in 2002-03 on twenty-two households (three from Warangal) where 
cultivators had taken their lives.  Farmers in the study cultivated cotton, chillies and tomatoes as 
commercial crops (Reddy, 2010: 248). This debt level was against an average annual return per cultivator 
household in Andhra Pradesh of approximately Rs 39,300 in 2002-03 (derived from monthly income 
figures provided by Galab et al., 2009: 187). 
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only on the way in which the risks of the technology are differentiated which has 
been explored, but also on its ideological legitimation as part of risk construction 
which will now be examined.   
 
9.3 Village Power Arrangements in the Differentiation and Construction of Risk  
Wade (1994: 1) argues that ‘variations in scarcity and risk in the vital agricultural 
sphere explain much of the variation to be found in village organization.’  The 
analysis of the three villages suggests, however, that variations in the villages are 
not due to the variation of risk per se, but to differences associated with power 
arrangements arising from the village compositions (see Appendices 6.1 to 6.3, pp. 
373-375).  The analysis highlights that the representation of castes and land-holding 
patterns in the villages give rise to the ‘social risk positions’ (Beck, 1992: 23) 
which are central to the way in which the meso level ideological struggle is 
mediated in risk constructions in the villages.  
 
The importance of micro level power relations in the legitimation of wider 
ideologies is emphasised by Pattenden (2005: 1975) who argues that ‘[t]otalising 
views of neo-liberal globalisation and its opponents tend to overlook how processes 
of ‘globalisation’ and ‘anti-globalisation’ are refracted through specific social, 
political and material relations.’  This thesis asserts that this refraction of wider 
ideologies in the construction of risk in the villages is associated with varying 
degrees of legitimacy with regard to the way in which power is exercised and this 
will now be explored.   
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Bantala 
The village of Bantala is characterised by its highly concentrated power structure.  
This is due to the presence of a small number of high-caste land owners, such as 
Pavan, and a powerful dominant caste which owns fifty-one per cent of the village 
land (Table 6.1, p. 167).  Five per cent of the population is landless.  Bt cotton is 
central to risk negotiation in the village, with sixty-one per cent of village land 
allocated to the crop.  
 
The concentration of power in Bantala coincides with a high degree of risk 
differentiation.  The ownership of tractors and oxen, as well as access to irrigation, 
are restricted to Risk Coalition One participants.  Sudhakar, the Reddy cultivator in 
Risk Coalition One, is the only Bantala participant to own a tractor.   Likewise, the 
fifty per cent of participants who own oxen and have irrigation access all belong to 
Risk Coalition One (Appendix 6.8, p. 380).  (As noted, while Natesh from Risk 
Coalition Two owned oxen at the beginning of the 2010/2011 season, he was 
obliged to sell these to pay his labour costs). The prevalence of land leasing among 
Risk Coalition One participants also suggests the greater legitimation of risk-taking 
among this coalition as part of cultivation praxis.   
 
Labour costs are kept to a minimum, given the low degree of caste mobilisation 
among the Scheduled Castes from which the majority of agricultural labour is 
derived, and their suppression by a dominant caste.  While the minimal labour rates 
paid to agricultural labourers in the village (one hundred rupees) are of benefit to 
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Risk Coalition One and Two cultivators, they serve to heighten the risk exposure of 
Risk Coalition Three participants, many of whom rely on daily wage labour for 
their survival.   
 
Pavan, the high-caste land-holder of twenty acres, was one of the first cultivators to 
introduce Bt cotton to the village (in 2002). This highlights the ‘prestige bias’ 
identified by Stone (2007: 71) where the adoption of Bt technology by influential 
farmers was unreflexively emulated by other cultivators.  There is also evidence of 
the ‘conformist bias’ which Stone (2007: 71) notes, particularly among low caste 
cultivators in Risk Coalition Two. Thus, Ashna in Risk Coalition Two claims, 
‘[e]verybody is growing Bt, so I am also growing it’ (13) 
 
The study of Bantala highlights the diffusion of the neo-liberal ideology in the 
village.  Here, the regular use of English words such as ‘money’ and ‘market rate’ 
by participants suggests evidence of the ‘economic hegemonization’ of the Bt 
cotton discourse identified by Yamaguchi and Harris (2004).  This is notably 
associated with the English language.  While all participants assert the improved 
access to food, housing, roads and schools associated with the current development 
model, their discourse is also marked by significant uncertainty with regard to their 
adoption of Bt cotton.  This relates to their concerns for animal deaths, declining 
yields, soil degradation, and escalating costs.  
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The differentiation in risk exposure arising from the ideological construction of risk 
supported by power structures in Bantala is clear from the experience of the 
2010/2011 season.  Here, Risk Coalition One participants made an average profit, 
while those in Risk Coalition Two made an average loss (Table 6.14, p. 197).  
Similarly, while all participants asserted the increased wealth to which Bt cotton 
has contributed, the average debt in the village was the highest in the current study, 
particularly for the more ‘enterprising’ Risk Coalition One participants.   
 
Nandanapuram 
The power structure in Nandanapuram is highly fragmented, and no one caste is 
dominant.  While the Scheduled Caste Madigas are numerically in the majority, and 
own the highest proportion of village land (thirty-seven per cent), they are not 
regarded as dominant due to their low caste status and reliance on others for wage 
labour. Land-holding is also dispersed among a number of other castes (see 
Appendix 6.2, p. 374), with the Backward Caste Gowdas being the next most 
powerful jati, owning twenty-six per cent of the land.  Again, cotton cultivation is 
central to risk negotiation in the village, with sixty-three per cent of village land 
allocated to the crop, ninety per cent of which is Bt cotton. 
 
Nandanapuram is associated with a more evenly distributed, if generally 
heightened, exposure to risk.  Only thirty-seven per cent of participants own oxen.  
These include two participants from Risk Coalition One and one, Ambu, from Risk 
Coalition Two. Tractor ownership is again restricted to one Reddy participant 
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(Nikhil) in Risk Coalition One. The low asset ownership contributes to the 
generally high costs of cultivation given that these must be hired at additional 
expense.  As in Bantala, fifty per cent of participants in Nandanapuram have access 
to irrigation.  However, this access is not restricted to Risk Coalition One 
participants.  Instead, one participant from Risk Coalition One (Nikhil) and two 
from Risk Coalition Two (Rajiv and Ambu) have their own borewells (see 
Appendix 6.9, p. 381). 
 
As Table 6.9 (p. 189) indicates, Bt cotton farmers in Nandanapuram have the 
highest labour costs in the current study, with some participants claiming they had 
paid up to one hundred and fifty rupees for daily wages (for females). These high 
wage rates were due to the relative bargaining power of the Scheduled Caste 
Madiga jati in the village from which the bulk of the agricultural labour is drawn, as 
well as the high degree of landlessness (ten per cent) in the village (Table 6.1, p. 
167).  While the higher labour rates in Nandanapuram serve to somewhat alleviate 
the risk exposure of Risk Coalition Three participants, they also significantly 
exacerbate the risk exposure of cultivators.216   
 
Land lease is rare, with Rajiv in Risk Coalition Two being the only participant in 
Nandanapuram to lease a small area (two acres) of land (Appendix 6.19, p. 391).  
While this could indicate that participants in this village are more risk-averse than 
                                                 
216
 Varshney (1998: 131) and Robinson (1988: 125) note that many marginal and small farmers supplement 
their income by working as wage labour in the fields of others.  However, where this occurred in the 
current study, it was associated with female cultivators who often used this income to pay the wage labour 
on their own land, as well as household costs. 
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in Bantala, it could also be associated with the higher costs of land lease in the 
village (Table 6.11, p. 193).   
 
Bt technology was introduced to Nandanapuram by Rajiv, a gregarious Backward 
Caste Gowda small-holder in Risk Coalition Two.  This was against the advice of 
Nand, the university-educated NPM cultivator in Risk Coalition One.  Although 
Nand is accorded a high degree of respect in the village as a result of his education 
and farming success, his lower caste (Yadava) status (see Appendix 6.2, p. 374), 
and the higher yields which were initially obtained with Bt cotton varieties, meant 
that it was Rajiv’s approach which was more widely legitimated.   
 
Stone (2011: 388) argues that Bt cotton adoption is generally associated with better 
educated, larger land-owners.  However, the findings in Nandanapuram suggest that 
the way in which the choice of cultivation praxis is ideologically legitimated relies 
upon the power arrangements arising from the particular composition of the village.  
This means that power holders may not always be those who are better educated or 
who have larger land-holdings.217 
 
As in Bantala, the level of debt in Nandanapuram is high.  In fact, Bt cotton farmers 
in the vulnerable Risk Coalition Two in Nandanapuram are the most exposed to 
debt of all Risk Coalition Two participants (Table 6.15, p. 199).  Bt cotton is being 
adopted in the village, in conjunction with its ideological delegitimation related to 
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 Kumbamu (2007: 891) criticises the lack of caste analysis in Stone’s study of Bt cotton in Warangal.  
The inclusion of caste in the current research highlights that this dimension needs to be carefully 
contextualised within the composition of particular villages.    
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concerns regarding soil degradation, animal deaths, high costs and indebtedness.  
Here, Bt cotton adoption continues due to the material constraints associated with 
the wider agrarian crisis, such as water scarcity, the absence of non-Bt cotton seeds, 
the high debt levels, and the potential for the technology to deliver higher yields 
which could alleviate the risks associated with these.  The sense of entrapment 
which characterises cultivation in Nandanapuram is noted by Kumbamu (2007: 
891) who argues that ‘[m]any desperate Warangal farmers continue cultivating Bt 
cotton (so-called white gold) in the hope that one good crop may help them out of 
the debt trap and the death trap.’   
 
The impact of the more widespread diffusion of risk in Nandanapuram is evident 
from the finding of the 2010/2011 season that both coalitions cultivating Bt cotton 
made an average loss.  Meanwhile, however, despite the generally high costs of 
cultivation in the village, and due largely to their savings on pesticides, both NPM 
farmers made an average profit.  Their returns were the highest in the study for both 
coalitions.   
 
Orgampalle 
The village of Orgampalle is marked by its caste homogeneity, with the dominant 
Backward Caste Mudhiraj jati accounting for ninety-two per cent of the population, 
and owning eighty-two per cent of the village land.  Orgampalle is associated with 
the cultivation of a diversity of crops in an attempt to enhance sustainability, and 
spread the risk of crop failure.  There is also a strong reliance on inter-cropping in 
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order to promote soil fertility.  Cotton accounts for just seventeen per cent of the 
cultivated land, and Bt seed varieties are banned. 
 
The strategy of organic cultivation as a means of risk negotiation in Orgampalle is 
supported by the affiliation with Crops Jangaon.  While there is an emphasis on 
profit-making as a means of negotiating risk, this is tempered with the ‘post-
materialistic values’ described by Renn (2008: 120).  These assert the need for 
‘harmony, social responsibility and environmental quality’ (ibid.).   
 
The strong emphasis on the collective of the village is supported by the influential 
village elder, Pradnesh.  This is clear from the way in which the risks associated 
with water scarcity and labour charges, in particular, are negotiated.  In an attempt 
to guard against the lowering of the water table which would heighten the risk 
exposure for all, the drilling for new borewells is banned in the village (see 
Appendix 6.4, p. 376).218 Instead, rainwater is harvested, and ground water levels 
are closely monitored.  This ensures that the soil moisture content for the village 
land as a whole is protected, rather than differentiating the risk of drought between 
those who can afford (or can gain access to credit for) borewells, and those who 
cannot. 
 
Similarly, all participants assert their collaboration in charging each other wages 
lower than the minimum rate (seventy rupees per day) on the basis that they all help 
on each other’s fields.  This strategy meant that Orgampalle had the lowest average 
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 Achanda’s borewell precedes the ruling, so he still uses it for paddy cultivation.   
 293 
labour costs in the study (Table 6.9, p. 189), and was facilitated by the fact that 
there is only one landless household in the village (Sajan’s) which does not rely on 
wage labour.   
 
Asset ownership is higher and more evenly distributed in Orgampalle than in the 
other villages. While tractor ownership is again restricted to Risk Coalition One 
(Pradnesh), eighty-five per cent of the participants in Orgampalle own oxen.  This 
significantly reduces the costs associated with oxen hire for participants (Table 
6.10, p. 191).  Participants are also risk-averse with regard to land leasing, with only 
one participant in Risk Coalition Two (Achanda) leasing a small area of land (three 
acres).  
 
The benefits associated with this collective response are highlighted by the fact that 
not one organic cultivator in Orgampalle made a loss, despite the catastrophic 
season.  Thus, while the average yields for organic farmers in Risk Coalition Two 
are on a par with those associated with Bt cotton farmers (Table 6.7, p. 187), 
villagers were better able to withstand the crop loss of the 2010/2011 season due to 
the lower cultivation costs which they incurred.   
 
It is noted that, despite these lower cultivation costs and the evidence of post-
materialistic values in the village, the level of debt among Risk Coalition Two 
participants in Orgampalle is surprisingly high.  Table 6.15 (p. 199) highlights that 
this debt is associated exclusively with Risk Coalition Two participants, and is 
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mainly linked to dowry expenditure, and borrowing to supplement government 
grants for house construction (Appendix 6.19, p. 391).  This suggests that 
indebtedness is endemic to the neo-liberal development model given its ideological 
legitimation of aspirations linked to consumerism as the basis for development.  In 
Orgampalle, this indebtedness is nonetheless considerably lower than for Bantala 
and Nandanapuram given that cultivation costs, at least, are minimised.    
 
This overview of the approach to risk negotiation in the three villages highlights the 
impact of the way in which power is exercised on the material experience of risk as 
a concern of the wider village collective.  The concentrated and fragmented power 
structures in Bantala and Nandanapuram, respectively, means that risk negotiation 
is perceived as a power struggle between groups based upon their land-holding and 
numerical dominance.  In both villages, powerful groups (Risk Coalition One in 
Bantala, and the Scheduled Caste Madigas in Nandanapuram) seek to mitigate their 
risk exposure at the expense of others.  While NPM farmers in Nandanapuram 
assert the value of a more co-operative approach, their less powerful status within 
the village hierarchy contributes to the delegitimation of their construction of risk.   
 
The emphasis on social justice and the safety of the village as a collective in 
Orgampalle represents a more legitimate (if still imperfect) exercise of power. This 
is facilitated by the presence of a charismatic leader (Pradnesh) who promotes such 
values, as well as the smaller scale of the village, its significant caste homogeneity, 
and the absence of agricultural labourers who rely on daily wages for their survival.  
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The benefits of this more collective approach mean that a longer-term, more 
equitable and sustainable approach to risk negotiation is supported.  This alleviates 
the risk for the village collective, rather than supporting its differentiation between 
groups.  This chapter will now explore village democratic praxis as the link 
between the villages and wider meso level attempts to define risk. 
 
9.4 Village Democracy and the Elevation of the Risk Discourse 
As the primary focus of democratic praxis in the villages, the Gram Sabha meeting 
is expected to perform the dual functions of administering top-down funding for 
development programmes, and permitting deliberation and decision-making on 
issues relevant to the village collective (Beteille, [1965], 2002: 231-236).  
Discourses concerning risk would, therefore, be expected to elevate from the grass 
roots of the Gram Sabha through the institutional tiers to inform meso level 
decision-making.   
 
The analysis highlights, however, that the Gram Sabha meeting is more commonly 
seen as a forum for accessing top-down development funds, rather than as a means 
by which the risks of such development could be elevated.  Kumar (2006: 236) also 
asserts the view, supported by the current study, that villagers attend Gram Sabha 
meetings ‘demanding or expecting some personal benefit.’  Government policies, 
such as the PDS and Indiramma Housing Scheme, are also emphasised by all 
villagers, and have a direct impact on the legitimation of the state for many.  This 
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lends support for the view of Indian democracy as a ‘patronage democracy’ 
(Corbridge et al., 2013: 176).   
 
The analysis also highlights that there is a general absence of legitimation for the 
Gram Sabha meeting.  In the current study, the meeting was most strongly 
legitimated by participants in Orgampalle.  This higher degree of legitimacy was 
associated with the more legitimate exercise of power in the village, and the greater 
potential for consensus on issues related to social justice due to its smaller scale and 
caste homogeneity.  There is also evidence of a deliberative component to the 
meeting in Orgampalle, with Akhil asserting, ‘We talk about the problems in the 
village in the Gram Sabha meetings’ (49). 
 
It is also noted, however, that Gram Sabha attendance is restricted to male 
participants.  This was due to a perception expressed by the two female participants 
in the study that the meeting was not their ‘level’.  This view of the Gram Sabha 
meeting as a male domain is also supported by Powis (2003: 2619) and Kumar 
(2006: 228).  The study also highlights that the Scheduled Castes, females and 
landless who are often most in need of patronage are unable to attend the Gram 
Sabha meeting due to their obligation to engage in daily wage labour.  Thus, the 
analysis highlights that attendance at Gram Sabha meetings largely reflects village 
power structures. 
 
 297 
The limited political power of females in the villages is indicated by the way in 
which female reservations for the role of sarpanch are negotiated.  As Powis (2003: 
2619) notes, the ‘sarpanch post is the prime locus of village power.’ However, 
despite the fact that both Nandanapuram and Bantala have female sarpanches, their 
presence in the role appears to support the argument of Buch (2009: 9) that ‘women 
in the reserved seats are there by proxy and…their husbands and male relatives 
exercise power…on their behalf.’  This was particularly evident in Bantala where it 
was Pallav, the sarpanch’s husband, who commanded the power associated with 
the sarpanch role.  This involved the coercive management of the Gram Sabha 
meeting, as well as his orchestration of village protests.  Villagers themselves also 
used the male pronoun to refer to the sarpanch position.   
 
There is also evidence of a well developed culture of ‘money politics’ (Powis, 
2003: 2620) in the current study, with many of the villagers asserting that they were 
offered cash and alcohol in return for votes.  This is a finding also made by 
Robinson (1988: 174) in her study of politics in Andhra Pradesh.  Given the links of 
village democracy to the accessing of patronage, the finding that ‘[t]he poor and 
deprived defend democracy more vigorously than the elite’ (Nandy, 1996: 28-39, as 
cited in Gershman, 2007: 32) is, therefore, hardly surprising.   
 
The study highlights, however, that the ‘vernacularization of democracy’ 
(Michelutti, 2007: 639) in the villages refers to more than opportunities for 
patronage.  There is also a strong discourse of rights, and the linking of these rights 
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to an ability to have one’s exposure to ontological risk recognised and addressed as 
part of the concern for social and epistemic justice within a democratic society.  
Thus, Sudeep, the Scheduled Caste (Mala) participant in Bantala’s Risk Coalition 
Two claims, ‘[s]ince we are living in a democratic country, this has given us the 
right to…fight for our rights.  Now I have enough freedom to go and ask what rate 
I’m getting [for my cotton] and why I’m getting it.  I can fight for my own 
sustenance’ (10).  Here, democracy is interpreted as the means by which the 
purported economic ‘freedom’ of a globalised market can be brought within the 
remit of a local process of legitimation in the negotiation of risk. 
 
It could be argued that the funding for government initiatives, and its associated 
contribution to the alleviation of poverty, would have been impossible without the 
state’s adoption of neo-liberal policies, and the economic growth which these 
policies have secured.  This thesis asserts, however, that such a view does not take 
account of the ontological risk associated with micro level indebtedness in the neo-
liberal development model, as well as the inadequacy of the technocratic approach 
to address the wider social and institutional factors contributing to the agrarian 
crisis.  It also fails to recognise the anxiety associated with a development model 
which emphasises the adoption of ambiguous technologies as part of a compulsive 
drive to modernise.   
 
Omvedt (1993: 291) argues that the ‘dispensing of patronage function[s] mainly to 
demobilize the oppressed.’  This depoliticisation can be seen most clearly in the 
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tolerance for the uncertainty and debt levels associated with most Bt cotton 
cultivators in Bantala.  This thesis argues, however, that NGOs combat this 
tendency towards depoliticisation through the assertion of risk as a micro level 
phenomenon.  This function of NGOs is also noted by Echeverri-Gent (1993, as 
cited in Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 226) who argues that ‘NGOs and social 
movements can play an important role in enabling the poor to articulate and act on 
their interests.’   
 
The translation which NGOs perform in the current study is, on the one hand, literal 
given that, as Brass (1990: 145) notes, English is the ‘dominant language of elites’ 
in India.  Cultivators in the current study are unable to participate in risk definition 
given that their sole language is Telugu (some, such as Pradnesh, also speak limited 
Hindi).  Thus, NGO actors ensure that the risk discourse of micro level participants 
is translated into English at the meso level.   
 
Similarly, however, as scientists and researchers, NGO actors translate the micro 
level experiential knowledge of cultivators into a scientific discourse as a means of 
challenging the potential for closure associated with the use of scientific knowledge 
by power holders.  Here, as Beck (1992: 155) highlights, the ‘inherent foundations 
and external consequences of science’ are challenged.  This thesis asserts that 
efforts by NGOs to secure openness in the core guards against the potential for 
‘epistemic injustice’ (Fricker, 2007), and seeks to mitigate the potential for the risk 
discourse of the otherwise politically marginalised to become suppressed. 
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Omvedt (1993: 192) argues that NGOs play an intermediary role in linking the 
micro level discourses of risk to global discourses of resistance to neo-liberalism.  
The influence of such global discourses on the framing of opposition to Bt cotton is 
evident from the fact that all the NGOs who participated in the current study are 
funded by international donors.  This funding is asserted by Herring (2010: 614) as 
the basis for the delegitimation of their risk discourse given that, he argues, NGOs 
have become ‘epistemic brokers’ in the global coalition against biotechnology.   
 
The material analysis of the current study suggests, however, that contrary to 
Herring’s (2008b: 155) view, NGOs and global opponents of Bt technology have 
not simply constructed ‘narratives of catastrophe’ for which there is no basis in 
reality.  Instead, the analysis highlights that NGOs are asserting a dimension of 
material reality which is not being adequately recognised.  This relates to the 
recurrent failure of Bt cotton for many cultivators, the rising debt levels and the 
non-viability of agriculture to which Bt technology is now contributing for all but a 
‘lucky’ few.  This discourse of risk also seeks to highlight the anxiety of cultivators 
with regard to the animal deaths and the future sustainability of the cultivation 
praxis which the Andhra Pradesh government is perceived as supporting.   
  
It is recognised that village participants who are highly mobilised against the 
technology in the current study are all Backward Caste males from a variety of land 
holding categories.219 This suggests that these mobilisations are not fully 
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 These are Pradnesh (a medium land-holder) and Prakash (a marginal land-holder) in Orgampalle, and 
Nand (a semi-medium land-holder) and Rajiv (a small-holder) in Nandanapuram.   
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inclusive.220  Nonetheless, the study also highlights that Pradnesh, a cultivator from 
a small village in Andhra Pradesh, has spoken directly to the (then) Minister for the 
Environment and Forests from Delhi, Jairam Ramesh, about his opposition to Bt 
crops.  This is no inconsiderable feat of an Indian democracy charged with the 
representation of 1.2 billion people.  It also provides evidence of the ‘circulation of 
power’ (Habermas, 1996: 356) as the basis for legitimate decision-making in 
democratic praxis.221  
 
This thesis argues that the inclusion of risk discourses at the micro level is 
extending micro level democratic praxis beyond the village.  It also asserts that it is 
the obligation of the core to remain responsive to risk as a result of these mass 
mobilisations which leads to the glimpses of legitimacy within an otherwise highly 
dysfunctional and seemingly impossible democratic praxis.  These glimpses of 
functionality are the real paradox of India’s democracy, and represent the basis of 
its legitimacy.  The impact of power relations upon the meso level analysis of risk 
definition as part of the wider constitution of society will now be discussed.   
 
9.5    Political Power Arrangements and Knowledge Construction in Risk Definition  
This section explores the impact of meso level power relations on attempts to 
construct knowledge with regard to risk definition. This focusses on the ‘relations 
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 It is recognised, however, that mobilisations against Bt cotton involving five thousand Scheduled Caste 
females from seventy-five villages in the state were coordinated by the Deccan Development Society in 
2012.  Available at:  
http://www.gmwatch.org/index.php/news/archive/2012/13848-women-march-for-total-ban-on-bt-cotton 
Accessed on 29/10/2013. 
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 Although it is also recognised that Pradnesh is a power holder within this small village, and has been 
highly influential in formulating the risk construction which he is ostensibly representing.   
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of definition’ described by Beck (1995: 43).  At this level, social actors are 
differentiated in terms of the decision-making power associated with the institutions 
which they represent.  This is illustrated by the Habermasian (1996: 356) core-
periphery model. The normative theoretical assumption is that legitimate 
democratic decision-making can be illustrated as an inclusive ‘circulation of power’ 
(ibid.) in deliberations between actors in the core and the periphery.  
 
As the analysis highlights, the discourse of risk is asserted by the Non-Bt Coalition 
as a means of delegitimating the ideological positioning of power holders in the Bt 
Coalition.  This not only seeks to undermine the legitimacy of the framing of 
development asserted by actors in the Bt Coalition; it also challenges the legitimacy 
of the exercise of power proposed by the Bt Coalition as their interpretation of the 
way in which democratic praxis should operate with regard to knowledge 
construction in risk definition.   
 
Through the struggle to legitimate the exercise of power, this thesis argues that 
democratic praxis is itself being (re-)defined.  This struggle is also relevant for 
micro level democratic praxis where changing power relations at the micro level 
will contribute to an ongoing redefinition of village democracy, and an altered 
distribution of resources and differentiation of risk.  The degree to which these 
changes will enhance or undermine democratic legitimacy in terms of their 
contribution to social and epistemic justice is a contingent outcome of the ongoing 
struggle for the legitimation of risk and democracy at both levels. 
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It is clear that definitional power is central in the context of ‘non-knowing’ (Beck, 
2009: 115) which characterises risk society. The recognition of the significance of 
knowledge in the conflict which Bt cotton represents has led Herring (2010: 614) to 
conclude that the debate is more about ‘alternative epistemologies’ than ultimate 
values.  This is given his view that the ‘[i]mprovement of farmer welfare and 
enhanced sustainability of agriculture are universally valued goals.  However, the 
means to those ends are politically disputed’ (ibid.). 
 
This thesis supports the view that contested perspectives on knowledge construction 
are central to the legitimation struggle which Bt technology represents at the meso 
level. However, it argues that this struggle is inextricable from normative judgments 
as to the way in which power should be exercised as part of such knowledge 
construction.  This supports Foucault’s (1977: 27) assertion that ‘power and 
knowledge directly imply one another.’ The immanent struggle to legitimate power 
in knowledge construction involves appeals to transcendent principles such as 
justice and equality as part of the legitimation of democracy itself.  This relates to 
the view of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982: 8) that the ‘choice of risk and choices of 
how to live are taken together.’   
 
The analysis indicates that the discourse of the ANGRAU and Monsanto actors 
seeks to secure legitimation for an expertocracy of scientists as part of a globalised, 
commodified form of scientific knowledge construction which would support 
economic growth as part of a neo-liberal development model.  Such attempts are 
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contested by NGOs and the CPM actor who, as scientists themselves, assert the 
epistemic significance of values related to justice and equity.  The need for the 
inclusion of experiential perspectives in scientific knowledge construction is 
asserted as the basis for an alternative development model whose legitimation is 
secured through normative appeals to transcendent principles in the negotiation of 
risk in particular contexts.  This simultaneously, however, calls for scientific 
knowledge which is ‘shaped by real felt needs of local/relevant actors’ (Raina, 
2006: 1623), as opposed to a universalised, commodified form of scientific 
knowledge which serves simply to reinforce existing power relations.  Thus, the 
dialectical relation between the immanent and transcendent dimensions of social 
conflict is highlighted, as is the contestation involved in the legitimation of 
globalised forms of knowledge construction in local contexts.   
 
The bi-level analysis allows an illustration of the distinction between the types of 
knowledge construction which are at stake in the legitimation of democracy.  Thus, 
the Monsanto research scientist claims: ‘genes to a scientist are just DNA. You 
know, the basic blocks that make the DNA are the same whether it’s plant or 
animal’ (8). This form of knowledge construction emphasises a decontextualised, 
universalising simplification as the basis for the negotiation of risk as a global 
concern. 
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This is contrasted with the assertion of Pradnesh, the Risk Coalition One organic 
farmer in Orgampalle, who attended school for six years, but has been a cultivator 
for more than fifty.  He describes organic cultivation as follows:  
It’s like a doctor’s job, the way a doctor recognises the disease of a person and 
treats it with a certain medicine. It’s similar with organic 
farming….[R]ecognising the disease is an art, and giving the suitable solution 
for that disease is a different art (56). 
 
Here, the construction of knowledge is qualitatively different to the Monsanto 
actor’s assertion of simplicity.  The discourse of the organic cultivator instead 
emphasises the intricacy of nature, and his obligation to carefully negotiate this 
complexity in order to secure his ontological survival within his context.   
 
Pieterse (2001: 89) argues that, in countries in the Global South, ‘indigenous 
knowledge’ is a ‘countervailing position to Western science’ (ibid.).  The current 
analysis highlights that the struggle for legitimation associated with these 
competing forms of knowledge construction is mediated by power relations 
between institutional actors in their attempts to define Bt technology’s role within 
the future development of the state.   
 
Attempts by power-holders in the Bt Coalition (the Congress Party actor, the 
ANGRAU regulator and representatives from Monsanto) to legitimate a form of 
development which centres on the commodification of scientific knowledge are 
challenged by the Non-Bt Coalition actors (the NGO and CPM actors).  These 
actors delegitimate such an approach to knowledge construction, and the 
development model within which it is incorporated, on the basis of the irrationality, 
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unsustainability and homogenisation of human needs which such a universalising 
view entails.  This leads them to assert alternative methods, which valorise the 
experiential knowledge of cultivators as the basis for alleviating agrarian risk within 
the local context of the village (Ramanjaneyulu, 2006).   
 
NGOs and the CPM actor seek to secure the type of ‘epistemological 
decentralization’ described by Pieterse (2001: 89) through asserting the need for the 
inclusion of micro level experiential knowledge on risk as part of the legitimation of 
democracy.  In doing so, they seek to transform the basis of legitimation of 
scientific knowledge itself.  Thus, Lidskog (2008: 75) notes the emergent need for 
scientific knowledge which is more ‘richly contextualised, socially robust, and 
epistemologically eclectic’.  Swaminathan (2011: 25) also asserts the need for a 
broader approach to research into biotechnology, arguing that it should not only be 
explored from the ‘economic angle, but also…the ecological, equity and ethical 
perspectives.’  This is also asserted by Giri (2012: 193) who claims there is a need 
for an epistemology which is capable of incorporating a ‘multi-valued logic.’   
 
The analysis indicates that meso level perspectives on the way in which power 
should normatively be exercised as part of democratic praxis are mediated by the 
positioning of the institutions which the actors represent within the core-periphery 
model.   The inextricable nature of knowledge and power, and the recognised 
influence of both on the values which contribute to a society’s future development, 
leads the CPM actor to emphasise his preference for closer links with Chinese 
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research institutions as opposed to US multinationals.  This is informed by his 
ideological commitment to communism, a perspective which contributes to his view 
of communist China as a more equitable, less profit-driven society than the United 
States. 
 
Actors in the Bt Coalition express a strong preference for varying degrees of closure 
in the democratic process.  Both the Monsanto and ANGRAU actors assert their 
support for a form of democracy in which responsibility for the definition of risk is 
confined to scientists.  The attempt to institutionalise such a perspective is 
highlighted in the BRAI proposal in which scientists would become the pre-eminent 
authority on risk definition.  As highlighted, according to the core-periphery model 
(Habermas, 1996: 356), this would be democratically illegitimate given its removal 
of the state as the central locus for decision-making in the theoretical illustration of 
the ideal of democracy as self-rule.    
 
The Congress Party actor, while legitimating the role of science and technology 
within the contemporary development model, is nonetheless obliged to guard 
against the threat to the legitimacy of the state arising from mass mobilisations and 
the risk discourse of NGOs.  As highlighted in Chapter Three, the core must also, 
however, defend its legitimacy against attempts by Monsanto and ANGRAU actors 
to usurp it.   
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Thus, the analysis highlights that the Andhra Pradesh core is engaged in a complex 
power struggle through which the legitimation of democratic praxis, as both a 
normative and institutional concern, is itself being challenged and (re)defined.  The 
attempts by the state to secure its own legitimation present opportunities for the 
inclusion of micro level discourses in the definition of risk.  However, these 
opportunities themselves represent attempts by the state to maintain its legitimacy 
within the ‘profound institutional crisis’ (Beck, 1994: 8) of risk society.   
 
The analysis suggests that the activity of NGOs in the current study mitigates, to 
some degree, the tendency for ‘[d]emocratic authoritarianism’ which Jalal (1995, as 
cited in Varshney, 2000: 14) asserts is a characteristic of Indian political practice.  
This study highlights that their function is crucial for ensuring that power is 
contested within attempts to legitimate risk and democracy as part of the macro 
constitution of society itself. 
 
The conclusion will now explore the implications of the struggle to secure the 
legitimation of risk and democracy which Bt cotton represents for the constitution 
of the new state of Telangana, as well as for an emergent global society.   
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Chapter Ten 
CONCLUSION 
Legitimation and the Macro Constitution 
of Telangana and Global Society 
 
 
10.1 Thesis Objectives and Limitations 
 
This thesis has explored the struggle to legitimate risk and democracy which Bt 
cotton represents within Andhra Pradesh society.  This has highlighted the way in 
which attempts to secure the legitimation of risk and democracy as material and 
ideological concerns are mediated through power relations at both the micro 
(village) and meso (institutional) levels.   
 
This thesis also asserts, however, that society itself is being formed through 
attempts to secure the legitimation of risk and democracy.  This relates to the role of 
the public as a ‘third point of view’ (Strydom, 1999: 13) in discerning legitimacy 
from illegitimacy.  This critical judgment of wider society has a direct bearing on 
the exercise of power in terms of the way in which resources are distributed, and 
access to them differentiated, as well as the way in which ambiguous technologies 
are adopted in the legitimation of risk.  It is also crucial to determining the way in 
which power is exercised in knowledge construction and the institutionalisation of 
democratic praxis as part of the legitimation of democracy.  This, it is argued, has 
direct implications for informing the way in which transcendent principles, such as 
justice and equity, are translated into praxis as part of a given society’s 
development.   
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As a form of knowledge construction, this thesis seeks to contribute to, and assist a 
critical public in, this wider process of legitimation through highlighting the 
relevance of its findings to the macro constitution of both Telangana and global 
society.  It is acknowledged that, in reaching these conclusions, the study has a 
number of limitations.  These relate to its small sample size, the initial unfamiliarity 
of the researcher with the Indian context, the fact that she did not reside in a village 
full-time, her limited knowledge of Telugu, and the study’s focus on one season.   
 
Nonetheless, it is suggested that the analysis offers an in-depth insight into the 
legitimation of risk and democracy with regard to Bt technology in three villages in 
the Telangana region, and into the centrality of Bt technology to a wider concern for 
epistemology and the legitimation of political praxis in Andhra Pradesh.  As such, it 
is argued that the study highlights some key dilemmas which will confront the new 
government of Telangana. It is also proposed that the conflict explored in 
Telangana can be seen as a microcosm of the wider struggle for the legitimation of 
risk and democracy in the constitution of global society.  Both of these aspects will 
now be explored.     
 
10.2  The Negotiation of Agrarian Risk in the New State of Telangana 
The struggle to secure a more equitable access to resources as a means of 
negotiating risk has been, as Chapter Four explored, a central concern of the 
movement for a separate state of Telangana.  It is also relevant to the Bt cotton 
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debate given that, as the analysis has highlighted, access to resources is a key factor 
in the differentiation of the risks (and potential benefits) of the technology.  
  
The analysis of the villages highlighted that the exercise of power was associated 
with varying degrees of legitimacy with regard to risk negotiation.  The analysis 
indicated that the more cooperative response to risk in Orgampalle, which entailed 
considerations of the risk exposure of the collective of the village over time, was 
associated with a reduced exposure to risk in terms of exposure to debt, and the 
longer-term sustainability of agricultural praxis.  It was recognised that the exercise 
of power in Orgampalle was imperfect; nonetheless, the analysis suggests that the 
more legitimate the exercise of power, the lower the overall exposure to risk for the 
collective.   
 
Kannabiran et al. (2010: 79) questions whether ‘[the] vision of a democratic 
Telangana [as formulated by the movement for a separate state] [would] be centred 
on a different model of development?’  This thesis suggests that the potential for the 
new state of Telangana to undertake a qualitatively different form of development 
relies crucially upon the values which will inform the way in which power is 
exercised as part of the legitimation of risk in the state.   The analysis highlights that 
the viability of agriculture as a concern of the collective is strongly connected to the 
way in which power is exercised.   This relates to whether a wider collective is 
prioritised, as opposed to certain powerful groups within it, as the basis for a 
general alleviation of risk.  It is recognised, however, that a more widespread 
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diffusion of such a cooperative approach would entail significant changes in the 
conceptualisation of development.   
 
The current study highlights that the widespread adoption of Bt technology cannot 
be assumed to equate with its widespread legitimation among cultivators.  Instead, 
the current analysis supports Glover’s (2010: 482) view that ‘the performance and 
impacts of GM crops have…been highly variable, socio-economically differentiated 
and contingent on a range of agronomic, socio-economic and institutional factors.’ 
The technology’s ongoing adoption is, it is argued, the result of wider constraints 
associated with the agrarian crisis, and coincides with anxiety for the future (in the 
case of Bantala) or active opposition (in the case of Nandanapuram).  The study 
also indicates that power holders in the villages are themselves questioning the 
technology’s viability, as indicated by Rajiv’s active opposition in Nandanapuram, 
and the proposed visit to Orgampalle by village elders from Bantala. 
 
This thesis asserts that, if the new state of Telangana wishes to promote a form of 
development which more adequately addresses agrarian risk in the region as a 
concern for its own legitimacy, then it will be required to deconstruct the 
rationalisation of development in which ‘certain modes of development [are 
constructed] as rational and others as regressive’ (Lacy, 2002: 52).  This relates not 
only to cultivation methods, but also to the perceived ideological obligations 
incorporated within the Vision 2020 initiative.  These include the assumption that 
the universal path to development entails a drastic reduction of the agricultural 
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work-force (Frankel, 2005: 623).  As Rajivlochan and Rajivlochan (2010: 400) 
argue, ‘it would be neither immediately possible nor desirable to relocate [farmers] 
to the factory shop-floor.’   
 
This thesis has highlighted that it was the historical absence of investment in 
agriculture in Telangana, and the inability of significant sections of the population 
to gain access to resources such as land and water, as well as jobs, which 
contributed to the delegitimation of the state of Andhra Pradesh.  This would 
suggest that the Telangana government needs to support agriculture and industry in 
equal measures.  The analysis of Bt cotton in Andhra Pradesh also highlights the 
fallacy of assuming that macro level increases in agricultural productivity are 
equated with an unproblematic legitimation of the risk of ambiguous technologies at 
the micro level. 
 
Telangana continues to be associated with a highly differentiated access to 
resources, particularly land.  The new government’s management of this inequity 
will be particularly central to its legitimation, due to the presence of radical 
Naxalites, and a strong NGO sector, who assert the need for social justice in risk 
negotiation.  Given that the inequity in land distribution is supported by local power 
structures, however, the government’s ability to undertake non-violent land reform 
is likely to be limited.   
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The experience of Orgampalle highlights that equality in access to resources is not a 
pre-condition for the legitimate exercise of power.  However, the analysis also 
suggests that a legitimate negotiation of risk not only needs to entail a concern for 
achieving greater equality in the access to key resources in the future, but also to 
respect the equal right of individuals within a collective, especially those who 
currently lack access to resources, to be safeguarded from ontological risk as the 
basis for an immediate concern with social justice.   
 
Attempts to promote greater equality in the access to resources may include 
expanding the area of land under cultivation to secure greater land access for the 
landless, as well as efforts to create opportunities for off-farm employment in ways 
which do not negatively impact upon cultivators.  This could involve employment 
in areas which are focussed on the improvement of agriculture such as extension 
services, the maintenance of irrigation tanks, the completion of unfinished canals, 
and the clearing of new land for cultivation.  The analysis also highlights that state 
pensions for widows and the elderly are insufficient to cover their rations from the 
Public Distribution System, and this needs to be addressed. 
 
The simultaneous need to protect the wider collective from ontological risk given 
the existing unequal access to land, however, suggests that it will be necessary to 
consider ways in which cultivation risks can be alleviated through a greater focus 
on the collective.  Reddy and Mishra (2010a: 47) note that ‘[s]mall [farm] size is 
not a constraint on efficiency.  It has been theoretically well established that small 
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farms are more efficient in factor productivity than large.’ The current study 
highlights, however, that agricultural viability is significantly impacted by the costs 
associated with particular cultivation methods, especially for the small and marginal 
cultivators who are most at risk of suicides.   The analysis indicates that viability is 
also influenced by the values which inform the exercise of power in local contexts 
as a concern for the legitimation of risk. 
 
The study suggests that the government’s legitimation of Bt technology as a 
strategy for alleviating agrarian risk within a neo-liberal development ideology 
needs to be carefully reconsidered, in collaboration with Telangana’s rural 
population.  The comparative analysis of the 2010/2011 season highlights that Bt 
technology cannot be assumed to represent the most viable option for the alleviation 
of agrarian risk.  On the contrary, the study suggests that the performance of 
organic and NPM methods may hold greater potential for reducing debt levels and, 
subsequently, farmer suicides, in the region, due not least to the lower costs 
involved in a context characterised by its climatic variability.   
 
There are strong demands for greater state support in the promotion of organic and 
NPM methods in the literature (Ramanjaneyulu, 2006; Eyhorn, 2007; Santhanam, 
2010: 361).  These methods are labour-intensive (there was not a notable difference 
in the numbers of labourers employed by Bt cotton farmers and NPM and organic 
cultivators in the current study), and were not found to negatively impact on yields 
in the current study, particularly in the far from atypical catastrophic 2010/2011 
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season.  It is noted, however, that similar findings have been contested.222  The 
particular role of NGOs in alleviating risk in Orgampalle has been previously 
highlighted.  Similarly, Reddy and Mishra (2010a: 49) assert, that ‘shifts towards 
organic farming and crop rotation are not easy options, particularly for small 
farmers, unless accompanied by appropriate institutional support systems.’  Such a 
change would require significant investment in agricultural extension services.   
 
The analysis suggests that a form of development which supports a more holistic 
consideration of risk, and which avoids privileging the mitigation of the risk of 
certain groups at the expense of others, alleviates the risk exposure for society as a 
whole.  Rao (2009: 123) also asserts the need for ‘collective action to undertake 
activities such as planning of crops, water use, management of pests and diseases, 
choice of varieties and seeds.’  It is clear, however, that village power structures 
play a key role in determining the viability of such a collective approach.   
 
The current study highlights that the potential for a more collective approach to risk 
is likely to be limited in Bantala and Nandanapuram, given the way in which power 
is currently exercised in these villages, as well as the caste heterogeneity and scale 
with which they are characterised.  However, the new Telangana government could 
support more cooperative initiatives associated with, for instance, watershed 
management and non-Bt seed procurement across a number of villages.  This would 
                                                 
222
 Badgley et al.’s (2007) response to critiques of their claims that organic and conventional yields were 
statistically indistinguishable based upon an analysis of yield ratios comparing organic and non-organic 
production across the world highlights the difficulty in making generalisations on yields based upon 
comparative studies.   Here, the definition of ‘organic’ used in the study was itself called into question, as 
was the way in which yield data was selected and analysed.   
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allow farmers a greater choice in the crops which they cultivated, and in the 
methods which they adopted.  Such inter-village cooperation may also contribute to 
a more critical view of village power structures and support an enlarged perspective 
of the village collective as the key to negotiating risk. 
 
The research also highlights the need for an inclusion of indebtedness in poverty 
estimates, and indicates that the focus on the provision of credit as a solution to 
indebtedness is highly problematic.  The behaviour of MFIs, and their contribution 
to farmer suicides in Warangal during the research period, suggests greater need for 
regulation of the micro-finance sector.  Similarly, although Self-Help Groups are 
associated with female empowerment (Tesoriero, 2005; Reddy and Mishra, 2010a: 
66), the research highlights that the indebtedness of Salma, the landless female in 
Nandanapuram, arose as a result of borrowing supported by Self-Help Group 
membership.  It is recognised that, in contrast to the landless females in Bantala, the 
sourcing of Salma’s debt means that she is not working for landlords in semi-
bonded conditions; however, it is also suggested that encouraging vulnerable 
individuals who are at risk to take additional risks in order to secure their 
ontological survival is not the most legitimate approach to risk in a high-risk 
context.   
 
The study indicates the need for the greater targeting of government initiatives, 
such as the Public Distribution System.  This is a finding also noted in the literature 
(Indrakanth, 1997; Deb, 2009).  The cost of rations for pensioners surviving on Rs 
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200 per month is too high, while many cultivators asserted that they do not need 
rations. Similarly, the Indiramma Housing Scheme has led many participants to 
access debt in order to construct more elaborate housing than the funding allowed.  
Meanwhile, many homeless Risk Coalition Three participants were unable to 
construct houses given the unavailability of assistance with the building work.  In a 
smaller state, it should be possible to undertake greater targeting of such initiatives 
to ensure that they more adequately address the differentiation of micro level risk.   
 
It is clear that the indebtedness of participants is not only due to cultivation costs.  
Exposure to debt also results from the values associated with the ‘revolution of 
rising expectations’ (Gupta, 2002: 86) created by the Vision 2020 endorsement of 
neo-liberal policies in Andhra Pradesh.  This has seen modernisation become 
associated with consumerism as part of a universalised measure of development.  
The analysis of this thesis suggests that farmer suicides are a direct result of the 
systemic ideological legitimation of risk differentiation, social aspiration and 
individualisation associated with this approach to risk in the Telangana agrarian 
context.   
 
The pervasive legitimation of neo-liberal values suggests the need for inclusive 
public deliberation to encourage reflexivity on the meaning of development itself.  
This could involve the greater engagement of politicians in public forums where 
such themes are articulated, and visits to villages to speak to agricultural labourers 
at work in the fields.  This more direct approach was used to good effect by Jairam 
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Ramesh with regard to Bt bringal.  The need for this type of approach to politics is 
also asserted by Bryld (2001: 170) who argues that governments have to ‘move 
beyond generalized delegation schemes…to play a more proactive role, through 
increased awareness of the social context.’   
 
10.3 Knowledge Construction and Democratic Legitimacy in Telangana State  
This thesis has argued that the legitimation of democracy relates to attempts to 
secure a legitimate exercise of power as part of efforts to institutionalise democratic 
praxis and to construct knowledge related to risk definition.  The analysis indicates 
that the conflict regarding knowledge construction is predominantly a normative 
one, which refers to values related to inclusion, autonomy, justice and equity in the 
exercise of power in risk definition.  These values also form the basis for the 
legitimation of democracy.  The study highlights that meso level narratives related 
to the way in which power should be exercised within democratic societies are 
associated with varying degrees of legitimacy when assessed using the 
Habermasian (1996: 356) core-periphery model as a normative reference point.   
 
Kannabiran et al. (2010: 79) note that the movement for a separate state of 
Telangana raised questions regarding ‘participation, equity, power, inclusiveness, 
representation, democratic values [and] accountability’.  This led the authors to 
wonder whether a new state would result in ‘a new politics’ (ibid.).  Given the 
deeply embedded power structures in Indian politics, Maringanti (2010: 37) 
speculated whether the ‘capture of state power or redrawing of state boundaries [in 
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Telangana would] by itself accomplish anything other than a change of actors – 
keeping the scripts [as existing power relations] intact?’   
 
This thesis argues that the ongoing power struggle to secure the legitimation of risk 
and democracy in Telangana will now become central to the constitution of the state 
itself.  This supports the view of Kohli (2009: 4) that ‘Indian democracy is best 
understood by focusing not mainly on its socio-economic determinants, but on how 
power distribution…is negotiated and renegotiated.’  
  
As highlighted in the case of Bt cotton in Andhra Pradesh, the responsiveness of the 
new Telangana government to its citizens will be of crucial significance to its 
ability to secure its own legitimation.  Telangana is historically volatile, and is 
characterised by a high degree of deinstitutionalised politicisation, in conjunction 
with significant expectations for risk alleviation.  The pressure on the new state will 
be exacerbated by the presence of radical Naxalites who will seek to highlight 
social injustice as a means of undermining the state’s legitimacy.  Finally, and 
importantly, as Herring (2008b: 155) asserts, there is a strong NGO network, many 
of whom serve as ever-alert overseers on government practice.  To this end, the new 
state will be obliged to pay careful attention to the way in which agrarian risk is 
approached as an epistemic, as well as a material, concern as the basis for its own 
legitimacy.   
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This analysis of Bt cotton indicates that the incorporation of science and technology 
within the contemporary development model is associated, as Beck (1992: 19) also 
highlights, with both the creation of wealth, and of risk.  It is also clear from the 
research that a technocratic approach to the agrarian crisis does not address the 
differentiation of risk associated with power relations; instead, the study has shown 
that the adoption of Bt technology is legitimated through existing power structures 
at both the micro and the meso levels.   
 
This study of Bt cotton highlights both legitimate and illegitimate tendencies in 
relation to the exercise of power in democratic praxis in Andhra Pradesh. This is in 
line with Fraser’s (2008: 140) assertion that contemporary democracies are 
characterised by their ‘quasi-totalitarian’ tendencies.  This thesis argues that it is 
this struggle to legitimate power at the meso level which is central not only to the 
definition of risk, but also to the definition (and redefinition) of democratic praxis 
as part of the macro constitution of society.  It is also highlighted, however, that the 
potential for the institutionalisation of illegitimate power as part of the struggle to 
legitimate democracy represents a threat to the legitimacy of the democratic state 
itself. 
 
This study suggests, therefore, that the struggle to ensure the institutionalisation of a 
legitimate exercise of power capable of addressing the risk exposure of the region 
will be of vital significance not only for the legitimation of democracy, but for the 
future legitimation of Telangana state itself.  This is due not least to the centrality of 
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the struggle for social and epistemic justice in the region’s history, and its 
manifestation in contemporary Telangana as the fight to secure the legitimation of 
risk and democracy with regard to Bt cotton.  It is argued that the conflict relating to 
Bt cotton forms part of a wider concern for the alleviation of risk within the 
region’s quest for development, and the fears of its citizens for their ongoing 
exploitation as a result of an illegitimate exercise of power.   
 
Gupta (2011: 736) argues that there are opposing sources of legitimacy in the 
governance of risk, namely ‘legitimacy deriving from a privileging of scientific 
expertise and an objective science removed from politics; versus legitimacy 
deriving from innovative experiments in direct, participatory democracy.’  The 
analysis highlights that both of these aspects form part of the same legitimation 
process, and represent a tension in the legitimation of democracy as an epistemic 
concern.   
 
The current study suggests that the ‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas, [1973], 1976) 
which Bt technology represents at a political level relates crucially to the tension 
concerning the potential for an institutionalisation of an illegitimate exercise of 
power.  This would represent an unaccountable concentration of power with the 
potential to support a highly differentiated exposure to risk through the assertion of 
an elitist form of knowledge construction which would constrain the ability of 
cultivators to gain recognition for the risks associated with their local contexts.   
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The potential institutionalisation of an illegitimate exercise of power presents 
concerns not only for epistemology, but also for the legitimacy of democratic praxis 
itself.  This is evident in the controversy surrounding the legislation associated with 
the BRAI and Seed Bills, both of which would limit the new state’s capacity to 
respond to the demands of its people as part of its own concern to secure its 
democratic legitimacy.  This legislation also has the potential to threaten the state’s 
position as the apex decision-making body as the basis for the self-rule or swaraj of 
the democratic ideal.   
 
The analysis highlights the significance of the inclusion of the knowledge of 
cultivators in the attempts to bridge the epistemic gap which risk represents.  
Bohman (2006: 187) argues that the ‘epistemic benefits of diversity’ should become 
the basis of democratic legitimacy itself.  He (ibid.) asserts that ‘[r]obust solutions 
[should be seen as] as those that can be accepted from a variety of different 
perspectives.’  This thesis asserts that such an inclusion of a variety of perspectives 
is not only crucial to the legitimation of democracy given the need to combat the 
potential for the type of ‘epistemic injustice’ described by Fricker (2007); it also 
represents humanity’s best opportunity for negotiating the epistemic gap associated 
with the risk of ambiguous technologies, such as Bt crops.   
 
The analysis has explored the complex struggle for legitimation in which the state 
of Andhra Pradesh is engaged.  The new state of Telangana will be obliged to 
negotiate these potential threats to its own legitimation immediately upon its 
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formation.  The current study highlights that NGOs seek to reinforce the state’s 
democratic legitimacy through asserting the need for inclusion as the basis for 
epistemic justice, and through supporting the state’s position as the legitimate apex 
of decision-making with regard to agrarian risk. 
 
The deinstitutionalisation of democratic praxis in Telangana, and the potential for 
mass mobilisations, suggests the ongoing need for the enhanced inclusion of NGOs 
and cultivators in meso level attempts to define risk as a concern of institutionalised 
democratic decision-making.  This is particularly relevant in the case of the animal 
deaths and their links to Bt cotton in all three of the villages studied.  The anxiety of 
villagers in this regard clearly indicates the need for the greater inclusion of 
cultivators in deliberations with regard to these deaths.  These should be aimed at 
undertaking a methodical assessment of cultivators’ claims (in Telugu), and involve 
independent testing approved by NGOs, the results of which are clearly 
communicated to cultivators.   
 
Establishing closer links with civil society activists is, it is argued, not only crucial 
to addressing risk as a micro level concern, but also represents the new state’s best 
chance for gaining legitimation in a region associated with a historic struggle for 
social and epistemic justice.  As highlighted, however, the ability of the state to 
represent the needs of its people as a concern for its own legitimation relies 
crucially upon its ability to negotiate the wider power struggles in which it is 
embedded.    
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This thesis has asserted that the way in which financing for development projects is 
secured significantly influences the approach to development, given the 
conditionalities which are linked to such funding.  It has been highlighted that the 
establishment of Genome Valley in Hyderabad in 2001 was supported by aid 
funding from the UK government.  While acceptance of this funding supported the 
trend for the unregulated widespread adoption of the technology which was already 
occurring at this time, it also led to a general weakening of the state’s ability to take 
charge of the technology as a concern for its own legitimation.    
 
The new state of Telangana will be obliged to pay particular attention to the 
regulation of Bt technology given the potential for ‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas, 
[1973], 1976) which it represents, and the potential for an institutionalisation of a 
democratically illegitimate exercise of power which will represent a threat to the 
legitimacy of the state itself.   
 
The emphasis on self-sufficiency asserted by Bt cotton opponents as a resistance to 
the loss of autonomy associated with neo-liberal globalisation bears a strong 
resonance to Gandhi’s emphasis on swadeshi (self-sufficiency) and homespun 
cotton (khadi) as a means of confronting colonial exploitation.  The study highlights 
that cotton remains central to the contemporary struggle to resist exploitation as a 
concern for India’s autonomy.  This refers to competing normative perspectives as 
to the benefits of a form of self-sufficiency secured through an enhanced macro 
positioning in a globalised market, as opposed to a micro level emphasis on self-
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sufficient villages in which the need for global trade, and the negotiation of global 
power structures, is minimised.    
 
The current study suggests that the new state of Telangana will be required to serve 
as a mediator between power relations in both global and local contexts.  Here, 
epistemology on risk will need to be negotiated as both a local contextualised 
concern, and as part of a wider negotiation of decontextualised power related to the 
global commodification of knowledge associated with initiatives such as the TRIPs 
agreement and the Indo-US Knowledge Initiative (Raina, 2006).   
 
The analysis also indicates, however, that the discourse of risk is contributing to a 
heightened awareness of democratic principles, such as equity and justice, as the 
basis not only for democratic legitimacy, but for development itself.  Thus, risk 
represents the potential for a form of development which involves, through a 
process of legitimation, a ‘transformation towards justice, inclusiveness and 
sustainability’ (Korten, 1990, as cited in Pieterse, 2001: 82).   This thesis argues 
that, while such a transformation is contingent upon the power struggle entailed in 
the legitimation of risk and democracy in local contexts, it is also informed by, and 
has significant implications, for the wider struggle to legitimate risk and democracy 
as a global concern.   
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10.4 Legitimation and the Constitution of Global Society in a World at Risk 
This thesis argues that the issue of risk will become increasingly prominent in 
global society. This relates to the predicted scarcity of resources, and the 
differentiated impacts of climate change, in conjunction with a growing global 
population.  Agoramoorthy (2008: 505) estimates that, by 2050, humanity will 
require resources at double the rate that it can produce them.  Tuteja and Tuteja 
(2009: 282) argue that, in the case of India, land constraints and water shortage will 
form the basis of the differentiation of risk associated with climate change. These 
authors (ibid.) also argue that India’s best opportunity for confronting the risk of 
climate change will be through the development of ‘eco-friendly, indigenous 
technologies’.   
 
The current analysis indicates that risk will continue to be differentiated, regardless 
of the technologies which are introduced, as long as land and water resources are 
differentially allocated within a neo-liberal economic system which legitimates a 
highly atomised response to risk.  This thesis has previously highlighted the 
legitimation of food left to rot in godowns (warehouses) in a country in which 
millions are hungry (Deccan Chronicle, 7/9/2010) as part of the neo-liberal market 
rationale.  This highlights that the central risk in risk society is in the power 
relations which legitimate it. 
 
This thesis asserts that its central finding that a cooperative response to risk 
supported by a more legitimate exercise of power will alleviate the risk exposure of 
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the collective generally can be extrapolated to a global context.  This would suggest 
that the most legitimate response to securing ontological survival in a world at risk 
would be to seek to minimise the risk exposure of the collective of humanity.  This 
is not simply a moral concern, but also a pragmatic one.  Beck (1992: 23), too, 
highlights that the current differentiated approach to risk is associated with a 
‘boomerang effect’ which will eventually endanger humanity as a whole.   
 
Beck (2009: 188) notes that the global nature of contemporary risks opens up ‘a 
complex moral and political space of responsibility’ as ‘meanings of proximity, 
reciprocity, dignity, justice and trust’ (ibid.) are transformed.  This thesis argues 
that such a concern for the global collective requires that local legitimation 
processes are perceived as part of a wider, decontextualised, struggle for the 
legitimation of risk and democracy globally.  Thus, it is argued that attempts to 
legitimate risk and democracy are contextualised, but also informed by a wider 
decontextualised ideological struggle.  This is noted by Scoones (2008: 339) who 
argues that, although local protests against GM crops have ‘taken on very distinct 
characters’, they are also globally informed.  Here, the discourse of risk concerning 
GM crops serves as a framework for the articulation of the struggle for social and 
epistemic justice as part of the global concern for the legitimation of risk and 
democracy.   
 
This thesis has asserted that local protests are determined by the specificities of 
power relations involved in local processes of legitimation.  However, it has also 
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indicated that these local protests are ideologically supported through wider global 
discourses of resistance both to Bt technology and neoliberalism.  This is 
highlighted by the fact that all of the NGOs involved in the current study are funded 
by international NGOs and civil society organisations. Herring (2010: 614) claims 
that discourses of risk related to Bt technology ‘have diffused to and from India in 
global networks.’ He (ibid.) also argues that the ‘claims [of the global network of 
opposition] have proved either false or inconsistent with dynamics on the ground.’  
This is not the finding of this study where it is argued that the global discourse of 
risk not only informs, but is also inspired by, local struggles to legitimate risk and 
democracy as a direct concern of the material reality of risk in those contexts.   
 
It is argued that this global struggle for the legitimation of risk and democracy is 
being spear-headed by international NGOs, in much the same way as many NGOs 
drive protests in local contexts.  Kuper (2004: 175) asserts the growing power of 
international NGOs in global deliberations, arguing that ‘one thousand six hundred 
NGOs have consultative status [in the United Nations]’, and ‘twenty NGOs meet 
with the UN Security Council’ (ibid.: 176).   
 
The emergence of this global process of legitimation is, it is argued, associated with 
the constitution of a global society, contextualised as a concern for the planet and 
informed by the concern for social and epistemic justice on behalf of the collective 
of humanity.  This is also asserted by Clark (2007: 210) who claims there is an 
‘emerging reality of world society.  We feel its presence through the alternative 
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normative principles that it enshrines, however embryonic and unsettled these might 
remain.’  He (ibid.) also asserts that ‘[n]ew norms will emerge from this process of 
negotiation as power-holders are obliged to accommodate some of the demands as a 
concern for their own legitimacy.’  Similarly, Strydom  (2002: 43) asserts that the 
‘dynamics involving both power exertion and conflict…constitute a process of 
construction of both national and global society…which is more fundamental than 
regular political competition and economic conflict’.  This thesis argues that Bt 
technology is central to this wider legitimation struggle which is serving to 
contribute to the constitution of global society.   
 
Strydom (2008: 8) asserts that attempts to construct and define risk are not simply 
about ‘problem-solving.’ They are also about ‘creating and bringing a new world 
into being’ (ibid.).  As part of this, Glover (2002: 2738) argues that political 
decision-makers ‘need to be able to scrutinise seductive development narratives 
critically and invite other perspectives and interests to propose their own critique.’ 
This thesis asserts, however, that the ability of political actors to make critical 
judgments on development narratives depends upon the way in which risk is 
mediated through power relations globally.  This is due to the inherent inequality in 
risk exposure between states, and the unequal access to resources globally.  Thus, 
Beck  (2009: 178) highlights, the ‘unequal exposure to risk…must be treated as 
largely an expression and product of power relations at the national and global 
levels.’  
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Pieterse (2001: 159) questions, ‘[w]ouldn’t it be more appropriate to make 
contingency part of the understanding of development? It would mean redefining 
development as a collective learning experience.’  It is clear from the current 
analysis, however, that such collective learning needs to entail an awareness of the 
power struggle associated with knowledge construction, and the ability to 
distinguish legitimacy from illegitimacy in the exercise of power with regard to 
attempts to secure the legitimation of risk and democracy.  The full implications of 
such illegitimate uses of power also need to be recognised in terms of their potential 
to expose the wider collective to risk.   
 
This thesis argues that management of power relations entails the ability to 
recognise legitimate power through its contribution to promoting a cooperative 
response to risk alleviation as a concern for social and epistemic justice at local, 
national and global levels.   This forms the basis of the struggle in the legitimation 
of risk and democracy with regard to Bt technology. 
 
The current study suggests that ongoing attempts to construct knowledge on the 
risks of GM crops will continue to raise the need for transparent and inclusive 
global deliberation to support national legitimation processes.  In terms of Bt 
technology, it is argued that global attempts at knowledge construction need to be 
inclusive of discourses of risk asserted in local contexts, not only as a concern for 
epistemology, but also for the legitimacy of an emergent democratic praxis at a 
global level.  Within this, the struggle of international NGOs to broaden the basis 
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for knowledge construction will continue to serve as a counter-weight to attempts 
by global power holders at closure through the dismissal of local discourses of risk 
and the institutionalisation of democratically illegitimate bodies at a global level.  
These would seek to establish an authoritarian form of governance beneath the 
guise of an ostensibly legitimate democratic praxis as a global concern.    
 
Giri and Van Ufford (2004: 28) argue for the need for ‘development as 
responsibility’, and a new morality focussed on our ‘acknowledged dependence’ as 
part of the negotiation of risk.  This is particularly pertinent in risk society given the 
profound inter-connectivity of local and global contexts.  This thesis argues, 
however, that responsibility in risk society must entail a critical re-evaluation of 
needs.  This would involve a legitimation of the needs relevant to local contexts, 
and the identification of ways in which these can be fulfilled through sustainable 
means with consideration for the safety of the collective of humanity. 
 
Strydom (2009: 77) argues that ‘the question of authentic needs...can be answered 
neither by science nor by the political institutions since it concerns what we really 
want, how we really want to live, what kind of a society we really desire [and] what 
we would really find good.’  This current study suggests that the question of 
legitimate needs forms the basis for the ‘critical re-evaluation of both Western and 
non-Western cultures, and the encounter between them’ which Marglin (1990: 26, 
as cited in Ziai, 2004: 1051) argues is crucial to a fundamental re-definition of the 
concept of development.    
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Within the attempt to draw attention to ‘the manifold, real, self-critical voices’ of a 
country in the Global South which Beck (2009: 211) asserts is central to 
understanding risk society, this thesis has revealed a clear critique of neo-liberal 
values.  These are formulated on the basis of constructed needs which emphasise 
consumerism, acquisition and differentiation as the basis for human development.  
The impact of these values on the struggle to legitimate risk and democracy within 
the local context of Telangana has been highlighted, where they contribute to 
indebtedness, and lead the state into a legitimation trap which involves it in taking 
risks as a trade off for economic growth.   
 
The study highlights that greater awareness is required by those in the West of the 
way in which the legitimation of values associated with conspicuous consumption 
and competition is serving to exacerbate the risk exposure of the collective of 
humanity, and to threaten democratic legitimacy world-wide.  This recognition has 
led Pleyers (2010: 176) to argue that ‘[w]hat we need are struggles, constructive 
actions and a change of values.’ Here, citizens of less directly vulnerable Western 
states, are called upon to take responsibility for their part in exacerbating the risk of 
humanity as a whole through the values which they are contributing to legitimating 
within their local contexts.   
 
Frankl (1967: 117 as cited in Giri, 2012: 195) argues that ‘deep down man is 
dominated neither by the will to pleasure nor by the will to power but by the will to 
meaning: his deep-seated striving and struggling for a higher and ultimate meaning 
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to his existence.’ This thesis has sought to highlight that the struggle for 
legitimation with regard to Bt cotton represents a profoundly normative one in 
which the meaning of our relations to each other, as the basis for our ontological 
survival, are being challenged.  Thus, as Banerjee (2007: 170) notes, ‘[t]he 
questions that need to be asked are…how do we understand ourselves and our 
world and how should we negotiate our relationships with ourselves?’   
 
This thesis recognises that, as Joshi (as cited in Omvedt, 1993: 318) highlights, 
‘there is no utopia; we only move from one flawed society to another.’  However, it 
has also attempted to highlight that distinctions with regard to legitimacy can, and 
must be, made as a concern not only for the normative direction of a given society, 
but also for the ontological survival of humanity as a whole.   
 
It is recognised that a perfectly legitimate exercise of power will never be possible.  
However, it is argued that the closer the approximation to such a legitimate exercise 
of power in local, national and global contexts, the lower the potential for an unjust 
differentiation of risk and a reductionist construction of knowledge which will 
exacerbate the risk exposure for the collective.  As such, it is argued that the 
ongoing struggle for the legitimation of risk and democracy is central to the 
negotiation of risk society, not only as a concern for social and epistemic justice, 
but for the ontological survival of humanity as a whole. 
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Appendix 5.1 
 
Consent Form:  Village Sarpanch 
 
RESEARCH APPROVAL 
(for verbal translation into Telugu) 
 
 
I _______________________________ (sarpanch of …) confirm that I agree that the 
village of … can be used as a research location for the PhD project of Elaine Desmond 
from University College Cork, Ireland.   
 
I understand this project will look at Bt cotton, and will involve interviews with selected 
villagers in order to discover the different impact of the crop for various households 
within the village. 
 
It has been explained that the identities of the village and the participants in the research 
will be protected.   
 
It has also been explained that information gathered will be used for the purposes of the 
PhD research, academic papers and creative projects and that the anonymity of the 
participants will be respected throughout. 
 
SIGNED:  ______________________________________ DATE:  __________ 
RESEARCHER:  _________________________________             DATE:  __________ 
WITNESS:  ____________________________________ DATE:  ___________ 
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Appendix 5.2 
 
Consent Form: Participants 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
(verbally translated into Telugu) 
 
I __________________________ agree to participate in Elaine Desmond’s research 
study on GM crops. 
 
The purpose and nature of the study has been explained to me in writing. 
 
I am participating voluntarily. 
 
I give permission for my interviews with Elaine Desmond to be tape-recorded 
 
I understand that I can withdraw permission to use the data within two weeks of the start 
of the research, in which case any material collected will be destroyed. 
 
I understand that anonymity will be ensured in the write-up by disguising my identity. 
 
I understand that disguised extracts from my interview may be quoted in the thesis and 
any subsequent publications if I give permission below: 
 
(Please tick one box:) 
I agree to quotation/publication of extracts from my interview   
I do not agree to quotation/publication of extracts from my interview  
 
 
Signed  _________________________   Date  _______________ 
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Appendix 5.3 
 
Confidentiality Agreement with Translator 
 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
 
 
I confirm that the identities of research participants to whom I am introduced as part of 
my work as translator for Elaine Desmond will be respected. 
 
I confirm that the identity of the village(s) where this research is based will be kept 
confidential. 
 
I confirm that information which is disclosed to me as part of this work will remain 
confidential, and that the anonymity of research participants will be respected. 
 
 
 
 
 
SIGNED:   _______________________________ 
 
DATE:  __________________________________ 
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Appendix 5.4 
 
Interview Guide for Qualitative Village Interviews 
 
How long have you lived in …? 
What is your age?   
Where did you live before/what caused you to move?   
What changes have you seen in … in that time? 
What do you like/dislike about living in …? 
How many are in your family? 
How many brothers/sisters do you have? 
Are your parents alive? 
How many children do you have?  Nieces/nephews? 
Do they all live in the village? 
Are your brothers/sisters at school?  What age did they leave? 
Are your children at school?  What age did they leave? 
Where do they work?  In the village, etc.  What do they do for work? 
 
Ownership of assets 
Do you own land? 
If yes, how much?   
How did you come to own the land? 
Do you have animals? 
Is your land irrigated? 
 
Bt cotton 
What caused you to start growing Bt cotton? 
Are you pleased with it? 
Do you like growing Bt crops?  If yes, why?  If not, why don’t you change to non-Bt 
cotton or other crops? 
Have you seen good yields?  What did you grow before? 
Does the seed dealer give loans? 
How do you know you are getting genuine GM seeds and not second generation hybrids 
or non-Bt seeds? 
What are the main differences between growing Bt and non-Bt cotton? 
Have you experienced any problems in growing Bt cotton?  What are they? 
How has life changed for you since the introduction of Bt cotton? 
Is pesticide use more or less with Bt cotton? 
Is there a higher yield with Bt cotton? 
How is the price for the harvest set? 
How are you paid? 
Do you employ others? 
Has the need for labour increased with Bt cotton? 
Are you finding new pests? 
Are you better off since growing Bt cotton? 
Has there been any impact on the environment as you’ve seen it? 
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Are you in favour of Bt aubergine?   
Have you heard of any problems that others have had with Bt cotton? 
 
Non-landed 
Do you always work for the same farmer? 
Do you get advanced payment before the season starts? 
How long have you been working for others? 
How much are you paid per day? 
Has Bt cotton changed things for you? 
Was there land redistribution?  Why did you not get land as part of that? 
Do you receive a share of the crop at the end of the season?  How much? 
How is that divided at the end of the season? 
Do you always work for the same farmer? 
Do you have employment opportunities outside of farming?  
Can you go to other villages to work?  
How many people in the household work on the land? 
 
Diet 
What is your daily diet? 
Do you buy most of your food?  Where?   
Do you get PDS help?  Does it work well?  Do you have enough food? 
Has your diet changed since Bt cotton? 
Do you buy all your food?   
 
Health 
Are you and your family in good health? 
Who do you see if you have a health problem?  Is it free? 
Have there been health issues with regard to Bt cotton? 
 
Household income  
Talk me through the income of the household – who works, for how long and how much 
would they bring in? 
Are you paid in advance of the season for your work on the cotton fields?  What are your 
outgoings other than food?   
How often would natural disasters such as floods or famines occur?  How do you survive 
these poor seasons? 
Do you receive help from the government – subsidies, etc? 
Are you in debt? 
How did the debt arise? 
Who do you owe the money to?   
How much do you owe?   
How will you repay it? 
What happens if you do not repay the debt? 
Are you less/more in debt since the introduction of Bt cotton?   Why? 
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Democracy 
Are you active in the Panchayat? 
Do you attend Gram Sabha meetings? 
Do you feel the Panchayat does a good job for village development?  How? 
Do you feel the Indian political system works? 
Why/why not? 
Do you vote in sarpanch/MLA elections? 
Do you feel voting makes a difference? 
Which has the most influence in your life – the sarpanch or MLA? 
Do you feel represented at a political level? 
Do you feel politicians listen to you/are interested in you? 
Are the government/industry interested in the concerns of farmers regarding Bt crops?  
Do they visit farms/talk to farmers? 
What does Telangana mean to you? 
 
Caste 
Is caste still important in the village?  In what way? 
Are the traditional occupations still carried out by particular castes in the village? 
 
Suicides 
What is causing farmers to take their own lives in Warangal?  Have there been any 
suicides in this village? 
How do you feel about the suicides?  What should be done to stop them? 
Do you feel the government cares?  Does it do enough? 
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Appendix 5.5 
 
Interview Guide for Quantitative Village Interviews 
 
Income/expenditure account for Bt/non-Bt cotton: 
 
 
Name  ________________________ 
 
Village  _______________________ 
 
Number of acres planted  _________ 
 
Seed Varieties __________________ 
 
Soil Type ______________________ 
 
End of Season Income: 
 
Quintals per acre      _____________ 
 
Price per quintal Rs  _____________ 
 
Total Income    Rs  ______ 
 
Expenditure: 
 
Purchases 
 
Seeds Rs  ______ 
 
Machinery Rs  ______ 
  
Oxen Hire    Rs  ______ 
 
Tractor Hire Rs  ______ 
 
Land lease Rs  ______ 
 
Fertilisers Rs  ______    Number of uses    _____ 
Pesticides        Rs _______   Number of sprays  _____ 
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Labour Rs _______   Rate per day         _____   
Number of workers  _____ 
Members of family employed _____  Paid? _____ 
Irrigation  Rs  ______   
Fuel  Rs  ______ 
 
Crop share with  
workers  Rs  ______ 
 
Livestock 
Maintenance  Rs  ______ 
 
Transport to  
Market  Rs  ______ 
 
 
Other costs  Rs  ______ 
 
Total Expenses       Rs  ______ 
 
PROFIT/LOSS          Rs  ______ 
 
 
 
Level of Debt  Rs  ______ 
 
Causes of Debt 
 
 
 
 
Debt Repayment   Rs  ______ 
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Seasonal break-down of Costs 
 
 
Ploughing 
  
Number of workers 
 
Daily rate Rs  _____  Number of days  _____ 
 
Other costs 
 
Sowing 
 
Number of workers 
 
Daily rate Rs  _____  Number of days  _____ 
 
Seeds  Rs  _____ 
 
Other costs 
 
Weeding 
 
Number of times 
 
Number of workers 
 
Daily rate Rs  _____  Number of days  _____ 
 
Other costs 
 
Harvesting 
 
Number of times 
 
Number of workers 
 
Daily rate Rs  _____  Number of days  _____ 
 
Other costs 
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Appendix 6.1 
 
Village Composition 
Bantala, 2010/2011 
 
 
Caste  Traditional 
Occupation 
Number of 
households 
Land-holding in 
acres  
per caste¹ 
Forward Castes    
Vaishya Merchants, land-
owners, money-lenders 
4 40 
    
Backward Castes    
Kuruma² Shepherds 90 1,100 
Gowda Cattle breeders/toddy 
tappers 
80 250 
Are Agriculture 10 100 
Vadrangi Carpenters 10 90 
Chakali Washermen 20 80 
Kapu/Munnuru Kapu Land owners 10 70 
Reddy Land-owners  8 70  
Kumari  Potter 5 25 
Kamari Blacksmith 8 20 
Mangali Barber 5 20 
Padmashali Weavers 8 15 
    
Scheduled Castes    
Madiga³ Leather workers 150 300 (of which 
only 150 acres 
cultivated)4 
Mala Weaving, watchmen, 
agricultural labourers 
20 50 
Total  428 2,120 
         
¹ Ranked according to land holding within caste categories.      
² Dominant caste and Kuruma sarpanch. 
³ Majority population  
4 This includes uncleared land from land redistribution which has here been allocated to the Madigas, 
but is unfit for cultivation. 
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Appendix 6.2 
 
Village Composition 
Nandanapuram, 2010/2011 
 
 
 
Caste  Traditional 
Occupation 
Number of 
households 
Land-holding in 
acres  
per caste¹ 
Forward Castes    
Vaishya Merchants, land-owners, 
money-lenders 
5 15  
Brahmins Priests, teachers, 
administrators 
2 14 
    
Backward Castes    
Gowda² Cattle breeders/toddy 
tappers 
200 496 
Boya Hunters 250 300 
Kumari Potter 40  200 
Reddy Land-owners** 20 100 
Yadava Cattle Herding 22 50 
Vadla Carpenters 20 20 
Chakali (dhobi) Washermen 10 5 
Darji Tailors 2 2 
    
Scheduled Castes     
Madiga Leather workers 400* 700 
Total  971  1,902 
 
¹ Ranked according to land holding within caste categories.    
² The sarpanch is a female BC Gowda.    
 
 
* Scheduled Caste Madigas are numerically in the majority in Nandanapuram, but are not 
identified as dominant given their low caste ranking and high degree of landlessness.  
Instead, power is negotiated between Backward Caste Gowdas, Boyas and Reddys, as well 
as Scheduled Caste Madigas.   
 
** Although the land-holding of Reddys in Nandanapuram is comparatively small 
compared to Gowdas, Boyas, Kumaris and Madigas, they are nonetheless identified by 
villagers as being powerful (though less so than previously).  This relates to the wider 
power with which the jati is associated in Andhra Pradesh, and highlights the way in which 
power relations within wider society serve to intersect with village power structures.    
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Appendix 6.3 
 
Village Composition 
Orgampalle, 2010/2011 
 
 
 
Caste  Traditional 
Occupation 
Number of 
households 
Land-holding in 
acres  
per caste 
    
Backward Castes    
Mudhiraj¹ Agriculture 48 236 
Yadava Cattle Herding 2 25 
Chakali  Washermen 2 25 
    
Total  52 286 
 
¹ Dominant Caste. 
The sarpanch (a male BC Mannuru Kappu) is located in a neighbouring village.  
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Appendix 6.4 
 
‘Rules’ of Orgampalle Village  
(Translation from Telugu) 
 
 
1. We farmers follow organic cultivation methods. 
2. We prepare our own seeds. 
3. We grow mixed crops. 
4. Every household grows trees. 
5. We grow vegetables in the backyard of every house. 
6. We will develop the dairy industry. 
7. In every family, the farmer will be a member of the self-help group.¹  
8. Every farmer will maintain a register giving details of how their crops are 
cultivated. 
 
9. Farmers will abide by the conditions agreed upon by the village society 
and Crops [Jangaon]. 
 
10. We ban GM crops. 
11. We will make other farmers aware of organic methods. 
12. We will dig no more borewells. 
13. Every farmer who has sufficient water will share it with others. 
 
Sky water (rain) is sacred, river water is more sacred, ground water is the most 
sacred.  We will conserve rain water, and increase ground water. 
 
 
¹ Organised by Crops Jangaon 
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 Appendix 6.5 
 
Caste Wards and Locations of Participants  
 
BANTALA 
2010/2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FC: Forward (upper) caste;  
BC: Backward Caste;  
SC: Scheduled Caste;  
T – Temple; WP – Water Purifier; WT – Water Tank; Church for small Christian minority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SC 
Madiga 
 
ASHNA 
NIPA 
BC 
Kammari/Chakali/ 
Gowda 
T 
BC Mannuru Kapu/ 
Gowda 
BC Kuruma/Kummari/ 
Chakali 
SC Madiga 
SC Mala 
 
SUDEEP 
SC Madiga 
FC Vaishya 
 
PAVAN 
BC Gowda/ 
Chakali 
 
NATESH 
S
ch
o
ol
 
BC: Gowda/ 
Vadrangi 
BC: Reddy 
SUDHAKAR 
Panchayat Office 
T BC Kuruma 
BC Kuruma/Are/ 
Padmashali/ 
Mangali 
 
ABANI 
BC  
Are 
BC 
Kuruma 
 
CHITTA 
BC 
Kuruma 
BC 
Kuruma 
T 
Church 
W
P 
Fields 
Fields 
Fields 
Village Main Street 
W
T 
W
T
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Appendix 6.6 
 
Caste Wards and Locations of Participants 
 
NANDANAPURAM  
2010/2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FC: Forward (upper) caste;  
BC: Backward Caste;  
SC: Scheduled Caste;  
T – Temple; WT – Water Tank; PO – Post Office 
 
 
SC  
Madiga 
 
AMBU, SALMA, NISHOK  
BC Boya 
T FC Brahmin 
 
CHARAN,  
RASHI 
 
 
Panchayat  
Office 
Village 
Tank 
 
BC  
Vadla,  
Darji  
 
PO 
 
FC 
Vaishya  
 
BC  
Yadava, 
Kumari 
 
NAND 
 
WT 
T 
Fields 
Well 
 
BC Reddy 
 
NIKHIL 
 
T 
NPM  
Shop 
Villag
e
 C
e
ntre
 
School 
BC  
Chakali 
 
RANJAN 
BC 
Gowda 
 
RAJIV, ANSHUL 
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Appendix 6.7 
 
Caste Wards and Locations of Participants 
 
ORGAMPALLE 
2010/2011 
 
 
 
  
FC: Forward (upper) caste;  
BC: Backward Caste;  
SC: Scheduled Caste;  
T – Temple; WT – Water Tank;  
* The Panchayat Office is located in neighbouring village. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School 
T 
 
To the 
fields 
 
BC Mudhiraj  
 
ARUNI, 
SAJAN 
BC 
Yadava 
 
PRAKASH, 
NIRMAL 
 
BC Chakali 
 
AMITA, 
ACAHNDA 
WT 
 
BC Mudhiraj  
 
PRADNESH, 
AKHIL 
 
Fields 
To the 
fields 
Organic 
Training 
Centre 
 
T 
WT Village Centre 
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Appendix 6.8 
 
Total Cultivation Costs per Participant, 
 Bantala Risk Coalitions, 2010/2011 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
Name Land-holding of 
cotton 
Tractor 
Ownership 
(%) 
Oxen 
Ownership 
(%) 
Irrigation 
(%) 
Cultivation 
Costs per 
acre 
 
Average BT  16 50 50 16,733 
 
Pavan 
(FC) 
20 acres (17 
leased) 
 
No Yes Wet 17,000 
Sudhakar 
(BC) 
5 acres (4 leased) Yes No Wet 19,000 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
ab
le
) 
Chitta 
(BC) 
7 acres (5 leased) No Yes Wet 19,800 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
  
10.6 acres 
    
18,600 
Natesh 
(BC) 
4 acres (all leased) No Yes**  Dry 20,000 
Ashna 
(SC) 
2 acres No No Dry  9,800* 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Sudeep 
(SC) 
1 acre No No Dry 14,800 
A
v
er
ag
e:
 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
  
2 acres 
    
14,866 
* Crop lost mid-way through season. 
** Sold mid-way through season.  
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Appendix 6.9 
 
Total Cultivation Costs per Participant,  
Nandanapuram Risk Coalitions, 2010/2011 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
Name Land-
holding of 
cotton 
Tractor 
Ownership 
(%) 
Oxen 
Ownership 
(%) 
Irrigation 
(%) 
Cultivation 
Costs per acre 
 Average NP  12.5 37.5 37.5 18,625 
 
Charan 
(FC) 
8 acres No Yes Dry 19,300 
Nikhil 
(BC) 
10 acres Yes Yes Wet 23,000 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
ab
le
) 
Nand (BC) 
(NPM) 
 
3 acres No No Dry 12,800 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
  
9 acres (Bt) 
 
3 acres 
(NPM) 
 
   18,366 
 
21,250 Bt 
12,800 NPM 
Anshul (BC) 
 
2 acres No No Dry 15,700 
Rajiv (BC) 
 
4 acres (2 
acres leased) 
 
No No Wet 27,000 
Nishok (SC) 
(NPM) 
 
2 acres No No Dry 10,700 
Rashi 
(FC) 
 
2 acres No No Dry 20,000 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Ambu (SC) 
 
3 acres No Yes Wet 20,500 
A
v
er
ag
e:
 
R
isk
 
C
o
al
iti
o
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
 
  
2.75 (Bt) 
 
2 (NPM) 
   18,780 
 
20,800 Bt 
10,700 NPM 
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Appendix 6.10 
 
Total Cultivation Costs per Participant,  
Orgampalle Risk Coalitions, 2010/2011 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
Name Land-
holding of 
cotton 
Tractor 
Ownership 
(%) 
Oxen 
Ownership 
(%) 
Irrigation 
(%) 
Cultivation 
Costs per acre 
 
Average OR  14 85 14 10,300 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
 
Pradnesh  
(BC) 
 
4 acres 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Dry 
 
9,100 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
C
o
st
 
C
oa
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
 
 
 
4 acres 
    
9,100 
Akhil  
(BC) 
1.5 acres No Yes Dry 6,700 
Nirmal 
(BC) 
3 acres No Yes Dry 8,300 
Achanda 
(BC) 
3 acres (all 
leased) 
No Yes Wet* 16,200 
Prakash 
(BC) 
1.5 acres No Yes Dry 8,400 
Aruni 
(BC) 
1.5 acres No Yes Dry 8,000 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Amita 
(BC) 
1 acre No No Dry 15,400 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
C
o
st
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
 
1.9 acres 
    
10,500 
* Not used for cotton cultivation 
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Appendix 6.11 
Break-down of Cultivation Costs per Participant,  
Bantala Risk Coalitions, 2010/2011 
  
  
 
                                               
Risk 
Coalitions 
Name Seed 
Cost 
per 
acre 
(Rs) 
Pesticide 
Costs per 
acre (Rs) 
Number 
of 
pesticide 
sprays 
Fertiliser 
Costs per 
acre (Rs) 
Number 
of 
fertiliser 
uses 
Labour 
Costs 
per 
acre 
(Rs) 
Tractor 
Hire 
per 
acre 
(Rs) 
Oxen 
Hire 
per 
acre 
(Rs) 
Total 
Cost of 
Land 
Lease 
 Average 
(BT) 
 2,700 
(N=5) 
7  
(N=5) 
2,090 
(N=5) 
4 
(N=5) 
8,200   21,000 
(N=4) 
Pavan 
(FC) 
750 3,200 8 2,250 3 6,100 0 0 51,000 
 
Rs 
3,000 
per acre 
50:50 
share of 
profits/ 
costs 
Sudhakar 
(BC) 
750 3,000 6 2,500 5 10,000 0 0 8,000 
 
Rs 
2,000 
per acre 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Chitta 
(BC)  
750 5,000 10 1,700 4 9,200 2,000 0 15,000  
 
Rs 
3,000 
per acre 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
 
 
750 
 
3,733 
 
8 
 
2,150 
 
4 
 
8,433 
 
  666 
 
0 
 
74,000 
Natesh  
(BC) 
750 3,500 7 2,500 5 8,300 0 0 10,000 
 
Rs 
2,500 
per acre 
Ashna  
(SC) 
950 0 0 0 0 8,800 2,000 1,300 0 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Sudeep  
(SC) 
750 1,500 3 1,500 3 7,300 0 1,500 0 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
 
820 
 
2,500 
 
5 
 
2,000 
 
4 
 
8,133 
 
  666 
 
  933 
 
10,000 
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Appendix 6.12 
Break-down of Cultivation Costs per Participant,  
Nandanapuram Risk Coalition, 2010/2011 
 
 
 
   
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
Name Seed 
Cost 
per 
acre 
(Rs) 
Pesticide 
Costs per 
acre (Rs) 
Number 
of 
Pesticide 
Sprays 
Fertiliser 
Costs per 
acre (Rs) 
Number 
of 
Fertiliser 
Uses 
Labour 
Costs 
per 
acre 
(Rs) 
Tractor 
Hire per 
acre (Rs) 
Oxen 
Hire 
per 
acre 
(Rs) 
Total 
Cost of 
Land 
Lease 
(Rs) 
 Mean (NP) 800 3,958 
(N=6) 
7.1 (N=6) 2,272 
(N=8) 
3.5  
(N=8) 
9,746 1,325 1,957 10,000 
(N=1) 
Charan 
(FC) 
1250 3,000 4 3,200 4 10,275 2,000 0 0 
Nikhil 
(BC) 
1000 5,250 7 3,000 4 10,900 0 0 0 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Nand (BC) 
(NPM) 
0 0 0 1,000 2 10,200 1,200 4,500 0 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
 
 
1125 
 
4,125 
(N=2) 
 
5.5  
(N=2) 
 
 
3,100 (Bt) 
1,000 
(NPM) 
 
4 (Bt) 
2 (NPM) 
 
10,458 
 
1,066 
 
1,500 
 
0 
Anshul 
(BC) 
850 3,000 6 1,680 3 8,000 1,600 2,000 0 
Rajiv 
(BC) 
750 5,600 10 3,000 5 10,700 1,600 4,000 10,000  
 
(Rs 
5,000 
per 
acre) 
Nishok 
(SC) 
(NPM) 
500 0 0 700 1 7,500 1,800 1,560 0 
Rashi 
(FC) 
 
750 2,700 9 3,000 5 8,500 1,200 3,600 0 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Ambu (SC) 
 
800 4,200 7 2,600 4 11,900 1,200 0 0 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
 
780 (Bt) 
500 
(NPM) 
 
3,875  
(N = 4) 
 
8 
(N=4) 
 
Rs 2,570 
(Bt) 
Rs 700 
(NPM) 
 
4.25 (Bt) 
1 (NPM) 
 
9,320 
 
1,480 
 
2,232 
 
2,500 
(Bt) 
0 
(NPM) 
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Appendix 6.13 
Break-down of Cultivation Costs per Participant, 
Orgampalle Risk Coalitions, 2010/2011 
 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
Name Cost of 
seeds 
per 
acre  
(Rs) 
Pesticide 
Costs per 
acre (Rs) 
Number 
of 
pesticide 
sprays 
Fertiliser 
Costs per 
acre (Rs) 
Number 
of 
Fertiliser 
Uses 
Labour 
Costs per 
acre (Rs) 
Tractor 
Hire 
per 
acre 
(Rs) 
Oxen 
Hire 
per 
acre 
(Rs) 
Total 
Cost of 
Land 
Lease 
(Rs) 
 Mean 
(OR) 
 0 0 0 0 7,542 2,633 
(N=3) 
3,000 
(N=1) 
6,500 
(N=1) 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
 
Pradnesh 
(BC) 
 
450 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
7,300 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
 
 
450 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
7,300 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Akhil 
(BC) 
500 0 0 0 0 5,400 0 0 0 
Nirmal 
(BC) 
475 0 0 0 0 6,600 1,300 0 0 
Achanda 
(BC) 
475 0 0 0 0 7,800 600 0 6,500 
(Half 
profit 
share)  
Prakash 
(BC) 
475 0 0 0 0 5,800 0 0 0 
Aruni 
(BC) 
600 0 0 0 0 6,500 0 0 0 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Amita 
(BC) 
475 0 0 0 0 13,400 6,000 3,000 0 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
 
500 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
7,583 
 
1,316 
 
500 
 
1,083 
 386 
Appendix 6.14 
 
Yields, Selling Price and Profit and Loss per Participant,  
Bantala Risk Coalitions, 2010/2011 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
 Yields per acre 
(quintals) 
Best price per  
quintal (Rs) 
Total Profit/ 
(Loss)  
(Rs) 
Average BT  4.3 4,725 15,250 
Pavan 
(FC) 
6.5  6,000 102,000 
Sudhakar 
(BC) 
4 3,800 (20,000) 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Chitta 
(BC) 
5 4,250 19,100 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
 
 
5 
 
4,600 
 
33,700 
Natesh 
(BC) 
5.5 5,100 10,200 
Ashna 
(SC) 
0 (entire crop lost) 0 (19,600) 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Sudeep 
(SC) 
5 4,600   4,600 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
 
3.5 
 
4,850 
 
(4,800) 
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Appendix 6.15 
Yields, Selling Price and Profit and Loss per Participant,  
Nandanapuram Risk Coalitions, 2010/2011 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
 Yields per acre 
(quintals) 
Best price per  
quintal (Rs) 
Total Profit/ 
(Loss)  
(Rs) 
Average NP  5.25 4,612 68,500 (including 
NPM farmers); 
(9,350) for Bt 
farmers 
Charan (FC) 4.5 5,000 11,400 
Nikhil (BC) 
 
5 4,200 (39,200) 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Nand (BC) 
(NPM) 
9 5,300 104,500 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
 6.1 
 
4.75 Bt 
9 NPM 
4,833 
 
Rs 4,600 Bt 
Rs 5,300 NPM 
25,566 
 
(Rs 13,900) Bt 
Rs 104,500 NPM 
Anshul (BC) 4.5 4,500  8,900 
Rajiv (BC) 
 
5.5 5,000 (13,200) 
Nishok  (SC) 
(NPM) 
4.5 4,650 20,300 
Rashi (FC) 
 
8 4,050 24,800 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Ambu (SC) 
 
1 4,200 (49,000) 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 4.7 
 
4.75 Bt 
4.5 NPM 
4,480 
 
Rs 4,437 Bt 
Rs 4,650 NPM 
(1,640) 
 
(Rs 7,125) Bt 
Rs 20,300 NPM 
Ranjan 
(BC) 
0 0 0 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
re
e 
(A
t 
R
isk
) 
Salma (SC) 
 
0 0 0 
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Appendix 6.16 
 
Yields, Selling Price and Profit and Loss per Participant,  
Orgampalle Risk Coalitions, 2010/2011 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
 Yields per acre 
(quintals) 
Best price per  
quintal (Rs) 
Total Profit/ 
(Loss)  
(Rs) 
Average OR  4.6 3,838 17,968 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
 
Pradnesh 
(BC) 
 
6 
 
5,600 
 
 
56,600 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
 
 
6 
 
5,600 
 
56,600 
Akhil 
(BC) 
2.5 4,000 5,600 
Nirmal 
(BC) 
5.5 5,200 37,900 
Achanda 
(BC) 
5 4,000 16,000 
Prakash 
(BC) 
4.5 4,000 880 
Aruni 
(BC) 
3 4,000 5,100 R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Amita 
(BC) 
6 4,000 3,700 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
 
4.4 
 
4,200 
 
11,530 
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Appendix 6.17 
Debt Levels per Participant,  
Bantala Risk Coalitions, 2010/2011 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
 Debt Level Main Reasons Given Sources of  
Debt 
Average BT  186,125   
Pavan 
(FC) 
400,000 Cultivation costs (seeds, inputs, 
labour); 
Banks; People in 
other village. 
Sudhakar 
(BC) 
700,000 Buying land; Borewell; Tractor; 
Cattleshed. 
Bank; People in 
own village. 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Chitta 
(BC) 
150,000 Borewell; Cultivation costs (seeds, 
inputs, labour). 
Banks; Private 
money lender in 
another village. 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
 
 
416,000 
  
Natesh 
(BC) 
65,000 Dowry for sisters and daughter; 
Cultivation costs; Son’s private hospital 
treatment. 
Bank; People in 
own village and 
other villages. 
Ashna 
(SC) 
50,000 Labour charges (incurred this season); 
Daughter’s treatment in private 
hospital. 
Bank; 
Micro-Finance 
Institution  
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Sudeep 
(SC) 
0   
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
 
36,000 
  
Abani 
(BC) 
100,000 Private hospital – husband’s surgery. Others in own 
village. 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
re
e 
(A
t 
R
isk
) Nipa 
(SC) 
24,000 Private hospital – own health problems;  
Payment for Andhra Pradesh Rural 
Poverty Reduction Project – training to 
work as a cobbler. 
Bank (land owner 
as guarantor); 
‘Landlords’ in the 
village 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
re
e 
 
  
62,000 
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Appendix 6.18 
Debt Levels per Participant, 
Nandanapuram Risk Coalitions, 2010/2011 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
 Debt Level Main Reasons Given Sources of Debt 
Average NP  118,500   
Charan (FC) 
 
110,000 Input and labour costs. Bank; 
Person in the village. 
Nikhil 
(BC) 
250,000 Cultivation costs; 
Education of children. 
Commission agent in 
Warangal; 
Bank. 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Nand  (BC) 
(NPM) 
0   
A
v
er
ag
e:
 
D
eb
t 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
 120,000 
 
Rs 180,000 Bt 
0 NPM 
  
Anshul (BC) 
 
 80,000 Input and labour costs. Trader in another village. 
Rajiv (BC) 
 
250,000 Dowry; cultivation costs (inputs, seeds, 
labour). 
Own village. 
Nishok (SC) 
(NPM) 
25,000 Labour costs (current season). 
 
Own village. 
Rashi (FC) 
 
350,000 House construction; Dowry (of sister’s 
daughters). 
Bank; 
People in own village (own 
caste). 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Ambu (SC) 
 
110,000 Dowry; Education of children; Hospital 
bills; Input and labour costs. 
Own village; (Gowda caste) 
and people from other 
villages; Sister. 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
D
eb
t 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 163,000 
 
Rs 197,500 Bt 
Rs 25,000 
NPM 
  
Ranjan (BC) 
 
0 Previous debt due to health costs.   Family.  Sold buffalo to repay. 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
re
e 
(A
t 
R
isk
) 
Salma 
(SC) 
10,000 Lease of land for paddy cultivation and 
crop failure. 
Self-help group. 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
D
eb
t 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
re
e 
 
 
5,000 
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Appendix 6.19 
Debt Levels per Participant, 
Orgampalle Risk Coalitions, 2010/2011 
 
Risk 
Coalitions 
 Debt 
Level 
Main Reasons Given Sources of  
Debt 
Average 
OR 
 42,375   
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
 
Pradnesh 
(BC) 
 
0 
  
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
 
 
0 
  
Akhil 
(BC) 
4,000 Labour costs (2010/2011 season). People in nearby village. 
Nirmal 
(BC) 
100,000 House construction. Cross-cousin and people in 
other villages. 
Achanda 
(BC) 
50,000 Labour charges in the 2010/2011 
season. Dowry for daughters (1 lakh 
for one daughter and Rs 50,000 for 
another). 
Banks.  People in own and 
other villages. 
Prakash 
(BC) 
35,000 House construction. Bank and Crops Jangaon 
society. 
Aruni 
(BC) 
50,000 Dowry of two daughters.  Borewell 
(years ago). 
Bank;  
MFI in Jangaon. 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
Amita 
(BC) 
100,000 Dowry of four daughters; Health. People from nearby villages.  
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
 
 
56,500 
 
  
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
re
e 
(A
t 
R
isk
) 
 
Sajan 
(BC) 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
A
v
er
a
ge
: 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
re
e 
 
 
0 
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Appendix 7.1 
 
Interview Schedule for Cited Participants 
Micro Level: The Villages 
 
 
Interview 
Number 
Participant 
Pseudonym 
Date 
Bantala   
1 Chitta 23/08/2010 
2 Chitta 23/11/2010 
3 Chitta 05/02/2011 
4 Sudhakar 15/08/2010 
5 Sudhakar 24/11/2010 
6 Pavan 15/08/2010 
7 Pavan 23/11/2010 
8 Pavan 05/02/2011 
9 Sudeep 29/08/2010 
10 Sudeep 24/11/2010 
11 Ashna 08/08/2010 
12 Ashna 24/08/2010 
13 Ashna 24/11/2010 
14 Ashna 05/02/2011 
15 Natesh 14/08/2010 
16 Natesh 23/11/2010 
17 Natesh 05/02/2011 
18 Nipa 22/08/2010 
19 Nipa 23/08/2010 
20 Nipa 23/11/2010 
21 Abani 15/08/2010 
   
Nandanapuram   
22 Rashi 21/11/2010 
23 Rashi 22/01/2011 
24 Anshul 26/09/2010 
25 Anshul 23/01/2011 
26 Rajiv 26/09/2010 
27 Rajiv 23/01/2011 
28 Ambu 27/09/2010 
29 Ambu 22/01/2011 
30 Nikhil 22/11/2010 
31 Nikhil 22/01/2011 
32 Ranjan 21/11/2010 
33 Nand 22/11/2010 
34 Nand 22/01/2011 
35 Nishok 27/09/2010 
36 Nishok 23/01/2011 
37 Charan 22/11/2010 
38 Charan 23/01/2011 
39 Salma 21/11/2010 
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Interview Schedule with Cited Participants 
Micro Level: The Villages 
 
Interview 
Number 
Participant 
Pseudonym 
Date 
Orgampalle   
40 Aruni 23/10/2010 
41 Aruni 26/11/2010 
42 Aruni 13/02/2011 
43 Achanda 22/10/2010 
44 Achanda 25/11/2010 
45 Achanda 13/02/2011 
46 Amita 19/09/2010 
47 Amita 25/11/2010 
48 Amita 12/02/2011 
49 Akhil 19/09/2011 
50 Akhil 25/11/2010 
51 Akhil 12/02/2011 
52 Sajan 20/09/2010 
53 Prakash 26/11/2010 
54 Prakash 13/02/2010 
55 Pradnesh 30/09/2010 
56 Pradnesh 26/11/2010 
57 Pradnesh 12/02/2011 
58 Nirmal 22/10/2010 
59 Nirmal 26/11/2010 
60 Nirmal 13/02/2010 
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Appendix 7.2 
 
Questionnaire Results 
(Administered as Part of Interview Process),  
2010/2011 
 
 
1. I want to grow Bt cotton. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
 (N=7) 
Strongly Agree 66   
Agree 17 12  
Don’t Know 17 14  
Disagree    
Strongly Disagree  62 58 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
 
 
2. Growing Bt cotton has increased my household income. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 83  15 
Agree 17 13  
Don’t Know   15 
Disagree    
Strongly Disagree  75 28 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
 
 
3. Growing Bt cotton has led to increased crop yields. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 83 25 15 
Agree 17   
Don’t Know   15 
Disagree    
Strongly Disagree  63 28 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
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4. I have complete control of whether I grow Bt cotton or not. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 100 50 43 
Agree    
Don’t Know    
Disagree  25 15 
Strongly Disagree  13  
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
 
 
5. Bt cotton is not damaging to the environment.  
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree  12  
Agree    
Don’t Know 83 13 15 
Disagree  13  
Strongly Disagree 17 50 43 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
 
 
6. I believe Bt crops will make more food available to those who need it. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 83 13 15 
Agree   15 
Don’t Know 17 13 14 
Disagree    
Strongly Disagree  62 14 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
 
 
7. I would have no health concerns about eating Bt bringal (aubergine). 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 16   
Agree    
Don’t Know 17 13 15 
Disagree 17 25  
Strongly Disagree 50 50 43 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
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8. Growing Bt cotton has allowed myself and my family easier access to food. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 33 12 15 
Agree 33 13  
Don’t Know   15 
Disagree 17 25 14 
Strongly Disagree 17 38 14 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
 
 
9. Growing Bt cotton has made my life easier. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 50 13  
Agree 16 13 28 
Don’t Know 17  15 
Disagree 17 12  
Strongly Disagree  50 15 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
 
 
10. Fewer pesticide sprays are required on Bt cotton. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 83 38 15 
Agree   15 
Don’t Know   14 
Disagree    
Strongly Disagree 17 50 14 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
 
 
11. The government is interested in the experience of farmers who grow Bt cotton. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 50 12  
Agree  13 15 
Don’t Know   15 
Disagree 16 13 14 
Strongly Disagree 34 50 14 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
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12. Economic development, through science and technology, is essential for 
reducing poverty. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 83 75  
Agree 17 13  
Don’t Know   15 
Disagree   28 
Strongly Disagree   15 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
 
 
13. India must compete on the global economic market in order to deal with 
poverty. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 83 50 28 
Agree  25  
Don’t Know 17 13 15 
Disagree    
Strongly Disagree   15 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
 
 
14. The democratic process has led to greater equality in terms of access to 
opportunities in Indian society. 
 Bantala (%) 
(N=6) 
Nandanapuram (%) 
(N=8) 
Orgampalle (%) 
(N=7) 
Strongly Agree 83 25  
Agree  25  
Don’t Know   16 
Disagree  13  
Strongly Disagree 17 25 42 
Unaware of Bt Cotton  12 42 
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Appendix 7.3 
Discourse Analysis: Legitimation through Authorisation 
(BT = Bantala; NP = Nandanapuram; OR = Orgampalle) 
  
Bt Farmers Non-Bt Farmers 
 
BT 
 
‘When the seeds came to the shop, the dealers told us 
[about them].  So, because of that, everybody knows.’ 
 
‘The government is praising those who opt for cotton.’ 
 
‘We have seen the difference [between Bt and non-Bt 
yields] in newspapers and through TV advertising.’  
 
 
NP 
 
 
‘I have seen the other farmers who have grown it.  It 
gives higher yields with lower water consumption.’   
 
‘Some, one or two in the village, have bought it and 
tried it.’   
 
‘There was still a concern that the soil might get eroded 
if we grew Bt cotton.  But a trend was created.’ 
‘I insisted with farmers of the village not to use Bt 
cotton.  Still they have used it.’ 
 
 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
OR   ‘I am telling farmers in meetings not to grow Bt 
varieties.’   
 
BT 
 
‘Once the government introduced Bt, we started 
growing it.’ 
 
‘Because others were getting more yields with Bt, I 
also tried it.’  
 
‘I don’t know Bt.  I just pick up whatever the dealer 
sells me.’ 
 
 
NP 
 
 
‘Everyone is cultivating Bt, so I am also cultivating 
Bt….We expected a higher yield with the Bt varieties.’ 
 
‘I want to see which variety gives me more yield.’ 
 
‘I’ll see [the variety] the majority goes for.’ 
‘Nand [Risk Coalition One NPM farmer and 
employee of the NGO, SEED] gets the [non-Bt] 
seeds for me….I use the solutions which Nand 
gives to us.’   
 
‘Because of the solutions given to us by Nand, the 
problem of pests has reduced.’   
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
 
 
OR 
 
 
 
‘I don’t grow it [Bt cotton] because I believe in 
Crops [Jangaon] and I do according to what they 
say.’   
 
‘Until now, we are following Pradnesh’s wish.  
We follow his opinion….’ 
 
‘I have met people and I have seen video clips….I 
have also witnessed the way animals died in 
Bantala.’ 
SP  ‘many people are growing it [cotton].’ 
NP  ‘now, since we lost our pension, we can’t even get 
a proper meal’ 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
re
e 
(A
t R
isk
) 
OR 
 
‘i]f someone obliges, I would get some rice on 
their ration card’ 
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Appendix 7.4 
Discourse Analysis: Legitimation through Moral Evaluation 
(BT = Bantala; NP = Nandanapuram; OR = Orgampalle) 
  
Bt Farmers Non-Bt Farmers 
 
BT 
 
‘On TV, the news and the whole world are mainly 
concentrating on money.’   
 
 ‘Since the government supplies it [a ration card], we 
have to take it.  Without a ration card, too, we can 
survive.’ 
 
 
NP 
 
 
‘I have entered agriculture, but not because of profit.  
It’s only more and more investment, more and more 
indebtedness’  
 
t]here have been a lot of government policies so we are 
getting benefit.’   
 
‘[a] lot of them [farmers] can’t bear the losses so…they 
have to sell the land in order to clear their debts’ 
‘In my grandfather’s time, we used to have roti and 
ragi….Now people have changed to commercial crops.’   
 
‘[m]ost of the money we are earning is going to the 
hospitals because we are getting diseases we have never 
heard of before’ 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
 
OR 
 ‘We have to look for long-term benefits.’ 
 
‘Recognising the disease [in the plant] is an art and 
giving the correct solution is a different art.’ 
 
BT 
 
‘we used to strive hard.  Now we are living happily’ 
 
‘We used to grow jowar, wheat, things like that.  Now 
we mainly grow paddy and Bt cotton.’ 
 
‘Earlier, there were no bt [bitumen] roads, only concrete.  
And the school building…gram panchayat [office] and 
water plant we initiated.’ 
 
 
NP 
 
 
‘The soil fertility will be lost so future generations will 
have nothing to eat.’ 
 
‘By the time I finish it [house construction], I will be 
four or five lakhs in debt.  That will be for my life.’   
 
‘I am the leader of a woman’s society [self help group]’ 
‘earlier we used to go for daily wage labour and live in 
huts.’ 
 
‘[b]efore cotton, I used to grow green gram, maize, 
turmeric, red gram and ground nut’ 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
 
 
OR 
 
 
‘What is the point of having higher returns when it 
doesn’t help health?’ 
 
‘If I chose Bt seeds, I would have to use chemicals in 
crop production.  It’s very expensive.’   
 
‘We don’t want to increase the [labour] rates.  It’s a 
mutual understanding.’ 
BT  ‘Now we eat three times a day.’ 
NP  ‘Now there is heavy rainfall so we have regular work.’ 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
re
e 
(A
t R
isk
) 
OR  ‘Maybe tomorrow I will have to start begging for food.’ 
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Appendix 7.5 
Discourse Analysis: Legitimation through Rationalisation 
(BT = Bantala; NP = Nandanapuram; OR = Orgampalle) 
  Bt Farmers Non-Bt Farmers 
 
BT 
 
‘There has been a twenty-five per cent increase in income 
with Bt cotton….I don’t know specifically [if Bt cotton 
damages the soils].  It is something I feel.’ 
 
‘[t]he non-Bt fellow will say Bt is harmful.  We listen and 
that’s it.  We don’t know if it’s really harmful or not’ 
 
‘Everybody grows cotton.  But tomorrow what will 
happen?’    
 
 
NP 
 
 
‘I made Rs 35,000 profit last year.’ 
 
‘I tried crop rotation in one part of my land but I couldn’t 
try it elsewhere because there is no water.’ 
 
‘If everyone is growing Bt cotton and making money, then 
I must also do it to live.  I’m just following the blind.’ 
‘The height of the crop has been decreasing…[and] the 
quality of the soil is deteriorating day by day.’ 
 
‘sucking pests have doubled’ 
 
‘They [farmers] have seen animals dying….But still 
the farmer has no alternative.’ 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
OR  ‘They [farmers] are being cheated by the seed 
companies.’ 
‘Chemicals have poisoned the seed.’ 
‘Non-Bt cotton has a constant yield.’ 
 
BT 
 
‘There are a lot of monkeys, so there is no safety in 
growing vegetable items.’   
 
‘People told me that it [Bt cotton] damages the 
environment, but I don’t know if that’s true or not.’ 
 
‘[w]e are getting more yield, so we are getting more 
money…we get more, but our expenses are more’ 
 
 
NP 
 
 
‘Because this cotton is rain-fed, I grow cotton.’   
 
‘When it’s luck, I get profit.  When it’s unfortunate, I 
don’t get anything.  It’s only luck.’   
 
‘The Bt crop yields have declined but my expenditure 
keeps increasing because of pesticide use.’   
‘Soil fertility is declining because of consecutive 
cultivation of cotton.  That’s why I’m doing crop 
rotation with maize and groundnut.’ 
 
‘Compared to non-Bt, Bt produces less.’   
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
 
 
OR 
 
 
‘I believe it [Bt cotton] affects the land, so I don’t grow 
it.’   
 
‘It [Bt cotton] might increase returns but damage 
health.’ 
 
‘Farmers commit suicide because they are paying for 
chemicals.’ 
BT  ‘If I can work, I can live.  Otherwise, it is difficult.’ 
 
NP  ‘A few are getting higher returns, while others are 
making losses.’  R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
re
e 
OR  ‘I would look to people who can give me food, nothing 
else.’ 
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Appendix 7.6 
Legitimation through Mythopoesis  
 
 (BT = Bantala; NP = Nandanapuram; OR = Orgampalle) 
  Bt Farmers Non-Bt Farmers 
 
BT 
 
‘All this [Gram Sabha meetings] comes under politics, 
so since I’m a farmer, I have to go for my work.’ 
 
‘if I cast my vote, I may get benefit.’ 
 
‘[e]verybody who has the right will cast their vote’ 
 
 
NP 
 
 
‘They bribe me for my vote. ‘ 
 
‘we are under a compulsion to vote….Otherwise, we 
wouldn’t.’ 
 
‘King’s rule is preferable [to democracy] because the 
electoral system is too corrupt.’ 
‘If the farmers are protesting in huge numbers, that is 
one kind of force.  But the government uses force by 
lathi charge…to undermine or repress the movement.’ 
 
‘India is trapped... It is unable to say to America that 
our farmers don’t want Bt cotton.’   
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
O
n
e 
(L
ea
st
 
V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) OR  ‘I campaign vigorously against Bt bringal.  I have even 
argued with Jairam Ramesh.’ 
 
‘The students are staging protests [for Telangana], they 
are being jailed….There’s no need for all this conflict.  
We have the right to vote every five years, so let’s 
make use of that.’   
 
BT 
 
 ‘I’ll participate in every activity as I’m an elder in the 
village.’   
 
‘Since we are living in a democratic country, this has 
given us the right to…fight for our rights.’  
 
 
NP 
 
 
‘I don’t attend panchayat meetings.  I go to the 
meetings held for women [self-help group meetings]’  
 
‘farmers went on a…huge protest [after the failure of 
Bt cotton seeds]....The police officer…said he would 
do justice [to the farmers] but he took a bribe.’   
 
 
 ‘If I keep attending these [Gram Sabha] meetings, I’ll 
not have much time to tend to my fields.’   
 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Tw
o
 
(V
u
ln
er
a
bl
e) 
 
 
OR 
 
 
‘[t]his [attendance at the Gram Sabha] is not my 
level….Women like me never attend such meetings.’ 
 
‘There are thousands of farmers fighting on the streets 
against Bt.  Why does the government not listen to 
them?’ 
 
‘[e]veryone votes, so I also vote.’ 
BT  ‘I don’t have time [to attend meetings]’ 
NP  
 
‘Every party bribes, usually with alcohol.  I don’t 
drink, so they give me money.’ 
R
isk
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Th
re
e 
 
OR  ‘we get benefits like ration cards, and pensions have 
come of late’ 
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Appendix 8.1 
 
Interview Schedule with Cited Participants: 
Macro Level 
 
Interview 
Number 
Institution Date of 
Interview 
1 
 
Deccan Development 
Society (DDS) 
 
 
18/08/2010 
 
2 
 
Crops Jangaon 
 
 
30/08/2010 
3 
 
Communist Party 
(Marxist) 
 
 
16/11/2010 
4 
 
Monsanto 
(Hyderabad)* 
 
 
15/12/2010 
5 
 
Congress Party  
 
 
18/01/2011 
6 
 
Centre for Sustainable 
Agriculture (CSA) 
 
 
10/02/2011 
7 
 
ANGRAU 
Agricultural 
University 
 
 
17/02/2011 
8 
 
Monsanto x 3 
participants 
(Bangalore: involving 
teleconference with 
two Mumbai 
employees) 
 
 
25/02/2011 
 
 
* This Monsanto employee was based in Monsanto’s Mumbai office, but was interviewed in Hyderabad. 
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Appendix 8.2 
Legitimation through Authorisation and Core-Periphery Positioning 
 Actor Use of ‘I’ 
position and 
possessive 
pronoun 
Use of ‘you’ position 
and possessive 
pronoun 
Use of ‘we’ 
position and 
possessive 
pronoun 
Use of ‘they’ 
position as 
delegitimation of 
alternative 
ideological 
positions 
Congress 
Party 
(core) 
 
‘[m]y vision is to 
have the farmer net 
realizing from 
agriculture.’ 
 
‘Suppose you want to 
scale up the protein levels 
[in food], maybe you can 
use intervention.’ 
Government: 
‘[w]e have to make 
farming profitable’  
‘It’s not as damaging as 
they [NGOs] advocate, 
and it helps the farmer 
to cut costs.’ 
ANGRAU 
and RCGM 
Regulator 
(inner 
periphery) 
 
‘[i]f I say certain 
facts, I’m 
considered as 
belonging to a 
group either 
opposing or 
promoting it [Bt 
cotton].’ 
‘[w]hen you are taking a 
driving test, you don’t ask 
everyone to watch.’ 
Regulators: 
‘[w]e can’t control 
pests and save the 
environment 
simultaneously’ 
‘It was too difficult to 
find an unbiased NGO’ 
(to sit on the Review 
Committee of Genetic 
Modification). 
Bt
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
Monsanto 
(periphery) 
 
 ‘I spend almost a 
week every month 
in farmers’ fields.’ 
‘as you can probably tell I 
have varied experience on 
safety being a 
toxicologist’ 
Monsanto 
‘we get lots of 
invitations to talk to 
scientists, as well as 
farmers, on our 
technology.’ 
‘Generally those people 
[NGOs] don’t do 
dialogue.  They have 
their own agenda.’   
 
Communist 
Party – 
Marxist 
(CPM) 
(core) 
 
 
 
‘I belong to a rich 
peasant family’ 
‘You can use a knife to 
cut a bringal and you can 
use the knife, that same 
knife, to cut a throat.’   
CPM 
‘We want 
technology, but 
technology in the 
interests of people 
and the environment.’ 
   
‘… they [the 
government] are 
making this technology 
an instrument of profit-
making for MNCs.’  
 
‘Sometimes we may not 
agree with them 
[NGOs], especially the 
extreme environmental 
positions.’   
N
o
n
-
Bt
 
C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
NGOs 
(periphery) 
 
 
 
‘I felt if I worked 
for farmers that 
would be best.’ 
(CJ) 
‘… if you are faced with a 
problem, no-one is 
responsible?  What is 
this?’ (CSA) 
 
‘you submit data which 
says that since animals are 
not dying in America, 
they will not die in India’ 
 
‘if you are giving ninety 
per cent of your research 
funds only for genetic 
engineering, that’s what 
people will do.’ (CSA) 
CSA 
‘We found there were 
trials happening with 
Bt cotton in 1998.  
No information, no 
regulation.’ (CSA) 
 
CJ 
‘We organise NPM 
programs in the 
villages.’ (CJ) 
‘Government here is 
not very open.  What 
they are doing is 
deciding somewhere in 
closed meetings.’ 
(DDS) 
 
‘They [Monsanto] said 
animals will not die.’ 
(CSA) 
 
‘the GEAC allowed 
them to do the field 
trials whereas the local 
monitoring system was 
not established.’ (CSA)  
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Appendix 8.3 
 
Legitimation through Moral Evaluation and Core-Periphery Positioning 
 
 
Legitimation through 
Moral Evaluation: 
Framing of Values 
Diagnostic 
(Counter-framing as 
Delegitimation through 
problem identification) 
Prognostic 
(Counter-framing as solutions 
through alternative 
interpretations of values) 
 
 CPM 
(periphery) 
NGOs 
(periphery) 
CPM 
(periphery) 
NGOs 
(periphery) 
Congress  
(core) 
‘farmers cannot be neglected.  
They have to be supported’ 
 
 ‘farmers are to be given the best 
possible price for their produce.’ 
 
‘we should…help tenant farmers 
to avail of loans from the bank.’   
 
Earlier, when the population of 
this country was thirty crores, 
we used to import wheat from 
America. 
‘[i]t [technology] 
should not 
subjugate or it 
should not make 
us dependant on 
outside forces. It 
should not be left 
to the kindness 
of those forces.’   
 
 
if indebtedness is 
the problem, credit 
cannot be the 
solution.’  (CSA)  
 
‘if the trend of 
cotton…continues 
like this,…India 
will go around the 
world with a bowl 
begging for food.’ 
(DDS) 
 
 
 ‘[i]f a certain 
technology is only 
useful to a certain 
community or to a 
certain section of 
the people, then we 
should make it 
equitable or we 
should abandon it’ 
‘… they [farmers] 
should stop using 
fertilisers and 
pesticides.’ (CJ) 
 
‘Why should we 
not give equal 
importance to the 
[cultivation of] 
food grains?’ 
(DDS) 
 
 
ANGRAU 
(inner 
periphery) 
‘information should be put 
before the farmer and he should 
decide.’   
 
 ‘[f]armers should be able to 
produce their own seed and be 
self-sufficient in inputs.’ 
‘[i]f the tests are 
unable to explain 
the disease 
[which caused 
the animal 
deaths], then it 
should be an 
emergency.’ 
(CSA) 
 
 
‘It was never tested 
for human safety.  
What is this?’ 
(CSA) 
 
‘in 2006, again we 
accidentally 
stepped into a Bt 
field trial.’ (CSA)  
‘science and 
technology should 
be used for the 
good of the 
community and 
humanity and the 
environment’  
 
 
‘… the chairman of 
the expert 
committee was a 
crop developer 
himself. … We 
said you are 
beneficiaries of the 
process so you 
cannot test it.’ 
(CSA) 
 
Monsanto 
(periphery) 
‘the farmer is the one who bears 
all the risk…so he must receive 
the maximum benefit.’   
 
‘it cannot be more lies that 
people would link Bt cotton and 
farmer suicides.’ 
 
‘why should the Indian farmer 
pay a tenth of the costs of the 
rest?’   
 
 ‘[i]f you look at 2002, India was 
a net importer of cotton.  Now 
we are an exporter.’ 
‘our government 
is forcing these 
[Indian research] 
institutes to have 
tie-ups with 
multinational 
companies.  Why 
should it?’ 
‘Why do you need 
it [the technology] 
first? Second, 
whether it suits 
clear situations.  
And then inform 
people properly. … 
Apart from all 
these things, it 
should be safe.’ 
(CSA).   
‘[w]e can have tie-
ups with Chinese 
agricultural 
research institutes.  
Why is it a US 
initiative only?’  
 
‘[i]f they [farmers] 
grouped together, 
their choices would 
be freer.  They 
could grow non-Bt 
if they wanted to.’ 
(CJ). 
 
We should have 
price regulation, 
we should have a 
compensation 
mechanism, we 
should also have an 
increased fine. 
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Legitimation through Rationalisation and Core-Periphery Positioning 
 Legitimation through 
Rationalisation: 
Framing of 
Development 
Diagnostic 
(Counter-framing as Delegitimation 
of Bt Coalition) 
Prognostic 
(Counter-framing as 
rationalisation of alternative 
world view) 
Non-Bt / 
Bt 
Coalition 
 CPM 
(periphery) 
NGOs 
(periphery) 
CPM 
(periphery) 
NGOs 
(periphery) 
Congress 
(core) 
 
‘farming … has to be a 
profitable enterprise, like 
any other business.’ 
 
‘science and technology 
should and will help society 
and farmers’  
 
‘I don’t have any limitations 
[with regard to Bt 
technology] but if it is a 
food crop generally people 
may have a lot of 
apprehensions.  We have to 
sort those out.’ 
‘It is not the fault of 
the technology; it’s 
the fault of the whole 
system’  
 
‘all the knowledge 
gained by the farmers 
is equally important 
as science and 
technology’  
 
‘It made the farmers 
dependent on credit 
institutions in a big 
way.’ 
 
 
‘If Bt cotton can solve 
all the problems, why 
do cotton farmers in the 
US need so many 
subsidies?’ (CSA) 
 
‘if indebtedness is the 
problem, credit cannot 
be the solution.’ (CSA) 
 
‘[w]hen there are 2 lakh 
farmer suicides in this 
country, no-one takes 
responsibility, no-one 
feels responsible.’ 
(CSA) 
‘you realise the 
problem that 
may come in 
twenty years and 
take remedial 
action in the 
present.  This is 
one type of 
visionary 
development.’ 
 
 
‘We are giving 
them [farmers] 
an alternative 
with NPM.’  
(DDS) 
 
‘Our objective is 
to create 
awareness in the 
villages.’  (DDS) 
 
 
ANGRAU 
(inner 
periphery) 
‘I support Bt transgenic 
technology as it has reduced 
the need for pesticides’  
 
‘things are logical which are 
scientifically decided.’ 
 
‘[s]o far, it [Bt technology] 
is not killing us.  Tomorrow 
if it kills us, let us find out.’   
 
 ‘[w]ithout testing, 
without trials, they 
are approving.’ 
 
 
‘gene transfer is 
imprecise’ (CSA) 
 
‘there is no testing for 
other changes 
happening in the plant.’ 
(CSA)   
 
‘[e]verybody is saying 
there are types of 
cancer because of the 
toxins and pesticides’ 
(DDS) 
 
 ‘You have to 
research seed 
suitable for 
different soils 
and 
environmental 
conditions.’ 
 ‘None of the 
tests 
conclusively say 
it is safe for 
animals.’  (CSA) 
Monsanto 
(periphery) 
 
‘[e]very farmer benefits’  
 
‘[g]enes to a scientist are 
just DNA.’   
 
‘this money made by the 
farmers [through Bt cotton 
cultivation] has been used 
for various purposes.’ 
 
‘People have realised that 
public education is going to 
be important.’   
 
‘there was not as 
much yield as they 
were claiming.’ 
(CSA) 
‘yield increase is not 
because of Bt cotton.  It 
is because of increased 
irrigation facilities 
[and]…hybrids.’ (CSA) 
 
  
‘if you have 
agreements with 
other research 
institutes…they 
are not going to 
demand royalties 
or proprietary 
rights.’ 
 
 
‘We established 
a cotton 
processing unit 
where cotton can 
be spun in the 
village itself.’ 
(CSA) 
 
‘Instead of so 
many big 
companies, we’ll 
have villages.’ 
(CSA) 
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Legitimation through Mythopoesis and Core-Periphery Positioning 
 
 Diagnostic 
Framing 
Prognostic 
Framing 
Framing of 
NGOs  
Framing of 
Democratic 
Legitimacy 
 
Congress 
Party 
 
‘we have to respect 
society, we have to 
respect civic 
responsibilities, we 
have to be more 
rule-abiding.’ 
‘People complain 
we have excess 
democracy.’   
It’s [Bt cotton] 
not as damaging 
as they [NGOs] 
advocate … we 
have to have 
some sort of 
compromise.’   
Strong state; 
Law and order; 
Profitable 
agriculture 
C
o
re
 
 
Communist 
Party – 
Marxist 
(CPM)  
 
‘because there are 
inequalities in 
society, these are 
being imposed on 
democracy’  
‘If you want real 
democracy, you 
have to eliminate 
inequity or at least 
control inequities 
through the 
democratic process. 
‘NGOs raise 
crucial 
questions. They 
raise public 
awareness, they 
bring important 
questions to the 
notice of the 
public.’   
Equity; 
Participation 
In
n
er
 
Pe
ri
ph
er
y 
 
ANGRAU 
 
‘Where 
confidentiality is 
required, we 
cannot be 
democratic.’ 
 
 
‘We are policy-
makers.  We 
decide.  Farmers 
need us to decide.’   
 
‘Regulation is the 
most democratic 
way.’ 
‘[t]here was a 
hue and cry that 
companies were 
using data from 
their own labs.  
Although these 
labs are 
authorised by 
the government, 
the government 
has asked for 
independent 
tests to satisfy 
NGOs.’ 
Trust in 
expertise of 
decision-
makers; 
 
 
Monsanto 
 
‘the price [of Bt 
seeds] was reduced 
which we believe 
was a very 
arbitrary decision 
by some of the 
stakeholders, very 
political.’ 
‘Government can 
always, through 
policies, help the 
development of 
new technologies.’ 
‘Generally those 
people [NGOs] 
don’t do 
dialogue.  They 
have their own 
agenda.’ 
Incentivisation 
of private 
investment in 
research; 
Removal of 
intervention in 
pricing 
decisions 
Pe
ri
ph
er
y 
 
NGOs 
 
‘If I have a 
problem with your 
product, you 
should be 
responsible.  … 
There should be a 
transparent process 
of decision-
making.’ (CSA) 
 ‘There cannot be a 
uniform policy at 
the national level.  
It should be 
localised.  Every 
state would be in a 
position to decide.’ 
(CSA) 
‘[w]e are 
definitely 
showing them 
[the 
government].  
They are not 
responding, but 
they are 
conscious of it’ 
(DDS) 
Transparency; 
Responsibility; 
Participation; 
Concern for 
the future. 
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Categories of 
Legitimation/ 
Positioning of 
Actors 
Authorisation Moral 
Evaluation 
Rationalisation 
 
Mythopoesis Basis of state 
legitimacy 
Congress 
Party 
 
‘We have to 
make farming 
profitable.’ 
‘Farmers cannot 
be neglected.  
They have to be 
supported.’ 
‘Farming has to 
be a profitable 
enterprise like 
any other 
business.’ 
‘We have to be more 
rule-abiding.’ 
Profitable 
agriculture. 
Self-sufficiency 
in food. 
Law and order. 
 
C
o
re
 
Communist 
Party 
(Marxist) 
‘We want 
technology, 
but technology 
in the interests 
of people and 
the 
environment.’ 
‘science and 
technology 
should be used 
for the good of 
humanity and the 
environment.’ 
‘All the 
knowledge 
gained by the 
farmers is 
equally as 
important as 
science and 
technology.’ 
‘If you want real 
democracy, you have 
to…control 
inequities through 
the democratic 
process.’ 
Equity. 
Participation. 
Self-sufficiency 
as sovereignty. 
Safety. 
Testing. 
 
In
n
er
 
Pe
ri
ph
er
y 
ANGRAU ‘When you are 
taking a 
driving test, 
you don’t ask 
everyone to 
watch.’ 
‘Farmers should 
be able to 
produce their 
own seed and be 
self-sufficient in 
inputs.’ 
‘So far it [Bt 
cotton] is not 
killing us.  
Tomorrow if it 
kills us, let us 
find out.’ 
‘Where 
confidentiality is 
required, we cannot 
be democratic.’ 
 
‘We are policy 
makers. We decide.’   
Trust in experts. 
Choice. 
Regulation. 
Information. 
Farmer as self- 
sufficient. 
Testing. 
Monsanto 
 
 
‘I feel really 
proud that we 
played a small 
role in 
improving the 
lives of 
farmers.’ 
‘Why should the 
Indian farmer 
pay a tenth of the 
costs of the rest?’ 
 
‘Genes to a 
scientist are just 
DNA.’ 
 
‘People have 
realized that 
public 
education is 
going to be 
important.’ 
‘As a company, we 
are willing to answer 
questions 
scientifically.’ 
 
‘Government can 
always, through 
policies, help the 
development of new 
technologies.’ 
Scientific 
education. 
Self-sufficiency 
through global 
trade. 
Limited state 
intervention in 
pricing. 
Incentivisation 
of private 
investment in 
research.  
Pe
ri
ph
er
y 
 
 
NGOs ‘We found 
there were 
trials 
happening 
with Bt cotton 
in 1998.  No 
information, 
no regulation.’ 
(CSA) 
 
 
‘We are not 
against 
technology.  Why 
do you need it 
first? Second, 
whether it suits 
clear situations.  
And then inform 
people 
properly.…Apart 
from all these 
things, it should 
be safe.’ (CSA) 
‘If Bt cotton can 
solve all the 
problems, why 
do cotton 
farmers in the 
US need so 
many 
subsidies?’ 
(CSA) 
 
‘We are giving 
them an 
alternative with 
NPM.’  (DDS) 
 
‘There should be a 
transparent process 
of decision-making.’  
(CSA) 
 
‘I should have the 
right to say no.’ 
(CSA)  
 
‘We are definitely 
showing them [the 
government].  They 
are not responding, 
but they are 
conscious of it.’ 
(DDS)  
Self sufficiency 
as sovereignty. 
Transparent 
decision-making. 
Responsibility. 
Safety. 
Testing. 
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